# Benchmark Analytics > Independent economic, financial services and regulatory analysis for government relations, corporate affairs and policy, plus Political Data Alerts. Public Ghost content for AI and LLM tooling. This file includes a bounded export of public pages first, then recent public posts. Append `.md` to any post or page URL to get the content in Markdown (for example, `/example-post.md`). ## Pages ### About Benchmark Analytics URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/about/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T05:03:12.000Z Benchmark Analytics is an Australian economic, financial services and regulatory consultancy preparing high-quality analysis, reports and submissions for organisations engaged in public policy, regulation and economic reform. The service focuses on clear reasoning, strong evidence, and concise expression — delivering material that can withstand scrutiny from government, regulators, and industry experts. The Principal, Nick Hossack, is a former Director of Policy at the Australian Bankers' Association and an adviser to Prime Minister John Howard. He has drafted analysis for major national debates across financial regulation, competition, consumer policy, and economic governance. Nick is also a contributor to the Australian Financial Review and The Spectator Australia. --- ## When to use Benchmark Analytics Clients engage Benchmark Analytics when they need: - a submission or report capable of influencing a regulatory process or government review; - analysis that meets Treasury, Finance, or Productivity Commission expectations for evidence and logic; - clear, defensible arguments to support a specific policy outcome or reform proposal; - a credible, well-researched idea that advances thought leadership; - a bespoke, branded publication produced for an organisation to explain industry trends, policy issues or business performance; - policy-grade analysis without the overheads and delegation layers typical of large consulting firms; - the capability of an economist–policy adviser without the cost of hiring one full-time. This work is suitable for companies, industry associations, not-for-profits, public bodies, and financial institutions. --- ## Political Data Alerts Alongside its consulting work, Benchmark Analytics provides **Political Data Alerts**, a professional intelligence and communications content service for people who need rapid, rigorous analysis of important political, economic and financial data. Paid subscribers receive original analysis, evidence, charts, key messages and communications-ready content that can be adapted for briefings, reports, submissions, stakeholder communications and social media. **Annual subscribers can also nominate up to two Priority Indicators** that matter to them or their organisation. Benchmark Analytics monitors those indicators as the underlying official data is updated and incorporates relevant findings into Political Data Alerts coverage. **You help determine what Benchmark Analytics watches. Benchmark Analytics determines what the evidence says.** --- ## Branding and Presentation Reports can either incorporate a client's own branding and design system or be produced using the Benchmark Analytics style. Formatting and presentation are handled professionally to ensure the document is publication-ready. --- ## Quality Assurance Benchmark Analytics stands behind the quality of its consulting work. If a report does not meet the standard required under the agreed brief, the client is not required to pay. In that event, all intellectual property remains with Benchmark Analytics. Ownership transfers only upon payment. This gives clients confidence that commissioned work will be suitable for its agreed purpose, whether external publication, regulatory submission, policy advocacy or board-level consideration. --- ## Artificial Intelligence (AI) AI tools may be used to assist with research organisation, drafting and editing. They are not treated as authoritative sources. Factual claims, calculations and source material are checked against primary or otherwise reliable sources before publication. --- ## Request a Quote You can request a quote by email Benchmark Analytics at: **nick@benchmarkanalytics.com.au**. In your email, please state the following: 1. Topic or title of the report; 2. Purpose of the report; 3. Key reading audience; 4. Expected length (number of pages and/or number of words); 5. Dates for delivery of first and final drafts of the report; and 6. Any other needs or expectations. We will get back to you within 24 hours. ### AFR articles URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/afr-and-the-australian-articles/ Last updated: 2025-07-08T23:44:09.000Z --- ## **The teals are strangely silent on Albanese's flights** Article | The Australian Financial Review 30 October 2024 | Nick Hossack [Link to article](https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/the-teals-are-strangely-silent-on-albanese-s-flights-20241028-p5klrn?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) --- ## **Greens bank bashing is juvenile** Article | The Australian Financial Review 15 August 2023 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/145054f1-70d6-4e06-9a40-144d6bf76e37_584x842-jpeg.jpg) --- ## **Attacks on PwC ideological and overblown** Article | The Australian Financial Review 28 June 2023 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/855977f1-350f-4d96-907b-a85b2ee4a30b_865x564-jpeg.jpg) --- ## **Super for housing** Article | The Australian Financial Review 27 February 2023 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/80d6840e-12f7-48b4-b89a-0d9de28b0bbc_586x843-jpeg.jpg) --- ## **Government would create business lobby groups** Article | The Australian Financial Review 9 September 2022 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/f14dd80b-a9a5-4075-ac46-9db00d03c773_1310x761-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Finance & fossil fuel politics should not mix** Article | The Australian Financial Review 25 July 2022 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/5cf3ac26-c2ce-46b1-b6ab-9c7bda37e522_841x488-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Three reasons to vote against teals** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 6 May 2022 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/5dd35f73-b038-49ea-a53b-a79c4d365754_556x766-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Labor's choice to reform public sector** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 11 February 2022 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/bc4903f6-4aba-4f91-9412-a501123b74d0_1319x759-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **China and emissions** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 22 April 2021 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/b0d04fc7-fa0e-4211-bc67-370831a66833_1600x1200-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Big Tech and virtue signalling** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 7 April 2021 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/8631385f-741a-4c52-a9ea-0926be8c875e_610x851-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Ban alcohol at Parliament House** Opinion Article | The Australian 30 March 2021 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ea38c87d-5cf6-43eb-94b7-9ffd8e9c3e44_589x834-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Merit follows Murray out the door** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 26 August 2020 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/d7a2f692-50af-4959-a182-43e3e854f2f8_1127x1600.png) ## --- ## **Ending lockdowns** TV interview | ausbiz with David Kosh 27 April 2020 | Nick Hossack & Chris Joye ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/63958cbf-157b-486e-9f85-b2d7418445f5_1237x644-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Restrictions must end** Open Letter | Joint signatory to end lockdowns 23 April 2020 | Nick Hossack and others ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/c0cc9b34-9e96-40b5-a91c-633db49d63fd_1357x886-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **World Health Organisation set itself up** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 16 April 2020 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/f5ac4312-9e61-4a73-bb0d-339f16897434_1149x800.png) ## --- ## **Reducing cabinet secrecy** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 7 January 2020 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/38179235-5c12-4327-a94c-02e174d767f9_1236x668.png) ## --- ## **Politicians should blame themselves** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 4 October 2019 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/8f8a2b69-ff64-4ab7-8f48-ca7ab370ec10_1248x703.png) ## --- ## **Westpac and wagyu beef test** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 14 August 2019 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/75ff757b-0858-4a3e-92a4-08c1bdb7e011_1200x1600-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **APRA needs to maintain confidentiality** Radio interview | ABC Radio National Breakfast show 19 July 2019 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/bc4d768b-11e5-42d3-8365-989cdb61db10_1182x870-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **APRA must remain opaque** Opinion Article | Australian Financial Review 17 July 2019 | Nick Hossack ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/bf8f7427-4ff4-4260-a3fd-4725d86af075_1600x1200-jpeg.jpg) ## --- ## **Toothless regulators** ### **Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review** **4 February 2019 | Nick Hossack** \[need image - original was a pdf and did not render\] --- ## **Responsible lending laws** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 20 September 2018 | Nick Hossack \[need image - original was a pdf and did not render\] --- ## **High cost of bank politics** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 4 July 2018 | Nick Hossack \[need image - original was a pdf and did not render\] --- ## **Help for adult survivors of child trauma will bring big savings** Opinion Article | The Sydney Morning Herald 4 February 2015 | Nick Hossack and Cathy Kezelman \[need image - original was a pdf and did not render\] --- ## **ACCC will find court a tougher place to test its petrol claims** Opinion Article | The Australian Financial Review 22 August 2014 | Nick Hossack and Alistair Davey \[need image - original was a pdf and did not render\] ## --- ## **Small business hit by too big to fail banks** TV Interview | ABC 7:30 Report with Leigh Sales 14 July 2014 | Nick Hossack ## --- ## **Time to tackle banks on too big to fail** Opinion Article | The Australian 8 January 2014 | Nick Hossack and Alistair Davey ### Spectator Articles URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/spectator-articles/ Last updated: 2025-07-08T23:46:41.000Z ## The Spectator Australia Contributions to the Flat White section ### What the K’gari dingoes need Nick Hossack | Spectator | 26 June 2025 I’m a bit jaded because a ranger on Fraser Island (renamed K’gari by the Qld Labor government in 2023) has fined me $483 because a local island dingo clawed the lock off my portable fridge and made off with four frozen steaks. [Click here to read.](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/06/what-the-kgari-dingos-need/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) --- ### What did the election result say about Australia? Nick Hossack | Spectator | 7 May 2025 There was one small incident during the Voice Referendum that I never understood, and it has stayed with me. Standing in the cardboard partition to cast my vote, I inadvertently saw the choices of the women on either side of me. [Click here to read](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/05/what-did-the-election-result-say-about-australia/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au). --- ### Be suspicious when you hear the words 'no evidence' Nick Hossack | Spectator | 26 march 2025 In every organisation there is usually an Achilles' Heel, some fact which if widely known or understood, can cause damage...[Click here to read](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/03/be-suspicious-when-you-hear-the-words-no-evidence/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au). --- ### I recommend not walking the Camino de Santiago Nick Hossack | Spectator | 22 March 2025 A lefty fri*end who just loves political arguments, currently living in Buenos Aires, made a rare conces*sion. He’s usually so…[Click here to read.](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/03/i-recommend-not-walking-the-camino-de-santiago/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) --- ## [Is the US steel tariff ‘entirely’ unjustified?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/03/is-the-us-steel-tariff-entirely-unjustified/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 14 March 2025 10:23 am Prime Minister Anthony Albanese characterised the US steel tariff to be imposed on Australia as ‘entirely unjustified’. That might be… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/67bf97d1-7386-4d7b-a343-4ffb8ae82ef3_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Dutton and Abbott have got Ukraine wrong, not Trump](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/02/dutton-and-abbott-have-got-ukraine-wrong-not-trump/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 21 February 2025 3:00 am Peter Dutton has said that Trump is wrong on Ukraine, while Tony Abbott has claimed that the US President is… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/1d06d4fc-7fd2-413f-9d8e-ed93c861e682_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Dutton should sound out Miranda Devine to be Washington Ambassador](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/02/dutton-should-sound-out-miranda-devine-to-be-washington-ambassador/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 11 February 2025 10:37 pm The news that Australia does not get an exemption from Trump’s steel and aluminium tariffs is a failure of the… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/67349e84-366c-4cf2-b235-a7b6fe7e14c6_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Support for Trump’s Gaza plan will soon emerge](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/02/support-for-trumps-gaza-plan-will-soon-emerge/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 10 February 2025 11:57 am Donald Trump’s proposal to own and rebuild Gaza has been criticised by every expert and the Arab nations in the… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/02fa6a57-7595-451a-aa6b-f2db4d3f3957_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Muddying the waters on interest rates](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/01/muddying-the-waters-on-interest-rates/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 30 January 2025 3:20 pm ‘Muddying the waters’ is a common strategy in politics. It entails finding a key fact or piece of information that… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/4257f182-34f1-4179-a140-0034c05d4a62_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Deep inside the Sydney protest](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/10/deep-inside-the-sydney-protest/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 9 October 2024 11:12 pm I’m not sure why I felt an obligation – perhaps because I’m now residing within easy walking distance of Hyde… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/aa60abc6-65f5-4058-a497-0c71ea4891a3_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [No stairs. Is this another example of the government trying to kill us?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/10/no-stairs/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 3 October 2024 1:29 am At a function a few weeks ago, a NSW bureaucrat told me that he had woken up early to catch… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/f3c80419-1197-42c2-a98f-746590841fd2_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Not just the RBA, Chalmers at odds with the ABS](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/08/not-just-the-rba-chalmers-at-odds-with-the-abs/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 10 August 2024 1:22 am My guess is that Treasurer Jim Chalmers is wondering if he’s kicked an own goal by pushing through structural changes… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/a14932fb-5e82-455b-af80-c63170390170_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Why was the crowd booing?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/08/why-was-the-crowd-booing/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 6 August 2024 2:53 am The Police and Citizens Youth Club in Woolloomooloo opened in 1937 and was the original club in the network of… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/08e75ad7-4bd2-408f-ac2b-c1001bc1cd28_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Would tinkering with the banking system help first home buyers?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/07/would-tinkering-with-the-banking-system-help-first-home-buyers/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 30 July 2024 1:00 am There is a simple and free way to observe a fascinating yet little-known aspect of Australia’s banking system. By browsing… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/e98743f0-03eb-4414-875d-2844674fe84a_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Results are in: don’t date Woke](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/06/results-are-in-dont-date-woke/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 14 June 2024 7:59 am It was an odd choice of venue, but I accepted it, perhaps the invitation was meant ironically, a joke, something… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/652686db-14f7-48c9-b071-c0f16de697a7_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Julian Assange: when two contradictory things are both true](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/06/julian-assange-when-two-contradictory-things-are-both-true/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 10 June 2024 2:30 am This is my contribution to Alexandra Marshall’s challenge on Julian Assange… In the last year or so I’ve had a… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/cc0d2d3f-d400-4459-9c18-465fb9cd09bd_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Are the new weight loss drugs headed for listing on the PBS?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/06/are-the-new-weight-loss-drugs-headed-for-listing-on-the-pbs/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 5 June 2024 2:45 am Ever since Covid, I’ve avoided making reference to the World Health Organisation (WHO) given how wrong it seemed to be… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/c7f0028e-2829-4e6a-9f8b-f1baa3d7fa0f_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [How long before laughter is grounds for cancellation?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/05/how-long-before-laughter-is-grounds-for-cancellation/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 24 May 2024 9:33 am Jerry Seinfeld is not just a practitioner of comedy, he’s become a philosopher of the profession and he’s arguing that… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/bcec0e55-a4cb-4a13-9ba3-d9f6333e2039_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Rigid principles can lead to manic delusion](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/05/rigid-principles-can-lead-to-manic-delusion/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 15 May 2024 3:00 am For years I’ve played this game with a good mate, that is, to see who can simplify their life the… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/bdcb4049-7a36-4c0c-9ae0-4a8b750e65f2_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Forced divestiture is better than expanding regulation](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/04/forced-divestiture-is-better-than-expanding-regulation/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 19 April 2024 1:00 am ‘Muddying the waters’ is one of the cleverer and more effective tools deployed by public relations advisers. The method involves… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/28ebba3c-4967-4be0-b9df-67f95aa5e642_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Health insurers experiment with nine-day fortnights](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/03/health-insurers-experiment-with-nine-day-fortnights/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 26 March 2024 10:21 am It is reported that health insurer BUPA is ‘trialling’ a nine-day fortnight for its staff, meaning it is looking to… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/9622f137-b765-4b1a-895d-1f9863b0adb0_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Australian banks need to be making much bigger losses on their lending](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/03/australian-banks-need-to-be-making-much-bigger-losses-on-their-lending/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 18 March 2024 2:30 am At a recent event I met and had a long chat with a retired economist who, in his professional career,… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/68f2e147-11db-4c3a-81d4-f713244905de_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [The 30th anniversary of ABS gender pay gap data](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/03/the-30th-anniversary-of-abs-gender-pay-gap-data/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 7 March 2024 1:57 am Gender pay gap activists have had an exciting few weeks, especially with the new statistics showing these gaps at the… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/21e88d7f-e9b2-41d4-a4aa-2c18f445748f_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Should ANZ be allowed to buy Suncorp Bank?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/03/should-anz-be-allowed-to-buy-suncorp-bank/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 1 March 2024 7:34 pm As I’m writing this article, I have one eye on the ANZ share price. I’ve watched it drop more than… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/469c5fec-3e1d-4b77-9018-1209f81b62f6_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Medicinal cannabis and government licensing](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/02/medicinal-cannabis-and-government-licensing/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 28 February 2024 3:00 am One of the more insidious aspects of government involvement in commercial markets is the practice of supplier licensing. As entrepreneurs… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/0941d056-bb98-496a-8909-3885450b89d7_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Take the lollies away: defund UNRWA](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/02/take-the-lollies-away-defund-unrwa/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 19 February 2024 3:00 am A few weeks back, I observed a pretty sad scene down at the local shops. A mother was holding out… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/dc5fba05-c5ee-4fb1-aef6-3ba0f85c6807_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Applying Javier Milei’s ideas to banking regulation in Australia](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/applying-javier-mileis-ideas-to-banking-regulation-in-australia/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 31 January 2024 2:30 am There is a series of sentences in Javier Milei’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, which are… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/78e893be-7ee0-4635-96e2-c6d70161b3d3_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [The café owner and the public servant](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/the-cafe-owner-and-the-public-servant/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 25 January 2024 2:00 am What I thought was going to be an irritation turned out to be a source of admiration. Even inspiration. At… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/1f6426da-f793-42e0-a0e7-9d9a24388abc_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [What happened to Labor’s two big election promises?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/what-happened-to-labors-two-big-election-promises/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 21 January 2024 2:00 am The two most notable Labor promises before the May 2022 election involved ‘getting wages moving again’ and the promise to… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/dea36582-f387-4c1a-875e-6255367cfb73_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [How to protect yourself against risk](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/how-to-protect-yourself-against-risk/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 15 January 2024 3:00 am A formative incident for me happened when I was 25 while travelling through Turkey with a backpack. The British owner… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/90e2fe29-fe5e-44c2-9c24-936378368fa3_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [A splinter in life](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/a-splinter-in-life/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 9 January 2024 4:00 am My feet had become so white and feminine that I committed myself to walk around barefoot as much as I… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/b0292833-c691-4610-af5a-e5bbbc6a1a35_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [King Charles vs Ayn Rand](https://www.spectator.com.au/2024/01/king-charles-vs-ayn-rand/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 3 January 2024 1:50 am Is it only the political movement of Climate Change in which we need to be wary of King Charles III,… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/32d321fd-d04b-414e-b082-38505f5ea552_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [A teetotal Parliament House?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/12/a-teetotal-parliament-house/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 30 December 2023 2:01 am Christmas seems a good time to bring up alcohol. Having recently moved to Manly, I am now living near the… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/7f11b09e-ce04-4515-8a2c-54de1ab89a9d_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Albanese government: highest taxing since 1959!](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/12/albanese-government-highest-taxing-since-1959/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 19 December 2023 12:15 am What I’m about to say is probably not fair, but I’ll say it anyway. When working in party politics, you… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/01e38c42-4661-4e4d-9a39-03ed02f43ed6_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Is the RBA’s 2-3 per cent inflation target still being taken seriously?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/12/is-the-rbas-2-3-per-cent-inflation-target-still-being-taken-seriously/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 12 December 2023 1:24 am Promises need timeframes, otherwise they are just empty words. If your friend tells you they are doing a diet, you… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/8eebf68d-7e06-4774-bbb3-a75bc8eb96f4_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Does the ABS partner violence survey fall short?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/11/does-the-abs-partner-violence-survey-fall-short/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 28 November 2023 4:00 am Since the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) released its publication on partner violence, the widely reported statistic is that one… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/83eaff49-2f87-4816-b4b2-59f901f63db1_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Wokeism complicates the raising of kids](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/09/wokeism-complicates-the-raising-of-kids/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 20 September 2023 4:30 am One of the dilemmas raising children in an era when Wokeism dominates every institution is whether to bluntly express your… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/a4dbc4e6-4683-499d-956a-83a738353319_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Affirmative consent: a seductive ‘maybe’ no longer means ‘yes’](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/08/affirmative-consent-a-seductive-maybe-no-longer-means-yes/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 21 August 2023 5:30 am Warren Buffett once got into trouble with a joke that touched on the matter of sexual consent. He was lucky… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/16352762-2f2e-4524-ac9b-174d09ed9360_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Sad times for the larrikin](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/08/sad-times-for-the-larrikin/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 13 August 2023 4:00 am When Bob Hawke died, I received a phone call from an old family friend who jokingly reminded me to put… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/27a39452-74a8-42c7-a6b4-83d42d37fa6d_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Private health is painfully slow](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/07/private-health-is-painfully-slow/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 30 July 2023 5:30 am It started with an odd sensation in my leg as I ate chicken and leek pie in a Sydney CBD… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/48d043f6-562e-4e1f-9338-16416045d65e_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Who will speak up for young men?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/07/who-will-speak-up-for-young-men/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 5 July 2023 5:00 am The success of girls highlights problems facing boys in schools ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/fefb1d3d-aa87-43db-b159-e48d17b2ddec_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [It’s amazing how tolerant home borrowers have become](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/06/its-amazing-how-tolerant-home-borrowers-have-become/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 14 June 2023 4:00 am It seems like the Aston by-election was not just a disaster for the Liberal Party, losing a once-safe seat from… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/523e4c64-67ec-4390-a7ef-dd65e990a6d2_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Despite criticism, RBA outperforms most central banks](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/05/despite-criticism-rba-outperforms-most-central-banks/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 22 May 2023 5:00 am A small war has broken out amongst some economics on the topic of whether Australia’s central bank has performed well… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/523e4c64-67ec-4390-a7ef-dd65e990a6d2_410x275-jpeg-1.jpg) ## [A devastating truth](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/04/a-devastating-truth/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 28 April 2023 4:30 am Every now and again you come across someone who has genuine authority, no self-interest at stake, nothing to gain, but… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/2dc381ea-f147-4982-9230-5ed51fa6cd7d_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [The gap between worlds](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/04/the-gap-between-worlds/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 21 April 2023 12:19 pm The scariest thing about some political debates in Australia is not the polarisation or nastiness that can often arise –… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/af1a4302-b1e0-419b-b748-7bfa5c7d9c62_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [You won’t hear these statistics on International Women’s Day](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/03/you-wont-hear-these-statistics-on-international-womens-day/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 18 March 2023 4:00 am International Women’s Day (IWD) came and went, with morning teas and combative speeches. We heard about unconscious bias, injustice, imposter… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/6e140571-1c5b-4c9f-a3c8-b777dc802752_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Labor uses every trick to dodge interest rate rise blame](https://www.spectator.com.au/2023/03/labor-uses-every-trick-to-dodge-interest-rate-rise-blame/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 6 March 2023 4:30 am Due in March this year is the report of the Review into the mandate and operational arrangements for the Reserve… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/34164f77-d9a8-458e-8f69-14e362d61728_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Iranian women fight, Western feminists hide](https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/09/iranian-women-fight-western-feminists-hide/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 26 September 2022 4:00 am One of the most powerful speeches I ever heard was delivered in a casual meeting of the NSW Rostrum public… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/5bc75e01-7c06-453b-9dfc-d24c585982cd_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Why are businesses arguing for higher wages?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/09/why-are-businesses-arguing-for-higher-wages/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 1 September 2022 11:43 am One of the more bizarre aspects in the lead-up to the Jobs and Skills Summit is the spectacle of business… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/72328ef0-0b14-41c1-a571-c50314227b7e_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Neutered ‘Voice’ a bureaucratic mess?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/08/neutered-voice-a-bureaucratic-mess/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 15 August 2022 8:00 am Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s proposed Voice to Parliament is something that a lot of right-wing commentators want to hate, but… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/f89ec475-6875-4c78-8803-f13472fd5f5b_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Albanese should support Scomo’s super access](https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/05/albanese-should-support-scomos-super-access/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 21 May 2022 2:10 pm Labor politicians and union representatives need a failsafe check on their emotional outbursts whenever the Liberal Party proposes changes to… ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/a4a1ec55-795b-43a2-be15-c193fd592a27_410x275-jpeg.jpg) ## [Should Morrison propose compulsory military service to win the election?](https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/04/should-morrison-propose-compulsory-military-service-to-win-the-election/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) [Nick Hossack](https://www.spectator.com.au/author/nick-hossack/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) 4 April 2022 9:00 am Long-serving Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, has identified national security as the channel in which Scott Morrison should swim to secure… ### Contact URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/contact/ Last updated: 2026-07-27T01:48:21.000Z Subscriptions & Editorial For questions about Political Alerts, other newsletters, or media/republishing inquiries: info@benchmarkanalytics.com.au Consulting Enquiries For consulting work, speaking engagements, or advisory projects: nick@benchmarkanalytics.com.au We aim to respond within one business day. ### Political Data Alerts URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/political-data-alerts/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T22:12:01.000Z *Fast, rigorous data — the moment it matters.* When government, industry, or economic statistics move, Political Data Alerts gives you the number, the context, and the comparison — before the news cycle catches up. 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Coverage focuses on the issues that matter to financial institutions, government and regulatory affairs teams, policymakers and other professionals operating in a heavily regulated industry — including prudential regulation, competition, bank profitability, lending, deposits, regional banking and access to financial services. Analysis draws extensively on official and primary sources including APRA, the Reserve Bank of Australia, ASIC, the ACCC, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and individual bank disclosures. ### What Benchmark Analytics covers - **Regulation and public policy** — prudential regulation, consumer policy, competition, government reform and regulatory developments affecting banks. - **Bank performance** — profitability, net interest margins, costs, returns, lending and deposit trends using APRA and bank financial data. - **Competition and industry structure** — differences between major banks, regional banks, customer-owned institutions and other ADIs. - **Regional banking and access** — branch networks, cash and face-to-face banking services, regional competition and policy responses to declining access. - **Politics and communications** — the evidence behind major banking debates and the implications for government, regulators, industry and public discussion. ### Banking analysis built on primary data Australian banking is unusually data-rich. APRA publishes extensive financial and prudential information on authorised deposit-taking institutions, while the RBA, ASIC, ACCC and ABS provide complementary information on lending, payments, competition, financial conditions and the wider economy. Benchmark Analytics uses these sources to test claims, compare institutions and identify developments that matter for policy and public debate. ### Australian Payments & Regulation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/payments/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T07:13:11.000Z Benchmark Analytics provides independent analysis of the politics, regulation and economics of Australian payments. Coverage focuses on the issues affecting financial institutions, payments providers, government and regulatory affairs teams, policymakers and other professionals operating in a rapidly changing and heavily regulated payments system — including cash, cards, digital payments, payment infrastructure, competition, access and regulatory reform. Analysis draws extensively on official and primary sources including the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Payments Network, the ACCC, ASIC, APRA, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and industry disclosures. ### What Benchmark Analytics covers - **Payments regulation and public policy** — regulation of payment systems, government reform, competition policy, consumer issues and regulatory developments affecting payments providers. - **Cash and access to payments** — cash usage, cash distribution, ATM and branch access, merchant acceptance and policy responses to declining cash use. - **Cards and transaction payments** — debit and credit cards, interchange, merchant service fees, surcharging and changes in consumer payment behaviour. - **Digital payments and infrastructure** — real-time payments, account-to-account payments, mobile payments, payment-system infrastructure and emerging technologies. - **Competition and industry structure** — banks, payment networks, fintechs, payment processors and the changing competitive structure of Australian payments. - **Politics and communications** — the evidence behind major payments debates and the implications for government, regulators, industry and public discussion. ### Payments analysis built on primary data Australia's payments system generates a substantial body of official and industry data. The Reserve Bank publishes detailed information on payment methods, cards, cash and payment-system costs, while the ACCC, ASIC, APRA and Australian Payments Network provide complementary information on competition, regulation, infrastructure and industry developments. Benchmark Analytics uses these sources to test claims, identify structural changes and assess the policy significance of new developments. ### Australian Superannuation & Regulation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/superannuation/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T07:37:01.000Z Benchmark Analytics provides independent analysis of the politics, regulation and economics of Australian superannuation. Coverage focuses on the issues affecting superannuation funds, financial institutions, government and regulatory affairs teams, policymakers and other professionals operating in one of Australia's largest and most heavily regulated financial sectors — including fund performance, fees, investment allocation, member outcomes, competition, prudential regulation and government policy. Analysis draws extensively on official and primary sources including APRA, ASIC, the Australian Taxation Office, Treasury, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and superannuation fund disclosures. ### What Benchmark Analytics covers - **Regulation and public policy** — prudential regulation, member outcomes, government reform, taxation policy and regulatory developments affecting superannuation. - **Fund performance and returns** — investment performance, returns over time, differences between funds and the relationship between performance, risk and asset allocation. - **Fees, costs and member outcomes** — administration and investment costs, fees, economies of scale and their implications for members. - **Industry structure and competition** — industry, retail, public-sector and corporate funds, consolidation, market concentration and differences in business models. - **Investment allocation** — Australian and international equities, fixed income, property, infrastructure, private assets and other investment exposures. - **Politics and communications** — the evidence behind major superannuation debates and the implications for government, regulators, funds, employers and members. ### Superannuation analysis built on primary data Australia's superannuation system produces an unusually rich body of regulatory and financial data. APRA publishes detailed information on fund assets, investment allocation, performance, fees, expenses and membership, while ASIC, the ATO, Treasury and individual funds provide complementary information on regulation, taxation, member outcomes and industry structure. Benchmark Analytics uses these sources to compare funds, test claims and identify developments that matter for policy and public debate. ### Australian Insurance & Regulation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/insurance/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T07:36:47.000Z Benchmark Analytics provides independent analysis of the politics, regulation and economics of Australian insurance. Coverage focuses on the issues affecting insurers, financial institutions, government and regulatory affairs teams, policymakers and other professionals operating in a heavily regulated industry — including premiums, claims, profitability, capital, competition, prudential regulation, consumer policy and government reform. Analysis draws extensively on official and primary sources including APRA, ASIC, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Treasury, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and insurer financial disclosures. ### What Benchmark Analytics covers - **Regulation and public policy** — prudential regulation, consumer protection, government reform and regulatory developments affecting insurers. - **Premiums and affordability** — movements in insurance premiums, affordability pressures and differences across products and markets. - **Claims and underwriting performance** — claims costs, loss ratios, underwriting results and the drivers of insurance profitability. - **Capital and financial performance** — insurer profitability, capital strength, investment income, expenses and returns using APRA and company data. - **Competition and industry structure** — market concentration, differences between insurers, industry consolidation and competitive conditions. - **Politics and communications** — the evidence behind major insurance debates and the implications for government, regulators, insurers, consumers and public discussion. ### Insurance analysis built on primary data Australia's insurance industry produces extensive regulatory and financial information. APRA publishes detailed data on premiums, claims, underwriting results, investment income, profitability, expenses and capital across major insurance sectors, while ASIC, the ACCC, Treasury and individual insurers provide complementary information on regulation, consumer outcomes, competition and industry developments. Benchmark Analytics uses these sources to compare performance, test claims and identify developments that matter for policy and public debate. ### Data URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/data/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T05:01:23.000Z _No content available._ ### APRA Monthly ADI Statistics URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/apra-monthly-adi-statistics/ Last updated: 2026-09-05T13:36:41.000Z _No content available._ ## Posts ### Private credit is growing rapidly. Why isn't the RBA worried about a financial crisis? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/private-credit-is-growing-rapidly-why-isnt-the-rba-worried-about-a-financial-crisis/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T20:30:18.000Z Australia's private credit market is growing quickly and attracting increasing regulatory scrutiny. Yet the Reserve Bank's latest Financial Stability Review concludes that it does **not currently pose a system-wide financial stability risk**. The reason is largely about size, leverage and where losses ultimately fall. Private credit is lending provided by investment funds and other non-bank investors rather than traditional banks or public bond markets. It can finance companies, property developments and borrowers whose funding needs do not fit conventional bank lending. The RBA estimates private credit now represents around **10% of Australia's total business debt**, but still accounts for **less than 2% of financial-system assets**. Australian private credit funds are particularly concentrated in real estate, including construction and property development. That concentration creates risk. A property downturn can produce borrower defaults, falling collateral values and redemption pressure from fund investors. But the transmission mechanism differs fundamentally from banking. Private credit funds generally use relatively little leverage. Australian banks also have limited direct exposure to them. The RBA estimates banks' broader drawn exposure to non-bank financial institutions — an upper bound for their private-credit exposure — at only **2.8% of bank assets**, with actual private-credit exposure considerably smaller. The comparable upper bound for off-balance-sheet exposures is below **2%**. If a private-credit loan performs badly, therefore, the loss is principally borne by the investors in the fund rather than highly leveraged banks funded by depositors. That is why the RBA distinguishes **investor protection from financial stability**. ASIC is considerably less relaxed about the former. Its 2026 survey covered **22 managers, 52 funds and about $76 billion of assets** and found emerging credit deterioration, tightening liquidity buffers and wide variation in concentration management. ASIC has also identified weaknesses in valuations, governance, disclosure and conflicts management. Australia's property concentration is particularly important. ASIC warns that cost overruns, project delays, weaker presales and refinancing difficulties can make valuations stale before a borrower formally defaults. Private credit therefore presents two different questions. Could investors lose substantial money? **Yes.** Could current losses cascade through Australian banks and destabilise the financial system? The RBA's present assessment is **unlikely**. But that conclusion depends on the sector remaining relatively small, lightly leveraged and weakly interconnected with banks. If any of those conditions changes, the financial-stability assessment could change with it. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| PRIVATE CREDIT How big is Australian private credit? Large enough to matter for business finance — still small relative to Australia's financial system. \~10% of total Australian**business debt** <2% of Australian**financial-system assets** WHERE IS THE RISK? Property, construction and development Australian private credit is more concentrated in real estate than many overseas markets, increasing exposure to project delays, cost overruns and refinancing pressure. Why the RBA sees limited systemic risk Bank drawn exposure Upper-bound measure ≤2.8% of assets Bank off-balance-sheet exposure Upper-bound measure <2% Fund leverage Generally low ASIC's 2026 private-credit snapshot 22 managers 52 funds $76bn assets surveyed **The distinction:**private-credit losses can be serious for investors without becoming a banking crisis. Today, the main regulatory concerns are valuation, governance, disclosure and investor protection. Sources: RBA Financial Stability Review, October 2026; ASIC private-credit surveillance, 2026\. Bank exposure percentages are upper bounds for broader non-bank financial-institution exposures; actual private-credit exposure is smaller. | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### US inflation is easing. Australia has the harder problem URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/us-inflation-is-easing-australia-has-the-harder-problem/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T00:49:26.000Z US inflation remains too high, but the underlying picture is considerably better than Australia's. The latest US Consumer Price Index rose **3.4% over the year to August**, with prices increasing 0.4% during the month. Gasoline prices rose 3.9% and accounted for more than one-third of the monthly increase. But core inflation — excluding food and energy — was only **2.4% annually**. The Federal Reserve's preferred PCE measure tells a slightly less comfortable story. Headline PCE inflation was **3.4%**, while core PCE remained at **3.0%**. In August alone, core PCE rose 0.2%. That leaves US inflation above the Fed's 2% goal, but underlying inflation has moved substantially closer to target. Australia's problem looks harder. Australian headline inflation reached **4.0% in August**, while trimmed mean inflation remained at **3.6% for a third consecutive month**. Importantly, non-tradables inflation — prices more influenced by domestic conditions — was still **4.5%**. Energy has pushed up inflation in both economies, but the Australian shock has been much larger. US gasoline prices rose 3.9% in August. Australian automotive fuel prices jumped **14.8% in one month** and were 13.5% higher over the year. Electricity prices were also up **13.2% annually**. The monetary-policy response is consequently similar but not identical. The Federal Reserve raised its target range in September to **3.75–4.00%**, while the RBA lifted Australia's cash rate to **4.60%** two weeks later. Both central banks judged inflation too high. The complication is employment. US payrolls increased by just **29,000 in September**, with unemployment at 4.2%. Australian unemployment is already **4.6%**. Both central banks therefore confront an increasingly difficult combination: inflation above target while labour markets lose momentum. But Australia's starting position is worse. US core CPI has fallen close to 2%; Australia's preferred underlying measure remains well above the RBA's 2–3% target band. The next phase of the inflation fight is therefore less about whether headline energy prices rise or fall — and more about whether those shocks spread into the broader price system. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| INFLATION US inflation versus Australia Both economies face energy inflation and softer labour markets — but Australia's underlying inflation problem is larger. UNITED STATES 3.4% Headline CPI AUSTRALIA 4.0% Headline CPI US CORE CPI 2.4% Ex food & energy AUSTRALIAN TRIMMED MEAN 3.6% Underlying inflation The energy shock US gasoline — August m/m +3.9% Australian automotive fuel — August m/m +14.8% Australian electricity — annual +13.2% Central banks are still tightening 3.75–4.00% US Fed funds target 4.60% RBA cash rate Meanwhile, labour markets are cooling US September payroll growth +29,000 US unemployment 4.2% Australian unemployment 4.6% **The key difference:**US core CPI has fallen close to the Fed's 2% objective. Australia's trimmed mean inflation remains well above the RBA's 2–3% target band. Both central banks must now manage inflation while labour markets lose momentum. Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Federal Reserve; Reserve Bank of Australia. Core CPI and trimmed mean use different methodologies and are not directly identical measures. | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### Explainer: Why Apple Pay is the focus of RBA regulatory supervision URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/explainer-why-apple-pay-is-the-focus-of-rba-regulatory-supervision/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T00:01:30.000Z Apple Pay looks simple. Hold an iPhone near a payment terminal, authenticate the purchase and the payment is made. Behind that tap, however, sits a complicated chain involving Apple, your bank, a card network such as Visa, Mastercard or eftpos, the merchant's bank and several pieces of technology. The Reserve Bank is now asking whether control over parts of that chain gives mobile-wallet providers too much influence over competition. This matters because mobile payments are becoming mainstream. In the RBA's 2025 Consumer Payments Survey, **43% of Australians used a mobile device to make a contactless payment during the survey week**, up from 35% in 2022\. Parliament has also expanded the RBA's regulatory remit to cover participants such as mobile wallets. ### First: what exactly is Apple Pay? Apple Pay is not itself a bank or card network. Think of it as a secure digital layer sitting over your existing card. Instead of transmitting your actual card number, the wallet normally uses **tokenisation**: your card details are replaced with a substitute digital number, or token. Your iPhone then communicates with the shop's terminal using **near-field communication**, or NFC — the short-range radio technology behind “tap and go”. This architecture brings significant security benefits. Apple argues that tokenisation and device authentication mean Apple Pay transactions have materially lower fraud rates than conventional card transactions. More than **125 Australian financial institutions** now support Apple Pay. ### So where is the competition problem? Consider an ordinary Australian debit card. About 90% of debit cards have traditionally been **dual-network debit cards**. That means the same card can potentially send a payment through either Australia's eftpos network or an international network such as Visa Debit or Debit Mastercard. The shop may pay different fees depending on which network processes the transaction. That creates the idea of **least-cost routing**. Instead of automatically sending every transaction through the default network, the merchant can route an eligible payment through whichever network is cheaper. The RBA likes this because it creates competition: eftpos, Visa and Mastercard have an incentive to keep their costs down. But mobile wallets complicated that system. When debit cards were first tokenised for mobile and online payments, submissions to the RBA say only the international card networks could support those transactions. **eftpos was therefore sometimes missing from the digital version of a dual-network card**, meaning merchants could not choose it even if eftpos would have been cheaper. eftpos has since developed the necessary technology, but stakeholders told the RBA that retrofitting a second network token into established wallets can be technically difficult. ### Why does the iPhone itself matter? A second issue is access to the phone's NFC technology. Historically, Apple tightly controlled access to the technology allowing an iPhone to make contactless payments. Since October 2024, Australian developers have been able to apply to Apple's **NFC & Secure Element Platform** to develop alternatives. Some submissions argue that the conditions remain too restrictive or commercially unattractive for rival wallets to compete effectively. They point to Europe, where Apple has provided fee-free access to different NFC technology following regulatory intervention. Apple strongly disputes this. It says Australian developers already have access, that Apple Pay is available to institutions of all sizes on equal terms and that its platform encourages rather than restricts competition. ### Then there are Apple's fees Banks pay Apple when customers use Apple Pay. Some stakeholders told the RBA that these fees have not fallen despite transaction volumes rising and unit costs declining. They also argue that even large banks have little ability to negotiate, while the fees are generally invisible to merchants and consumers. Apple's response is that its fees reflect the security and other value Apple Pay provides, are uniform between issuers and **have not increased since launch**. Apple also says its contracts do not allow it to increase the fees unilaterally. That disagreement gets to the heart of the regulatory question. The RBA is not deciding whether Apple Pay is a good product. It is asking whether control of the **device, wallet and customer interface** gives Apple the ability to influence fees, competitors and which payment network ultimately carries a transaction. Stakeholders have proposed everything from publishing Apple Pay fees and opening NFC access on fair terms to examining contractual conditions and, potentially, regulating prices. The RBA has not accepted those arguments. Its next step is to decide which issues justify deeper investigation. The bigger question is one the payments system increasingly faces everywhere: **When a technology company controls the doorway through which consumers make payments, how much control does it gain over the market behind the doorway?** | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| PAYMENTS Why Apple Pay is in the RBA's regulatory frame The issue is not the tap itself. It is who controls the technology, routing and fees behind it. 43% of Australians used a mobile device for a contactless payment during the RBA's 2025 survey week 125+ Australian financial institutions support Apple Pay, according to Apple WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU TAP? 1\. Your bank card The money still comes from your existing account ↓ 2\. Tokenisation Your real card number is replaced by a secure digital token ↓ 3\. Apple Pay + iPhone NFC The phone securely communicates with the merchant's terminal ↓ 4\. Payment network eftpos | Visa Debit | Debit Mastercard ↓ 5\. Merchant receives payment Different routes can have different costs LEAST-COST ROUTING Same debit card. Two possible roads. Around 90% of Australian debit cards have historically supported two networks. If both are available digitally, the merchant can potentially send the payment down the cheaper route. Why regulators are looking **NFC access:**Can competing wallets use the iPhone's tap-and-go technology on workable terms? **Routing:**Are both debit networks available so merchants can choose the cheaper one? **Fees:**Do banks have sufficient bargaining power over Apple Pay charges? **Customer interface:**Can the wallet influence which payment methods customers see and use? STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS Access terms may inhibit rival wallets; Apple Pay fees may lack competitive pressure; digital wallets can affect routing and payment choice. APPLE'S RESPONSE Apple says access is open, fees are uniform and unchanged, Apple Pay is network-neutral and its security reduces fraud. **The regulatory question:**when one company controls the device, wallet and customer interface, can competitors still reach customers and compete on equal terms? Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Review of Payments System Regulation, October 2026; RBA Consumer Payments Survey 2025; Apple submission to the RBA. The RBA has not yet decided whether to impose Apple Pay-specific regulation. | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### How resilient are Australian banks to a housing crash? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-resilient-are-australian-banks-to-a-housing-crash/ Last updated: 2026-10-06T20:30:50.000Z A 20% fall in Australian house prices would cause significant economic pain. But according to the Reserve Bank's latest stress testing, it would still leave Australia's banking system strongly capitalised and capable of continuing to lend. The RBA's adverse scenario is considerably more severe than simply assuming lower house prices. It combines a **3% fall in GDP**, unemployment rising to **6.3%**, inflation reaching **7%**, the cash rate increasing to **5.6%**, and a **20% fall in both housing and commercial property prices**. Despite those assumptions, the banking system's Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio falls from **12.4% to around 11.6%**. ### What does 11.6% mean? Common Equity Tier 1, or CET1, is the highest-quality regulatory capital available to absorb bank losses. It consists principally of shareholders' equity and retained earnings relative to a bank's risk-weighted assets. Australia's prudential framework deliberately requires banks to hold substantial capital above minimum requirements so those buffers can be used during severe downturns rather than forcing banks to stop lending. The RBA estimates that, even in its adverse scenario, very few banks would need to use a substantial proportion of those buffers. ### Why are the losses relatively contained? One reason is collateral. More than **90% of banks' non-performing housing loans** and more than **50% of non-performing business loans** were still considered well secured in June. Even when a borrower is in difficulty, the property securing the loan is generally worth enough to repay the bank if it has to be sold. Banks also hold loan-loss provisions equivalent to around **0.7% of total credit outstanding**. Capital and liquidity buffers are substantial. At June 2026, Australian banks held a total capital base of about **$480 billion**, while their liquidity coverage ratio was **133%**, comfortably above the regulatory minimum. Annual net profit after tax was **$42.5 billion**, providing another capacity to absorb losses before capital is depleted. Funding has also become safer. Since the global financial crisis, Australian banks have reduced their dependence on short-term offshore wholesale borrowing and increased their reliance on domestic deposits. More than half of remaining offshore debt funding now has maturities longer than one year. None of this means a housing crash would be harmless. Falling prices, higher unemployment and mortgage stress would damage households and economic activity. But the RBA's conclusion is important: **a severe housing downturn does not automatically become a banking crisis**. Australia's banks have been deliberately structured to absorb substantial losses while continuing to provide credit. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| BANKING How resilient are Australian banks? The RBA's severe economic downturn scenario. The stress scenario GDP −3% Unemployment 6.3% Inflation 7.0% Cash rate 5.6% Housing & commercial property −20% BANKING SYSTEM CET1 CAPITAL Before stress 12.4% → After stress 11.6% Only a **0.8 percentage-point decline** despite an extreme economic downturn. What absorbs the shock? \>90% of housing NPLs remain well secured $480bn total bank capital base at June 2026 133% banking-system liquidity coverage ratio 0.7% loan-loss provisions as a share of credit **The key distinction:**a severe housing downturn could cause substantial household and economic stress without becoming a banking crisis. Capital, collateral, provisions and liquidity stand between borrower stress and bank failure. Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, October 2026; APRA, Quarterly ADI Performance Statistics, June 2026\. | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### The Coalition's Immigration Policy - Facts and Issues URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-coalitions-immigration-policy-facts-and-issues/ Last updated: 2026-10-06T05:44:03.000Z The Coalition has unveiled a substantially tighter immigration policy, proposing to reduce net overseas migration (NOM) to 100,000 a year for its first two years in government, before increasing it to 130,000 in year three and 160,000 in year four. That compares with NOM of 292,100 in the year to March 2026\. Labor is targeting 245,000 this financial year and 225,000 the following year. The Coalition says its initial target would represent the lowest migration level outside the pandemic since 2004. The policy is not simply a reduction in skilled migration. The permanent migration program would remain capped at 185,000 places, while the composition of temporary migration would change significantly. The Coalition proposes reducing the stock of temporary visa holders by about 650,000 over four years. Temporary Graduate Visas would largely be abolished, international student commencements capped at 240,000 and restrictions placed on dependants accompanying students. Bridging and temporary protection visas are projected to fall from around 414,000 to 20,000\. The humanitarian intake would be halved to 10,000 places annually. At the same time, the Coalition proposes increasing temporary skilled migration by about 60,000 places, introducing 15,000 Skilled Project Visas annually for major projects and giving greater priority to construction and employer-sponsored regional migration. ## The economic issue The central economic question is whether Australia can reduce population growth substantially while preserving the economically valuable parts of migration. Lower migration would slow growth in labour supply and aggregate demand and would therefore tend to reduce headline GDP compared with a higher-migration scenario. Industries dependent on migrant labour could also face greater labour shortages. Against this, slower population growth would reduce some of the additional demand placed on housing, infrastructure and public services. The appropriate economic test is therefore broader than GDP growth alone. GDP per capita, productivity, housing supply, infrastructure capacity and the skills and incomes of migrants all matter. The Coalition has not yet released comprehensive modelling of the broader economic effects, although it says the package would be budget neutral. Detailed costings are expected closer to the 2028 election. ## The One Nation question The policy also has an important political dimension. One Nation proposes an even larger near-term migration adjustment, including reducing temporary visas by about 750,000 and producing negative net overseas migration for three years before moving to a ceiling of 130,000\. Pauline Hanson has characterised the Coalition announcement as following ground already occupied by One Nation. The significance is that some of One Nation's recent growth has come from voters who previously supported the Coalition, while immigration has become an increasingly prominent political issue. The Coalition's 100,000 target therefore narrows the policy gap with One Nation considerably. What remains unknown is whether voters who have moved to One Nation primarily because of immigration policy will regard the Coalition's new position as sufficient — or whether their dissatisfaction now encompasses a broader range of economic, cultural and political issues. Coalition migration plan | 100,000 Net overseas migrationYears 1–2 | | 130,000 Net overseas migrationYear 3 | | 160,000 Net overseas migrationYear 4 | | --------------------------------------- | | ------------------------------------ | | ------------------------------------ | Source: Coalition migration policy, 6 October 2026\. What changes Lower migration — but more emphasis on skills | Temporary visa holders | −650,000 over 4 years | | ------------------------------------- | --------------------- | | Student commencements | 240,000 cap | | Humanitarian intake | 10,000 | | Bridging / temporary protection visas | \~414,000 → 20,000 | | Temporary skilled visas | \~60,000 more | | Skilled Project Visas | 15,000 a year | Source: Coalition migration policy; ABC News, 6 October 2026\. The economic trade-off | Lower migration may mean • Slower labour-force growth• Slower aggregate GDP growth• Greater labour shortages in some industries• Lower aggregate demand | But it may also mean • Less pressure on housing• Less infrastructure congestion• Lower demand on public services• More capital per worker, all else equal | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | The key test is living standards — not population growth or headline GDP alone. ### Explainer: How much does regulation cost Australia? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/cost-of-regulation-australia-productivity-commission/ Last updated: 2026-10-06T00:08:45.000Z Australia has begun putting surprisingly large dollar values on the cost of regulation. The Productivity Commission estimates that Commonwealth regulation imposes around **$115 billion to $160 billion a year** in compliance and delay costs. The Government, meanwhile, says its current reform program will remove **$10.2 billion a year** of regulatory burden. But what exactly is being measured? ### How is regulatory burden calculated? The Productivity Commission favours Australia's existing **Regulatory Burden Measurement framework**, administered by the Office of Impact Analysis. It measures three types of costs. **Administrative costs** are the staff time and resources needed to demonstrate compliance: completing forms, maintaining records, reporting information and making applications. **Substantive compliance costs** are the things businesses must actually do or buy because of regulation — such as employee training, new equipment, IT systems, legal advice or accounting services. **Delay costs** arise when regulation prevents economic activity from beginning. If a business is ready to operate but must wait six months for government approval, for example, the lost income attributable to that regulatory delay can be counted. The methodology measures costs **above business as usual**. If a company would have installed a particular system regardless of regulation, it is not counted. Taxes, government licence fees, fines and most indirect or opportunity costs are also excluded. For labour-intensive requirements, the basic calculation is essentially: **time required × labour cost × frequency × number of affected businesses or people.** New regulations are normally costed over ten years. One-off implementation expenses are spread across that period, and the result is expressed as an average annual cost in constant prices. ### Where does $115–160 billion come from? This is necessarily less precise. The Productivity Commission's **$115 billion lower estimate** starts with the Commonwealth's detailed 2013 estimate of about $65 billion and scales it by nominal GDP growth. The **$160 billion upper estimate** uses a recent external estimate that also incorporates indicators such as the volume and complexity of legislation, employment in compliance functions and growth in direct business costs. The Commission acknowledges that repeating the original bottom-up costing would produce a better baseline, but would itself be expensive and time consuming. Against this $115–160 billion base, the PC recommended reducing annual compliance and delay costs by **$10 billion by 2030** — equivalent to roughly **6–9%**. It deliberately chose a broader target than the UK and EU, which focus mainly on administrative costs. ### What is the Government claiming? The 2026–27 Budget goes slightly further, claiming **$10.2 billion a year of gross regulatory savings** once its reforms are fully implemented. Major components include around **$3 billion from environmental approvals, $3 billion from housing reforms, $2.05 billion from National Competition Policy and $961 million from financial-sector reform**. Financial services account for **$780 million from 14 legislative reforms** and another **$181 million from the Council of Financial Regulators' Better Regulation Roadmap**. But there is a crucial difference. The PC recommended a **net** $10 billion reduction. The Government's $10.2 billion is **gross**. If existing regulation is simplified by $10.2 billion but new regulation imposes another $3 billion of costs, the net reduction is only $7.2 billion. That is the number that ultimately matters for productivity. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| PRODUCTIVITY What does regulation cost Australia? How the Productivity Commission measures regulatory burden — and why gross and net savings are different. $115–160bn Productivity Commission estimate of annual Commonwealth **compliance + delay costs** What counts as regulatory burden? ADMIN Forms, reporting,records, applications COMPLY Equipment, training,IT, advisers DELAY Lost income whilewaiting for approval PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION $10bn **NET** annual reductiontarget by 2030 GOVERNMENT PACKAGE $10.2bn **GROSS** annual savingsonce fully implemented THE CRITICAL TEST Gross regulatory savings −new regulatory costs \=net savings Financial services 14 legislative reforms $780m Better Regulation Roadmap $181m Claimed annual saving $961m Selected Government savings estimates Environmental approvals $3.0bn Housing reforms $3.0bn National Competition Policy $2.05bn Financial-sector reform $961m **The Benchmark test:**the $10.2 billion headline is not the final measure of success. What matters is whether total regulatory costs fall after new regulation introduced elsewhere is also counted. Sources: Productivity Commission; Australian Government 2026–27 Budget; Office of Impact Analysis. Figures are estimated annual regulatory burden, not Budget cash expenditure. | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### A 20% house price fall would leave only 5% of mortgages underwater URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/a-20-house-price-fall-would-leave-only-5-of-mortgages-underwater/ Last updated: 2026-10-05T20:30:40.000Z Australian house prices are falling, but the Reserve Bank's latest stress testing suggests it would take an extraordinarily large correction before negative equity became widespread. National dwelling values fell another 1.1% in September and are now **5.2% below their March peak**, according to Cotality. Yet the RBA estimates that even if housing prices were to fall a **further 20% uniformly from current levels**, only around **5% of Australian mortgages would move into negative equity**. Negative equity occurs when the outstanding mortgage exceeds the value of the property securing it. Currently, the RBA estimates that **less than 1% of borrowers** are in that position. The reason is straightforward: Australian house prices rose substantially before the current correction, while lending standards have remained relatively conservative. Borrowers have therefore accumulated significant equity cushions. The RBA stresses that its 20% fall is a **stress scenario, not a house-price forecast**. Current forecasts are considerably less severe, although they have been revised down rapidly. Westpac expects national dwelling values to decline **7.3% peak-to-trough**. Commonwealth Bank expects around **9%**, while UBS forecasts approximately **10%**. AMP is more pessimistic, forecasting a **10–15% peak-to-trough decline**. Those forecasts nevertheless represent substantial corrections. Sydney and Melbourne are particularly exposed: Westpac forecasts peak-to-trough falls of **10.4% and 8.6% respectively**, while Cotality data already show some higher-value housing segments down more than 10%. Importantly, negative equity does not mean default. Mortgage default normally requires a second problem: the borrower must also become unable to service the loan. The RBA estimates only around **2% of variable-rate owner-occupier borrowers** currently have insufficient income to meet mortgage payments and essential expenditure. Many of these borrowers also hold savings or mortgage prepayment buffers. Recent borrowers with high loan-to-value ratios are more vulnerable, including some participants in the Government's 5% Deposit Scheme. But even there, borrowers were assessed using APRA's three-percentage-point serviceability buffer and the Government guarantees part of the lender's exposure. The result highlights an important distinction. Falling house prices can damage household wealth, consumption and housing activity well before they threaten banking stability. Australia could therefore experience a historically large housing correction without experiencing a mortgage crisis. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| HOUSING How far could Australian house prices fall? Current decline, private forecasts and the RBA's financial-stability stress scenario. Already fallen −5.2% National dwelling values from the March 2026 peak to September. Peak-to-trough forecasts Westpac −7.3% Commonwealth Bank \~−9% UBS \~−10% AMP −10% to −15% RBA STRESS SCENARIO — NOT A FORECAST A further −20% would leave only around **5% of mortgages** in negative equity. <1% mortgages currentlyin negative equity \~2% variable owner-occupiersin cash-flow shortfall **The distinction:**falling prices can substantially reduce household wealth and spending without creating widespread mortgage losses for banks. Negative equity alone does not cause default. Sources: RBA Financial Stability Review, October 2026; Cotality; Westpac; Commonwealth Bank; UBS; AMP. Forecasts are estimates and may change. | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### A reflection on the source of domestic inflation - housing URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/housing-inflation-tradables-australia-2026/ Last updated: 2026-10-04T20:00:07.000Z Australia’s biggest inflation problem is not petrol. It is housing. The August CPI shows housing prices 5.7 per cent higher than a year earlier, making housing the largest contributor to annual inflation. The detailed ABS contribution data put the scale of the problem into perspective. Housing added approximately 1.24 percentage points to Australia’s annual CPI increase. By comparison, the entire tradables component of the CPI — covering prices most exposed to international trade, including fuel and many imported goods — contributed approximately 0.99 percentage points. Housing alone is therefore currently adding more to Australian inflation than all tradable goods and services combined. Three components account for most of the housing contribution. New dwelling prices increased 5.4 per cent over the year and contributed around 0.40 percentage points to CPI. The ABS says builders continue to pass through higher materials and labour costs. Electricity contributed another 0.32 percentage points. Annual electricity inflation reached 13.2 per cent, although this figure is heavily affected by changes to government electricity rebates and should not be interpreted simply as current market-price inflation. Rents contributed approximately 0.24 percentage points, with rental prices 3.6 per cent higher over the year. Together, those three items account for roughly three-quarters of housing’s contribution to inflation. This helps explain why separating imported from domestically generated inflation matters. Tradable inflation is currently 2.9 per cent. Non-tradable inflation is 4.5 per cent. And of the approximately 3.96 percentage points of annual CPI inflation recorded in August, non-tradables contributed 2.97 points — almost exactly 75 per cent. The immediate August inflation shock came through fuel. But the reason Australian inflation remains persistently above target lies much closer to home: housing, construction costs and domestically determined services. The RBA therefore cannot simply wait for oil prices to fall. Even if the global energy shock disappears, a substantial domestic inflation problem remains. | Housing is adding more to inflation than all tradables combined | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Australia’s August CPI shows why the inflation problem cannot be explained by imported prices alone. | | Housing +1.24pp contribution to annual CPI All tradables +0.99pp contribution to annual CPI | | **Housing alone is contributing around 25% more to annual CPI**than every tradable good and service in the CPI basket combined. | | What is driving housing inflation? | | Housing component Annual price change CPI contribution New dwelling purchase +5.4% +0.40pp Electricity +13.2% +0.32pp Rents +3.6% +0.24pp Other housing — +0.28pp Total housing +5.7% +1.24pp | | Share of annual CPI contribution 75% non-tradable Non-tradables contributed approximately **2.97 percentage points** of the **3.96 percentage-point** annual CPI increase. | | The domestic inflation gap remains wide | | CPI component Annual inflation Annual contribution Non-tradables 4.5% +2.97pp Tradables 2.9% +0.99pp | | **Important:**not every housing price movement represents underlying market pressure. The annual electricity increase is materially affected by the timing and treatment of government energy rebates. New dwelling costs and rents provide a cleaner indication of persistent housing-related price pressure. | | **Benchmark takeaway:**August’s immediate inflation shock came through fuel, but the larger underlying problem remains domestic. Housing alone is currently adding more to annual CPI than the entire tradables sector. | | Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, August 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations using ABS CPI contribution tables. Contribution figures use unrounded index-point data and may differ slightly from published rounded percentage changes. | ### The big four banks are losing mortgage market share URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-big-four-banks-are-losing-mortgage-market-share/ Last updated: 2026-10-03T21:00:29.000Z Australia’s four major banks still dominate home lending, but their grip on the mortgage market has been steadily weakening. APRA’s August 2026 banking statistics show ANZ, Commonwealth Bank, NAB and Westpac together holding $1.83 trillion of housing loans, equivalent to 73.0 per cent of the market. In August 2020, the same four banks controlled 77.8 per cent. The decline has been remarkably consistent. Their combined share fell to 76.4 per cent in 2021, 75.3 per cent in 2022, 74.9 per cent in 2023, 74.6 per cent in 2024 and 73.8 per cent last year. The majors have not been shrinking their mortgage books. Their combined housing lending has increased from $1.38 trillion to $1.83 trillion since 2020. The problem is that everyone else has grown faster. Australia’s total mortgage market expanded from $1.77 trillion to $2.50 trillion over the same period — growth of 41.3 per cent, compared with 32.7 per cent for the four majors. The loss has been particularly pronounced in investor lending. The majors’ share of investor mortgages has fallen from 82.5 per cent to 76.2 per cent, while their owner-occupier share has declined from 75.2 per cent to 71.5 per cent. Macquarie has been a major beneficiary. Its mortgage market share increased from just 2.9 per cent in August 2020 to 7.5 per cent today. There is an important qualification. Suncorp Bank is now owned by ANZ but remains separately reported by APRA as Norfina Limited. Including Suncorp lifts the current major-bank group share to about 75.3 per cent — still below the four majors’ 77.8 per cent share in 2020. And this is specifically a mortgage story. Over the same six years, the majors’ combined share of business lending has actually edged higher, from 69.5 per cent to 70.4 per cent. Competition is reshaping Australian banking — but not uniformly. | AUSTRALIAN MORTGAGES \| AUGUST 2026 | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | The Big Four's mortgage share is steadily falling | | ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac still dominate Australian housing lending, but the rest of the market has grown faster. | | August 2020 77.8% Big Four mortgage share → August 2026 73.0% Big Four mortgage share | | Six years of market-share erosion | | August Big Four share Change from 2020 2020 **77.8%** — 2021 76.4% −1.4pp 2022 75.3% −2.5pp 2023 74.9% −2.9pp 2024 74.6% −3.2pp 2025 73.8% −4.0pp 2026 73.0% −4.8pp | | Where the share has been lost | | Housing 2020 2026 Change Owner-occupier 75.2% 71.5% −3.7pp Investor 82.5% 76.2% −6.3pp | | Why market share fell **Total mortgage market:**$1.77tn → $2.50tn **+41.3%** **Big Four mortgage books:**$1.38tn → $1.83tn **+32.7%** | | **Important qualification:**APRA reports individual ADIs. Suncorp Bank is now owned by ANZ but remains separately reported as Norfina Limited. Including Suncorp Bank lifts the current major-group mortgage share from 73.0% to approximately **75.3%**. | | Source: APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, August 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Big Four ADIs are ANZ, Commonwealth Bank, NAB and Westpac. | ### Six key insights from the RBA Financial Stability Report URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/six-key-insights-from-the-rba-financial-stability-report/ Last updated: 2026-10-03T05:16:30.000Z The Reserve Bank’s October Financial Stability Review provides a useful map of the risks sitting behind Australia’s financial system. Its central conclusion is reassuring: households, businesses and banks remain broadly resilient. But the sources of potential instability are changing. Private credit, the enormous superannuation system, AI investment and increasingly concentrated technology infrastructure feature prominently. Here are six key insights. ### 1\. Australian mortgage borrowers have much larger buffers than the headlines suggest Higher rates are putting pressure on household cash flows, but the RBA finds little evidence of widespread mortgage distress. Less than 1% of borrowers are currently estimated to be in negative equity and slightly under 2% of variable-rate owner-occupier borrowers have insufficient income to cover mortgage repayments and essential expenses. More strikingly, the RBA estimates that even a uniform **20% fall in house prices would leave only around 5% of mortgages in negative equity**. Strong post-pandemic house-price growth, savings buffers and tighter lending standards provide substantial protection. Household financial stress and banking-system credit risk are therefore very different things. ### 2\. Australian banks could absorb a severe housing downturn The banking system appears even more resilient. The RBA models a severe downturn involving a **3% fall in GDP and 20% fall in house prices**. Even then, the banking system’s Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio falls only to around **11.6%**, leaving banks capable of continuing to lend. Australian banks have also reduced their reliance on potentially volatile offshore wholesale funding over the past two decades, replacing it with more stable domestic deposits. Just over half of remaining offshore debt funding has maturities exceeding 12 months. The traditional banking system is therefore not where the RBA sees the largest emerging vulnerabilities. ### 3\. Private credit is an investor-protection issue before it is a systemic-risk issue Australian private credit has expanded rapidly but remains relatively small. The RBA estimates that it accounts for roughly **10% of business debt but less than 2% of financial-system assets**. Australian funds are heavily exposed to property, including construction and development, but generally use relatively little leverage and banks have limited exposures to them. That means losses are more likely to be borne by fund investors than transmitted through the banking system. The RBA therefore distinguishes between **financial stability and investor protection**. ASIC’s concerns about opaque valuations, governance and risk management can be serious without implying another banking crisis. ### 4\. Superannuation has become part of Australia’s financial infrastructure Australia’s superannuation system now accounts for around **one-third of financial-system assets** and will continue growing relative to domestic financial markets. Approximately half the assets of APRA-regulated funds are already invested offshore. Historically, super has strengthened financial stability: compulsory contributions provide steady inflows, leverage is limited and withdrawals are constrained. But the system is changing. More members will enter retirement and gain greater capacity to withdraw funds, while growing foreign investment creates larger foreign-exchange hedging requirements. APRA’s first system-wide stress test was reassuring, but the RBA wants funds to keep strengthening liquidity and operational risk management as their systemic importance grows. ### 5\. The AI investment boom is becoming a financial-system risk The RBA devotes unusual attention to the financing of artificial intelligence. AI companies are increasingly turning to bonds, private credit, bank lending and asset-backed finance to fund enormous investment programs. Debt could finance **more than one-third of planned AI capital expenditure**, while technology companies generated nearly **30% of US investment-grade corporate bond issuance** in the first half of 2026. The risk is not AI itself, but leverage, concentrated exposures and increasingly complex financing. The RBA highlights circular financing arrangements, possible overinvestment, long-dated debt funding rapidly depreciating technology and financial commitments that could become problematic if expected AI revenues fail to materialise. ### 6\. The next financial crisis may be operational rather than financial The RBA increasingly treats cyber attacks, technology outages and dependence on common service providers as potential **systemic** risks rather than simply problems for individual institutions. APRA’s survey found **91% of regulated institutions rated cyber security a high or critical risk**, followed by geopolitical risk at 70%. AI is simultaneously increasing cyber capabilities and financial institutions’ dependence on complex technology providers. The RBA specifically identifies Austraclear as systemically important and says ASX has yet to establish adequate contingency arrangements for maintaining its critical services through a prolonged outage. A future financial shock could therefore begin not with bad loans, but with infrastructure that stops working. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| FINANCIAL STABILITY Six insights from the RBA The October 2026 Financial Stability Review finds a resilient banking system — but emerging risks are shifting towards private markets, superannuation, technology and operational infrastructure. 5% 1\. Mortgages have substantial equity buffers Even after a uniform 20% house-price fall, only around 5% of mortgages would fall into negative equity. 11.6% 2\. Banks remain strongly capitalised Estimated banking-system CET1 ratio even in an adverse scenario combining a 3% GDP fall with a 20% housing correction. <2% 3\. Private credit is not yet systemically large Private credit is about 10% of business debt but less than 2% of financial-system assets. Investor protection is the bigger immediate issue. ⅓ 4\. Super is now financial infrastructure Superannuation represents around one-third of Australian financial-system assets, while roughly half of APRA-regulated fund assets are offshore. \>⅓ 5\. AI is becoming a financing story Debt could fund more than one-third of planned AI capital expenditure, increasing financial-system exposure to the investment boom. 91% 6\. Operational risk can become systemic risk 91% of APRA-regulated institutions rate cyber security as a high or critical risk. Critical infrastructure and shared technology providers are increasingly important vulnerabilities. **The RBA's bottom line:**Australia's traditional banking system remains resilient. The emerging risks increasingly lie outside conventional bank credit — in private markets, large institutional investors, technology and operational dependencies. Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, October 2026\. | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### BOQ is shrinking mortgages to grow its business bank URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/boq-is-shrinking-mortgages-to-grow-its-business-bank/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T01:30:55.000Z Bank of Queensland is deliberately changing the composition of its balance sheet — shrinking its mortgage book while putting more capital into business lending. The strategy is now clearly visible in APRA’s monthly banking statistics. In August 2026, BOQ had $50.7 billion of housing loans, down 7.6 per cent over the previous year. Owner-occupied mortgages fell 8.4 per cent to $35.1 billion, while investor housing lending declined 5.6 per cent to $15.6 billion. That is occurring while the Australian mortgage market continues to expand. System-wide owner-occupied lending increased 5.1 per cent over the same period and investor lending grew 7.5 per cent. BOQ’s business loan book is moving in the opposite direction. Loans to non-financial businesses increased 11.6 per cent over the year to $15.8 billion, slightly ahead of system business credit growth of 10.3 per cent. This is deliberate. BOQ has said it is reallocating capital away from lower-returning housing lending towards higher-returning business lending. In FY25, the bank reported commercial lending growth concentrated in healthcare, agribusiness and well-secured commercial property. The change becomes clearer over two years. Since August 2024, BOQ’s housing loan book has fallen from $58.8 billion to $50.7 billion — a decline of almost $8.1 billion. Business lending has increased from $12.8 billion to $15.8 billion. Business lending consequently represents 23.8 per cent of BOQ’s combined housing and business loan book, up from 17.9 per cent two years ago. BOQ’s total resident assets have also fallen 7.6 per cent over the past year to $108.5 billion. That makes the important distinction: BOQ is not currently pursuing balance-sheet growth at any price. It is changing what sits on the balance sheet. The August APRA numbers provide an unusually timely snapshot: BOQ’s financial year ended on 31 August, with its full-year results due on 15 October. | BANK OF QUEENSLAND \| AUGUST 2026 | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | BOQ is changing what sits on its balance sheet | | Housing lending is being run down while BOQ reallocates capital towards its growing business bank. | | Housing loans $50.7bn −7.6% year-on-year Business loans $15.8bn +11.6% year-on-year | | Lending category Aug 2026 BOQ growth System Owner-occupied housing $35.1bn −8.4% +5.1% Investor housing $15.6bn −5.6% +7.5% Business lending $15.8bn +11.6% +10.3% | | The two-year balance-sheet shift | | Housing loans **$58.8bn → $50.7bn** Business loans **$12.8bn → $15.8bn** Business share of housing + business lending **17.9% → 23.8%** | | **The strategy:**BOQ has explicitly said it is running off lower-returning home lending and reallocating capital towards higher-returning business lending. | | Source: APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, August 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Housing loans comprise owner-occupied and investor housing lending. | ### Australia’s inflation data now tells two quite different stories URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-inflation-imported-domestic-august-2026/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T10:30:13.000Z The Consumer Price Index rose 4.0 per cent over the year to August, up sharply from 3.5 per cent in July. But the jump does not mean domestic inflation suddenly accelerated in August. Quite the opposite. ABS data show tradable prices — those most exposed to international markets — rose 1.3 per cent during August. Non-tradable prices, which are predominantly influenced by domestic conditions, were unchanged. The contribution data make the distinction even clearer. Tradables added around 0.43 percentage points to the CPI during August, while non-tradables subtracted around 0.02 points. Total CPI increased by about 0.42 points. Automotive fuel alone contributed 0.46 percentage points — more than the entire CPI increase. Fuel prices jumped 14.8 per cent as higher global oil prices coincided with the final unwinding of the temporary reduction in Commonwealth fuel excise. But look at inflation over twelve months and the picture reverses. Non-tradable inflation is running at 4.5 per cent, compared with 2.9 per cent for tradables. More importantly, non-tradables contributed about 2.97 percentage points of Australia’s 3.96 percentage-point annual CPI increase. That is roughly three-quarters of total inflation. Housing illustrates the problem. Housing prices are 5.7 per cent higher over the year, including a 5.4 per cent rise in new dwelling costs and continued increases in rents. Education, health and a range of domestic services are also recording elevated price growth. Trimmed mean inflation therefore tells a useful story. It was only 0.2 per cent in August, but remains 3.6 per cent over the year — unchanged for three consecutive months and still above the RBA’s target band. So the August inflation shock was principally imported and policy-related. The broader inflation problem is not. Australia effectively has two inflation problems operating simultaneously: a global energy shock pushing headline inflation higher, layered over persistent domestic price pressures that have yet to return to target. That distinction matters far more for monetary policy than the 4.0 per cent headline number alone. | Australia has two inflation stories | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | August 2026 CPI: the latest inflation shock was overwhelmingly tradable, but the annual inflation problem remains predominantly domestic. | | Inflation source August change August CPI contribution Annual rate Annual contribution Tradables +1.3% +0.43pp 2.9% +0.99pp Non-tradables 0.0% −0.02pp 4.5% +2.97pp | | The August shock Fuel +0.46pp Automotive fuel contributed more than the entire **+0.42pp** monthly CPI increase. The annual problem 75% domestic Non-tradables account for approximately **75%** of annual CPI inflation contribution. | | Major annual CPI contributions Percentage points Housing +1.24 All tradables +0.99 Transport +0.64 Food +0.52 Automotive fuel +0.44 | | Source: ABS, Consumer Price Index, Australia, August 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations using ABS Tables 4, 5 and 6\. Figures may not sum exactly because of rounding. | ### Job vacancies point to a softer private labour market URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/job-vacancies-point-to-a-softer-private-labour-market/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T03:49:35.000Z Australia's labour market remains relatively tight, but the latest job vacancies data contain a clearer signal that labour demand is cooling. The ABS estimates there were **325,000 job vacancies in August**, down 0.9 per cent over the quarter and 1.3 per cent over the year in seasonally adjusted terms. Vacancies are now **31.2 per cent below their May 2022 peak**. The headline, however, understates what happened in the private sector. Private-sector vacancies fell **2.0 per cent to 286,300**, equivalent to roughly 5,800 fewer vacant positions. Public-sector vacancies jumped **7.8 per cent to 38,700**, adding roughly 2,800 vacancies and offsetting almost half the private-sector decline. That public-sector increase should not be over-interpreted. On the smoother trend measure, public vacancies actually fell 0.5 per cent during the quarter and are 3.5 per cent lower than a year ago. Private vacancies fell 1.0 per cent in trend terms. The underlying picture is therefore one of broader labour-market easing. An even better measure of that change is vacancies relative to the number of people looking for work. There were **722,900 unemployed Australians in August**, alongside 325,000 vacancies — equivalent to about **45 vacancies for every 100 unemployed people**. Around the May 2022 vacancy peak, the comparable ratio was approximately **84 vacancies per 100 unemployed people**. Labour-market tightness on this measure has therefore almost halved. The industry data also reveal substantial rotation. Professional, scientific and technical services vacancies fell from 35,700 to 29,500 — a fall of **6,200 positions**, or 17 per cent. Wholesale vacancies fell by 2,900 and health care by 2,400\. By contrast, retail vacancies jumped by 6,400 and financial and insurance services increased by 1,300. For the RBA, the numbers point in the direction it has been expecting. In August it forecast a gradual easing in labour-market conditions, and after increasing the cash rate to **4.60 per cent on 29 September**, the Bank said labour-market conditions had eased broadly as expected and leading indicators remained broadly stable. Today's figures do not signal a weak labour market. But they provide little evidence of a renewed economy-wide hiring boom either. That matters because, beneath the inflation headlines, one important source of domestic capacity pressure is continuing to ease. | Benchmark Analytics \| Labour Market Private labour demand is cooling Australian job vacancies — August 2026 Total vacancies 325,000 ↓ 0.9% q/q Since May 2022 peak −31.2% Labour demand normalising Unemployment 4.6% August 2026 The headline masks weaker private hiring Sector Vacancies Quarter Approx. change Private 286,300 −2.0% −5,800 Public 38,700 +7.8% +2,800 Seasonally adjusted. Public vacancies fell 0.5% on the smoother trend measure. Labour-market tightness has almost halved Vacancies per 100 unemployed people May 2022 \~84 Aug 2026 45 There are now substantially fewer vacant jobs competing for each unemployed worker than at the post-pandemic peak. Where vacancies moved Industry Change % Professional, scientific & technical −6,200 −17.4% Wholesale trade −2,900 −18.2% Health care & social assistance −2,400 −4.2% Financial & insurance services +1,300 +14.6% Retail trade +6,400 +24.6% Industry data are original estimates. Change compares May 2026 with August 2026\. RBA read Inflation remains the immediate problem — but the labour market is not showing signs of renewed broad-based overheating. Sources: ABS, Job Vacancies, Australia, August 2026; ABS, Labour Force, Australia, August 2026; RBA. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### CBA is closing the gap on NAB in business banking URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/cba-is-closing-the-gap-on-nab-in-business-banking/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T01:30:08.000Z National Australia Bank has traditionally been Australia’s main business bank. For more than two decades, NAB has held a leading position in business lending, supported by a large specialist business banking network and strong franchises in areas such as agriculture, health and commercial property. That leadership remains intact. But Commonwealth Bank is getting closer. APRA’s August 2026 banking statistics show NAB with $278.2 billion of loans to non-financial businesses, equivalent to 21.7 per cent of the Australian banking market. CBA now has $250.6 billion, or 19.6 per cent. The gap between the two banks is therefore just 2.2 percentage points. In August 2020 it was 4.6 percentage points, when NAB held 21.6 per cent of the market and CBA only 17.0 per cent. Importantly, NAB has not surrendered market share. Its share is almost exactly where it was six years ago. Instead, CBA has grown considerably faster than the market. Over the past year, CBA’s business lending increased 15.2 per cent, compared with 10.8 per cent for NAB and 10.3 per cent across the banking system. CBA added $33.1 billion of business loans in twelve months, compared with $27.2 billion for NAB. This is consistent with a deliberate expansion by CBA. The bank reported earlier this year that its Business Banking lending balances had increased 87 per cent, or $78 billion, over six years. NAB still has the largest business loan book and retains the specialist business banking franchise it has built over decades. But the competitive landscape is changing. Six years ago, NAB’s business lending market share was 27 per cent larger than CBA’s. Today the difference is only 11 per cent. If current trends persist, the contest for Australia’s largest business lender will become considerably closer. | AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS BANKING \| AUGUST 2026 | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | | CBA is closing the gap on NAB | | | NAB remains Australia's largest business lender, but CBA has taken substantial market share since 2020\. | | | Market share gap — 2020 4.6pp NAB 21.6% \| CBA 17.0% Market share gap — 2026 2.2pp NAB 21.7% | CBA 19.6% | | Business lending Aug 2020 Aug 2025 Aug 2026 12m growth NAB 21.6% 21.6% 21.7% +10.8% CBA 17.0% 18.8% 19.6% +15.2% Banking system $795.0bn $1,159.9bn $1,279.3bn +10.3% | | | August 2026 business loan books **NAB:** $278.2bn \| 21.7% market share **CBA:** $250.6bn | 19.6% market share **Current gap:** $27.7bn | | **The key point:**NAB's market share has barely moved since 2020\. The narrowing gap has been driven by CBA increasing its share from 17.0% to 19.6%. | | | Source: APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, August 2026\. Loans to non-financial businesses. Benchmark Analytics calculations. | | ### Chalmers Has One Point, Fuel Did Explain More Than 100% of August CPI Rise URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/chalmers-has-one-point-fuel-did-explain-more-than-100-of-august-cpi-rise/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T01:16:05.000Z The most remarkable number in Australia’s August CPI release is not 4.0 per cent. It is 111 per cent. Automotive fuel prices rose 14.8 per cent during August. According to the detailed ABS contribution tables, fuel added approximately 0.46 percentage points to the monthly CPI. Total CPI increased by only 0.42 percentage points. In other words, automotive fuel accounted for about 111 per cent of the net increase in consumer prices. Everything else in the CPI basket, taken together, slightly offset the fuel increase. The reasons are unusually identifiable. World oil prices have risen following disruption to global energy markets. At the same time, the remaining temporary reduction in Australian fuel excise ended on 3 August. The ABS identifies both factors as contributing to the increase. Fuel also explains most of the apparent acceleration in annual inflation. Annual CPI increased from approximately 3.45 per cent in July to 3.96 per cent in August using the unrounded ABS contribution data — an increase of 0.51 percentage points. The contribution from automotive fuel increased by approximately 0.45 percentage points between those two months. That means fuel alone explains about 89 per cent of the increase in the annual inflation rate. Electricity created another important base effect. Its contribution to annual inflation rose by around 0.16 percentage points between July and August, even though electricity prices were unchanged during August itself. Fuel and electricity therefore increased the annual inflation contribution by more than the entire increase in headline inflation. Price movements elsewhere partly offset them. That explains an otherwise puzzling result: headline inflation jumped from 3.5 to 4.0 per cent, while trimmed mean inflation remained unchanged at 3.6 per cent. The August CPI is therefore much less evidence of a sudden broad acceleration in prices than the headline suggests. The more important question is what happens after the fuel shock is stripped away. Unfortunately, that story is less reassuring: underlying inflation remains too high. | Fuel explained more than 100% of August inflation | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | Automotive fuel prices jumped 14.8% in August and contributed more to CPI than the total increase in consumer prices. | | Fuel's share of the August CPI increase 111% Automotive fuel added **0.46 percentage points**while total CPI increased by only **0.42 percentage points**. | | How August's inflation increase adds up | | Contribution Percentage points Automotive fuel +0.461 Everything else −0.045 Total CPI +0.416 | | **+0.461**\+ **−0.045**\= **+0.416 percentage points** | | Why fuel prices surged | | Global factor Higher oil prices Higher global oil prices flowed rapidly through to Australian petrol prices. Domestic policy factor Fuel excise relief ended The remaining temporary reduction in Commonwealth fuel excise ended in August. | | Headline inflation jumped — underlying inflation did not | | Measure July 2026 August 2026 Change Headline CPI 3.5% 4.0% +0.5pp Trimmed mean 3.6% 3.6% 0.0pp | | Fuel's contribution to the rise in annual inflation ≈ 89% Fuel explains approximately 0.45 percentage points of the roughly 0.51 percentage-point acceleration in annual CPI. | | **Benchmark takeaway:**August's jump in headline inflation was overwhelmingly a fuel story. Fuel alone contributed more than the total monthly CPI increase, while trimmed mean inflation remained unchanged at 3.6%. | | Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, August 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations using ABS CPI contribution tables. Figures use unrounded index-point contributions and may differ slightly from published rounded percentage changes. | ### The AI investment boom has arrived in the economic data URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-ai-investment-boom-has-arrived-in-the-economic-data/ Last updated: 2026-09-30T21:00:55.000Z Artificial intelligence is moving from the technology headlines into the official economic statistics. New figures from America and Australia reveal substantial increases in investment in computing equipment, data centres and supporting infrastructure. The latest US durable-goods report illustrates the scale of the expansion. Although total orders were virtually unchanged in August, core capital-goods orders increased 1.6% during the month and 14.1% over the year. Orders for computers and electronic products rose 16.5% annually, while machinery orders increased 15.1%. These broad categories include equipment required for AI infrastructure, alongside other industrial investment. Australia is experiencing a similar investment surge. The ABS reports that equipment investment in information, media and telecommunications increased an extraordinary 199.6% in the March quarter, driven by server racks and processing equipment for data centres. Spending subsequently fell 53.0% in the June quarter as large equipment purchases were completed. Nevertheless, investment remained 93.5% higher than a year earlier. Construction investment in the same industry increased 64.9% over the year, reflecting continued expansion of data-centre capacity. Across the Australian economy, equipment investment was 18.7% higher than a year earlier and total private capital expenditure was up 10.7%. But there is an important distinction between capital expenditure and economic growth. The ABS reports that substantial imports of data-centre equipment have offset much of the initial investment's contribution to Australian GDP. Domestic construction generates economic activity, but installing imported servers does not itself produce an equivalent increase in domestic output. The larger potential benefits arise when Australian businesses use AI infrastructure to increase productivity. For Australia, the economic question is therefore shifting from how many data centres are built to how effectively businesses exploit their capabilities. The investment boom is already measurable. The productivity dividend remains to be demonstrated. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| DATA SNAPSHOT THE AI INVESTMENT BOOM The US and Australian investment indicators behind the expansion of AI infrastructure | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | UNITED STATES Manufacturers' new orders, August 2026, annual change | | Computers and electronics +16.5% Machinery +15.1% Core capital goods +14.1% Categories overlap and include investment unrelated to AI. Figures are nominal orders, not completed capital expenditure. | | | | AUSTRALIA Information, media and telecommunications equipment investment. Index: December quarter 2025 = 100 | | Dec 2025 100 Mar 2026 300 Jun 2026 141 | | +199.6% March quarter surge +93.5% June quarter, year-on-year **Data-centre construction continues.**Information and telecommunications buildings investment increased 64.9% over the year to June. | | THE ECONOMIC DISTINCTION Imported servers lift investment but also imports, reducing the immediate GDP effect. Broader productivity gains depend on businesses adopting AI. | | Sources: US Census Bureau, August 2026 durable goods; ABS, June 2026 Private New Capital Expenditure; ABS, Data Centres in Economic Statistics.US figures are nominal orders; Australian figures are real investment. These are broader investment categories, not estimates of AI-only spending. | ### Macquarie Bank growth: APRA data sharpens CBA capital debate URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/macquarie-bank-growth-apra-data-sharpens-cba-capital-debate/ Last updated: 2026-09-30T00:17:49.000Z APRA’s August 2026 banking statistics show Macquarie Bank with $366.2 billion of resident assets, up 22.7 per cent over the past year, compared with growth of 6.6 per cent across the banking system. The expansion is concentrated where Macquarie competes directly with the majors. Its housing loan book reached $187.9 billion, up 24.8 per cent over the year, against system growth of 5.9 per cent. Macquarie’s share of housing lending has risen from 6.4 per cent to 7.5 per cent in twelve months. Investor housing is growing faster. Macquarie now has $72.6 billion of investor mortgages, up 27.0 per cent, giving it an 8.9 per cent market share. The funding side is equally striking. Household deposits increased 33.8 per cent to $118.2 billion, lifting Macquarie’s share from 5.4 per cent to 6.7 per cent. Total resident deposits reached $238.5 billion, up 24.0 per cent. These numbers give greater significance to Commonwealth Bank’s criticism of Macquarie’s capital treatment. CBA has argued that Macquarie’s non-operating holding company structure can produce different capital outcomes for comparable activities. Macquarie rejects that proposition, saying its bank operates on a level playing field and its pricing reflects business choices rather than a capital advantage. The APRA monthly data cannot resolve that dispute. They measure Macquarie Bank’s domestic balance sheet, not the consolidated capital economics of Macquarie Group. What they do show is why the issue matters. Macquarie is not merely growing faster than the system: in mortgages and deposits it is taking material market share. As it becomes a larger force in Australian retail banking, the economic consequences of any genuine difference in capital treatment become more important. | MACQUARIE BANK \| AUGUST 2026 | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | | Macquarie continues to take banking market share | | | Macquarie Bank's mortgages, deposits and total assets are growing substantially faster than the Australian banking system. | | | Measure Macquarie 12m growth System growth Market share Resident assets $366.2bn +22.7% +6.6% 6.0% Housing loans $187.9bn +24.8% +5.9% 7.5% Investor housing $72.6bn +27.0% +7.5% 8.9% Household deposits $118.2bn +33.8% +7.3% 6.7% Total resident deposits $238.5bn +24.0% +7.4% 6.8% | | | The CBA comparison **Housing loans:** Macquarie +24.8% \| CBA +6.9% **Household deposits:** Macquarie +33.8% | CBA +7.5% | | Source: APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, August 2026\. Housing loans comprise owner-occupied and investor housing loans. Growth rates are year-on-year. Benchmark Analytics calculations. | | ### Explainer: Why Australia's 23-year card surcharge experiment is ending URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/why-australias-card-surcharge-experiment-is-ending/ Last updated: 2026-09-29T21:00:47.000Z From **1 October 2026**, card surcharges will largely disappear from Australian shops. But describing this as an RBA “ban on surcharging” misses the most interesting part of the story. Australia is actually unwinding a regulatory intervention that began in **2003**. Before 2003, Visa and Mastercard generally prohibited merchants from adding a surcharge when customers paid by credit card. The Reserve Bank regarded those “no-surcharge” rules as inefficient. A customer using an expensive credit card could pay exactly the same shop price as somebody using a cheaper payment method, with the merchant recovering payment costs through prices charged to everybody. The RBA therefore required the schemes to allow merchants to surcharge from **1 January 2003**. American Express and Diners Club made similar undertakings. The reform had two economic objectives: give consumers a price signal encouraging cheaper payment methods, and give merchants leverage to negotiate lower card-acceptance fees. Initially, that logic was powerful. The person choosing the more costly payment method could be asked to pay its additional cost. But the system evolved. As surcharging spread, some charges bore little relationship to actual payment costs. In **2013**, the RBA allowed card schemes to limit surcharges to the “reasonable cost of acceptance”. In **2016**, Parliament prohibited excessive payment surcharges and gave the ACCC enforcement powers. The bigger change, however, was technological and behavioural. Cash fell from **69% of in-person transactions in 2007 to around 15% in 2025**. Many small businesses adopted payment plans charging one blended percentage for all cards, and only about **5% of merchants now apply different surcharge rates to debit and credit cards**. A surcharge therefore often no longer tells a customer which payment instrument actually costs less. The RBA estimates **16% of Australian merchants** surcharged designated cards in 2024–25, generating around **$1.8 billion of surcharges**. It also found poor disclosure, enforcement difficulties and payment providers offering merchants effectively “fee-free” arrangements by automatically passing their charges to customers. So the RBA has changed where it wants the competitive pressure to operate. From 1 October, it will stop prohibiting Visa, Mastercard and eftpos from imposing no-surcharge rules. Those networks have chosen to do so. American Express, UnionPay and PayPal are also removing surcharging, although they are not covered by the same RBA regulation. The cost of accepting a card does **not** disappear. A merchant must absorb it, negotiate a cheaper payments deal, or incorporate it into the advertised price. Consumers using cheaper payment methods will consequently again bear some of the cost of more expensive cards. That is why the reform is a package rather than simply the end of surcharging. From the same date, the RBA is reducing domestic interchange caps and requiring greater disclosure of card and merchant-service fees. Australia is therefore returning to something resembling the pre-2003 pricing model — but in a world where cards dominate payments and cash is no longer obviously the cheaper alternative. Australia's card surcharge experiment From no surcharging → surcharging → back to no-surcharge rules | Pre-2003 | **Card networks prohibit surcharging** Visa and Mastercard rules generally prevent merchants charging customers extra for paying by credit card. | | --------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 2003 | **RBA gives merchants freedom to surcharge** The RBA prohibits card networks from imposing no-surcharge rules. Objective: expose consumers to payment costs and encourage lower-cost payment choices. | | 2013 | **Surcharging is constrained** Card schemes are allowed to limit surcharges to a merchant's reasonable cost of accepting the card. | | 2016 | **Excessive surcharging prohibited by law** Merchants cannot surcharge above their permitted cost of acceptance. The ACCC receives enforcement powers. | | 2025 | **Payments have fundamentally changed** Cash falls to around 15% of in-person payments. Around 16% of merchants surcharge designated cards. Estimated surcharges reach $1.8 billion. | | 1 Oct2026 | **Card networks restore no-surcharge rules** The RBA stops prohibiting no-surcharge rules. Visa, Mastercard and eftpos then use their scheme rules and contracts to prevent merchants surcharging their cards. | **The key point:** the RBA is not directly banning merchants from surcharging. It is removing the regulatory prohibition that has prevented card networks from imposing their own no-surcharge rules since 2003\. **What doesn't disappear?** The cost of accepting cards. Merchants will still pay payment-processing costs. These can be absorbed, negotiated down or incorporated into the general prices of goods and services. **Source:** Reserve Bank of Australia; ACCC. Surcharges disappear. Payment costs don't. | **Today** | Merchant can pass card acceptance cost directly to the card user | | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **From 1 October** | Merchant absorbs the cost, negotiates a lower payment fee, or incorporates the cost into general prices | The reform changes **who sees the payment cost and how it is recovered**. It does not make card payments free. ### Household spending flat as RBA weighs rate rise in a few hours URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/household-spending-flat-as-rba-weighs-rate-rise-in-a-few-hours/ Last updated: 2026-09-29T01:39:36.000Z Australia’s latest household spending data give the Reserve Bank a slightly softer picture of consumer demand only hours before today’s interest-rate decision. The ABS Monthly Household Spending Indicator was flat in August in seasonally adjusted, current-price terms, after rising 1.1 per cent in July. Spending was still 6.8 per cent higher than a year earlier, while the trend estimate rose 0.5 per cent over the month and 6.3 per cent through the year. The composition matters. Discretionary spending fell 0.3 per cent, while non-discretionary spending rose 0.6 per cent. Services spending fell 0.3 per cent, offset by a 0.3 per cent rise in goods. Transport was the standout category, up 2.3 per cent, while recreation and culture fell 1.4 per cent. For the RBA, this is a mixed signal. The flat monthly result suggests the strong spending growth through June and July has lost momentum. That is consistent with the Bank’s objective of keeping aggregate demand subdued enough to reduce capacity pressures. But the annual figure remains strong, and the 0.5 per cent rise in the trend measure suggests underlying spending has not stalled. These are also nominal figures: part of the 6.8 per cent annual increase reflects higher prices rather than stronger real consumption. The result therefore slightly reduces the pressure for tighter policy at the margin, but is unlikely to dominate today’s decision. The RBA has repeatedly said inflation remains too high and that excess demand may still be present. July trimmed-mean inflation was 3.6 per cent, while August unemployment has risen to 4.6 per cent. The August CPI is not released until tomorrow. The Board therefore faces two signals: inflation and underlying demand remain firm, while household spending and the labour market are showing clearer signs of slowing. Before today’s release, markets were pricing roughly a 90 per cent probability of a 25 basis point rate increase. Monthly Household Spending Indicator — August 2026 Household spending stalls in August A softer monthly result for the RBA — but underlying spending growth remains positive. | Indicator | Monthly | Annual | | ---------------------------------------- | ------- | ------ | | **Total spending — seasonally adjusted** | 0.0% | +6.8% | | **Total spending — trend** | +0.5% | +6.3% | | Discretionary spending | −0.3% | +7.2% | | Non-discretionary spending | +0.6% | +6.3% | | Goods | +0.3% | +7.7% | | Services | −0.3% | +5.9% | Where did spending move? | Transport | **+2.3%** | | --------------------------- | --------- | | Hotels, cafes & restaurants | +0.8% | | Recreation & culture | **−1.4%** | | Clothing & footwear | −1.0% | THE RBA READ **Softer — but not soft.** The seasonally adjusted monthly result has stalled, but the trend measure is still rising. Combined with elevated underlying inflation, the data provide some evidence that monetary tightening is working without yet showing that household demand has weakened sharply. Today's monetary policy backdrop | Cash rate before today's meeting | **4.35%** | | ------------------------------------------- | --------- | | July headline CPI | 3.5% | | July trimmed-mean CPI | **3.6%** | | August unemployment rate | 4.6% | | Pre-release market probability of 25bp hike | **\~90%** | Source: ABS, Monthly Household Spending Indicator, August 2026; ABS Consumer Price Index; ABS Labour Force; RBA; market pricing reported 28 September 2026\. Current-price household spending data are nominal. ### Yep, Costello taxed more than Chalmers...but borrowed much less URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/yep-costello-taxed-more-than-chalmers-but-borrowed-much-less/ Last updated: 2026-09-28T22:57:02.000Z How much tax Australia collects relative to the size of the economy has changed substantially over the past six decades. A debate is raging as to which Australian Treasurer taxed the most. Using the ABS Modellers’ Database, Benchmark Analytics has calculated a quarterly tax-to-GDP measure by combining indirect taxes, household income tax payable and resident-corporation income tax, and dividing the total by nominal GDP. The series begins in the September quarter of 1959\. That means the Chifley and Fadden periods cannot be assessed from this dataset. The longer-run trend is striking. During Harold Holt’s period as Treasurer, the quarterly tax measure averaged 18.56 per cent of GDP. It averaged 20.00 per cent under William McMahon, 21.45 per cent under Billy Snedden and 23.10 per cent during Frank Crean’s term. By John Howard’s period as Treasurer, from 1977 to 1983, the average had reached 25.75 per cent. During Paul Keating’s lengthy term it averaged 27.88 per cent. Peter Costello’s 1996–2007 period recorded an average of 29.47 per cent. The measure subsequently averaged 26.27 per cent during Wayne Swan’s tenure, which included the global financial crisis, before rising through 27.27 per cent under Joe Hockey, 28.24 per cent under Scott Morrison and 28.62 per cent under Josh Frydenberg. For Jim Chalmers, the average through the June quarter of 2026 is 29.11 per cent. These figures should not be interpreted simply as the tax policies chosen by individual Treasurers. The ratio is also influenced by the economic cycle, company profits, wages, bracket creep and the composition of economic activity. The indirect-tax component also includes taxes outside direct Commonwealth control. The calculation nevertheless provides a consistent way of comparing the tax share of the Australian economy across different Treasury periods using the same quarterly national-accounts dataset. It should also be noted that the numbers do not reflect government borrowing. Government borrowing under Chalmers has been substantially higher than under Peter Costello. Borrowing has to - one day - be repaid by taxing people more. Benchmark Analytics Which Treasurer presided over the highest tax-to-GDP ratio? Average quarterly tax measure as a percentage of nominal GDP **Measure:** indirect taxes + household income tax payable + resident-corporation income tax, divided by current-price GDP. Quarterly observations are allocated to the Treasurer holding office for the majority of the quarter. | Rank | Treasurer | Term | Avg % GDP | | ---- | ------------------ | ----------- | ---------- | | 1 | **Peter Costello** | 1996–2007 | **29.47%** | | 2 | **Jim Chalmers** | 2022–2026\* | **29.11%** | | 3 | Josh Frydenberg | 2018–22 | **28.62%** | | 4 | Scott Morrison | 2015–18 | **28.24%** | | 5 | Paul Keating | 1983–91 | **27.88%** | | 6 | Ralph Willis | 1993–96 | **27.72%** | | 7 | Joe Hockey | 2013–15 | **27.27%** | | 8 | Chris Bowen | 2013 | **26.73%** | | 9 | John Kerin | 1991 | **26.62%** | | 10 | John Dawkins | 1991–93 | **26.58%** | | 11 | Wayne Swan | 2007–13 | **26.27%** | | 12 | John Howard | 1977–83 | **25.75%** | | 13 | Phillip Lynch | 1975–77 | **25.58%** | | 14 | Bill Hayden | 1975 | **23.70%** | | 15 | Dr Jim Cairns | 1974–75 | **23.69%** | | 16 | Frank Crean | 1972–74 | **23.10%** | | 17 | Billy Snedden | 1971–72 | **21.45%** | | 18 | Leslie Bury | 1969–71 | **20.86%** | | 19 | William McMahon | 1966–69 | **20.00%** | | 20 | Harold Holt | 1958–66 | **18.56%** | Source: ABS Modellers’ Database, June quarter 2026; Benchmark Analytics calculations. \*Jim Chalmers figure covers available quarterly data through June quarter 2026\. The measure combines indirect taxes, household income tax payable and resident-corporation income tax as a percentage of current-price GDP. ### Background to the RBA decision today at 2.30pm URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/background-to-the-rba-decision-today-at-2-30pm/ Last updated: 2026-09-28T22:00:47.000Z The Reserve Bank of Australia announces its next interest-rate decision at 2.30pm today. With the cash rate already at 4.35%, financial markets have been pricing a further 25-basis-point increase to 4.60%. The RBA has increased interest rates three times this year, by a combined 75 basis points, before holding steady at its June and August meetings. However, recent developments have complicated the inflation outlook. Inflation remains the central concern. Annual headline inflation eased to 3.5% in July, but underlying inflation, measured by the trimmed mean, remained at 3.6%. Housing costs rose 5.0% annually, while automotive fuel prices jumped 7.5% in July. Continuing Middle East tensions and higher energy costs present additional inflation risks. Meanwhile, the labour market is showing signs of cooling. August unemployment reached 4.6%, with full-time employment falling by 6,300 despite total employment increasing by 39,500\. Participation also increased. The ABS cautions against overinterpreting individual monthly movements. The timing is particularly interesting. Last Tuesday, Governor Michele Bullock said unemployment between 4.5% and 5% would probably remove sufficient pressure from the labour market to help reduce inflation. Two days later, the ABS reported unemployment of 4.6%. This was an indicative assessment, not a formal unemployment target. Economic growth is also subdued. GDP increased just 0.4% in the June quarter, while annual wages growth moderated to 3.2% and labour productivity declined 0.2% over the year. Financial markets were pricing approximately a 95% probability of another increase on 22 September. The four major banks have also forecast a September increase. Tomorrow's decision will reveal how the RBA weighs persistent inflation and energy-price risks against an economy already experiencing slower growth and rising unemployment. The August inflation figures, due Wednesday, will provide the next important test. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| RBA WATCH The numbers behind today's decision Tuesday, 29 September 2026 | 2.30pm AEST | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------- | | Current cash rate 4.35% Three increases totalling 75bp in 2026 Market-implied hike probability 95% Reported 22 September; update before publication | | | Indicator Latest Period Headline inflation3.5%July, annualUnderlying inflation3.6%July, annualHousing inflation5.0%July, annualFuel prices+7.5%July, monthlyUnemployment4.6%AugustUnderemployment6.2%AugustWages growth3.2%June, annualGDP growth0.4%June quarterLabour productivity\-0.2%June, annual | | | The policy trade-off Underlying inflation remains above the RBA's 2–3% target range, while unemployment has reached 4.6% and annual labour productivity has declined. | | | Sources: ABS, RBA, Productivity Commission and Reuters. Market probability was reported on 22 September 2026 and should be refreshed before Monday publication. | | ### Understanding CBA's capital argument against Macquarie Bank URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/understanding-cbas-capital-argument-against-macquarie-bank/ Last updated: 2026-09-28T08:36:39.000Z # Commonwealth Bank has raised concerns that differences in Australia’s regulatory architecture can allow similar financial activities to attract different capital requirements. At its February results, CBA chief executive Matt Comyn said competition was increasingly being shaped by differences in “business models, regulatory settings and architecture”. CBA-commissioned research subsequently published by Mandala argued for the principle that firms conducting the same activities with the same risks should face the same obligations. More recent CBA-commissioned analysis reported in September specifically examined Macquarie’s structure and reportedly estimated that comparable capital treatment could require Macquarie to hold around **$18 billion more capital**. That Macquarie-specific analysis has not been publicly released. To understand the issue, start with **bank capital**. Banks fund their assets using deposits, wholesale borrowing and shareholder capital. Capital is not money kept in a vault. It is funding — principally shareholder equity — that can absorb losses before depositors and other creditors suffer them. APRA therefore requires banks to maintain minimum amounts of capital relative to their **risk-weighted assets**. Higher-risk assets generally require more capital than lower-risk assets. The purpose is to limit leverage and ensure banks can withstand losses. CBA and Macquarie have different corporate structures. CBA itself is the authorised deposit-taking institution. Its regulatory capital is measured across its APRA Level 2 banking group. Macquarie Group Limited, by contrast, is a **non-operating holding company**, or NOHC. Beneath it sits Macquarie Bank Group and a separate Non-Bank Group. Macquarie Bank is subject to APRA’s banking capital rules. But capital for the Non-Bank Group is calculated using Macquarie’s APRA-agreed **Economic Capital Adequacy Model**. Macquarie’s overall minimum capital requirement is broadly the Bank Group requirement plus the separately calculated Non-Bank Group requirement. That distinction creates the capital issue. If $100 of economic risk requires $10 of shareholder capital when conducted inside a banking group but only $7 under another capital methodology, $3 less equity is required to support the activity. That matters because shareholder capital is relatively expensive. Investors expect a return on their equity. Requiring less equity can therefore reduce the amount of profit that must be earned from an activity to achieve a given return. The potential competitive implication follows directly: **a lower capital requirement can create greater capacity to offer lower lending rates or higher deposit rates while maintaining the same target return on equity**. That is the economic mechanism behind CBA’s concern. Macquarie rejects the proposition that its bank receives preferential capital treatment and says its mortgage and deposit pricing reflects business choices rather than a capital advantage. | BANK CAPITAL EXPLAINER Why corporate structure can affect banking economics | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 1 · WHAT IS CAPITAL? Banks fund assets with **deposits, borrowing and shareholder capital**. Capital is the loss-absorbing funding that protects depositors and creditors when losses occur. | | 2 · THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE CBA Commonwealth Bank is itself the authorised deposit-taking institution. APRA capital rules apply across its Level 2 banking group. MACQUARIE Macquarie Group is a NOHC sitting above a Bank Group and a separate Non-Bank Group. | | 3 · TWO CAPITAL METHODOLOGIES MACQUARIE BANK GROUP APRA banking capital rules ↓ Risk-weighted assets ↓ Regulatory capital requirement MACQUARIE NON-BANK GROUP Economic Capital Adequacy Model ↓ Economic-risk assessment ↓ Separate capital requirement | | 4 · WHY THE DIFFERENCE MATTERS ECONOMIC RISK $100 METHOD A $10 equity required METHOD B $7 equity required Illustrative example. Lower required equity means less expensive shareholder funding is needed to support the same amount of activity. | | 5 · THE PRICING CHANNEL Lower capital requirement → lower equity cost per $ of business → greater pricing capacity Potentially allowing **lower loan rates**, **higher deposit rates**, or a higher return on equity. | | \~$18 billion Reported CBA/Mandala estimate of additional capital that could result from applying comparable capital treatment. This is a CBA-commissioned estimate, not an APRA determination. | | THE ISSUE IN ONE SENTENCE If comparable financial risks attract different capital requirements, the institution required to use less shareholder capital may have a lower cost of providing the activity. | ### Australia's banking accountability rules are being simplified. What is changing? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-banking-accountability-rules-are-being-simplified-what-is-changing/ Last updated: 2026-09-27T21:00:35.000Z Australia's financial regulators are proposing to simplify the Financial Accountability Regime (FAR), which governs the responsibilities of senior executives and directors across banking, insurance and superannuation. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) estimate that the changes will reduce reporting obligations affecting approximately 4,500 accountable people and at least halve the number of updates institutions make to their accountability maps. ### What is FAR? FAR requires financial institutions to identify which senior executives and directors are responsible for particular activities, risks and decisions. Institutions must allocate accountability clearly, register accountable individuals and notify regulators of specified changes. Senior executives have personal obligations, including taking reasonable steps to prevent matters arising that would adversely affect the institution's prudential standing. The regime also links remuneration to accountability. Generally, at least 40% of an accountable person's variable remuneration must be deferred for four years, subject to a $50,000 threshold and other exemptions. ### How did FAR develop? The Banking Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR) commenced in July 2018 following concerns about misconduct and executive accountability in banking. The 2019 Financial Services Royal Commission recommended extending the framework across APRA-regulated institutions. Parliament enacted FAR in September 2023\. It commenced for banks on 15 March 2024 and extended to insurers and superannuation trustees on 15 March 2025\. Unlike BEAR, which APRA administered alone, FAR is jointly administered by APRA and ASIC. ### Why is FAR being amended? Following implementation and industry consultation, the regulators identified reporting requirements they consider unnecessary for effective supervision. For example, changes to reporting lines can require an institution to update its accountability map even when the underlying executive responsibilities remain unchanged. The proposed reforms seek to distinguish genuine changes in accountability from routine organisational administration. However, the regulators have not yet published a quantified estimate of the resulting dollar savings. ### What are the key changes? In June 2026, APRA and ASIC announced a package of simplification measures. Formal consultation on two regulatory changes commenced in September. First, institutions would no longer need to report prescribed key-function information for inclusion in the register of accountable persons. Second, accountability maps would no longer need to identify accountable persons' direct reporting lines. Regulators estimate this change will at least halve the number of map updates. Separately, the proposed reforms include a higher threshold for notifying changes in accountability. The Government also intends to amend FAR legislation so institutions provide accountability statements and maps on request rather than automatically lodging them. Registration deadlines would be extended. The regulators expect their current consultation proposals to take effect in early 2027\. Submissions close on 2 October 2026. The important test will be whether fewer reporting obligations produce measurable compliance savings without reducing regulators' ability to identify the executives responsible when something goes wrong. | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| REGULATION FAR: Reducing the reporting burden APRA and ASIC's proposed financial accountability reforms | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 4,500 Accountable people Affected by proposed reporting simplification At least 50% Fewer map updates Estimated reduction for relevant institutions | | What is proposed to change? Requirement Proposed reform Key-function reporting Remove prescribed key-function information from the register Accountability maps Remove direct-reporting-line detail Change notifications Increase the threshold for reporting material changes Initial lodgement Provide maps and statements on request, subject to legislation | | What stays in place? Underlying accountability duties and remuneration-deferral requirements are not being removed. | | Sources: APRA and ASIC, June and September 2026\. Estimates are projected reporting reductions, not verified dollar savings. The proposals remain subject to consultation and, where applicable, legislative change. | ### Machines execute 85% of Australian share trading. ASIC is tightening the rules URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/machines-execute-85-of-australian-share-trading-asic-is-tightening-the-rules/ Last updated: 2026-09-26T23:27:07.000Z Australia's financial markets have undergone a remarkable transformation. Computers now execute an estimated 85% of trading in Australian listed equities. In some futures markets, the proportion is even higher. ASIC has responded by introducing new rules to manage the risks of increasingly automated markets. ### What is algorithmic trading? Algorithmic trading uses computer programs to decide when, how and sometimes whether to buy or sell financial instruments. An investment fund purchasing $100 million of shares, for example, might use an algorithm to spread its purchases across thousands of transactions, reducing their impact on market prices. Other algorithms exploit small price differences between markets or continuously provide buying and selling quotes. High-frequency trading takes automation further, executing transactions in milliseconds or faster. Importantly, algorithmic trading is not synonymous with artificial intelligence. Conventional algorithms follow programmed rules, whereas AI-enabled systems can identify patterns and adapt their behaviour using machine learning. ### Which markets are affected? ASIC estimates that algorithms account for 85% of Australian listed-equity trading, 94% of SPI 200 futures trading and 46% of three-year Treasury bond futures trading. These markets are central to Australia's financial system. Equities facilitate investment in companies, share-index futures allow investors to hedge market exposure, and bond futures help financial institutions manage interest-rate risk. The figures measure algorithmic trading activity, not the proportion of investors using AI. ### What has ASIC found? Automation can improve liquidity, reduce transaction costs and facilitate faster execution. However, it introduces risks that traditional market supervision was not designed to address. Faulty algorithms can generate large volumes of erroneous orders. Interactions between automated systems may amplify price movements during volatile trading. AI models introduce additional uncertainty because their decisions can be difficult to explain or predict. ASIC has identified these as potential threats to orderly markets, rather than evidence that automated trading is inherently harmful. ### What is ASIC doing? On 24 September 2026, ASIC finalised amendments to its Market Integrity Rules covering securities and futures markets. The changes strengthen requirements for market participants to develop, test, monitor and govern trading systems and algorithms. They also clarify the prohibition on trading that creates a false or misleading appearance in financial markets, including AI-enabled activity. The technology-neutral rules commence on 18 March 2028, following an 18-month transition. ASIC is simultaneously consulting on simpler regulatory guidance, proposing to reduce its volume for securities-market participants by almost 60%. This reduction is proposed, not yet implemented. The underlying regulatory question is increasingly important: as computers undertake more trading decisions, how can financial institutions retain effective control over their behaviour? | BENCHMARK ANALYTICS \| FINANCIAL MARKETS The machines are doing the trading ASIC estimates of algorithmic trading in major Australian markets | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | SPI 200 futuresHedging Australian share-market exposure 94% | | Australian listed equitiesBuying and selling listed company shares 85% | | Three-year Treasury bond futuresTrading short-term government bond exposure 46% | | ASIC's regulatory response | | 2028 New rules commence 18 March; 18-month transition \~60% Less guidance proposed Relevant securities guidance | | Sources: ASIC, August 2025 trading estimates and September 2026 market integrity rule amendments. Percentages are estimates of algorithmic trading, not AI trading. The guidance reduction remains a proposal. | ### Unemployment under Australia's prime ministers URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/unemployment-under-australias-prime-ministers/ Last updated: 2026-09-25T21:00:22.000Z Australia's unemployment rate increased to 4.6 per cent in August. How does today's labour market compare with the unemployment rates experienced under previous prime ministers? Benchmark Analytics has calculated the average monthly unemployment rate during each prime ministerial term using seasonally adjusted ABS data from February 1978 to August 2026. Australia experienced markedly different labour market conditions over these 48 years. Average unemployment was 8.12 per cent during Bob Hawke's prime ministership and 9.89 per cent during Paul Keating's. During John Howard's government, it averaged 6.35 per cent, compared with 4.96 per cent during Kevin Rudd's first term. More recently, unemployment averaged 5.37 per cent under Scott Morrison and 3.98 per cent under Anthony Albanese to August 2026. These comparisons require care in interpretation. Prime ministers inherit economic conditions, while international recessions, financial crises, pandemics and structural changes influence employment outcomes. The averages also cover substantially different periods. Kevin Rudd's second term provides just three monthly observations, while the available data excludes Malcolm Fraser's first two years. Source: ABS, Labour Force, Australia, August 2026, Table 001; Benchmark Analytics calculations. Historical ABS data before February 1978 is available quarterly but is not included in this comparison. | Unemployment under Australia's prime ministers Average monthly unemployment, February 1978 – August 2026 | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------ | | Prime minister | Average | Months | | Malcolm Fraser\* | 6.42% | 61 | | Bob Hawke | 8.12% | 106 | | Paul Keating | 9.89% | 50 | | John Howard | 6.35% | 141 | | Kevin Rudd (2007–10) | 4.96% | 31 | | Julia Gillard | 5.21% | 36 | | Kevin Rudd (2013) | 5.72% | 3 | | Tony Abbott | 6.06% | 23 | | Malcolm Turnbull | 5.65% | 36 | | Scott Morrison | 5.37% | 45 | | Anthony Albanese† | 3.98% | 51 | | Source: ABS Labour Force, August 2026, Table 001; Benchmark Analytics calculations. Seasonally adjusted monthly observations, allocated according to the prime minister in office on the 15th of each month. \* Fraser: from February 1978 only. † Albanese: through August 2026\. Descriptive figures, not measures of government performance. | | | ### Australia and America store their wealth very differently URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-and-america-store-their-wealth-very-differently/ Last updated: 2026-09-24T21:00:51.000Z Australians and Americans are both wealthy by global standards, but they store that wealth very differently. At the end of 2025, Australian households owned about **$22.25 trillion in gross assets**. Of that, **$12.53 trillion was tied up in land and dwellings**. That means housing accounted for approximately **56% of everything Australian households owned**. The American household balance sheet looks very different. US households held about **US$192.4 trillion of assets**, of which US$47.9 trillion was real estate. Housing therefore represented only around **25% of total household assets**. The remaining **75% was held outside housing**. The comparison is important because simply comparing houses with directly owned shares understates Australian financial wealth. Australians held about **$4.55 trillion in superannuation reserves** at the end of 2025\. Those funds ultimately own shares, bonds, infrastructure and other assets. In this comparison, superannuation is therefore included in non-housing wealth rather than being overlooked. The result is still striking. **More than half of Australian household assets are stored in housing, compared with only one-quarter in the United States.** That has economic consequences. Australian household wealth is particularly sensitive to house prices, mortgage rates, credit conditions and housing policy. American household wealth is much more heavily concentrated outside residential property and consequently more exposed to financial markets. The countries have not simply accumulated different amounts of wealth. They have built very different household balance sheets. Where households store their wealth | Share of household assets | Australia | United States | | ------------------------- | --------- | ------------- | | **Housing** | **56.3%** | **24.9%** | | **Non-housing assets** | **43.7%** | **75.1%** | **The difference:** housing accounts for more than half of Australian household assets, but only around one-quarter of US household assets. Notes: Gross household assets, end-2025\. Australian housing is land and dwellings; US housing is household real estate. Australian superannuation is included within non-housing assets. Dollar values are not converted between currencies because the comparison is based on asset shares. Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics; US Federal Reserve Financial Accounts. ### Barclays returns to towns where it closed branches two years ago URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/barclays-returns-to-towns-where-it-closed-branches-two-years-ago/ Last updated: 2026-09-24T07:10:10.000Z Barclays is preparing to open new UK bank branches for the first time in around a decade. The more revealing fact is where it is opening them. The bank will establish branches in Bishop’s Stortford, Poole and Beverley this autumn, with a fourth location expected before year-end. Each is expected to employ about six staff and emphasise private, face-to-face conversations rather than routine counter transactions. All three towns have seen Barclays leave before. Poole closed on 8 March 2024, Beverley on 21 March and Bishop’s Stortford on 12 April. Just over two years later, Barclays is returning. That follows an extraordinary contraction. Barclays reported 2,080 UK branches in 2002 and 1,362 at the end of 2015\. The network fell to 963 in 2019, 666 in 2021, 481 in 2022, 306 in 2023 and 206 by the end of 2025 — an 85 per cent reduction since 2015\. It remained at 206 in June 2026. Barclays did not simply withdraw from physical service. By 2023 it also operated 351 “Barclays Local” sites in community locations and 16 mobile service points, while participating in shared banking hubs. The industry-wide retreat was similarly dramatic. Which? calculates that 6,871 UK bank and building-society branches have closed since January 2015, equivalent to 69 per cent of the network. It estimates Barclays alone closed 1,236, the largest reduction by an individual bank. Britain has meanwhile built 250 shared banking hubs, with 350 targeted by government. The economics behind the closures are clear. Cash represented only 9 per cent of UK payments in 2024, while 26 per cent of banked adults had used a branch for face-to-face banking during the previous year. But Barclays now appears to be separating transactions from relationships. UK chief executive Vim Maru, who took over in 2024, paused the closure program and signalled in April that branches would expand again. The new format is aimed at customers seeking help with more complex and longer-term financial decisions. This is not a return to the old branch model. It is evidence that digital banking may have changed what branches are for without eliminating the commercial value of staffed, face-to-face banking. | Barclays: a decade of branch contraction | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | After years of closures, Barclays is opening new UK branches again. | | | 2015 | **1,362 UK branches**Barclays still operates a large nationwide physical network. | | 2019 | **Last-in-town protection**Barclays temporarily freezes closures at 105 last-in-town and remote branches as concern about physical access grows. | | 2023 | **177 branches close during the year**Barclays increasingly shifts face-to-face support towards alternatives including Barclays Local sites. | | 2025 | **206 branches remain**Barclays extends opening hours across 86 branches, adding around 33,500 hours of annual in-branch availability. | | 2026 | **New branches return**Bishop's Stortford, Poole and Beverley are announced, with a fourth expected before year-end. The new format emphasises staff, private meeting space and more complex financial conversations. | | Context: 6,872 UK bank and building-society branches closed between January 2015 and June 2026 — around 69% of the network. Sources: Barclays, House of Commons Library, Which?, September 2026\. | | ### Is anyone still working long hours? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/is-anyone-still-working-long-hours/ Last updated: 2026-09-24T01:46:08.000Z Australia's latest labour force figures show unemployment rising to 4.6%. But behind the monthly figures is a structural change in how Australians work: the long working week is becoming increasingly uncommon. In August, employment increased by 39,500 people. Full-time employment fell by 6,300, while part-time employment rose by 45,800\. One month's figures can be volatile, particularly following recent changes to the ABS survey. The longer-term picture is more revealing. Using 12-month averages, Australia's employed population increased from 8.28 million in 1996 to 14.72 million in 2026\. Yet the number actually working 50 hours or more a week barely changed, rising from 1.45 million to 1.50 million. Their share of employment fell from 17.6% to just 10.2%. The proportion working at least 40 hours also declined, from 44.1% to 33.2%. Average weekly hours actually worked fell from 34.1 to 31.4 per employed person. Part-time employment explains some of this change. Its share of total employment increased from 24.5% to 31.1%. But working patterns within both groups have also changed. Average monthly hours among full-time workers declined from approximately 176 to 163, while those of part-time workers increased from 66 to 76. Shorter working weeks are not necessarily evidence of economic weakness. Many Australians prefer flexible arrangements, while others would welcome additional hours. August's underemployment rate was 6.2%. The economic distinction is between employment and actual labour input. Over the year to August, trend employment grew 1.6%, but hours worked increased only 1.0%. Australia has considerably more workers than three decades ago. Each, on average, is working fewer hours. Understanding labour supply requires measuring both. Source: ABS, Labour Force, Australia, August 2026, Tables 001, 017 and 018\. Historical comparisons use 12-month averages ending August. | Australia's changing working week 1996 versus 2026 \| 12-month averages to August | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | | Growth in employment +78% 6.44 million additional workers | Growth in 50+ hour workers +3% Only about 46,000 more | | Measure 1996 2026 Employed people 8.28m 14.72m Working 50+ hours 1.45m 1.50m Share working 50+ hours 17.6% 10.2% Share working 40+ hours 44.1% 33.2% Average actual weekly hours 34.1 31.4 | | | Source: ABS Labour Force, Australia, Table 018\. Original estimates, 12-month averages ending August. Hours refer to actual work in the survey reference week, not contracted hours. All figures rounded. | | ### Why the ACCC blocked IAG's acquisition of RAC Insurance URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/accc-iag-rac-insurance-merger-decision/ Last updated: 2026-09-24T01:25:59.000Z The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has prohibited Insurance Australia Group's proposed $1.35 billion acquisition of RAC Insurance, finding that it would substantially lessen competition in Western Australia's motor and home insurance markets. The decision, announced on 23 September, is an early test of Australia's new mandatory merger regime. However, the transaction is not necessarily finished: IAG intends to pursue approval through a separate public-benefit assessment. ### What was IAG proposing? IAG, which owns NRMA Insurance and acquired Queensland's RACQ Insurance in 2025, proposed to buy 100% of RAC Insurance from the Royal Automobile Club of Western Australia. The $1.35 billion arrangement comprised $400 million for the insurance company and $950 million for an exclusive, 20-year distribution and brand-licensing agreement. IAG would underwrite RAC-branded motor and home insurance, while RAC would continue distributing policies to its Western Australian members. RAC's roadside assistance and other non-insurance businesses were excluded. ### What legal restrictions apply? Australia's merger regime changed on 1 January 2026\. Acquisitions meeting prescribed thresholds must be notified to the ACCC and cannot proceed without approval. The central legal test is whether an acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially lessen competition. IAG first sought informal clearance in 2025, but the ACCC opposed the proposal in December. It notified the transaction again under the new regime in March 2026. Following an initial assessment, the ACCC commenced an in-depth Phase 2 investigation in April. Its September determination means the acquisition cannot proceed in its present form. IAG can seek a separate public-benefit assessment within 21 calendar days. The ACCC then has 50 business days, subject to extensions, to determine whether demonstrated public benefits outweigh the transaction's likely detriments. Tribunal review is another available avenue. ### Why did the ACCC reject the transaction? The proposed market shares were central to the decision. The combined IAG would control approximately 55–65% of Western Australian motor insurance and 50–60% of home and contents insurance. RAC is already the market leader in both markets. But concentration alone was not the entire argument. The ACCC found that RAC and IAG were effective competitors, with strong brands, established customer relationships and substantial operational capabilities. Other insurers, including Allianz, QBE, Suncorp and several smaller competitors, would remain. Nevertheless, the regulator concluded they would not sufficiently constrain the combined business. Historically, competing insurers have struggled to expand their Western Australian market shares. The ACCC also examined the alternative scenario. Despite rising claims, reinsurance and regulatory costs, it considered RAC capable of remaining an effective independent competitor. The regulator investigated whether IAG could restrict competitors' access to smash repairers but ultimately found insufficient evidence to establish that additional competition concern. AIG and RAC argue that their partnership would provide greater financial resilience and long-term benefits for members. Their next opportunity is to demonstrate that those public benefits outweigh the competition concerns identified by the ACCC. Why the ACCC rejected IAG–RAC Estimated combined Western Australian insurance market shares Motor insurance 55–65% | | | | | | Home and contents insurance 50–60% | | | | | | Bars show the midpoint of the ACCC's estimated ranges. | $1.35bn Total transaction arrangement | 20 years Exclusive distribution agreement | | ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | | Issue | ACCC finding | | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | | Motor insurance | Substantial lessening of competition | | Home and contents | Substantial lessening of competition | | Smash repair services | Insufficient evidence to establish additional concern | **What happens next?** IAG can seek a public-benefit assessment within 21 calendar days of the ACCC's decision. The statutory assessment period is 50 business days, subject to extensions. Source: ACCC, 23 September 2026 decision; May 2026 Notice of Competition Concerns. Estimates relate to Western Australia, not national market shares. ### Australia’s manufacturing recovery is concentrated in four industries URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-manufacturing-recovery-is-concentrated-in-four-industries/ Last updated: 2026-09-23T21:00:12.000Z Australian manufacturing employment is recovering, but the recovery is much narrower than the headline numbers suggest. ABS Australian Industry data show manufacturing employment increased from 844,100 in June 2019 to 900,800 in June 2025 — a gain of 56,700 jobs, or 6.7 per cent. Employment is now above 900,000 for the first time since 2012, after falling to 830,200 in 2020. But 49,500 of those additional jobs came from just four of the 15 manufacturing subdivisions: food products, fabricated metal products, transport equipment, and machinery and equipment. Together, they account for **87.3 per cent of the net increase in manufacturing employment since 2019**. Food manufacturing made the largest contribution, adding 17,700 jobs to reach 231,500 employees. Transport equipment added 14,100 jobs, fabricated metals 9,300 and machinery and equipment 8,400. The same concentration appears in industry value added. Total manufacturing industry value added increased by $32.0 billion between 2019 and 2025, from $109.9 billion to $142.0 billion. The same four industries accounted for $26.5 billion — **82.7 per cent** — of that nominal increase. This matters because the recovery should not be interpreted as a simple return of Australia’s old manufacturing economy. Manufacturing employment remains about 105,000 below its 2007 level. And the composition of the sector has changed markedly. Food manufacturing now employs 231,500 people, more than one-quarter of all manufacturing workers. By contrast, textile, leather, clothing and footwear employment has fallen from 53,800 in 2007 to 24,500, while printing employment has more than halved from 50,400 to 24,000. Transport equipment is particularly notable. Employment fell heavily during the long decline of Australian automotive manufacturing, reaching 71,300 in 2019\. It has since rebounded to 85,400\. The category includes considerably more than passenger cars, so the source of that growth warrants closer examination. The aggregate story, then, is not that Australian manufacturing has simply returned. It is that a different manufacturing sector is emerging. Employment growth is increasingly concentrated in food, metal fabrication, transport equipment and machinery — while much of the older industrial base remains smaller than it was two decades ago. | Australia's manufacturing recovery is highly concentrated | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------ | | 87.3% of net manufacturing employment growth since 2019 came from four industries | | | | Industry | Jobs added2019–25 | Share ofnet growth | | Food products | +17,700 | 31.2% | | Transport equipment | +14,100 | 24.9% | | Fabricated metal products | +9,300 | 16.4% | | Machinery & equipment | +8,400 | 14.8% | | All other manufacturing | +7,200 | 12.7% | | Total manufacturing | +56,700 | 100% | | The same four industries accounted for **82.7%**of the increase in nominal manufacturing industry value added since 2019\. | | | | Source: ABS, Australian Industry, Manufacturing by industry subdivision, 2024–25\. Employment measured at end of June. Industry value added figures are nominal. | | | ### Private credit in Australia: What is going on? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/private-credit-australia-explainer/ Last updated: 2026-09-23T05:00:57.000Z Private credit is attracting unprecedented regulatory attention following the collapse of property developer Bathla and a fresh warning from ASIC that the industry should prepare for enforcement action. But what exactly is private credit, how large is it, and what has gone wrong? ## What is private credit? Private credit involves investors lending money to businesses outside conventional bank lending and public bond markets. Investment funds pool capital from institutions, superannuation funds and individual investors, then lend directly to businesses, property developers and other borrowers. Investors receive interest income but ultimately bear the risk of loan losses. Private credit can finance projects banks are unwilling or unable to support, particularly property development and more complex corporate lending. ## How big is the sector? ASIC puts Australian private credit at approximately $200 billion in assets under management, with roughly half exposed to real estate. However, the RBA's narrower estimate is approximately $50 billion in Australian private-credit loans outstanding at December 2025\. The estimates have different coverage and significant data gaps. Despite its rapid growth, private credit represents less than 2% of Australian financial-system assets, according to the RBA. Its aggregate systemic importance therefore remains relatively limited. ## What has gone wrong? ASIC's review of 28 private-credit funds exposed substantial weaknesses. Only four publicly disclosed the interest rates charged to borrowers. Just 12 had detailed written credit, impairment and default-management policies. Only two of the eight wholesale funds undertook liquidity stress testing. ASIC also identified conflicts of interest, inconsistent definitions of loan defaults and inadequate independence in valuations. These problems matter particularly when funds offer investors regular withdrawals while holding property-development loans that cannot be readily sold. Australia's considerable exposure to property development adds another vulnerability. Higher construction costs, delayed projects and falling collateral values can quickly turn apparently performing loans into troubled assets. The recent collapse of Bathla, which reportedly owed approximately $3 billion to more than 40 lenders, illustrates those risks. ## What is being done? ASIC has introduced ten principles covering governance, transparency, valuations, fees and risk management. It has issued stop orders against some funds and commenced enforcement investigations. Its latest surveillance covers retail and wholesale funds, with particular attention to valuations, redemption pressures and deteriorating credit. Superannuation trustees are also being pressed to scrutinise external managers rather than simply accepting their valuations. The central challenge is ensuring private credit remains an additional source of productive finance without exposing investors to poorly disclosed risks. The RBA currently sees limited evidence of widespread deterioration in Australian lending standards. ASIC's concern is that weaknesses in individual funds could become substantially more damaging during an economic downturn. Private credit under scrutiny Australia's market and what ASIC found | $200bn Broad estimate of assets under management | $50bn RBA estimate of loans outstanding | | ------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------- | These estimates have different coverage and are not directly comparable. | Risk | ASIC's finding | Why it matters | | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- | | **Disclosure** | **4 of 28** disclosed borrower interest rates | Investors cannot properly assess risk or fees. | | **Credit controls** | **12 of 28** had detailed credit or impairment/default policies | Poor loans may not be identified promptly. | | **Liquidity** | **2 of 8** wholesale funds stress-tested liquidity | Withdrawals may exceed readily available cash. | | **Valuations** | Most lacked effective independence in loan monitoring or valuation oversight | Conflicts may affect asset values and reported returns. | **What happens next?** ASIC's response includes ten guiding principles, stop orders, further surveillance, additional data collection and enforcement investigations. Source: ASIC REP 820 (November 2025); RBA (February–March 2026). Findings relate to ASIC's reviewed sample, not every Australian fund. ### Immigration and productivity: what Australia’s migrant settlement data reveal URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/immigration-and-productivity-what-australias-migrant-settlement-data-reveal/ Last updated: 2026-09-22T23:29:57.000Z Australia’s immigration debate concentrates heavily on migrant numbers. But if the objective is faster productivity growth, the composition of the immigration programme—and how effectively migrants use their skills—deserves equal attention. The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ latest migrant settlement data, released on 22 September, provide evidence of substantial differences in economic outcomes between visa categories. In 2023–24, skilled migrants aged 15–64 recorded median total income of $83,466, compared with $58,926 for family migrants and $43,910 for humanitarian migrants. The employment differences were also considerable. In 2021, 81.8% of working-age skilled migrants were employed, compared with 68.2% of family migrants and 46.0% of humanitarian migrants. Educational attainment tells a similar story. Almost 80% of skilled migrants held non-school qualifications, compared with 63.1% of family migrants and 36.2% of humanitarian migrants. English proficiency was also highest among skilled migrants, at 96.2%. | Migrant settlement outcomes | | | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------- | ------------ | | Australia \| Permanent migrants by visa stream | | | | | Indicator | Skilled | Family | Humanitarian | | Employed | 81.8% | 68.2% | 46.0% | | Non-school qualification | 79.7% | 63.1% | 36.2% | | English proficiency | 96.2% | 82.4% | 70.8% | | Median total income | $83,466 | $58,926 | $43,910 | | Employment and qualifications: ages 15–64, 2021\. English proficiency: all ages, 2021\. Median total income: ages 15–64, 2023–24, including government payments. These are descriptive outcomes, not direct productivity measures. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migrant Settlement Outcomes, 2026\. | | | | ### Explainer: Where your $100 petrol fill-up actually goes URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/explainer-where-your-100-petrol-fill-up-actually-goes/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T00:19:16.000Z At the current average price across Australia's five largest cities, **$100 buys about 45 litres of regular unleaded petrol**. But the money does not simply go to the service station. The price is built through a chain stretching from the international crude-oil market to an Australian petrol pump. Start with **crude oil**. In the week to 9 September, Brent crude was equivalent to about **93 Australian cents per litre**. On our $100 fill-up, that represents approximately **$41.82**. Brent is a benchmark rather than the literal crude barrel from which each litre of Australian petrol was produced, but it provides the upstream reference price. Crude must then be **refined into petrol**. Australia's relevant benchmark is Singapore Mogas 95, which was about **114 cents per litre** in that week. The 21-cent difference between Brent and Mogas — around **$9.44 of our $100** — is the international refining spread. It reflects the market value added in converting crude into petrol and changes with refinery capacity, petrol demand and crude supply. It should not be interpreted as Australian refinery profit. Next comes the **import and wholesale chain**. The petrol must be shipped or supplied domestically, meet Australian fuel specifications, insured, unloaded, stored and moved through terminals. The ACCC's wholesale category includes international shipping, fuel-quality premiums, insurance and losses, wharfage, terminal operations and wholesale marketing margins. Public data do not reliably separate those individual items. On the current numbers, this combined component is approximately **$8.83 per $100**. Then government enters the price. Fuel excise has been fully restored to **53.7 cents per litre**. That represents about **$24.15** of a $100 fill. GST adds another **$9.09**, because GST is one-eleventh of the final GST-inclusive price. Together, Commonwealth taxes account for approximately **$33.24 of the $100**. Finally comes the journey from the terminal to the motorist. Terminal-gate prices exclude transport to the service station and retail operating costs. The residual must fund **road transport, service-station wages, rent, electricity, administration and other operating costs — plus retailer profit**. Using a seven-day wholesale lag gives this final retail-stage bundle an estimated **$6.68 per $100**. That last figure is emphatically **not a $6.68 retailer profit**. The ACCC's longer-run gross retail measure includes both costs and profit, and can move substantially with petrol-price cycles and the timing of wholesale price changes. In 2025, for example, the five-city average gross indicative retail difference was 16.3 cents per litre. The striking conclusion is that the service station controls only the final part of the chain. **International crude and refining markets account for roughly half the current $100 fill, taxes about one-third, with wholesale logistics and the domestic retail system accounting for the remainder.** Where does a $100 petrol fill-up go? Illustrative breakdown using September 2026 fuel prices At 222.4 cents per litre $100 = about 45 litres | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | **Crude oil benchmark** Brent crude — upstream raw material value | $41.82 | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | | | **International refining spread** Difference between Brent crude and Singapore Mogas 95 | $9.44 | | | **Import & wholesale chain** Shipping, insurance, fuel-quality premium, losses, wharfage, terminal costs and wholesale margin | $8.83 | | | **Fuel excise** 53.7 cents per litre | $24.15 | | | **GST** One-eleventh of the GST-inclusive pump price | $9.09 | | | **Domestic transport & retail stage** Terminal-to-servo transport, wages, rent, utilities, administration and retailer profit | $6.68 | **Tax take: $33.24** Of every $100 spent at the pump in this illustration, $24.15 is fuel excise and $9.09 is GST. **Methodology:** Benchmark Analytics illustration using the ACCC five-city average retail price of 222.4 cpl on 16 September 2026, with Brent crude, Singapore Mogas 95 and terminal-gate prices lagged approximately one week to reflect the normal transmission of wholesale costs into retail prices. Figures are estimates rather than an accounting statement for an individual service station. The import/wholesale category cannot be separated precisely using public current data. The domestic retail category is a gross amount covering costs and profit — it is **not retailer profit**. Sources: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission; Australian Institute of Petroleum. ### Petrol jumps 14 cents in a week: how the oil shock reaches the bowser URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/petrol-prices-oil-price-lag-australia/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T00:03:16.000Z Australian petrol prices have moved sharply higher again. The ACCC says average retail petrol across Australia's five largest capital cities reached **222.4 cents per litre on 16 September**, an increase of **14.3 cents in one week**. Diesel rose almost identically, by 14.2 cents to 267.9 cents per litre. In Sydney, petrol increased 16.6 cents to 224.8 cents. The immediate cause is international markets. But the price of Brent crude oil does not simply translate directly into the Australian petrol price. Australia's relevant international benchmark for petrol is **Singapore Mogas 95** — the price of refined petrol in the Asia-Pacific market. Crude oil is its major input, but refinery capacity, product demand, shipping disruptions and refining margins can cause Mogas to move differently from crude. That distinction is visible now. Between the weeks ending 9 and 16 September, Brent crude rose from **US$107 to US$132 a barrel**. Mogas 95 increased from **US$130 to US$143**. Converted into Australian cents per litre, Mogas rose from **114 to 126 cents** — an 11% increase. The Australian dollar matters too. International fuel is priced in US dollars, so a weaker Australian dollar amplifies an international price increase while a stronger dollar can cushion it. From there, international refined-fuel prices feed into Australian wholesale prices. Average petrol terminal-gate prices across the five largest cities rose **13.7 cents to 219.8 cents per litre** in the latest week. Retail prices then rose 14.3 cents. Normally this transmission is not instantaneous. The ACCC says changes in international benchmarks can take **around two weeks** to work through the supply chain in major cities, while wholesale-to-retail changes typically take **one to two weeks**, largely because service stations change prices as stocks are replenished. Regional transmission can take longer. Those are typical lags, not rules. During the initial March oil shock, the ACCC found some retail prices increased almost simultaneously with wholesale prices rather than after the normal delay. Petrol price cycles in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth add another layer of short-term volatility. For inflation, the timing matters. The RBA estimates that a **10% increase in domestic fuel prices adds a little over 0.3 percentage points to headline inflation over one to two quarters**. Higher diesel and transport costs can then feed indirectly into other prices over a longer period. The oil shock therefore reaches consumers in stages — and the latest ACCC data show it is moving through the Australian pricing chain again. How the latest oil shock is reaching Australian petrol prices Movement from the week to 9 September to 16 September 2026 | Pricing stage | 9 Sep | 16 Sep | Change | | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | | **Brent crude oil** International crude price, converted to A¢/L | 93¢ | 116¢ | +23¢ | | **Singapore Mogas 95** Australia's refined-petrol benchmark | 114¢ | 126¢ | +12¢ | | **Australian wholesale** Five-city average terminal-gate price | 206.1¢ | 219.8¢ | +13.7¢ | | **Australian retail petrol** Five largest capital cities | 208.1¢ | 222.4¢ | +14.3¢ | The transmission chain | Crude oil | → | Refined petrolMogas 95 | → | Wholesaleprice | → | Bowserprice | | --------- | - | ---------------------- | - | -------------- | - | ----------- | **Two important modifiers:**the AUD/USD exchange rate affects the Australian-dollar cost of international fuel, while petrol price cycles can move retail prices independently in the five largest cities. International price changes typically take around two weeks to work through the supply chain, although the timing varies. Notes: international figures are weekly averages expressed in Australian cents per litre. Wholesale and retail figures are domestic averages reported by the ACCC; 9 September domestic values are derived from the ACCC's reported weekly changes. Source: ACCC Weekly Fuel Price Monitoring Report, 18 September 2026\. ### NSW gains migrants from overseas while losing residents interstate URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/nsw-overseas-interstate-migration/ Last updated: 2026-09-20T21:00:23.000Z New South Wales has a striking population pattern: **overseas migration is adding people while interstate migration is taking them away.** New ABS data show NSW gained **84,573 people through net overseas migration** in the year to March 2026\. At the same time, it recorded **net interstate migration of −20,818** — by far the largest interstate population loss of any state or territory. The contrast with Queensland and Western Australia is particularly revealing. Queensland gained **14,718 people from interstate**, alongside 55,217 from net overseas migration. Western Australia gained **10,314 interstate and 41,531 from overseas**. Victoria was essentially balanced domestically, recording net interstate migration of just 82 people, while gaining 81,732 through overseas migration. NSW is therefore unusual among the large states: international migration is supporting population growth while the domestic population flow is running strongly in the opposite direction. Overall, NSW still grew. Natural increase added another 33,216 people, more than offsetting the interstate loss. But its annual population growth rate was only **1.1%**, compared with 2.1% in Western Australia and 1.6% in both Queensland and Victoria. The numbers do not tell us *why* people move interstate. Housing costs, employment, family, lifestyle and retirement can all influence migration decisions. But interstate migration provides an interesting signal because Australians can choose between states without immigration restrictions. The emerging question for NSW is therefore not whether people want to live there — strong overseas migration demonstrates continuing population demand. It is why, once Australians are already here, **more are moving out of NSW than moving in**. Where Australia's population is moving Net migration, year ending March 2026 | State | Interstate | Overseas | Pop. growth | | ------------------ | ---------- | -------- | ----------- | | NSW | −20,818 | +84,573 | 1.1% | | Victoria | +82 | +81,732 | 1.6% | | Queensland | +14,718 | +55,217 | 1.6% | | South Australia | −1,208 | +17,406 | 1.0% | | Western Australia | +10,314 | +41,531 | 2.1% | | Tasmania | −98 | +3,247 | 0.6% | | Northern Territory | −1,589 | +3,585 | 1.5% | | ACT | −1,401 | +4,816 | 1.3% | **NSW stands out:**overseas migration added 84,573 people, while net interstate migration reduced the population by 20,818\. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, National, state and territory population, March 2026\. ### Retail sales are rising. Retail employment is falling. URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/retail-sales-are-rising-retail-employment-is-falling/ Last updated: 2026-09-19T21:00:41.000Z Something interesting is happening in Australian retail: the industry is getting bigger, but it is employing fewer people. New Australian Bureau of Statistics data show retail trade total income increased **2.8 per cent in 2024–25**, while industry value added rose **3.2 per cent** and EBITDA increased **4.4 per cent**. Yet employment fell by **8,000 people, or 0.5 per cent**, to about 1.49 million. At first glance, that looks like a textbook productivity story: more economic activity being generated with fewer workers. There are good reasons to think the structure of retail is changing in that direction. The ABS reports particularly strong earnings growth of **32.2 per cent in non-store retailing and commission-based retailing**. Its new retail data also show that $78.8 billion of goods sold by retail trade businesses were sold online. Technology, self-service, automated warehouses, online ordering and increasingly sophisticated logistics can allow retailers to process more transactions without a corresponding increase in shop-floor employment. But there is an important qualification. Productivity is not simply sales divided by the number of employees. Sales and income are measured in dollars and can rise because prices rise. Proper productivity measures compare the **volume of output** with the labour and capital required to produce it. On that measure, the story is less flattering. The ABS estimates that retail trade **multifactor productivity fell 1.7 per cent in 2024–25**. So the latest data reveal two things at once. Australian retail appears to be becoming **less labour intensive**: income and value added are rising while headcount falls. But converting that structural change into sustained economy-wide productivity growth remains a harder task. That distinction matters. Cutting labour per dollar of sales is efficiency. Producing more real output from the economy’s available labour and capital is productivity. | Australian retail: more activity, fewer workers | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | | Retail trade, 2024–25 annual change | | | Total income | +2.8% | | Industry value added | +3.2% | | EBITDA | +4.4% | | Employment | −0.5% | | Change in employment | −8,000 | | But the official productivity measure tells a different story Retail multifactor productivity: −1.7% | | | Rising dollar income with fewer employees indicates a less labour-intensive retail model. Productivity, however, measures real output relative to inputs rather than simply sales per employee. | | | Source: ABS, Australian Industry 2024–25; Estimates of Industry Multifactor Productivity 2024–25\. | | ### Indigenous Correctional Gap Widens Across Australia URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/indigenous-community-corrections-gap-australia/ Last updated: 2026-09-19T21:00:08.000Z Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander over-representation in Australia’s criminal justice system is usually discussed in terms of prisons. But the latest ABS data show the disparity extends much further. At 30 June 2026, the **age-standardised rate of Indigenous Australians serving community-based corrections orders was 3,147 per 100,000 adults**. For non-Indigenous Australians it was just **286 per 100,000**. That makes the Indigenous rate **11 times higher**. Community-based corrections cover people serving sentences or supervision in the community rather than full-time custody, including probation, parole and community service orders. They are less restrictive than imprisonment, so the two should not be treated as equivalent. But they provide a broader measure of how deeply different populations interact with the corrective-services system. The longer-term trend is particularly striking. In 2017, the Indigenous age-standardised community-corrections rate was 2,175 per 100,000, compared with 309 for non-Indigenous Australians — a ratio of **7.1 to one**. By 2026 that ratio had increased to **11 to one**. The Indigenous rate rose about **45 per cent**, while the non-Indigenous rate fell about **7 per cent**. The divergence appears across every state and territory, although its scale varies considerably. Western Australia recorded the largest 2026 gap at **14.2 times**, followed by the ACT at 13.5 and South Australia at 12.2. This sits alongside an already severe prison disparity. Indigenous Australians accounted for **37 per cent of people in custody** in June 2026, with an imprisonment rate of 2,719 per 100,000 adults. The national Closing the Gap agreement aims to reduce Indigenous adult incarceration by at least 15 per cent by 2031\. The Productivity Commission currently assesses progress against that imprisonment target as worsening. The community-corrections data suggest the policy challenge is broader still. Community-based corrections • 2026 The Indigenous correctional gap is widening Age-standardised community-based corrections rates per 100,000 adults. 7.1× Indigenous / non-Indigenous rate ratio in 2017 11.0× Indigenous / non-Indigenous rate ratio in 2026 | Jurisdiction | 2017 | 2026 | Change | | ------------------ | ----- | --------- | ------ | | NSW | 8.0× | 10.0× | +2.0 | | Victoria | 7.3× | 11.1× | +3.8 | | Queensland | 5.5× | 8.9× | +3.4 | | South Australia | 7.4× | 12.2× | +4.8 | | Western Australia | 10.0× | **14.2×** | +4.2 | | Tasmania | 2.9× | 5.1× | +2.2 | | Northern Territory | 7.8× | 9.4× | +1.6 | | ACT | 10.6× | 13.5× | +2.9 | | Australia | 7.1× | 11.0× | +3.9 | Ratio of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander to non-Indigenous age-standardised community-based corrections rates. Age-standardisation adjusts for differences in the age structures of the two populations. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Corrective Services, Australia*, June quarter 2026, age-standardised community-based corrections data cube. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### Retail Industry: Sales and Margins URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/where-does-100-of-retail-sales-actually-go/ Last updated: 2026-09-19T20:45:56.000Z When you spend $100 at a retailer, very little of that money is profit. New ABS data provide an unusually detailed look at what happens to the retail dollar by measuring the **retail margin** — the difference between what a retailer receives from selling a product and what it paid for that product. The differences between products are enormous. For **clothing**, the retail margin is 56 per cent. Put simply, from $100 of clothing sales, about **$44 represents the cost of the goods being sold and $56 remains as the retailer’s margin**. Furniture has a margin of 43.6 per cent, fresh fruit and vegetables 35.4 per cent and dairy products 31.1 per cent. Cars work very differently. For every $100 of new-car sales, around **$93.50 represents the cost of the vehicle and just $6.50 is the retail margin**. Petrol has a margin of 12.8 per cent. But that remaining margin is **not profit**. It is the pool of money from which a retailer must pay the costs of actually operating the business: employee wages and superannuation, rent, electricity, insurance, advertising, warehousing, transport, payment processing, depreciation, administration and numerous other expenses. What remains after those costs ultimately determines profit. This explains why comparing businesses simply by their sales can be misleading. Australian clothing retailers recorded $33.4 billion of sales in 2024–25 and generated $18.7 billion of retail margin. New-car sales were even larger at $39.9 billion, but generated only $2.6 billion of retail margin. Retail economics therefore differs enormously by product. A dollar of clothing sales and a dollar of car sales may look identical in a revenue statement. Economically, they are very different dollars. | Where does $100 of retail sales go? | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------- | | Cost of goods is what the retailer paid for the product. Retail margin is what remains before wages, rent and other operating costs are paid. | | | | Product | Cost of goods | Retail margin | | Clothing | $44.00 | $56.00 | | Furniture | $56.40 | $43.60 | | Cosmetics | $63.30 | $36.70 | | Fresh fruit & vegetables | $64.60 | $35.40 | | Dairy products | $68.90 | $31.10 | | Pharmaceutical goods | $73.50 | $26.50 | | Automotive petrol | $87.20 | $12.80 | | New cars | $93.50 | $6.50 | | **Important:** retail margin is not profit. The margin must still cover wages, rent, logistics, utilities, marketing, depreciation and other operating expenses. | | | | Source: ABS, Wholesale and Retail Industries, 2024–25\. | | | ### Australia versus America: two very different manufacturing economies URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-versus-america-two-very-different-manufacturing-economies/ Last updated: 2026-09-19T07:00:16.000Z Manufacturing remains important in both Australia and the United States, but the two countries have very different industrial structures. Manufacturing contributes roughly **10% of US GDP**, compared with around **5–6% in Australia**. The US also employs about **12.6 million manufacturing workers**, including almost **1.8 million in transport-equipment manufacturing alone**. Automotive manufacturing illustrates the difference particularly clearly. The United States still supports a vast network of vehicle assemblers, parts manufacturers, engineering firms and equipment suppliers. Nearly **963,000 Americans currently work in motor vehicles and parts manufacturing**. Australia once had a comparable, though much smaller, vertically integrated industry. But Ford ended local vehicle production in 2016, followed by Toyota and Holden in 2017\. Australia still manufactures automotive components and undertakes vehicle engineering and specialist production, but no longer mass-produces passenger cars. Defence provides an important Australian counterexample. Australia's defence industry generated **$12.0 billion of gross value added in 2024–25 and supported 63,500 jobs**. Manufacturing accounted for $2.2 billion of that activity, including **$1.7 billion from transport-equipment manufacturing**. But professional, scientific and technical services are actually larger than manufacturing within Australia's defence industry. The US industrial base is broader again, spanning automotive, aerospace, defence, chemicals, machinery, computers and electronics alongside food and metals. The central difference is therefore not whether Australia manufactures things. It does. It is **industrial depth**: America sustains large interconnected manufacturing supply chains across many complex industries, while Australian manufacturing is smaller, more specialised and more closely concentrated around food, metals, resources and selected advanced industries such as defence. Manufacturing — Australia v United States | Measure | Australia | United States | | ---------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Manufacturing share of economy** | **\~5–6%** | **\~10%** | | **Manufacturing employment** | \~0.9 million | 12.6 million | | **Passenger-car manufacturing** | No mass-marketvehicle assembly | Major domesticproduction industry | | **Motor vehicles & parts jobs** | Specialist / component base | **\~963,000** | | **Defence industry** | $12.0b GVA63,500 jobs | Large aerospace,defence & weapons base | | **Major strengths** | FoodMetalsResourcesDefence niches | AutomotiveAerospace & defenceChemicalsMachinery & electronics | | **Industrial structure** | Smaller andmore specialised | Larger, broader anddeeper supply chains | **Key distinction:** Australia retains significant manufacturing capability, particularly in food, metals and selected advanced industries. The US has a much deeper industrial ecosystem extending through vehicle assembly, aerospace, defence, machinery, electronics and their supplier networks. Notes: US manufacturing employment is August 2026\. Australian defence figures are for 2024–25 and cover direct Australian economic activity supported by Department of Defence expenditure. Australia ceased large-scale passenger vehicle manufacturing following the closure of Ford, Toyota and Holden plants in 2016–17\. Sources: ABS, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Australian Department of Industry, Science and Resources. ### Victoria’s prison population rises 15% ahead of the state election URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/victorias-prison-population-rises-15-ahead-of-the-state-election/ Last updated: 2026-09-18T21:00:18.000Z Victoria will go to the polls on **28 November 2026**, and new ABS data provide an important measure for the coming debate over crime, bail and corrections policy. Victoria had an average **7,447 people in prison in the June quarter**, up from 6,469 a year earlier — an increase of **15.1 per cent**. That was the fastest percentage increase of any Australian state or territory. The national prison population increased 6.9 per cent over the same period. Importantly, Victoria's increase was not solely a remand story. The number of **unsentenced prisoners rose 16.0 per cent**, from 2,575 to 2,988, while sentenced prisoners increased **15.0 per cent**, from 3,849 to 4,427\. Benchmark calculations use the latest ABS corrective-services data cube. There is an important qualification. Despite the rapid increase, Victoria still has Australia's **second-lowest imprisonment rate**, at 132 prisoners per 100,000 adults. Only the ACT is lower. Queensland's rate is 270, NSW's 208 and Western Australia's 357. The increase is occurring alongside deliberate changes in criminal-justice policy. Victoria tightened its bail laws during 2025, including tougher tests for several serious offences. Parliamentary budget estimates noted the expected pressure on prisons and included **$727 million to prepare additional prison capacity**. That makes corrections an important policy measure heading into the election. Tighter bail settings can keep more accused offenders in custody while their cases are determined, but they also increase remand numbers, prison-capacity requirements and public expenditure. The latest numbers therefore provide useful context for the election debate: **Victoria is starting from a comparatively low imprisonment rate, but its prison system is now expanding faster than anywhere else in Australia.** Corrective Services • June quarter 2026 Victoria's prison population is growing fastest Annual change in the average number of people in full-time custody +15.1% Victoria annual growth +6.9% Australia annual growth | Jurisdiction | PrisonersJun 2026 | Annualchange | Rate per100,000 | | ------------------ | ----------------- | ------------ | --------------- | | Victoria | 7,447 | +15.1% | 132 | | ACT | 473 | +11.6% | 122 | | Tasmania | 865 | +9.9% | 185 | | Queensland | 12,126 | +7.9% | 270 | | NSW | 14,208 | +7.0% | 208 | | South Australia | 3,595 | +4.7% | 235 | | Western Australia | 8,632 | +1.9% | 357 | | Northern Territory | 2,818 | +0.3% | 1,380 | | Australia | 50,164 | +6.9% | 228 | Prisoner numbers are average daily numbers. Annual change compares June quarter 2026 with June quarter 2025\. Imprisonment rates are per 100,000 adult population. **Key point:** Victoria has the fastest-growing prison population, but its imprisonment rate remains the second-lowest nationally. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Corrective Services, Australia*, June quarter 2026\. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### Unemployment Rates - Split by Industry Sector URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/unemployment-rates-by-industry-sector-australia/ Last updated: 2026-09-17T21:00:11.000Z Australia has one headline unemployment rate. But underneath it sit 19 very different industry labour markets. In February 2026, the unemployment rate associated with **accommodation and food services was 6.3 per cent**, the highest of any industry. At the other end of the spectrum, **financial and insurance services recorded just 1.3 per cent**. Health care and social assistance was also low at 1.7 per cent, while public administration and safety was 1.8 per cent. But an “industry unemployment rate” needs careful explanation. An unemployed person does not technically have a current industry. Instead, the Australian Bureau of Statistics records the **industry of their last job**, provided they worked within the previous two years. The industry unemployment rate is then calculated as unemployed people whose last job was in that industry divided by those people plus everyone currently employed in the industry. People who have never worked, or last worked two or more years ago, are therefore excluded. The figures are also original rather than seasonally adjusted. Looking over time produces an interesting result. Comparing February 2010 with February 2026, unemployment rates fell in **17 of the 19 industries**. The largest decline was in agriculture, forestry and fishing, from 4.2 to 1.9 per cent. Construction fell from 4.1 to 2.6 per cent and mining from 4.7 to 3.3 per cent. Only information media and telecommunications and other services recorded higher rates. Most striking is the persistence of hospitality. Accommodation and food services had the highest rate in 2010, at 6.9 per cent, and remains highest today. One final qualification: the ABS has temporarily stopped publishing its separate Labour Account industry unemployment series while it reviews changes associated with modernisation of the Labour Force Survey. These figures therefore use the February 2026 Labour Force Detailed data, providing the latest clean industry comparison currently available. Unemployment rates by industry Australia · February 2010 versus February 2026 | Industry | 2010 | 2026 | Change | | -------------------------------------- | ---- | -------- | ----------- | | **Accommodation & food services** | 6.9% | **6.3%** | −0.6 pp | | Information media & telecommunications | 3.8% | 4.3% | **+0.5 pp** | | Administrative & support services | 5.3% | 4.2% | −1.1 pp | | Arts & recreation services | 4.7% | 3.9% | −0.8 pp | | Retail trade | 4.9% | 3.6% | −1.3 pp | | Manufacturing | 4.7% | 3.5% | −1.2 pp | | Mining | 4.7% | 3.3% | −1.4 pp | | Other services | 2.8% | 3.3% | **+0.5 pp** | | Transport, postal & warehousing | 3.3% | 3.2% | −0.1 pp | | Electricity, gas, water & waste | 3.5% | 3.1% | −0.4 pp | | Professional, scientific & technical | 3.1% | 2.8% | −0.3 pp | | Construction | 4.1% | 2.6% | −1.5 pp | | Wholesale trade | 3.6% | 2.4% | −1.2 pp | | Education & training | 3.0% | 2.3% | −0.7 pp | | Rental, hiring & real estate | 3.4% | 2.3% | −1.1 pp | | **Agriculture, forestry & fishing** | 4.2% | 1.9% | **−2.3 pp** | | Public administration & safety | 3.1% | 1.8% | −1.3 pp | | Health care & social assistance | 1.9% | 1.7% | −0.2 pp | | **Financial & insurance services** | 2.5% | **1.3%** | −1.2 pp | **How to read this:**The industry rate attributes unemployed people to the industry of their last job, where that job was held within the previous two years. People who have never worked or last worked two or more years ago are excluded. Figures are original, not seasonally adjusted. **Source:** ABS Labour Force, Australia, Detailed; Fair Work Commission Statistical Report — Annual Wage Review 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations for February 2010 comparison. ### Australia Inc: Small business is losing economic ground URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-inc-small-business-economic-decline/ Last updated: 2026-09-17T21:00:08.000Z Small business is routinely described as the engine room of the Australian economy. But over the past two decades, that engine room has become a smaller part of the economy it powers. That issue came up on a recent episode of the **Australia Inc. podcast**, when one of the panelists put the concern plainly: **“If 97% of Australia is small business, they’re hurting.”** The 97 per cent figure refers to the proportion of Australian businesses classified as small businesses. But the more revealing numbers are what has happened to their contribution to employment and economic output. According to the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman, small businesses employed just over **5.1 million Australians in 2023–24**, representing **39 per cent of the private-sector workforce**. In 2006, small businesses employed **53 per cent** of private-sector workers. The same pattern appears in economic output. Small businesses now account for about **32 per cent of Australian GDP**, compared with approximately **40 per cent in 2006**. That does not mean small business is disappearing. Australia actually has more businesses than ever. The Australian Bureau of Statistics recorded **2.81 million actively trading businesses at June 2026**. But only **996,203 employed anyone**. This distinction matters. During 2025–26, the number of non-employing businesses increased by **4.8 per cent**, while employing businesses increased by just **0.2 per cent**. Indeed, the ABS says this was the first annual increase in the number of employing businesses since 2021–22. A growing business count can therefore coexist with declining small-business economic weight. A sole trader or independent contractor counts as a business, but that does not necessarily represent the creation of an organisation employing additional workers, investing capital and expanding productive capacity. The long-run numbers suggest economic activity and employment have gradually shifted towards medium and large businesses. There is no single explanation. Larger firms can spread technology, compliance and administration costs across much larger revenue bases. Small firms face labour shortages, financing constraints and regulatory obligations without those economies of scale. But the result matters. Small businesses remain especially important in construction, professional services, agriculture and local service industries. They are also one of the principal mechanisms through which an individual turns an idea or skill into an employing enterprise. Australia still creates plenty of businesses. The more important question for **Australia Inc.** may be whether enough of them are becoming businesses that grow and employ people. Australia Inc. Small business is losing economic ground Small businesses remain overwhelmingly dominant by number, but their share of employment and economic output has fallen. Share of private-sector employment 2006 53% → −14 pts 2023–24 39% Share of Australian GDP 2006 40% → −8 pts 2023–24 32% More businesses does not necessarily mean more employers 2.81m actively trading businesses June 2026 996,203 businesses that employ people 2025–26 growth | Non-employing businesses | +4.8% | | ------------------------ | ----- | | Employing businesses | +0.2% | Sources: Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman; Australian Bureau of Statistics. Small business generally defined as fewer than 20 employees. ### Australia’s population reaches 27.9 million — 68% live in the capital cities URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-population-reaches-27-9-million-68-live-in-the-capital-cities/ Last updated: 2026-09-17T01:43:07.000Z Australia’s population has reached **27.92 million**, according to the latest Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates. At 31 March 2026, the population was **27,921,150**, up **392,700 people, or 1.4 per cent**, over the previous year. New South Wales remains comfortably the largest state, with **8.67 million people**, followed by Victoria at **7.15 million** and Queensland at **5.74 million**. Western Australia has passed **3.09 million**, while South Australia has **1.92 million**. All states and territories recorded population growth over the year. Western Australia grew fastest, at **2.1 per cent**, while Tasmania recorded the slowest growth at **0.6 per cent**. Migration remains the main driver of national growth. Net overseas migration added **292,100 people** during the year, equivalent to around **74 per cent of total population growth**. Natural increase — births minus deaths — contributed another **100,600 people**. But where do Australians actually live? The latest ABS population estimates that allow a clean capital-city versus regional comparison are for **30 June 2025**. At that point, Australia had **18.75 million people living within the eight Greater Capital City Statistical Areas**, representing **67.9 per cent of the national population**. The remaining **8.86 million people — 32.1 per cent — lived outside the capital-city areas**. The ABS definition is important. Greater Capital City Statistical Areas measure the broader functional area of each capital, including some surrounding towns and rural areas whose residents regularly work, shop or socialise within the city. So Australia remains a highly metropolitan country: roughly **two Australians in every three live within a capital-city region**, while about one in three live elsewhere. | Australia’s population reaches 27.9 million | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------- | --------------- | | Population 27.92m 31 March 2026 Annual growth +392,700 +1.4% | | | | State / territory | Population | Annual change | | NSW | 8.670m | +97,000 (1.1%) | | Victoria | 7.154m | +109,500 (1.6%) | | Queensland | 5.740m | +90,100 (1.6%) | | Western Australia | 3.096m | +64,200 (2.1%) | | South Australia | 1.917m | +18,400 (1.0%) | | Tasmania | 580,700 | +3,400 (0.6%) | | ACT | 489,700 | +6,200 (1.3%) | | Northern Territory | 268,900 | +4,000 (1.5%) | | Where Australians live | | | | Greater capital cities | 18.751m | 67.9% | | Rest of Australia | 8.864m | 32.1% | | Note: Current national and state populations are at 31 March 2026\. The latest official capital-city/regional population split is at 30 June 2025\. Capital cities are ABS Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSAs); “rest of Australia” is the population outside those areas. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. | | | ### Explainer: Why scale matters so much in Australian banking URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/why-scale-matters-australian-banking/ Last updated: 2026-09-17T01:31:22.000Z APRA’s latest banking statistics reveal a striking feature of Australian banking: **smaller institutions can earn perfectly respectable lending margins and still struggle to make attractive profits.** The clearest comparison is between the major banks and APRA’s credit union and building society category. At first glance, the problem does not appear to be interest margins. Over the latest three-year period, credit unions and building societies generated net interest income equivalent to **2.08 per cent of assets**, compared with **1.64 per cent for the major banks**. Their estimated housing loan-to-deposit spread was also remarkably similar: **1.87 percentage points**, compared with **1.94 percentage points for the majors**. That is a difference of just seven basis points. The real divergence appears further down the income statement. Operating expenses for credit unions and building societies were equivalent to **1.97 per cent of assets**. For the major banks they were just **0.97 per cent**. Put another way, the smaller institutions generate 44 basis points *more* net interest income per dollar of assets, but incur around 100 basis points *more* operating expenses. That difference flows directly into profitability. Credit unions and building societies recorded a **cost-to-income ratio of 81.5 per cent**. That means more than 81 cents of every dollar of operating income is absorbed by operating expenses. For the majors, the figure was just **50.6 per cent**. Their respective profit margins were therefore **12.3 per cent and 32.4 per cent**, while return on equity was **4.1 per cent compared with 11.2 per cent**. This is the economics of scale at work. Banks need technology systems, cybersecurity, regulatory compliance, risk management, payments infrastructure, finance functions, branches and administration regardless of their size. A major bank can spread many of those costs across hundreds of billions of dollars of assets and millions of customers. A much smaller institution cannot. The APRA figures do not tell us exactly which expenses account for the difference. But they show clearly where the profitability gap emerges. **The smaller institutions’ central problem is not necessarily what they earn from banking. It is how much banking costs them to provide.** | Why scale matters in Australian banking | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------- | ------- | | APRA profitability ratios — three-year average | | | | Metric | Mutuals\* | Majors | | Net interest income / assets | 2.08% | 1.64% | | Housing / deposit spread | 1.87 pp | 1.94 pp | | **Margins are remarkably similar:** the estimated housing/deposit spread differs by only 7 basis points. | | | | Operating expenses / assets | 1.97% | 0.97% | | **This is the key divide:** operating expenses per dollar of assets are roughly twice as high for mutuals. | | | | Cost-to-income ratio | 81.53% | 50.63% | | Profit margin | 12.33% | 32.35% | | Return on equity | 4.06% | 11.23% | | Similar lending spreads. Very different operating costs. Very different returns. | | | | \* Mutuals refers here to APRA's credit union and building society category.Source: APRA Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Performance Statistics, June 2026\. Ratios shown are three-year averages. | | | ### Background to Tony Burke's pending immigration announcement URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/background-to-tony-burkes-pending-immigration-announcement/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T23:28:51.000Z When Tony Burke talks about reducing temporary immigration, one useful number for understanding the scale of the issue is the **number of people physically in Australia holding temporary visas**. At 31 December 2025, that number was **3.03 million**. That is not the same thing as annual immigration or net overseas migration. It is a **stock measure**: a snapshot of how many temporary visa holders are in Australia at a particular point in time. The category is also much broader than temporary skilled workers. At the end of 2025 it included about **709,000 New Zealand citizens on Special Category visas, 661,000 visitors, 478,000 international students and 413,000 bridging visa holders**. There were also around **226,000 working holiday makers** and **216,000 temporary skilled visa holders**. The total increased by **122,500, or 4.2 per cent, during 2025**. Interestingly, international students were not responsible for that latest increase. Student visa holders fell by about 44,000 over the year. That was more than offset by increases in temporary skilled workers, bridging visa holders, visitors and working holiday makers. The longer-term trend is more revealing. Immediately before COVID, Australia had about **2.2 million temporary visa holders**. Border closures subsequently pushed the number down to around **2.0 million by June 2020**. It then rebounded rapidly as international movement resumed. There were about **2.46 million temporary visa holders by March 2023**, **2.91 million by December 2024**, and just over **3.0 million by December 2025**. Relative to Australia's population, the change is also noticeable. Temporary visa holders were equivalent to roughly **8.6 per cent of the population in December 2019**. The ratio fell during COVID, but had risen to approximately **10.9 per cent by December 2025**. That ratio needs one qualification: some temporary visa holders, particularly short-term visitors, are not counted in the ABS estimated resident population. It is therefore best understood as a simple comparison of the two totals rather than saying that 10.9 per cent of Australian residents are temporary migrants. But the trend is clear: **Australia now has around one million more temporary visa holders than it did during the pandemic trough, and substantially more than immediately before COVID.** How many temporary visa holders are in Australia? A simple background snapshot of Australia’s temporary visa population Current total 3.03m Temporary visa holders at 31 Dec 2025 Annual change +122,505 Up 4.2% from 31 Dec 2024 Share of population 10.9% Temporary visa holders as a share of Australia’s population Temporary visa holders as a share of Australia’s population 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 8.6% 7.8% 9.3% 10.6% 10.1% 10.9% Dec 2019 Jun 2020 Mar 2023 Dec 2024 Jun 2025 Dec 2025 Share of total Australian population Time-series snapshot | Date | Temporary visa holders | Population | % of population | | ----------- | ---------------------- | ---------- | --------------- | | 31 Dec 2019 | \~2.20m | 25.52m | 8.6% | | 30 Jun 2020 | \~2.00m | 25.69m | 7.8% | | 31 Mar 2023 | 2.46m | 26.47m | 9.3% | | 31 Dec 2024 | 2.91m | 27.40m | 10.6% | | 30 Jun 2025 | 2.79m | 27.61m | 10.1% | | 31 Dec 2025 | 3.03m | 27.80m | 10.9% | Notes: “Temporary visa holders” is a point-in-time stock measure. It includes visitors, students, New Zealand Special Category visa holders, bridging visa holders, working holiday makers and temporary workers. Pre-COVID and June 2020 totals are reported as rounded totals in the Home Affairs paper. ### Background: The Fed inflation target URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/background-the-fed-inflation-target/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T22:23:57.000Z The Federal Reserve has a **2 per cent inflation target**. But that simple number conceals a monetary policy framework that has evolved substantially over the past half-century. Importantly, the Fed does not target the widely reported Consumer Price Index. Its target is **2 per cent annual inflation in the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index**. PCE covers a broader range of household expenditure and adjusts more readily when consumers change what they buy. The target refers to headline PCE inflation, although policymakers closely examine core measures when assessing underlying inflation pressure. Nor does 2 per cent mean prices should return to their previous level after an inflationary episode. If prices rise 10 per cent and inflation subsequently returns to 2 per cent, the higher price level generally remains. The Fed targets the **rate of change in prices**, not the price level. ### From Volcker to an explicit target Modern US inflation policy was shaped by the Great Inflation of 1965–82, when inflation eventually approached 15 per cent. Paul Volcker's Federal Reserve responded with severe monetary restraint from 1979, accepting recession and sharply higher unemployment to re-establish price stability and policy credibility. Under Alan Greenspan, inflation settled near 2 per cent without a formal numerical target. Internal FOMC discussions in 1996 show policymakers already debating whether approximately 2 per cent represented effective price stability. The Fed switched its preferred inflation measure from CPI to PCE around 2000. Only in **January 2012** did the Fed formally announce that 2 per cent PCE inflation was its longer-run objective. In 2016 it clarified that the target was **symmetric**: persistent inflation below 2 per cent was undesirable as well as inflation above it. Then came another significant experiment. In 2020, after years in which inflation had tended to undershoot 2 per cent and interest rates repeatedly approached zero, the Fed adopted **flexible average inflation targeting**. After prolonged periods below 2 per cent, it would deliberately tolerate moderately above-target inflation for a time. The theory was that this would keep average inflation and inflation expectations around 2 per cent while giving monetary policy greater room to support employment during downturns. That framework did not survive the post-pandemic inflation shock. Following its 2025 review, the Fed abandoned the explicit “make-up” strategy and returned to **flexible inflation targeting**. The 2 per cent destination remained unchanged, but the Fed no longer promises to compensate for previous undershoots with subsequent overshoots. Its current framework instead stresses keeping longer-term inflation expectations anchored and balancing inflation and employment risks across different economic circumstances. ### Should 2 per cent remain the target? That question remains contested. Economists favouring a **3 per cent target** argue that slightly higher normal inflation would produce higher nominal interest rates, giving the Fed more room to cut rates during recessions before reaching zero. Olivier Blanchard has advocated 3 per cent on these grounds. Former Fed chair Ben Bernanke has acknowledged the theoretical argument but warned that abandoning a target established over decades could damage hard-won credibility. Others favour a target **range**, such as 1.5–2.5 per cent, recognising that inflation cannot be fine-tuned to a decimal point. More radical alternatives include price-level or nominal-GDP targeting, which would require policymakers to compensate systematically for previous misses. For now, however, the Fed has decisively retained 2 per cent. Its September 2026 projections show PCE inflation at **3.7 per cent in 2026, 2.3 per cent in 2027 and finally 2.0 per cent by 2029**. That illustrates how inflation targeting actually operates in practice: **2 per cent is an anchor, not a requirement that inflation equal 2 per cent every month or even every year.** US Monetary Policy How the Fed's inflation regime evolved The destination has been stable. The rules for getting there have changed. 1965–1982 The Great Inflation US inflation rises from around 1% in the mid-1960s to nearly 15% at its peak. The experience fundamentally changes thinking about monetary policy and inflation expectations. 1979–1982 The Volcker disinflation Paul Volcker makes defeating inflation the priority. Very tight monetary policy produces recession but re-establishes the Fed's anti-inflation credibility. 1987–2000s Implicit inflation targeting Under Alan Greenspan, inflation settles around levels broadly consistent with 2%, but the Fed still has no publicly announced numerical target. 2000 PCE becomes preferred The Fed shifts its preferred inflation measure from CPI toward the broader Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. 2012 2% becomes official The FOMC formally defines price stability as 2% annual PCE inflation over the longer run. 2016 The target becomes explicitly symmetric Persistent inflation below 2% is formally recognised as undesirable, just as persistent inflation above 2% is. 2020 Flexible average inflation targeting After persistent undershooting, the Fed says periods below 2% can be followed by periods moderately above 2% — a form of monetary-policy “make-up”. 2025 Make-up strategy abandoned Following its five-year review, the Fed returns to flexible inflation targeting. The 2% target remains, but previous misses no longer require deliberate future offsets. 2026 Current regime: 2% remains the anchor The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation over the longer run while balancing inflation and employment risks and strongly defending anchored inflation expectations. What has not changed 2% PCE inflation The Fed's formal numerical inflation objective has remained unchanged since it was introduced in 2012\. Sources: Federal Reserve Board; Federal Reserve History. Benchmark Analytics. ### Why the Fed just raised rates URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/fed-interest-rate-rise-september-2026/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T22:08:30.000Z The US Federal Reserve has raised its target interest rate by 25 basis points to **3.75–4.00 per cent**, its first increase since 2023\. The economics are straightforward: inflation remains too high, while the economy appears strong enough to withstand tighter monetary policy. The Federal Reserve's target consumer inflation rate is 2%. Consumer prices rose **3.4 per cent** over the year to August. Energy prices were up **16.3 per cent**, including a **27.4 per cent** rise in gasoline. Core CPI was lower at 2.4 per cent, but the Fed expects its preferred PCE inflation measure to finish 2026 at **3.7 per cent**. Meanwhile, unemployment was 4.1 per cent in August and the Fed now expects real GDP growth of 2.3 per cent this year. That combination gives the Fed room to act. Higher interest rates make borrowing more expensive, restraining household spending and business investment and reducing demand pressure. They cannot produce more oil or reverse an energy shock, but they can reduce the risk that higher energy costs spread into broader prices and wages. The shift has been building. In July, three FOMC members already wanted rates increased. Now all 12 voting members supported the hike. The Fed’s median projection also puts the federal funds rate at **4.1 per cent at the end of both 2026 and 2027**. The politics are particularly interesting. Chair **Kevin Warsh was nominated by President Donald Trump in March and took office in May**. Trump wants substantially lower rates and, after the decision, said US interest rates should be **1 per cent or less**. Yet Warsh joined the unanimous vote to increase them. That illustrates an important feature of the US system. Presidents appoint Fed chairs, subject to Senate confirmation, but Congress has given the Fed operational independence over monetary policy. Warsh is therefore a Trump appointee, not Trump’s representative on interest rates. This decision puts that distinction squarely on display less than two months before the US midterm elections. US Monetary Policy Why the Federal Reserve just raised rates September 2026 FOMC decision | Federal funds target | 3.75–4.00% | | ------------------------------- | ---------- | | August CPI inflation | 3.4% | | Energy inflation | 16.3% | | Unemployment rate | 4.1% | | Fed 2026 GDP forecast | 2.3% | | Fed 2026 PCE inflation forecast | 3.7% | The political wrinkle Trump-appointed Fed Chair • 12–0 vote to raise rates President Trump says US interest rates should be 1% or lower. **The economics:** inflation above target + resilient growth and employment = greater scope for tighter monetary policy. Sources: US Federal Reserve; US Bureau of Labor Statistics. September 2026\. ### Reading: Australia’s quarter-century decline in proficiency URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/reading-australias-quarter-century-decline-in-proficiency/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T20:59:59.000Z Australia’s latest PISA results show that the deterioration in educational performance extends well beyond mathematics. Reading performance has also declined substantially. When the OECD’s comparable reading series began in 2000, Australian 15-year-olds recorded an average PISA reading score of **528.3**. By 2025, that had fallen to **490.9** — a decline of **37.4 points** over a quarter of a century. The fall has not been quite as relentless as mathematics. Reading improved slightly in 2009, for example. But the long-run direction is unmistakable. Australia scored 511.8 in 2012, 502.9 in 2015, 498.1 in 2022 and **490.9 in 2025**. The change beneath the average is equally revealing. In 2000, only **12.5 per cent** of Australian students were classified as low performers in reading, while **17.6 per cent** were top performers. Australia therefore began the century with considerably more top-performing readers than low-performing ones. By 2025, that relationship had reversed. Low performers accounted for **23.4 per cent** of students, while top performers had fallen to **11.2 per cent**. There are now more than **two low-performing readers for every top-performing reader**. Yet the international comparison provides an important qualification. Australia still performs comfortably above the OECD average. Its 2025 reading score of 490.9 was almost **30 points above the OECD average of 460.9**. More strikingly, Australia has retained most of its advantage over the OECD’s consistent group of 23 countries. In 2000, Australia scored **28.7 points above the OECD-23 average**. In 2025, the margin was still **25.0 points**. That does not mean Australia has avoided decline. Rather, it means much of the developed world has experienced a similar problem. The OECD-23 reading average itself fell from 499.5 in 2000 to 465.8 in 2025. Australia’s reading story is therefore different from mathematics. The absolute decline is serious: average performance is substantially lower, low performers have almost doubled, and the proportion of top readers has fallen sharply. But Australia has not lost much ground relative to comparable countries because they have been sliding too. That may be reassuring from a league-table perspective. It is considerably less reassuring if the objective is to ensure today’s students possess the reading skills of the generation that preceded them. Australia's reading performance has fallen for 25 years PISA mean reading score, Australian 15-year-olds 2000 score 528.3 2025 score 490.9 Change since 2000 \-37.4 535 525 515 505 495 485 528.3 490.9 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2022 2025 Low performers 12.5% → 23.4% 2000 to 2025 Top performers 17.6% → 11.2% 2000 to 2025 Lead over OECD-23 28.7 → 25.0 pts 2000 to 2025 **The important context:** Australia has declined sharply, but its relative OECD position has changed much less because reading performance has fallen across many developed economies. **Source:** OECD PISA 2025 Results. Mean reading performance from Table I.B1.2a.37; proficiency levels from Table I.B1.2a.34\. ### Why are 43% of Australian prisoners unsentenced? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/unsentenced-prisoners-australia-remand-explainer/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T12:20:52.000Z In the June quarter 2026, there were **21,659 unsentenced prisoners**. They represented about **43 per cent of prisoners** counted on the first day of the month, and their number was **9 per cent higher than a year earlier**. By comparison, the number of sentenced prisoners increased by 5 per cent. “Unsentenced” broadly means a person is being held in custody while awaiting the outcome of their case. In practice, this is the **remand population**. Bail law differs between states and territories, but the basic policy problem is similar. Courts have to balance an accused person's liberty before their case has been determined against risks such as failing to appear in court, committing a serious offence, endangering others or interfering with witnesses or evidence. Bail conditions can sometimes be used to manage those risks. The striking point is how much the system has changed. ABS historical data show that in **1992 only 12 per cent of prisoners were on remand**. By 2002 it was 20 per cent. The longer annual legal-status series tells the same story. In 1994, Australia had **1,948 unsentenced prisoners**, representing about **11 per cent** of prisoners. By 2015 there were 9,898, or around 27 per cent. In 2025 there were **19,850 — 42 per cent of all prisoners**. Between 1994 and 2025, therefore, the unsentenced population increased **more than tenfold**. The total prison population rose from 16,946 to 46,998 — less than threefold — while the sentenced population increased from 14,999 to 27,051. The composition of Australian imprisonment has fundamentally shifted towards remand. The latest **flow** data make the point even more strongly. During the June quarter there were 21,148 prisoner receptions into custody. Of these, **17,028 — 80.5 per cent — were recorded as unsentenced at reception**, according to the accompanying ABS data cube. That does **not** mean four in five people entering prison will never be sentenced. The ABS records legal status at the point of reception; a person's status can subsequently change while they remain in custody. Receptions also count episodes rather than unique people. The interstate differences are also substantial. In June 2026, unsentenced prisoners accounted for about **48 per cent of custody in South Australia and 47 per cent in NSW**, compared with about 40 per cent in Victoria and Western Australia. The proportion of receptions recorded as unsentenced ranged from about **55 per cent in Queensland to 95 per cent in South Australia**. Those differences should not be treated as a simple league table of tougher or more lenient bail systems. Legislation, court processes and administrative practices differ between jurisdictions. So why is remand growing? The corrective-services statistics cannot answer that question by themselves. Australian Institute of Criminology research identifies four broad drivers: **the number and type of defendants reaching the courts; bail laws and practices; changes in defendant characteristics; and court delays**, because longer case-processing times increase the period people remain on remand. That distinction matters. A rising remand population is not automatically evidence that crime has risen by the same amount. It can also reflect how police, bail systems and courts process accused people. With governments spending **$5.43 billion operating prisons in 2024–25**, identifying which part of that pipeline is driving the increase matters for both justice policy and prison capacity. Corrective Services • June quarter 2026 Australia's remand population Unsentenced prisoners now account for a large share of both people held in custody and new receptions into prison. 43% of prisoners are unsentenced 81% of prison receptions were unsentenced | Jurisdiction | Unsentencedprisoners | Share ofcustody | Annualchange | Share ofreceptions | | ------------------ | -------------------- | --------------- | ------------ | ------------------ | | NSW | 6,657 | **46.8%** | +15.1% | 88.6% | | Victoria | 2,988 | 40.3% | **+16.0%** | 86.6% | | Queensland | 5,076 | 42.3% | +10.5% | **54.6%** | | South Australia | 1,703 | **47.5%** | +8.5% | **95.1%** | | Western Australia | 3,468 | 40.2% | +1.7% | 91.7% | | Tasmania | 354 | 41.0% | +4.1% | 87.0% | | Northern Territory | 1,200 | 42.4% | −13.7% | 78.6% | | ACT | 212 | 44.6% | +6.5% | 91.9% | | Australia | 21,659 | 43.3% | +9.0% | 80.5% | **How to read this:** “Share of custody” is the proportion of prisoners who were unsentenced in the June quarter 2026\. “Annual change” compares unsentenced prisoner numbers with June quarter 2025\. “Share of receptions” is the proportion of receptions into full-time custody recorded as unsentenced during the June quarter 2026\. Receptions are episodes, not unique people, and legal status can change while a person remains in custody. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Corrective Services, Australia*, June quarter 2026, Tables 5 and 20\. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### Background: What the ACCC’s regional ATM decision means URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/background-what-the-acccs-regional-atm-decision-means/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T11:33:35.000Z The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has given the green light to a three-year trial of shared regional ATMs — an experiment that could eventually influence how cash services are provided across regional Australia. The Australian Banking Association sought approval for banks to cooperate in operating up to 20 multi-bank ATMs in regional and remote communities. Under the trial, anyone with an Australian-issued bank card will be able to withdraw cash without paying an ATM fee. Customers of participating banks will also be able to make fee-free cash deposits where deposit functionality is installed. The proposal comes as Australia's cash infrastructure contracts. Cash now accounts for around 15 per cent of consumer payments, although about 1.5 million Australians still rely mainly on cash. The number of ATMs has fallen by around one-quarter from its 2016 peak, while the number of bank branches has roughly halved over the past 15 years. Regional communities are particularly exposed when the remaining service disappears. The trial is designed partly to test whether banks can share the cost of providing cash infrastructure where operating individual networks may no longer be economical. Most of the trial machines will be existing NCR Atleos ATMs converted from fee-charging to fee-free operation, with two new ATMs planned. Deposit functionality is intended for at least 10 sites. The ACCC identified two principal public benefits: better access to cash in the communities covered by the trial, and better information about whether a wider shared ATM network could work. But the competition issue is more interesting. Regional banks argued that a collectively funded fee-free network could divert withdrawals, deposits and customer foot traffic from existing regional bank branches and ATMs. The ACCC accepted that substantial diversion **could negatively affect the viability of a regional branch**. However, it concluded the risk was limited in this trial because very few of the proposed locations overlap with regional bank branches and branches provide services an ATM cannot replicate. Importantly, this is not approval for a national shared ATM network. Any broader rollout would require another ACCC authorisation. The ABA sought five years for the trial, but the ACCC granted only three, partly because the cash and regional banking markets are changing rapidly. The real test will therefore be what the trial teaches us: not simply whether people use free ATMs, but whether shared infrastructure adds to regional banking access or displaces services already being provided. ACCC Regional ATM Trial What has actually been approved? | **Trial size** | Up to 20 regional ATMs | | --------------------- | ------------------------------------ | | **Withdrawals** | Fee-free for Australian-issued cards | | **Deposits** | At least 10 sites planned | | **Authorisation** | 3 years | | **National rollout?** | Not approved | **The key competition finding:** The ACCC accepted that diversion of customers to shared ATMs could affect the viability of a regional bank branch, but concluded the risk is limited in this 20-ATM trial because geographical overlap is small. Source: ACCC Final Determination AA1000722, 16 September 2026\. ### RBA links poor productivity to inflation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-links-poor-productivity-to-inflation/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T00:19:40.000Z Australia's productivity problem is not just about living standards. It also affects inflation and interest rates. RBA Assistant Governor Sarah Hunter made the connection particularly clearly this week. Weak productivity means the economy cannot grow as quickly before running into capacity constraints and generating inflation. Stronger productivity does the opposite: it allows more goods and services to be produced from the same resources. That matters because Australia's recent productivity performance has been poor. Whole-economy labour productivity **fell 0.2% over 2025–26**, while average annual productivity growth over the past five years has been around **−0.5%**. Hunter pointed to several possible explanations, including declining economic dynamism and less movement of workers between businesses. But she also highlighted regulation. The RBA's business liaison program, which talks directly with firms across the economy, hears **“all the time”** about the burden of regulation and particularly the difficulty created by regulation that continually changes. Businesses learn how to operate under one set of rules, only to have those rules change again. That does not mean regulation caused Australia's productivity slowdown. Nor does it mean regulation is unnecessary. But regulation has an economic cost. Management time spent understanding, implementing and then repeatedly adjusting to new requirements is time and capital unavailable for improving products, processes and technology. The broader consequence is easily overlooked. **Poor productivity reduces the speed limit of the Australian economy.** If businesses cannot produce more efficiently, economic growth runs into inflation sooner — leaving the RBA with less room to accommodate demand and ultimately increasing the pressure on interest rates. Productivity policy and inflation policy are more closely connected than they sometimes appear. Why productivity matters for inflation Australia's economic speed limit AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY −0.2% whole-economy growth, 2025–26 ↓ **Weaker productive capacity** Less additional output from available labour and capital ↓ **Capacity constraints arrive sooner** Demand runs into the economy's supply limits at a lower growth rate ↓ **Greater inflation pressure** Less room for the economy to grow without generating inflation ↓ **More pressure on interest rates** **RBA insight:** weaker productivity lowers the rate at which the economy can grow without creating inflation. Sarah Hunter also noted that businesses regularly raise regulation — particularly changing regulation — as an impediment to productivity. **Sources:** RBA; Productivity Commission. ### Science: Australia’s decade of stability in proficiency URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-science-performance-pisa-2025/ Last updated: 2026-09-15T21:00:24.000Z Australia’s latest PISA results contain a considerably more encouraging story on science than they do on mathematics. The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment tests the skills of 15-year-olds across participating countries. Australia’s science score in 2025 was **509.1 points**. That is below the **526.9** recorded when the comparable science series began in 2006 — a long-run decline of **17.8 points**. But unlike mathematics, the deterioration has not continued relentlessly. Australia scored **527.3 in 2009**, before falling to 521.5 in 2012 and 510.0 in 2015\. It dropped further to 503.0 in 2018, but has since recovered modestly: to 507.0 in 2022 and **509.1 in 2025**. The striking result is therefore that Australia’s science performance has been essentially unchanged for a decade. The 2025 result is less than one point below the 2015 result. The distribution of students tells a similar story. In 2006, **12.9 per cent** of Australian students were low performers in science, while **14.6 per cent** were top performers. By 2015, the low-performing share had risen to 17.6 per cent and the top-performing share had fallen to 11.2 per cent. But there has been little further deterioration. In 2025, low performers represented **18.4 per cent** of students and top performers **12.0 per cent**. Australia also retains a substantial international advantage. The Australian science score of **509.1** in 2025 was **27 points above the OECD average of 481.9**. More importantly, Australia has broadly maintained its advantage when measured against the OECD’s consistent group of 23 countries. In 2006, Australia was **24.1 points ahead** of the OECD-23 average. In 2025, it remained **23.2 points ahead**. That provides an important qualification to Australia’s broader education story. Science performance has declined since the mid-2000s, and the proportion of weak students remains substantially higher than it was two decades ago. But the evidence does not show an education system continuing to deteriorate across every academic domain. Mathematics has fallen at every PISA cycle since 2003\. Science has effectively stabilised over the past decade. Understanding why the two subjects have followed such different trajectories may be more useful than treating Australia’s education performance as a single problem. Australia's science performance has stabilised PISA mean science score, Australian 15-year-olds 2006 526.9 2025 509.1 Change since 2015 \-0.9 EFFECTIVELY STABLE SINCE 2015 535 525 515 505 495 526.9 509.1 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2022 2025 Low performers 12.9% → 18.4% 2006 to 2025 Top performers 14.6% → 12.0% 2006 to 2025 Above OECD average +27.2 pts in 2025 **Source:** OECD PISA 2025 Results. Australia mean science performance, 2006–2025\. Scores rounded to one decimal place. ### Australia Inc: The copper resources and production gap URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-copper-resources-global-demand/ Last updated: 2026-09-15T07:34:03.000Z Australia may be sitting on one of the more valuable economic opportunities of the next decade. On a recent episode of the **Australia Inc. podcast** (available on Apple and Spotify), the discussion turned to copper and the gap between Australia's geological endowment and what we actually produce. One panelist put it starkly: **“Australia has got the second biggest copper reserves on Earth. But we only rank eighth in overall global production.”** Geoscience Australia classifies Australia as having the **world's second-largest economic resources of copper**. Australia holds about **11 per cent of the world's economic copper resources**, yet produces only around **3 per cent of global output**. In 2024, Australia produced about **750,000 tonnes of copper**, ranking eighth globally. That gap is becoming considerably more interesting because the world is going to need much more copper. S&P Global estimates global copper demand will increase from about **28 million tonnes in 2025 to 42 million tonnes by 2040** — an increase of roughly **50 per cent**. Copper is fundamental to electricity networks, renewable generation, electric vehicles, conventional industrial equipment and increasingly data centres and AI infrastructure. Electrification requires conductors, and copper remains exceptionally difficult to replace across many high-value applications. The problem is that supply cannot simply be switched on. The International Energy Agency says average global copper ore grades have fallen about **40 per cent since 1991**. Lower grades mean more rock must be mined and processed to produce the same amount of copper. Major new discoveries have also slowed dramatically. Only around **5 per cent of copper deposits discovered during the past 35 years were found in the past decade**. And even when a substantial deposit is found, S&P Global estimates that it takes around **17 years on average** to move a new copper mine from discovery into production. That combination — deteriorating ore quality, fewer discoveries, rising development costs and extremely long lead times — means supply is unlikely to respond quickly to higher prices. S&P Global estimates that, without major additional investment and supply expansion, the global copper shortfall could reach around **10 million tonnes annually by 2040**. For Australia, that creates an intriguing question. We already have the copper. The economic opportunity is turning more of it into production. Australia's copper opportunity Australia has the copper. The world needs much more of it. #2 WORLD RANKING Economic copper resources #8 WORLD RANKING Copper production 11% Australia's share of world economic resources 3% Australia's share of world production GLOBAL COPPER DEMAND 2025 28m t → +50% 2040 42m t The supply problem New copper supply takes years to arrive | Average ore grades since 1991 | \~40% lower | | ------------------------------------ | ------------ | | Typical discovery-to-production time | \~17 years | | Potential 2040 supply shortfall | \~10m tonnes | Sources: Geoscience Australia, Australian Identified Mineral Resources 2025; S&P Global, Copper in the Age of AI (2026); International Energy Agency. ### Mathematics: Australia’s two-decade steady decline in proficiency URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-maths-decline-pisa-2025/ Last updated: 2026-09-15T01:10:20.000Z Australia’s latest PISA results confirm a long-running deterioration in school mathematics performance that can no longer be dismissed as a temporary setback. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), run by the OECD, tests the capabilities of 15-year-olds across participating countries. In mathematics, Australia’s score has now fallen at **every single PISA cycle since 2003**. The national average has declined from **524.3 in 2003 to 477.5 in 2025** — a fall of **46.7 points**. That is not just a bad year. It is a two-decade trend. Importantly, this is not mainly a COVID story. By 2018, before the pandemic, Australia’s mathematics score had already fallen to **491.4**, meaning most of the long-run deterioration had already occurred. The result beneath the headline average is even more concerning. In 2003, Australia had **19.8 per cent** of students performing at the top levels in mathematics, compared with **14.3 per cent** classed as low performers. In other words, Australia had more top maths students than weak ones. By 2025, that position had reversed dramatically. The share of **low performers had risen to 29.1 per cent**, while the share of **top performers had fallen to 9.9 per cent**. Australia now has almost **three low-performing maths students for every top performer**. That is a profound change in the shape of educational performance. It suggests the problem is not confined to one small struggling cohort. Australia is producing fewer outstanding maths students while also seeing a growing share of students fail to reach basic proficiency. There is, however, an important qualification. Australia is **still above the OECD average** in mathematics. In 2025, Australia scored **477.5**, compared with an **OECD average of 463.0**. But that should not provide much comfort. Using the OECD’s consistent comparison group, Australia’s lead has narrowed sharply. In 2003, Australia outperformed the OECD-23 average by **22.1 points**. By 2025, that advantage had fallen to just **8.1 points**. So the real story is not that Australia has already become a poor performer by international standards. It is that Australia has experienced a **clear and sustained decline**, and its former margin of strength has been steadily eroded. If this trend continues, the country’s future stock of numerate workers, professionals and high-skill problem-solvers will be weaker than the one that preceded it. Australia's maths performance has been falling for two decades PISA mean mathematics score, 15-year-olds 2003 score 524.3 2025 score 477.5 Change since 2003 \-46.7 470 485 500 515 530 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2022 2025 Australia Low performers 14.3% → 29.1% Top performers 19.8% → 9.9% Lead over OECD-23 22.1 → 8.1 pts **Source:** OECD PISA 2025 results workbook. Mathematics trend from Table I.B1.2a.38; low and top performers from Table I.B1.2a.35\. ### Who employs our young people? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/young-workers-hospitality-retail-australia/ Last updated: 2026-09-14T21:00:48.000Z Australia’s youngest workers are heavily concentrated in just two industries. New ABS Labour Account data show that in June 2026, **accommodation and food services accounted for 22.0 per cent of all filled jobs held by people under 25**, while retail trade accounted for another **17.8 per cent**. Together, hospitality and retail provided almost **40 per cent of all jobs held by Australians under 25**. Add health care and social assistance and the top three industries account for almost **half — 49.6 per cent — of all jobs held by young Australians**. The concentration works in the other direction as well. Young workers are not merely important to hospitality: they dominate it. Around **50.4 per cent of all filled jobs in accommodation and food services are held by people under 25**. In other words, roughly one in every two hospitality jobs is held by a young worker. That makes the industry unusually dependent on the employment decisions and availability of younger Australians. The figures help explain why changes affecting retail and hospitality can have disproportionate consequences for youth employment. Minimum wages, penalty rates, consumer spending, labour shortages and changes in casual employment conditions may affect the entire workforce, but industries employing large numbers of young people feel those changes particularly strongly. The data also highlight how narrow the early-career labour market remains. For many Australians, the first step into employment is still overwhelmingly likely to come through **a café, restaurant, hotel, supermarket or shop**. Australia’s youth labour market is therefore much less diversified than the overall economy it eventually feeds into. Where Australia’s young workers are employed Share of all filled jobs held by people under 25 — June 2026 | Accommodation & food services | **22.0%** | | ------------------------------- | --------- | | Retail trade | **17.8%** | | Health care & social assistance | **9.8%** | 39.9% of all jobs held by under-25s are in hospitality or retail 50.4% of all accommodation & food services jobs are held by people under 25 Filled jobs count individual employment relationships rather than individual workers. Source: ABS Labour Account, June 2026\. ### Industry super's $320 billion bet on unlisted assets URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/industry-super-unlisted-assets/ Last updated: 2026-09-14T21:00:15.000Z Australian industry and retail super funds are pursuing markedly different investment strategies. APRA's June 2026 fund-level statistics show industry funds held **$319.8 billion in unlisted equity, property and infrastructure**, equivalent to **18.8 per cent of their total investments**. Retail funds held just **$49.0 billion**, or **5.3 per cent**. The biggest difference is infrastructure. Industry funds had **$154.8 billion**, or 9.1 per cent of investments, in unlisted infrastructure. Retail funds had $14.9 billion, or 1.6 per cent. There are legitimate attractions to unlisted assets. Large super funds have long investment horizons and can own airports, roads, property and private companies directly rather than relying exclusively on listed markets. These assets may provide diversification and an illiquidity premium. But there is a genuine cost: **we do not know their market value with the same precision as listed assets**. A listed share has an observable market price every trading day. An airport or privately owned company does not. Its value must instead be estimated using assumptions about future cash flows, comparable transactions, discount rates and other valuation inputs. Those estimates ultimately feed into fund unit prices and therefore members' reported balances. APRA requires trustees to maintain robust valuation frameworks and generally expects valuations at least quarterly, with greater frequency where circumstances warrant. It has nevertheless identified continuing weaknesses in some funds' valuation governance. Unlisted investment is not inherently better or worse. But industry super members are substantially more exposed to assets whose value is **estimated rather than continuously discovered in a market**. That is an important difference between industry and retail super. Industry super's $320bn unlisted asset strategy Unlisted equity, property and infrastructure — June 2026 | Industry funds $319.8bn 18.8% of total investments | Retail funds $49.0bn 5.3% of total investments | | -------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | Where the difference comes from | Unlisted asset | Industry$bn | Industry% | Retail$bn | Retail% | | -------------- | ----------- | --------- | --------- | ------- | | Equity | $84.6 | 5.0% | $20.3 | 2.2% | | Property | $80.4 | 4.7% | $13.8 | 1.5% | | Infrastructure | $154.8 | 9.1% | $14.9 | 1.6% | | Total unlisted | $319.8 | 18.8% | $49.0 | 5.3% | THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY GAP Industry funds allocate 3.5× as much of their portfolios to these unlisted assets. In dollar terms they hold about 6.5 times as much as retail funds. Source: APRA Quarterly Fund-Level Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Unlisted assets shown here comprise APRA's unlisted equity, unlisted property and unlisted infrastructure categories. Private debt is excluded. ### Look under the hood: comparing Australian and US inflation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-us-inflation-comparison/ Last updated: 2026-09-14T01:34:33.000Z Australia and the United States currently have remarkably similar headline inflation rates. But look beneath the headline and the picture changes. Australian consumer prices rose **3.5% over the year to July**, while US inflation was **3.4% in August**. On headline inflation, there is almost nothing separating the two economies. Underlying inflation tells a different story. Australia's **trimmed mean inflation is 3.6%**, slightly *higher* than headline inflation and unchanged from June. The trimmed mean removes unusually large price movements at both ends of the CPI distribution, giving a better indication of broad inflationary pressure. In the US, **core inflation is 2.4%**, a full percentage point below headline inflation. Core CPI is constructed differently—it simply excludes food and energy—but it similarly attempts to look through particularly volatile prices. Energy helps explain the divergence. US gasoline prices jumped **3.9% in August alone**, accounting for more than one-third of the monthly increase in headline CPI. Australia's pressure looks broader. Housing prices are **5.0% higher over the year**, including a 5.7% increase in new dwelling prices, while food prices are up 3.2%. The distinction matters for monetary policy. Temporary energy shocks can eventually reverse. Broad-based domestic inflation is harder to eliminate. So while Australia and America currently have almost identical headline inflation, **Australia appears to have the more persistent underlying inflation problem**. Inflation: Australia versus the United States Latest annual consumer price inflation | Economy | Headline | Underlying\* | Gap | Key pressure | | ------------- | -------- | ------------ | ------- | ------------ | | Australia | 3.5% | 3.6% | +0.1 pp | Housing | | United States | 3.4% | 2.4% | −1.0 pp | Energy | **The key difference:**Australia's underlying inflation is slightly above its headline rate. In the US, underlying inflation is a full percentage point below headline inflation. **Sources:** Australian Bureau of Statistics; US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Australia: July 2026\. United States: August 2026\. \*Australia uses trimmed mean inflation; US figure is core CPI excluding food and energy. The measures are conceptually similar but are calculated differently. ### The death of the corporate super fund URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/death-corporate-super-fund-australia/ Last updated: 2026-09-12T22:00:40.000Z Australia's corporate super fund is almost extinct. A **corporate super fund** is built around employees of a single employer or related corporate group. Before universal compulsory super, these employer-sponsored schemes were an important employment benefit, particularly for larger companies and white-collar workers. Many historically included defined-benefit arrangements, under which the employer carried some of the investment and funding risk. But the model has steadily lost its economic rationale. APRA's fund-level data show **12 corporate funds remained in June 2021\. By June 2026 there was just one: the ANZ Australian Staff Superannuation Scheme**, with around 27,500 accounts and $7.9 billion in member benefits. The survivors disappeared through mergers and successor fund transfers. Commonwealth Bank Group Super transferred **63,700 members and $12.3 billion** to Australian Retirement Trust in 2023\. Qantas Super transferred around **25,000 members** to ART in March 2025. The fundamental problem is scale. Modern super funds require substantial spending on investment capability, administration, technology, cyber security, regulation and member services. APRA estimates large funds can spread those costs much more effectively: administration and operating expenses averaged **0.33 per cent of assets for large funds compared with 0.57 per cent for small funds**. Employee choice has also weakened the old relationship between employer and super fund, while compulsory super has created enormous multi-employer funds capable of offering sophisticated investment and retirement services. Corporate super once connected retirement savings closely to your employer. Today, the economics increasingly favour connecting employees to a **mega-fund instead**. The death of the corporate super fund APRA-regulated corporate funds, June quarter | Year | Corporate funds | Member accounts | Member benefits | | -------- | --------------- | --------------- | --------------- | | **2021** | **12** | 248,920 | $56.8bn | | 2022 | 11 | 243,850 | $54.0bn | | 2023 | 8 | 220,530 | $53.6bn | | 2024 | 5 | 156,650 | $44.0bn | | 2025 | 2 | 126,400 | $34.9bn | | **2026** | 1 | 27,460 | $7.9bn | Last one standing ANZ Australian Staff Superannuation Scheme Source: APRA Quarterly Fund-Level Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Corporate funds are funds with a corporate membership base under APRA's classification. ### More than one job - what do we know? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-second-job-economy/ Last updated: 2026-09-12T21:00:29.000Z Holding down a second job is becoming an increasingly common feature of Australian working life. New ABS Labour Account data show the proportion of employed Australians holding multiple jobs has risen from **5.5 per cent in June 2016 to 6.8 per cent in June 2026**. That might sound like a modest increase. Across Australia’s workforce, however, it represents a significant structural shift. The trend is particularly pronounced among younger workers. Among people aged **20–24, 11.1 per cent now hold multiple jobs** — roughly one in every nine employed people in that age group. The rate was 9.2 per cent a decade earlier. But the largest increase has occurred among **25–34 year-olds**. Their multiple-job-holding rate has jumped from **6.3 per cent to 8.9 per cent** since 2016 — an increase of around 41 per cent. The pattern continues into the 35–44 age group, where the rate has risen from 4.7 to **6.1 per cent**. Women are also more likely than men to have multiple jobs. In June 2026, the rate was approximately **7.5 per cent for women**, compared with **6.1 per cent for men**. The data do not tell us why workers are taking additional jobs. Cost-of-living pressures, changing work preferences, greater casualisation and the growth of industries where multiple employment relationships are common could all contribute. But the direction is clear. Australia’s labour market is increasingly not simply about whether someone has a job. For a growing number of Australians, the question is **how many jobs they need or choose to have**. Australia’s second-job economy is growing Multiple-job holders as a share of employed people All employed Australians 5.5% → 6.8% June 2016 to June 2026 | Age | 2016 | 2026 | Change | | --------- | ---- | --------- | ------ | | 20–24 | 9.2% | **11.1%** | +1.9pp | | **25–34** | 6.3% | **8.9%** | +2.6pp | | 35–44 | 4.7% | **6.1%** | +1.4pp | 1 in 9 employed 20–24 year-olds now hold multiple jobs Multiple-job-holding rate = multiple-job holders as a share of employed people. Figures compare June 2016 with June 2026\. Source: ABS Labour Account. ### Australians over 65 now hold 773,000 jobs URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australians-over-65-now-hold-773-000-jobs/ Last updated: 2026-09-12T01:00:24.000Z Australians are increasingly working well beyond the traditional retirement age. New ABS Labour Account data show people aged **65 and over held around 773,000 filled jobs in June 2026**. Thirty years ago, in June 1996, they held only about **160,000**. That means the number of jobs held by Australians aged 65 and over has increased almost **fivefold — around 383 per cent — in three decades**. The change is much larger than can be explained simply by growth in the overall labour market. In 1996, workers aged 65 and over accounted for just **1.8 per cent of all filled jobs**. Today their share is approximately **4.7 per cent** — approaching one job in every 20. And the trend is continuing. Since June 2016 alone, the number of jobs held by people aged 65 and over has increased by approximately **67 per cent**, from around 463,000 to 773,000. There are several possible explanations. Australia has an ageing population, people are living longer, jobs have become less physically demanding and flexible work can make continued employment easier. Changes to retirement incomes and the Age Pension eligibility age may also influence decisions about when people stop working. The figures alone cannot tell us whether older Australians are working because they **want to or need to**. But they reveal an unmistakable structural transformation. The traditional idea that Australian working life ends around 65 increasingly does not describe the labour market. Thirty years ago, employment beyond 65 was comparatively unusual. Today, Australians aged 65 and over hold **more than three-quarters of a million jobs**. Australians are increasingly working beyond 65 Filled jobs held by people aged 65 and over | Year | Jobs held by 65+ | Share of all jobs | | ------------- | ---------------- | ----------------- | | June 1996 | 160,000 | 1.8% | | June 2016 | \~463,000 | — | | **June 2026** | **773,000** | **4.7%** | +383% increase in jobs held by Australians aged 65+ since 1996 1996 160,000 →2026 773,000 Filled jobs count jobs rather than individual workers. Figures are original estimates. Source: ABS Labour Account, June 2026\. ### Consolidation and rise of the superannuation mega-funds URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rise-australian-super-mega-funds/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T21:00:34.000Z Australia's superannuation industry is rapidly becoming an industry of mega-funds. APRA's latest fund-level statistics show the number of regulated funds in the dataset has fallen from **130 in June 2021 to just 66 in June 2026** — almost exactly halving in five years. But the money has moved in the opposite direction. Member benefits increased from **$2.14 trillion to $3.20 trillion**, while the average amount of member benefits per fund almost tripled from **$16.5 billion to $48.4 billion**. The largest funds are becoming particularly powerful institutions. AustralianSuper now has **$438 billion** in member benefits and Australian Retirement Trust $366 billion. Together they account for about a quarter of the market captured by these statistics. The top five funds now hold **42.8 per cent** of member benefits, up from 32.0 per cent in 2021\. The top ten control **60.5 per cent**. There are good reasons for consolidation. Larger funds can spread administration, technology and compliance costs across millions of members and have greater bargaining power when purchasing investment-management services. But scale also changes the structure of Australia's financial sector. Trustee boards overseeing hundreds of billions of dollars make increasingly consequential decisions about which asset managers receive mandates, which infrastructure and private-market assets receive capital, which technology providers are selected and which professional advisers are engaged. For asset managers, winning or losing one mega-fund mandate can therefore matter enormously. For investment consultants, financial advisers, lawyers, technology companies and other advisory businesses, there are also fewer — but much larger — institutional clients. That makes expertise important, but also **professional connectivity**. Firms wanting to participate in Australia's growing superannuation system increasingly need strong relationships, reputations and networks inside a relatively small number of very large funds. Australia has not simply consolidated its super industry. It has created a new class of extremely powerful financial institutions. The rise of Australia's super mega-funds APRA-regulated funds in the Quarterly Fund-Level Statistics | Funds 130 → 66 −49% | Member benefits $3.20tn +49% | Top 5 share 42.8% 32.0% in 2021 | Top 10 share 60.5% 51.4% in 2021 | | ------------------- | ---------------------------- | ------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | Five years of consolidation | Measure | June 2021 | June 2026 | Change | | ------------------------- | --------- | --------- | ------ | | Number of funds | 130 | 66 | −49% | | Member benefits | $2.14tn | $3.20tn | +49% | | Average benefits per fund | $16.5bn | $48.4bn | +194% | Australia's largest super funds — June 2026 | Fund | Member benefits | Share | | --------------------------------------- | --------------- | ----- | | **1\. AustralianSuper** | **$437.8bn** | 13.7% | | **2\. Australian Retirement Trust** | **$366.4bn** | 11.5% | | 3\. Aware Super | $246.2bn | 7.7% | | 4\. UniSuper | $161.2bn | 5.0% | | 5\. HOSTPLUS | $156.9bn | 4.9% | | 6\. Public Sector Superannuation Scheme | $120.0bn | 3.8% | | 7\. CFS FirstChoice | $115.4bn | 3.6% | | 8\. REST | $112.1bn | 3.5% | | 9\. Cbus | $111.8bn | 3.5% | | 10\. HESTA | $106.4bn | 3.3% | | Top 10 combined | $1.93tn | 60.5% | Source: APRA Quarterly Fund-Level Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Member benefits are used for fund-level comparisons and differ from APRA's broader measure of total fund assets. ### Women hold more than 50% of all jobs in Australia URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/women-majority-australian-filled-jobs/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T04:12:08.000Z Women now hold **more than half of all filled jobs in Australia** — a milestone that says something important about how the labour market is changing. New ABS Labour Account data show women held **8.18 million filled jobs in June 2026**, compared with **8.12 million held by men**. Women therefore accounted for **50.2 per cent of all filled jobs**. But there is a catch. Women still do not hold a majority of Australians’ **main jobs**. Men held around **7.63 million main jobs**, compared with **7.53 million for women**. The difference comes from secondary employment. Women held approximately **656,000 secondary jobs**, compared with **493,000 for men**. That means women accounted for about **57 per cent of all secondary jobs**. In other words, men still held roughly **98,000 more main jobs**, but women held around **163,000 more secondary jobs**. Once both are counted, women finished with about **65,000 more filled jobs overall**. A “filled job” counts each job rather than each worker. Someone working for two employers therefore contributes two filled jobs: their main job and a secondary job. The female share of filled jobs first moved above 50 per cent in late 2025 and remained there through June 2026. The milestone therefore reflects two long-term changes in Australia’s labour market: the growing importance of female employment, particularly in rapidly expanding industries such as health and education, and the increasing prevalence of people holding more than one job. Women now hold most Australian jobs. But the reason why is almost as interesting as the headline itself. Women now hold more than half of Australian jobs Filled jobs by sex — June 2026 | Job measure | Women | Men | | ------------------- | ----------- | ---------- | | Main jobs | 7.527m | **7.625m** | | Secondary jobs | **656,000** | 493,000 | | **All filled jobs** | **8.183m** | **8.118m** | 50.2% of Australian filled jobs are now held by women A filled job counts each employment relationship. A worker with a second job therefore contributes both a main job and a secondary job. Source: ABS Labour Account, June 2026\. ### Investors now demand more than 5% to lend to the US Government for 30 years URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/investors-now-demand-more-than-5-to-lend-to-the-us-government-for-30-years/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T01:16:52.000Z Something unusual is happening in the world's most important bond market. Investors now demand more than **5% a year to lend money to the US Government for 30 years**, with the 30-year Treasury yield recently reaching its highest level in almost two decades. A Treasury bond is simply an IOU issued by the US Government. An investor lends the government money and, in return, receives regular interest payments before getting the bond's face value back when it matures. The **yield** tells us the return an investor can earn by buying that bond at its current market price and holding it to maturity. The important part is that bond prices and yields move in opposite directions. Imagine a bond paying $40 a year. If investors are willing to pay $1,000 for it, that payment represents 4%. But if investors become less enthusiastic and will pay only $800, the same fixed $40 payment represents 5% of the purchase price. The full yield calculation also takes account of the eventual repayment of the bond's face value. So when Treasury yields rise, the bond market is effectively saying: **we will lend to you, but we want a better return.** Why are investors demanding more now? Partly it reflects inflation. Higher oil prices and renewed inflation concerns increase the risk that dollars received decades from now will buy less than expected. But government finances matter as well. US federal debt has exceeded **$40 trillion**, deficits remain extremely large and Washington must continually issue vast quantities of new debt. Greater supply means investors may require higher yields to absorb it. There is also what economists call a **term premium**: extra compensation investors demand for locking their money away for decades while facing uncertainty about inflation, interest rates and government finances. That is why the 30-year yield matters beyond America. US Treasuries help set the global price of money. Higher Treasury yields can increase borrowing costs for companies, governments and banks around the world — including Australia. The bond market's message is not that America cannot borrow. It is that long-term borrowing is becoming more expensive. US Treasury yields — 9 September 2026 | Lending period | Treasury yield | | -------------- | -------------- | | **1 month** | 3.81% | | **2 years** | 4.43% | | **10 years** | 4.83% | | **20 years** | 5.28% | | **30 years** | **5.28%** | Highest in almost two decades The 30-year US Treasury yield has recently climbed above 5%, reaching levels not seen since 2007\. **The message from the bond market:** investors currently demand much more to lend to the US Government for decades than for months, reflecting greater uncertainty about future inflation, interest rates and government finances. Source: US Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates. Yields as at 9 September 2026\. ### Jim Chalmers has a fair criticism of Qld Government URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/jim-chalmers-has-a-fair-criticism-of-qld-government/ Last updated: 2026-09-10T23:24:02.000Z ## Federal Treasurer Jim Chalmers is hardly a neutral observer of Queensland politics, but on the state's finances he has a point. Queensland is reportedly on the brink of another S&P credit-rating downgrade. Chalmers described the prospect as “very troubling”, arguing that Queensland's fiscal position has deteriorated sharply despite increased Commonwealth support. The political argument over who is responsible is more complicated. Treasurer David Janetzki says the Crisafulli Government inherited the problem from Labor and is also being squeezed by Commonwealth cost-shifting, weaker GST receipts and falling stamp-duty revenue. Indeed, Queensland is now reportedly tracking around **$1 billion below expectations on stamp duty**, after collections fell 16.5 per cent in the first two months of this financial year. But those explanations do not make the underlying numbers disappear. Benchmark recently compared state finances using the Australian Bureau of Statistics' consistent Government Finance Statistics framework. Queensland's state and local general government sector spent **$103.2 billion in 2025–26 against revenue of $94.8 billion**, leaving an **$8.4 billion operating deficit**. Once investment was included, net borrowing reached **$19.1 billion — 20.2 per cent of revenue, the highest proportion of any state or territory**. Queensland's own Budget tells much the same story. Its estimated 2025–26 operating deficit was **$8.85 billion**. Non-financial public sector borrowings are forecast to rise from **$142.4 billion to $216.5 billion** by 2029–30, while annual interest expenses climb towards **$10.9 billion**. S&P had already shifted Queensland's **AA+ outlook to negative in February 2025**, warning about weaker budget performance and rapidly rising debt. Its concern is fundamentally about spending: operating expenses have risen around 50 per cent over five years. The LNP can reasonably argue that much of the deterioration predates it. Chalmers can reasonably be challenged over Commonwealth decisions. **But the fiscal diagnosis is becoming difficult to contest: Queensland is spending too much relative to its revenue base, borrowing heavily, and becoming increasingly exposed whenever revenue disappoints.** *Sources: ABS Government Finance Statistics; Queensland Budget 2026–27; S&P Global Ratings; Benchmark Analytics calculations.* Queensland's fiscal warning lights are flashing **S&P credit rating:** AA+ | **Outlook:** Negative | **Downgrade reportedly imminent** | 2025–26 operating deficit $8.85bn Queensland General Government Sector | Net borrowing / revenue 20.2% Highest of any state or territory | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | | Public sector borrowings $216.5bn Forecast by 2029–30 | Annual interest expense $10.9bn Forecast by 2029–30 | ABS figures include Queensland state and local general government. Budget borrowings and interest figures use Queensland Government sector definitions. Sources: ABS Government Finance Statistics; Queensland Budget 2026–27; S&P Global Ratings; Benchmark Analytics calculations. ### Snapshot of central bank policy interest rates URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/central-bank-policy-interest-rates/ Last updated: 2026-09-10T05:19:15.000Z Central banks have one particularly powerful lever for influencing their economies: the **policy interest rate**. In Australia, this is the RBA's cash rate target — the target interest rate for unsecured overnight lending between banks. Other central banks use somewhat different arrangements, so the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) identifies a comparable official policy rate for each country. Changing this rate flows through financial markets to mortgage rates, business borrowing costs, deposit rates, asset prices and exchange rates. Higher rates generally restrain spending and inflation; lower rates stimulate economic activity. The international picture is currently strikingly mixed. Australia's policy rate stands at **4.35%**, up from 3.60% a year earlier — the largest increase among the 11 economies shown below. Japan has also tightened, from 0.50% to 1.00%, while Korea and the euro area have increased rates by 0.25 percentage points. The direction has been very different elsewhere. The **US has cut by 0.75 percentage points**, while Canada and New Zealand have cut by 0.50 points. Britain and Sweden have also eased. Norway has the highest nominal policy rate in the group at **4.25%**, just below Australia's 4.35%. But nominal rates tell only part of the story. Subtracting current inflation produces a simple **real policy rate**. On this measure, Australia's rate is only around **0.4% above inflation**, compared with roughly 1.3% in Canada and Norway. The comparison illustrates why the same nominal interest rate can represent quite different monetary settings across economies. Snapshot of central bank policy interest rates Latest available BIS data | Economy | Policyrate | 12 monthsago | Change(pp) | CPIinflation | Realrate\* | | -------------- | ---------- | ------------ | ---------- | ------------ | ---------- | | Australia | 4.35% | 3.60% | +0.75 | 3.94% | +0.41% | | United States | 3.63% | 4.38% | −0.75 | 3.36% | +0.26% | | United Kingdom | 3.75% | 4.00% | −0.25 | 2.81% | +0.94% | | New Zealand | 2.50% | 3.00% | −0.50 | 4.06% | −1.56% | | Canada | 2.25% | 2.75% | −0.50 | 3.03% | −0.78% | | Euro area | 2.25% | 2.00% | +0.25 | 2.94% | −0.69% | | Japan | 1.00% | 0.50% | +0.50 | 1.90% | −0.90% | | Switzerland | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00 | 0.35% | −0.35% | | Sweden | 1.75% | 2.00% | −0.25 | 0.18% | +1.57% | | Norway | 4.25% | 4.25% | 0.00 | 2.98% | +1.27% | | South Korea | 2.75% | 2.50% | +0.25 | 2.79% | −0.04% | **Source:** Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Policy Rates and Consumer Prices databases. Policy rates are the latest available observations; 12-month comparison uses the corresponding policy rate approximately one year earlier. CPI is the latest year-ended observation available in the BIS dataset (June 2026 for Australia and New Zealand; July 2026 for most other economies). \*Real rate is the current policy rate less latest annual CPI inflation. It is a simple contemporaneous measure, not an expected real interest rate. ### Australia’s industrial strikes have not disappeared — but they have collapsed URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-long-decline-in-industrial-disputes/ Last updated: 2026-09-09T05:43:26.000Z Australia still experiences industrial disputes, but the long-run trend is unmistakable: the country is vastly less strike-prone than it was in the 1980s and 1990s. The latest ABS release shows that in the **June quarter 2026** there were **49 disputes**, unchanged from the previous quarter, although the number of employees involved and working days lost both fell sharply. Over the **year to June 2026**, total disputes rose to **217** and working days lost reached **193,000**, so there has been some recent firming. But the historical context matters far more than the quarter-to-quarter noise. Australia recorded **1,958 disputes in 1985**, compared with **252 in 2025**. Working days lost were **1.26 million in 1985**, compared with **166,600 in 2025**. On an average quarterly basis, the late 1980s saw about **416 disputes** and **340,000 working days lost**. In the 2020s, those averages have fallen to roughly **50 disputes** and **31,600 working days lost**. That is a profound structural change, especially in the context of strong employment growth in that period. Industrial conflict still flares during bargaining rounds and public-sector campaigns, but it is operating from a much lower base. Australia’s industrial relations system has become far less strike-intensive over time, reflecting lower union density, industrial change and the use of shorter, more targeted forms of action. Australia’s long decline in industrial disputes Annual total disputes, 1985–2025, with latest year-ended context from the June quarter 2026 ABS release. | 1985 full year 1,958 total disputes | 2025 full year 252 total disputes | Year to Jun 2026 217 total disputes | | ----------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 1985: 1,958 2025: 252 Year to Jun 2026: 217 | **Working days lost:** 1.26 million in 1985, 166,600 in 2025, and 193,000 over the year to June 2026. **Source:** ABS Industrial Disputes, Australia; annual totals calculated from quarterly Table 1 series. | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ### Australia’s governments do not have a revenue problem. They have a spending addiction. URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-governments-do-not-have-a-revenue-problem-they-have-a-spending-addiction/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T06:40:53.000Z New ABS Government Finance Statistics show total government revenue increased by 6.6% in 2025–26, adding $66.5 billion to government coffers. Tax revenue grew even faster, rising 7.0%. Yet government expenses increased by 8.2%, or $84.4 billion. The result was a net operating deficit of $37.8 billion — $17.9 billion worse than the previous financial year. That is an important distinction in the fiscal debate. Government revenue is not stagnant. It is growing comfortably faster than inflation and nominal wages. The difficulty is that expenditure continues to grow even faster. Disability spending provides a good illustration. Commonwealth disability benefits increased by another 10.7% in 2025–26, or $4.9 billion, after increasing 10.8% the previous year. The Government has already introduced reforms intended to improve the financial sustainability of the NDIS. Participant growth has subsequently slowed. But the ABS notes that average payments per participant increased. This is the broader expenditure challenge in miniature. Slowing the growth of a government program is not the same thing as reducing expenditure. Even after reform, disability benefits are still expanding at a double-digit annual rate. There were other large spending increases. Government employee expenses rose 6.1%, social benefits in goods and services rose 5.3%, monetary transfers to households rose 5.4%, while interest expenses jumped 12.0%. Australia’s governments enjoyed another year of strong revenue growth in 2025–26. It still was not enough to keep pace with spending. Australia’s spending problem Government Finance Statistics, 2025–26 ANNUAL GROWTH | Total revenue | +6.6% | +$66.5bn | | -------------- | ----- | -------- | | Tax revenue | +7.0% | +$58.6bn | | Total expenses | +8.2% | +$84.4bn | Net operating balance –$37.8bn $17.9bn worse than 2024–25 A case study in spending growth Commonwealth disability benefits 2025–26 +10.7% +$4.9bn Disability benefits also increased 10.8% in 2024–25\. Participant growth slowed in 2025–26, while average payments per participant increased. Source: ABS Government Finance Statistics, June 2026 ### Housing approvals still below 1.2 million-home target pace URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/housing-approvals-still-below-1-2-million-home-target-pace/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T01:44:25.000Z Australia’s housing approval pipeline is improving, but it is still running below the pace implied by the National Housing Accord target of 1.2 million new homes over five years. The latest ABS Building Approvals data show **18,365 dwellings were approved in trend terms in July 2026**. That was up 0.8 per cent over the month and **11.7 per cent over the year**. Annualised, the July trend rate is equivalent to around **220,000 dwelling approvals a year**. The Housing Accord target, which runs from 1 July 2024 for five years, implies an average construction rate of **240,000 homes a year**. That leaves the current approval rate about **19,600 dwellings, or 8 per cent, below** the annual pace implied by the target. The seasonally adjusted figures were weaker again. Total dwelling approvals fell 3.6 per cent in July to 17,687, although this followed a strong 6.9 per cent rise in June. Because monthly approvals can be volatile, the trend series gives a better indication of the underlying pipeline. There is an important qualification. **Building approvals are not completed homes.** The Accord target is for homes to be built, while an approval is the official permit allowing construction to begin. But approvals are a leading indicator of future construction. If Australia is to lift completions towards 240,000 homes a year, the approval pipeline will need to move sustainably above its current level. **The latest figures show progress — but not yet a housing pipeline consistent with the national target.** Australia’s housing approval pipeline Annualised dwelling approvals compared with the pace implied by the National Housing Accord | Current trend 220,380 approvals annualised | Accord pace 240,000 homes per year | | ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------- | 19,620 short Current approval pace is about **8.2% below** the rate implied by the target Source: ABS Building Approvals, July 2026; Australian Treasury. Current rate uses the ABS trend estimate of 18,365 approvals × 12\. Approvals are not equivalent to dwelling completions. ### ANZ under Nuno Matos: growth remains a work in progress URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/anz-nuno-matos-market-growth/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T08:04:45.000Z Nuno Matos became ANZ Group CEO on **12 May 2025**, succeeding Shayne Elliott after previously leading Wealth and Personal Banking at HSBC. Just over a year into his tenure, APRA’s banking statistics suggest **ANZ is yet to match the broader market’s balance-sheet growth**. The weakest result is **business lending**. ANZ’s business loan book has grown **6.6%** since Matos took over, compared with **14.2% across the major banks** and 12.4% across all ADIs. Business lending covers credit to companies and other commercial borrowers. Housing has performed somewhat better. **Owner-occupied lending** — mortgages on homes borrowers live in — increased **4.0%**, against 6.6% for the majors. **Investment housing lending**, covering loans on rental and investment properties, grew **8.8%**, marginally ahead of the major-bank average of 8.6%, although below 10.8% across all ADIs. Overall housing lending increased **5.6%**, versus 7.2% for the majors. **Resident deposits** — deposits from Australian households, businesses and other residents — increased **8.4%**, also below major-bank growth of 10.0%. The early conclusion is therefore fairly clear: **ANZ has broadly kept pace in investor mortgages, but has lost relative ground in business lending, owner-occupied housing and deposits under Matos so far.** The figures are from **APRA’s Monthly ADI Statistics for July 2026** and measure changes in outstanding balances rather than new lending flows. ANZ under Nuno Matos Growth in key markets since May 2025 | Market | Balance | Growth | Majors | All ADIs | | --------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ | ------ | -------- | | **Business lending** 12.4% market share | $157.8bn | +6.6% | +14.2% | +12.4% | | **Investor housing** 13.8% market share | $113.6bn | +8.8% | +8.6% | +10.8% | | **Owner-occupied housing** 12.9% market share | $218.3bn | +4.0% | +6.6% | +7.5% | | **Total housing** 13.2% market share | $331.9bn | +5.6% | +7.2% | +8.5% | | **Resident deposits** 12.5% market share | $438.3bn | +8.4% | +10.0% | +10.6% | **Period:** 12 May 2025 to July 2026. **Source:** APRA Monthly ADI Statistics. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### NAB under Andrew Irvine: business banking strong, investor housing the weak spot URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/nab-andrew-irvine-market-growth/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T07:48:41.000Z Andrew Irvine took over as NAB Group CEO on **2 April 2024**, succeeding Ross McEwan. More than two years into his tenure, APRA’s monthly banking statistics show a mixed but generally solid market-growth record. The standout is **business lending**. NAB’s business loan book has grown **24.8%** since Irvine’s appointment, ahead of the **23.9%** increase across all ADIs, although slightly behind the **27.0%** growth recorded by the major banks. Business lending covers credit provided to companies, small businesses and other commercial borrowers. Housing is more uneven. **Owner-occupied housing lending** — mortgages for borrowers living in the property — has risen **13.0%**, ahead of the major-bank average of 12.0%, but below system growth of 14.1%. **Investment housing lending**, covering mortgages on rental or investment properties, has increased only **6.2%**, far below the 17.3% system increase. As a result, total housing lending growth of **10.3%** trails all ADIs by 4.8 percentage points. **Resident deposits** — deposits held by Australian households, businesses and other residents — have grown **17.4%**, broadly matching the majors and system. Overall, Irvine’s NAB is **defending or gaining ground in business banking and owner-occupied mortgages, while investor housing is the clear weak spot**. The figures are from **APRA’s Monthly ADI Statistics for July 2026** and measure changes in outstanding balances, rather than new lending flows. NAB under Andrew Irvine Growth in key markets since April 2024 | Market | Balance | Growth | Majors | All ADIs | | --------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ | ------ | -------- | | **Business lending** 21.8% market share | $276.5bn | +24.8% | +27.0% | +23.9% | | **Investor housing** 14.0% market share | $115.3bn | +6.2% | +14.1% | +17.3% | | **Owner-occupied housing** 14.0% market share | $236.2bn | +13.0% | +12.0% | +14.1% | | **Total housing** 14.0% market share | $351.5bn | +10.3% | +12.7% | +15.1% | | **Resident deposits** 17.0% market share | $595.9bn | +17.4% | +17.2% | +18.2% | **Period:** 2 April 2024 to July 2026. **Source:** APRA Monthly ADI Statistics. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### Westpac under Anthony Miller: business growth strong, housing still lagging URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/westpac-anthony-miller-market-growth/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T07:29:07.000Z Anthony Miller became Westpac Group CEO on **16 December 2024**, succeeding Peter King. Almost 20 months later, APRA’s banking statistics provide a useful first measure of how Westpac is travelling in the battle for market growth. The picture is **positive, but uneven**. Since Miller took over, Westpac’s **business lending** has increased **23.2%**, comfortably ahead of major banks at 18.8% and all ADIs at 16.5%. It has even narrowly beaten CBA’s 22.6%. Business lending covers loans and other credit provided to businesses. Westpac has also performed well in **resident deposits** — money deposited with the bank by Australian households, businesses and other residents. Deposits have grown **14.1%**, compared with 13.4% across the majors and 13.9% for all ADIs. Housing is the weakness. **Owner-occupied lending**, where the borrower lives in the property, has grown 7.6% since Miller’s appointment, below system growth of 9.8%. **Investment housing lending** has increased just 8.7%, against 13.3% system-wide. Consequently, total housing lending growth of **8.0%** trails the market’s 10.9%. The implication is straightforward: **Westpac appears to be gaining ground in business banking and holding its own in deposits, while surrendering relative ground in mortgages — particularly investor housing.** The data are from **APRA’s Monthly ADI Statistics for July 2026** and measure changes in outstanding loan and deposit balances, rather than new lending flows. Westpac under Anthony Miller Growth in key markets since December 2024 | Market | Balance | Growth | Majors | All ADIs | | --------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ | ------ | -------- | | **Business lending** 16.6% market share | $210.4bn | +23.2% | +18.8% | +16.5% | | **Investor housing** 21.4% market share | $175.4bn | +8.7% | +10.7% | +13.3% | | **Owner-occupied housing** 20.3% market share | $342.6bn | +7.6% | +8.3% | +9.8% | | **Total housing** 20.6% market share | $518.0bn | +8.0% | +9.1% | +10.9% | | **Resident deposits** 19.3% market share | $675.0bn | +14.1% | +13.4% | +13.9% | **Period:** 16 December 2024 to July 2026. **Source:** APRA Monthly ADI Statistics. Calculations: Benchmark Analytics. ### Strong growth in instant payments - NPP URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-payments-shift-july-2026/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T01:44:02.000Z Australia’s payments system continues to move rapidly towards cards and real-time account-to-account payments, while older payment methods steadily retreat. The standout in the RBA’s July data is the **New Payments Platform (NPP)**. Australians made 176.2 million NPP transactions during the month, worth $260.6 billion. Transaction values were **20.1% higher than a year earlier**, while the number of transactions increased 12.2%. Cards remain the everyday workhorse. Australians made **1.42 billion card purchases worth $100.1 billion** in July. Card spending increased 6.6% over the year, compared with a 4.0% increase in transaction numbers — suggesting the average amount spent per transaction is also rising. Debit cards dominate by volume, accounting for more than three-quarters of card purchases. But credit and charge card spending grew faster in value, rising 8.1% over the year compared with 5.7% for debit. Cash is declining more gradually. The **number of ATM withdrawals fell 2.1%**, but their value actually increased 1.8%, suggesting Australians are making fewer but larger withdrawals. Cheques continue their structural collapse. Just 0.6 million cheque payments were made in July, down **27.1% over the year**. The direction is increasingly clear: Australian payments are becoming faster, more digital and more concentrated around cards and real-time transfers. *Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Retail Payments, July 2026.* How Australians are paying — July 2026 | Payment method | July value | Value growth | Number growth | | ------------------------- | ---------- | ------------ | ------------- | | **New Payments Platform** | $260.6bn | **+20.1%** | +12.2% | | **Card purchases** | $100.1bn | +6.6% | +4.0% | | **ATM withdrawals** | $9.3bn | +1.8% | −2.1% | | **Cheques** | $11.0bn | −14.0% | **−27.1%** | Year-ended growth. Seasonally adjusted. Source: Reserve Bank of Australia. ### The Productivity Commission just updated its dashboard - not good URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-productivity-commission-just-updated-its-dashboard-not-good/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T23:10:27.000Z The Productivity Commission’s latest dashboard shows **whole-economy labour productivity fell 0.2% over the year to June 2026**. Labour productivity measures the amount of economic output produced for each hour worked. More concerning is the longer-term result. Over the past five years, Australian labour productivity has declined by an average **0.5% a year**. That means Australia is not simply experiencing unusually slow productivity growth. On this measure, the economy is now producing **less output per hour worked than its recent trajectory would suggest**. This matters because productivity is ultimately the foundation for sustainable increases in real wages and living standards. Employment and population growth can increase the size of the economy, but without productivity growth they do much less to increase prosperity per person. The latest figures reinforce a central weakness in Australia’s recent economic performance: **we are adding labour without generating commensurate improvements in what each hour of work produces.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/09/image-1.png) ### US gas prices remain above $4 with 58 days to midterms URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/us-gas-prices-2026-midterm-elections/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T11:12:42.000Z The latest weekly US gas price sits at **$4.07 a gallon** as of 31 August 2026, well above the **$3.76 average recorded so far this year**. Prices have run even hotter since the Iran conflict began, averaging **$4.03** from the first weekly observation after hostilities commenced. Under **Trump's second term**, the average price has now increased to **$3.37**, ranging from a low of $2.78 in January 2026 to a high of $4.50 in May. The latest price is therefore about **21% above Trump's second-term average** and **33% above the $3.07 recorded in the week immediately before the 2024 presidential election**. Trump's second-term average nevertheless remains below the **$3.46 average under Biden**. Prices also swung much more sharply during the Biden presidency, from $2.39 in January 2021 to a peak of $5.01 in June 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. During **Trump's first term**, the average gas price was substantially lower at **$2.48**, although that period included the pandemic collapse in demand that pushed gasoline as low as $1.77 in April 2020. With **58 days until the 3 November 2026 midterm elections**, gasoline remains a significant political vulnerability. Prices have eased from their May peak, but they have remained around $4 a gallon throughout August. The data refer to US regular all-formulations retail gasoline prices, measured weekly in US dollars per gallon and not seasonally adjusted. They are published by the US Energy Information Administration and accessed through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database. | Recent Gas Prices | | | | --------------------------------- | ---------- | ------------------- | | Metric | US$/gallon | Dates | | Latest weekly gas price | $4.07 | 31 Aug 2026 | | Days until 2026 midterm elections | 58 | 3 Nov 2026 | | Average price through 2026 | $3.76 | 5 Jan – 31 Aug 2026 | | Average since US/Iran conflict | $4.03 | 2 Mar – 31 Aug 2026 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Trump Second Term | | | | -------------------------------------------- | ---------- | ------------------------- | | Metric | US$/gallon | Dates | | Price week before 2024 Presidential Election | $3.07 | 4 Nov 2024 | | Average price under Trump second term | $3.37 | 20 Jan 2025 – 31 Aug 2026 | | Maximum price under Trump second term | $4.50 | 11 May 2026 | | Minimum price under Trump second term | $2.78 | 12 Jan 2026 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Biden | | | | -------------------------------------------- | ---------- | ------------------------- | | Metric | US$/gallon | Dates | | Price week before 2020 Presidential Election | $2.11 | 2 Nov 2020 | | Average price under Biden term | $3.46 | 25 Jan 2021 – 13 Jan 2025 | | Maximum price under Biden term | $5.01 | 13 Jun 2022 | | Minimum price under Biden term | $2.39 | 25 Jan 2021 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Trump First Term | | | | -------------------------------------------- | ---------- | ------------------------- | | Metric | US$/gallon | Dates | | Price week before 2016 Presidential Election | $2.23 | 7 Nov 2016 | | Average price under Trump first term | $2.48 | 23 Jan 2017 – 18 Jan 2021 | | Maximum price under Trump first term | $2.96 | 28 May 2018 | | Minimum price under Trump first term | $1.77 | 27 Apr 2020 | ### Why does public administration capture 8.8% of employee compensation from 5.9% of hours worked? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/public-administration-compensation-hours-worked/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T10:50:25.000Z Australia’s Labour Account reveals an unusual mismatch in **Public Administration and Safety**. In the June quarter 2026, the industry accounted for **5.85% of all hours actually worked but 8.80% of total employee compensation**. The resulting **+2.95 percentage-point gap is the largest of any Australian industry**. Put another way, employee compensation equated to about **$89.75 for each hour worked** in Public Administration and Safety, compared with **$59.69 across all industries** — a premium of roughly 50%. For some industries, a large premium has an intuitive economic explanation. Mining, for example, generated 3.38% of employee compensation from 2.07% of hours worked. Mining is extraordinarily capital intensive and uses scarce specialised labour. Public administration is less obvious. The ABS category is broader than office-based bureaucracy: it includes government administration and courts, defence, police, fire and emergency services, corrections, regulation and border control. Possible explanations include a relatively highly skilled workforce, public-sector wage structures and bargaining, overtime and allowances in safety occupations, higher employer superannuation contributions, or the outsourcing of lower-paid support functions into other industries. None necessarily provides the full explanation. Nor should the statistic be interpreted as proof of excessive public-sector pay or unusually high productivity. Public administration largely produces **non-market services**, making economic output and productivity particularly difficult to value. But the question remains intriguing: **why does an industry responsible for less than 6% of Australia’s working hours receive almost 9% of employee compensation?** *Source: ABS, Labour Account Australia, June 2026, released 4 September 2026; seasonally adjusted industry series. Compensation of employees includes wages and salaries plus employer social contributions. Benchmark Analytics calculations from the industry data.* Where compensation exceeds the share of hours worked June quarter 2026, seasonally adjusted | Industry | Hours | Compensation | Gap | | ------------------------------------ | ----- | ------------ | ------- | | Public administration & safety | 5.85% | 8.80% | +2.95pp | | Professional, scientific & technical | 9.10% | 10.81% | +1.72pp | | Financial & insurance services | 3.63% | 5.21% | +1.58pp | | Mining | 2.07% | 3.38% | +1.31pp | | Administrative & support services | 4.81% | 5.88% | +1.07pp | | Education & training | 7.68% | 8.65% | +0.97pp | Public Administration & Safety $89.75 compensation per hour worked versus $59.69 across all Australian industries Source: ABS, Labour Account Australia, June 2026\. Seasonally adjusted. Gap equals industry's share of total employee compensation less its share of total hours actually worked. Benchmark Analytics calculations. ### Australia’s jobs boom is increasingly a care-and-government story URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-jobs-boom-care-government/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T05:06:47.000Z ### Australia has created a large number of jobs since 2022, but the **composition of that growth is unusually concentrated**. Benchmark analysis of the ABS **Labour Account Australia, June 2026**, released on 4 September, shows the number of seasonally adjusted **main jobs** increased by about **1.29 million between June 2022 and June 2026**, from 13.87 million to 15.16 million. The ABS defines a main job as the job in which an employed person usually works the most hours; each person can have only one. Of those additional main jobs, around **412,000 were in Health Care and Social Assistance, 205,000 in Education and Training and 72,000 in Public Administration and Safety**. Combined, those three industries generated about **689,000 jobs — 53.4 per cent of the entire net increase in Australian main jobs since June 2022**. Health Care and Social Assistance alone accounted for almost one-third. This does not mean 53 per cent of new jobs were government jobs. Health and education include substantial private-sector employment. But both industries are heavily influenced by taxpayer funding and government programs, while Public Administration and Safety is directly government-based. The longer-term transformation is even more striking. In 1994, manufacturing accounted for around **13.8 per cent of Australian main jobs**, compared with 8.4 per cent for health and social assistance. Today those positions have reversed: manufacturing represents about **5.9 per cent**, while health and social assistance accounts for **15.7 per cent**. Australia’s employment story is therefore not simply about how many jobs are being created. Increasingly, it is also about **which parts of the economy are creating them — and how dependent that growth is on government-supported activity**. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Labour Account Australia, June 2026*, seasonally adjusted industry time series. The release reports 15.159 million main jobs in June 2026. More than half of main-job growth came from three industries Seasonally adjusted Labour Account main jobs, June 2022 to June 2026 | Industry | Jun-22 | Jun-26 | Change | | ------------------------------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | | Health care & social assistance | 1.963m | 2.375m | +412k | | Education & training | 1.011m | 1.216m | +205k | | Public administration & safety | 0.748m | 0.820m | +72k | | Three industries | 3.722m | 4.411m | +689k | | All industries | 13.870m | 15.159m | +1.289m | The three industries accounted for **53.4%**of Australia's net increase in main jobs. Source: ABS, Labour Account Australia, June 2026\. Seasonally adjusted main jobs. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Figures rounded. Australia’s employment structure has reversed Share of Australian main jobs | Industry | 1994 | 2026 | | ------------------------------- | ----- | ----- | | Health care & social assistance | 8.4% | 15.7% | | Manufacturing | 13.8% | 5.9% | A main job is the job in which an employed person usually works the most hours. Each employed person can have only one main job. Source: ABS, Labour Account Australia, June 2026\. Seasonally adjusted industry time series. Benchmark Analytics calculations. ### One-quarter of the economy generated almost half of the growth in hours worked under Labor URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/labor-non-market-hours-growth/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T04:03:42.000Z Australia’s recent employment growth has been extraordinarily concentrated in industries dominated by government services and funding. In the June quarter 2022, the Australian Bureau of Statistics-defined **non-market sector accounted for just 25.7% of all hours worked in Australia**. Four years later, those industries had generated **46.3% of the entire increase in hours worked**. That is almost twice their initial share of the labour market. Between June 2022 and June 2026, seasonally adjusted hours worked in the non-market sector increased **18.9%**. Hours worked across the much larger market sector increased only **7.6%**. The non-market sector comprises **health care and social assistance, education and training, and public administration and safety**. It is not identical to the public sector — private hospitals and non-government schools are also included — but all three industries are heavily influenced by government spending, funding and service delivery. The largest increase occurred in health care and social assistance, where hours worked rose **21.4%**. Education increased **18.3%**, while public administration and safety increased **13.8%**. The imbalance matters for understanding Australia’s economy. Strong employment growth can make an economy appear resilient even when productivity and private-sector growth are weak. Since Labor came to office, a disproportionately large share of Australia's additional labour input has been absorbed by non-market activities rather than the market economy. Put another way, **the quarter of the economy most closely associated with government-funded services has produced almost half of the growth in hours worked**. That helps explain how Australia can continue generating strong headline employment numbers while struggling to generate stronger productivity and per-capita economic growth. *Method: Benchmark Analytics compares seasonally adjusted ABS Labour Account hours actually worked in the June quarter 2022 with the June quarter 2026\. Using September 2022, Labor’s first complete quarter in office, produces an even larger divergence: non-market hours increased 17.0%, compared with 5.7% in the market sector.* Growth in hours worked since Labor came to office Seasonally adjusted hours actually worked, June quarter 2022 to June quarter 2026 | Sector | Jun 2022 | Jun 2026 | Change | | ----------------- | -------- | -------- | ------ | | Non-market sector | 1,427.2m | 1,696.3m | +18.9% | | Market sector | 4,121.5m | 4,433.6m | +7.6% | | All industries | 5,548.6m | 6,130.0m | +10.5% | 46% of the increase came from non-market industries Non-market industries accounted for 25.7% of hours worked in June 2022, but 46.3% of the increase in total hours worked through to June 2026\. Non-market sector = Health care and social assistance, Education and training, and Public administration and safety. This ABS classification is not equivalent to the public sector because these industries also contain private-sector activity. Source: ABS Labour Account Australia, June 2026\. Seasonally adjusted. ### Background: Armaguard designation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/understanding-armaguard-cash-distribution-designation/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T01:36:11.000Z The Reserve Bank has formally designated Linfox Armaguard under Australia’s new Cash Distribution Framework. It sounds administrative, but it marks a major change in how Australia treats the infrastructure that keeps physical cash circulating. ### What is the cash distribution system? Cash distribution is the wholesale network behind the notes and coins consumers see. Cash must be collected from banks and retailers, transported in secure vehicles, counted and sorted at cash centres, checked for counterfeits, stored, redistributed and used to replenish ATMs and branches. The new legislation defines cash distribution broadly enough to cover transport, storage, processing, packaging and ATM replenishment. Without that network, having banknotes physically printed by the Reserve Bank is of little use: cash needs to reach the places where Australians withdraw and spend it. ### Why is the system under stress? Australians increasingly pay electronically. Cash accounted for around **15 per cent of payments in 2025**, compared with about 70 per cent in 2007\. Nevertheless, around half of Australians still use cash in a typical week and about one-third say losing convenient access to cash would cause hardship or major inconvenience. That creates an economic problem. Cash distribution has large fixed costs — depots, security systems, vehicles and staff — but fewer transactions over which to spread those costs. The industry consequently consolidated. The ACCC approved the merger of Armaguard and Prosegur in June 2023; the merged business was assessed as having **more than 90 per cent of the market**. Major banks, Australia Post and retailers subsequently provided financial support to keep Armaguard operating. ### Why introduce a regulatory framework? Australia had reached an uncomfortable position: cash remained socially important, but the national distribution network depended heavily on one commercially stressed provider. Until now, governments relied heavily on ACCC authorisations allowing competitors to collaborate, financial support from large customers and merger undertakings governing Armaguard’s conduct. The **Cash Distribution Framework Act 2026** replaces that temporary architecture with permanent regulatory powers. The ACCC can oversee standard contractual terms, arbitration and service-level standards, including pricing, frequency and location of services. The RBA receives crisis-readiness powers, can impose cash-distribution and resolvability standards, issue directions and plan for the failure of a designated provider. ### Why did the RBA move so quickly? Very quickly indeed. The Act received Royal Assent on **26 August**, commenced on **27 August**, and the RBA designated Armaguard on **3 September** — just one week later. The speed is understandable. Armaguard is already the dominant national provider, its financial sustainability has required repeated industry intervention, and the ACCC protections attached to the 2023 merger run only until September 2026\. The purpose of the new regime is precisely to avoid finding Australia without effective regulatory tools during a cash-distribution crisis. The RBA consulted both the ACCC and Armaguard before designation. ### What happens now? For ordinary customers, probably very little changes immediately. The designation does not suddenly create more ATMs or bank branches. Its significance is preventative. Banks, retailers and ATM operators now deal with a cash distributor operating inside a dedicated regulatory regime. Over time the ACCC can impose service standards and scrutinise commercial terms, while the RBA can intervene if continuity of critical cash services becomes threatened. For consumers, the objective is simple: **when they want cash, the machinery behind the scenes should continue working — even if providing that machinery is becoming increasingly difficult commercially.** The Armaguard designation therefore represents a fundamental policy shift. Australia is no longer treating cash distribution as merely a logistics business. It is treating it as **critical payments infrastructure that cannot be allowed to fail disorderly.** How Australia reached the Armaguard designation Declining cash use turned a commercial industry problem into a financial-infrastructure policy problem. | Sep 2022 | **Armaguard and Prosegur seek to merge.**Falling cash use and excess cash-distribution capacity are cited as major pressures on the industry. | | ------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Jun 2023 | **ACCC approves the merger.**The combined Armaguard becomes the dominant national provider, with an assessed market share above 90%. Conditions protect prices, services and geographic coverage until September 2026\. | | May–Jul 2024 | **Industry intervention begins.**The ACCC allows banks, retailers and other parties to collaborate. Major banks, Australia Post and major retailers agree to provide financial support to Armaguard. | | 2024–25 | **Temporary support continues.**Industry participants develop efficiency measures, business-continuity arrangements and a possible independent pricing mechanism under ACCC authorisations. | | Jul 2025 | **Regulators propose permanent regulation.**The Council of Financial Regulators and ACCC consult on a dedicated framework covering access, sustainability, resilience, pricing and crisis management. | | Apr 2026 | **Government releases draft legislation.**The proposed framework gives the ACCC oversight of commercial terms and service standards, and the RBA crisis-management powers. | | Jul–Aug 2026 | **Parliament passes the Cash Distribution Framework.**The legislation passes Parliament on 20 August and receives Royal Assent on 26 August. | | 27 Aug 2026 | **New regulatory framework commences.** | | 3 Sep 2026 | **RBA designates Armaguard.**Armaguard becomes the first entity brought inside the new cash-distribution regulatory framework. | **The structural change:** Australia has moved from temporary merger conditions, industry funding and competition-law exemptions to permanent regulation of critical cash-distribution infrastructure. Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, ACCC, Council of Financial Regulators, Australian Treasury and Federal Register of Legislation. ### Understanding the ING prudential reporting failure URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/understanding-the-ing-prudential-reporting-failure/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T01:11:18.000Z ING Australia’s liquidity failure sounds technical, but the underlying concept is straightforward: **a bank must always be able to find enough cash to meet withdrawals and other payments when they fall due.** That is what *liquidity* means. A bank can be profitable and have assets worth more than its liabilities, yet still fail if too much of its money is tied up in mortgages and other loans that cannot quickly be converted into cash. The global financial crisis demonstrated how quickly confidence and wholesale funding can disappear, leaving apparently solvent banks exposed. After the 2008 crisis, international regulators developed what is called the **Liquidity Coverage Ratio**, or LCR, as part of international reforms. Australia introduced the LCR requirement from **1 January 2015**. It requires larger and more complex banks to hold enough **high-quality liquid assets** — principally cash, Reserve Bank balances and highly liquid government securities — to meet their estimated net cash outflows during **30 days of severe financial stress**. The calculation is essentially: **High-quality liquid assets ÷ stressed 30-day net cash outflows = LCR** An LCR of 100 per cent means the bank has just enough qualifying liquidity to cover the modelled stress. APRA normally requires an LCR bank to remain at or above **100 per cent**. That makes the ING failure remarkable. ING Bank (Australia) Limited is an Australian authorised deposit-taking institution and part of the global ING Group. It is not treated by APRA as a simple, unsophisticated bank. ING is one of only **six Australian banks** currently accredited to use the **internal ratings-based approach** to calculate credit-risk capital requirements, alongside the four major banks and Macquarie. APRA says such accreditation requires sophisticated risk management and subjects banks to more intensive prudential supervision. ING received its initial internal-model accreditation in 2018. That accreditation does not certify ING’s liquidity calculations, but it makes the control failure particularly striking. ING told APRA in July that it had **materially miscalculated its liquidity position for several years**. The bank had been reporting LCRs of around **160 per cent** — apparently a very substantial buffer above the regulatory minimum. APRA says the true ratio was significantly lower and **at times fell below 100 per cent**. APRA has not yet publicly identified the precise calculation mistake. APRA’s response reflects the seriousness of the failure. It has imposed licence conditions, increased ING’s minimum liquidity requirement and imposed a **$50 million operational-risk capital add-on**. ING must commission independent reviews into the causes of the liquidity failure and its broader risk management and governance, prepare a remediation program and obtain independent assurance that the problems have been fixed. These measures remain until APRA is satisfied. APRA says ING remains financially resilient. The prudential issue is nevertheless fundamental: **a sophisticated bank spent years believing one of its most important safety buffers was substantially stronger than it really was.** ING’s reported liquidity buffer versus APRA’s finding APRA’s central publication continued to show ING reporting a Liquidity Coverage Ratio well above the 100% minimum. APRA has since said ING materially miscalculated the ratio and that the true position was at times below the minimum. | Quarter | Reported LCR | Minimum | Reported buffer | | ----------- | ------------ | ------- | --------------- | | 31 Mar 2025 | 160.7% | 100.0% | +60.7pp | | 30 Jun 2025 | 158.3% | 100.0% | +58.3pp | | 30 Sep 2025 | 164.3% | 100.0% | +64.3pp | | 31 Dec 2025 | 162.2% | 100.0% | +62.2pp | | 31 Mar 2026 | 167.5% | 100.0% | +67.5pp | **Why this matters:** every published quarterly figure shown here suggested ING had a very large liquidity cushion. Over these five quarters, the average reported Liquidity Coverage Ratio was **162.6%**. APRA has since said the true ratio was materially lower and at times **below the 100% minimum**. **APRA’s response** • $50 million operational-risk capital add-on • higher minimum liquidity requirement • licence conditions • independent reviews and remediation program Source: APRA centralised quarterly publication data supplied by user; APRA announcement on supervisory action against ING Australia. Published Liquidity Coverage Ratios, March 2026 | Institution | Reported LCR | | ----------------------- | ------------ | | ING Bank (Australia) | 167.5% | | Commonwealth Bank | 132.8% | | National Australia Bank | 131.6% | | Westpac | 132.2% | | ANZ | 131.8% | | AMP Bank | 136.6% | | Macquarie Bank | 173.9% | Reported Liquidity Coverage Ratios from APRA’s central publication for March 2026\. ### Australia’s productivity gap with the US is becoming embarrassing URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-us-productivity-gap-2026/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T00:45:53.000Z Australia and the United States produced broadly similar economic growth over the year to the June quarter. But the latest productivity data show they achieved it in very different ways. Productivity sounds technical, but the basic idea is simple. **Labour productivity measures how much output an economy produces for each hour people work.** If workers can produce more in an hour — through better technology, equipment, skills or business processes — productivity rises. Over time, productivity is one of the main ways economies can sustainably increase wages and living standards without generating inflation. Australia's result is poor. Real GDP grew **2.1%** over the year to June, but hours worked increased **2.4%**. As a result, GDP produced per hour worked fell **0.2%**. In the United States, nonfarm-business labour productivity increased **2.2%** over the same 12 months. In the June quarter alone, US output increased at a 1.7% annualised rate while hours worked increased only 0.3%, producing productivity growth of 1.4%. The measures are not perfectly identical: Australia's figure covers the whole economy, while the US measure covers the nonfarm business sector. But the direction and size of the gap are difficult to ignore. **Australia is increasing economic output largely by adding labour. America is increasingly getting more output from each hour of labour.** That matters because adding workers can increase GDP, but productivity growth is what ultimately determines whether Australians become materially better off. The rest of the comparison reinforces the contrast. Australia has stronger employment growth, but also higher underlying inflation and substantially tighter monetary policy. See table for comparison of key metrics. Australia v United States — latest outcomes | Indicator | Australia | United States | | ------------------------------------ | --------- | -------------- | | **Unemployment** July 2026 | **4.5%** | **4.1%** | | **Employment** July 2026 | 14.81m | 162.18m | | **Participation rate** July 2026 | 66.9% | 61.4% | | **Employment/population** July 2026 | 63.9% | 58.9% | | **Policy interest rate** August 2026 | **4.35%** | **3.50–3.75%** | Change over the past 12 months | Indicator | Australia | United States | | -------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------- | | **Real GDP** Year to Jun qtr 2026 | **+2.1%** | **+2.1%** | | **Headline CPI** Year to July 2026 | **+3.5%** | **+3.4%** | | **Underlying inflation\*** Year to July 2026 | **+3.6%** | **+2.5%** | | **Employment** Year to July 2026 | **+1.3%** | **−0.6%** | | **Unemployment rate** Year to July 2026 | +0.2 ppt | −0.2 ppt | | **Participation rate** Year to July 2026 | −0.1 ppt | −0.8 ppt | | **Employment/population** Year to July 2026 | −0.3 ppt | −0.7 ppt | | **Wages** Year to Jun qtr 2026 | **+3.2%** | **+3.2%** | | **Labour productivity** Year to Jun qtr 2026 | **−0.2%** | **+2.2%** | | **Policy interest rate** 12-month change | **+0.75 ppt** | **−0.75 ppt** | **Notes:** ppt = percentage points. \*Underlying inflation uses Australia's trimmed mean CPI and US CPI excluding food and energy. Labour productivity measures the amount of output produced for each hour worked. Australia uses whole-economy GDP per hour worked; the US measure covers the nonfarm business sector, so the measures are similar but not identical. US annual real GDP growth is calculated from published BEA quarterly real GDP growth rates. Sources: ABS, RBA, US BEA, US BLS and Federal Reserve. Data available at 4 September 2026\. ### Very interesting change to Australia's securitisation market structure URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/very-interesting-change-to-australias-securitisation-market-structure/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T04:43:43.000Z **Securitisation** is the process of pooling loans — such as mortgages, car loans or business loans — inside a special purpose vehicle, which then issues **asset-backed securities** to investors. The repayments on the underlying loans ultimately support the interest and principal paid to those investors. Residential mortgage-backed securities, or **RMBS**, are the best-known Australian example. Securitisation matters because it provides an alternative to funding lending through bank deposits. It is particularly important for non-bank lenders, which cannot collect deposits and therefore rely heavily on wholesale funding. Australia had a large securitisation market before the Global Financial Crisis. In June 2007 securitisers held $272 billion of assets. But the crisis severely damaged global confidence in securitisation. Offshore structured investment vehicles, which had been major buyers of Australian RMBS, collapsed or sold assets. Australian mortgages generally continued performing, but funding markets nevertheless seized up and issuance collapsed. COVID-19 produced a very different experience. Government support helped stabilise securitisation markets, while the Reserve Bank’s Term Funding Facility reduced bank bond issuance. Investors searching for substitutes increasingly bought RMBS, helping spreads fall to their lowest levels since before the GFC. The market has since strengthened further. June 2026 ABS data show securitiser assets reaching **$239.4 billion**, while long-term asset-backed securities issued in Australia reached **$214.7 billion**. **The structural change is striking.** In June 2007, **$100.0 billion** of securities had been issued overseas. Today it is just **$1.6 billion**. **But foreign investors have not disappeared.** Securities can be issued in Australia and purchased by offshore funds: the RBA estimated that around half of RMBS orders during the first three quarters of 2024 came from offshore accounts. Australia has therefore not simply rebuilt its old securitisation market. It has developed a much deeper **onshore capital market with an international investor base**. Australian securitisation has moved onshore Share of Australian asset-backed securities issuance **Key structural change:** in 2007, almost half of Australian asset-backed securities were issued overseas. By 2026, issuance had become almost entirely domestic. | June 2007 | Total ABS issuance: **$221.6b** | | --------- | ------------------------------- | | Australia 54.9% | Overseas 45.1% | | --------------- | -------------- | | **$121.6b**Issued in Australia | **$100.0b**Issued overseas | | ------------------------------ | -------------------------- | 19-year shift: offshore issuance share fell from 45.1% to 0.7% | June 2026 | Total ABS issuance: **$216.3b** | | --------- | ------------------------------- | | Australia 99.3% | | | --------------- | | | **$214.7b**Issued in Australia | **$1.6b**Issued overseas | | ------------------------------ | ------------------------ | | Issued in Australia 54.9% → 99.3% | | Issued overseas 45.1% → 0.7% | | Domestic issuance stock $121.6b → $214.7b | | --------------------------------- | | ---------------------------- | | ----------------------------------------- | **Important:** this chart shows *where securities are issued*, not who owns them. Offshore investors can still buy securities issued in Australia. The RBA estimated that around half of RMBS orders during the first three quarters of 2024 came from offshore accounts. Note: shares are calculated as a proportion of total asset-backed securities issuance (long-term ABS issued in Australia plus ABS issued overseas), rather than total liabilities, to show the structural funding-location shift more clearly. Source: ABS, *Assets and Liabilities of Australian Securitisers*, June 2026; Reserve Bank of Australia. ### Which political party is best for business investment? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/which-political-party-is-best-for-business-investment/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T03:55:51.000Z Private sector business investment is one of the hardest economic indicators to fake. Surveys can tell us how businesses say they feel, but investment tells us what firms actually do with their money. When businesses spend on machinery, buildings, engineering work and intellectual property, they are making a concrete judgement that future demand will justify more capacity. For that reason, real private business investment is one of the best **revealed measures of business confidence**, even though it is also influenced by interest rates, commodity cycles and tax settings. This analysis uses the Australian Bureau of Statistics seasonally adjusted **chain volume** measure of total private business investment from the national accounts. Quarterly growth is calculated as the quarter-on-quarter percentage change in the level series. For each Prime Minister, Treasurer, decade and party grouping, the arithmetic average of those quarterly growth rates is then multiplied by four to express the result as an annualised pace. Quarters are attributed to the office-holder or government in place at quarter-end. The results are striking. On the Prime Minister comparison, **Julia Gillard** ranks first, with private business investment growing at an annualised average pace of **12.3 per cent**, followed by **Paul Keating** at **9.5 per cent** and **John Howard** at **9.2 per cent**. At the other end, **Tony Abbott** records the weakest result at **\-9.4 per cent**, while **Malcolm Turnbull** is also negative at **\-1.9 per cent**. **Anthony Albanese** currently sits at **4.8 per cent** annualised: clearly positive, but below the strongest periods in the sample. The Treasurer chart is more volatile and must be interpreted carefully because some tenures are short. **Chris Bowen** tops the raw ranking, but that result is based on just **one quarter**. Among more substantial tenures, the strongest outcomes are **Ralph Willis** at **13.6 per cent**, **Peter Costello** at **9.2 per cent**, and **Wayne Swan** at **6.7 per cent**. At the weak end, **Joe Hockey** and **John Kerin** are clearly negative. By decade, the **1980s** and **2000s** stand out as the strongest periods for business investment growth, at **7.9 per cent** and **7.6 per cent** annualised respectively. The **1990s** are solid at **5.1 per cent**, the **2020s so far** are running at **4.5 per cent**, and the **2010s** are by far the weakest decade in the sample at just **1.3 per cent**. The party comparison is closer than many would expect. **Labor-governed quarters** average **5.4 per cent** annualised growth, against **4.5 per cent** under the **Coalition**. That is an edge to Labor, but not an overwhelming one, and it should not be read as a pure verdict on causation. Business investment depends not only on government policy, but also on the mining cycle, global growth, financing conditions and the broader profit outlook. Still, if the question is when Australian businesses were most willing to commit real capital to the future, these charts provide a disciplined starting point. Real private business investment growth by Prime Minister Average quarterly growth in real private business investment, annualised to a percentage per year. | Prime Minister | Growth | % p.a. | | ---------------- | ------ | ------ | | Julia Gillard | | 12.3% | | Paul Keating | | 9.5% | | John Howard | | 9.2% | | Anthony Albanese | | 4.8% | | Scott Morrison | | 2.3% | | Kevin Rudd | | 1.6% | | Bob Hawke | | 1.3% | | Malcolm Turnbull | | \-1.9% | | Tony Abbott | | \-9.4% | Note: Annualised growth is four times the arithmetic mean of quarterly percentage changes in seasonally adjusted real private business investment. Quarters are attributed to the Prime Minister in office at quarter-end. Real private business investment growth by Treasurer Average quarterly growth in real private business investment, annualised to a percentage per year. | Treasurer | Growth | % p.a. | | --------------- | ------- | ------ | | Chris Bowen | 17.8% | | | Ralph Willis | 13.6% | | | Peter Costello | 9.2% | | | Wayne Swan | 6.7% | | | John Dawkins | 4.9% | | | Jim Chalmers | 4.8% | | | Paul Keating | 2.4% | | | Josh Frydenberg | 2.3% | | | Scott Morrison | \-1.9% | | | Joe Hockey | \-9.4% | | | John Kerin | \-10.9% | | Note: Quarters are attributed to the Treasurer in office at quarter-end. Short tenures can generate volatile results: Chris Bowen is represented by one quarter and John Kerin by two quarters. Real private business investment growth by decade Annualised average quarterly growth in real private business investment. | Decade | Growth | % p.a. | | ------ | ------ | ------ | | 1980s | 7.9% | | | 1990s | 5.1% | | | 2000s | 7.6% | | | 2010s | 1.3% | | | 2020s | 4.5% | | Note: The 1980s result covers only the period for which quarterly growth is available from December 1985\. The 2020s result is through the June quarter 2026\. Real private business investment growth by party in power Labor versus Coalition governments, based on the party of the Prime Minister at quarter-end. | Party | Growth | % p.a. | | --------- | ------ | ------ | | Labor | | 5.4% | | Coalition | | 4.5% | **Method:** Quarterly growth is calculated from the ABS seasonally adjusted chain volume measure of total private business investment. For each grouping, the arithmetic mean of quarterly percentage changes is multiplied by four to produce an annualised rate. Quarters are assigned according to the office-holder or party in place at quarter-end. Coalition combines Liberal and Country-led quarters. Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts, Table 2\. ### How Australia’s economy has changed URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-australias-economy-has-changed/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T00:20:43.000Z # Australia’s economy today looks markedly different from the economy of two decades ago. Gross value added measures the value an industry creates after subtracting the goods and services it uses in production. Comparing each industry’s gross value added with the total therefore provides a simple measure of its economic weight. In June 2003, manufacturing generated **11.8 per cent of total Australian industry gross value added**. By June 2026, its share had fallen to just **5.4 per cent** — a decline of 6.4 percentage points. The biggest structural winner has been mining. Its share almost doubled from **4.8 per cent to 9.4 per cent**, making mining one of Australia’s largest industries by value generated. But the transformation is not simply from manufacturing to mining. Health care and social assistance increased from **6.0 per cent to 9.0 per cent**, while professional, scientific and technical services rose from **5.8 per cent to 7.8 per cent**. Retail and wholesale trade also became relatively smaller parts of the economy. These figures measure shares at current prices. That is deliberate: they show the economic value of different industries at each point in time. The longer-run real output data provide an important additional perspective: manufacturing has not merely been overtaken by faster-growing industries — its real output has barely advanced over two decades. Australia’s changing economic structure Share of total industry gross value added, current prices | Industry | 2003 | 2016 | 2026 | Change | | -------------------------------------- | ----- | ---- | ---- | ------ | | Mining | 4.8% | 6.1% | 9.4% | +4.6pp | | Health care & social assistance | 6.0% | 7.5% | 9.0% | +3.0pp | | Professional, scientific & technical | 5.8% | 7.4% | 7.8% | +2.0pp | | Construction | 6.6% | 8.4% | 7.8% | +1.2pp | | Financial & insurance services | 8.0% | 8.6% | 8.1% | +0.1pp | | Public administration & safety | 6.2% | 6.0% | 5.8% | −0.4pp | | Agriculture, forestry & fishing | 2.9% | 2.7% | 2.5% | −0.3pp | | Utilities | 3.3% | 2.9% | 2.2% | −1.1pp | | Retail trade | 5.6% | 4.6% | 4.3% | −1.3pp | | Information media & telecommunications | 4.0% | 2.9% | 2.3% | −1.6pp | | Wholesale trade | 5.8% | 4.4% | 4.1% | −1.7pp | | Manufacturing | 11.8% | 6.2% | 5.4% | −6.4pp | Change is measured in percentage points between June 2003 and June 2026\. Selected industries shown. Shares are calculated from seasonally adjusted current-price gross value added. Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts, Table 45\. ### Australia’s $288 billion-a-day financial plumbing URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australias-288-billion-a-day-financial-plumbing/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T07:30:44.000Z Most Australians see the payments system through the lens of daily life: tapping a debit card, receiving a salary, or sending money through a banking app. But underneath those visible transactions sits a much larger and less understood system: the Reserve Bank’s real-time gross settlement system, known as RITS. This is not a measure of household spending. It is a measure of **high-value settlement**. In plain English, it is the infrastructure that allows banks and other financial institutions to settle large payment obligations safely and finally across accounts held at the Reserve Bank. That is why the numbers are so striking. In 2024/25, RITS settled an average of **69,000 transactions worth $288 billion per business day**. That figure dwarfs the payment flows most people encounter directly. By comparison, total card purchases on Australian-issued cards were **$100.0 billion in June 2026**, or about **$3.3 billion per day**. New Payments Platform transactions were **$265.8 billion** for the month, or about **$8.9 billion per day**. ABS data show employers paid **$109.2 billion** in wages and salaries in June 2026, about **$3.6 billion per day**. The comparison is useful because it shows what RTGS is — and what it is not. It is not a proxy for shopping, retail activity or consumer confidence. Much of the value moving through RITS reflects **interbank activity, foreign exchange settlements and debt securities transactions**. These are large-value institutional flows, so RTGS values can look enormous next to everyday payments. That makes the public-interest value of the series fairly clear. The main story is **resilience**. A great deal of the Australian financial system depends on this plumbing operating smoothly. If it goes down, the consequences travel far beyond banks and markets. The average person may never see RITS directly, but they rely on it every day. Australia's $288 billion-a-day financial plumbing RTGS is so much larger than household-facing payment flows that a normal bar chart would make the smaller series almost invisible. To solve that, the bars below use a **logarithmic scale**. | Measure | Daily value | Scale bar | | ------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | -------------------- | | **RTGS via RITS** 2024/25 average business day | **$288.0b** | Reference series | | **NPP transactions** June 2026 monthly total ÷ 30 days | **$8.9b** | RTGS is 32.5× larger | | **Nominal GDP generated** 2024–25 annual GDP ÷ 365 days | **$7.6b** | RTGS is 37.8× larger | | **Wages and salaries paid** June 2026 total ÷ 30 days | **$3.6b** | RTGS is 79.1× larger | | **Card purchases** June 2026 monthly total ÷ 30 days | **$3.3b** | RTGS is 86.4× larger | Notes: RTGS is the RBA's 2024/25 average business-day value settled through RITS. NPP and card figures use June 2026 monthly values divided by 30 days. Wages and salaries use the ABS June 2026 total divided by 30 days. GDP uses 2024–25 nominal GDP divided by 365 days. Bar lengths use a logarithmic scale so smaller series remain visible. ### GDP Released: Australian productivity has barely increased in a decade URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australian-productivity-barely-increased-decade/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T01:46:08.000Z Australia's economy grew by 0.4 per cent in the June quarter and 2.1 per cent over the year, slightly stronger than the Reserve Bank of Australia's latest 1.9 per cent annual growth forecast. But the National Accounts reveal a much more troubling result: **Australian labour productivity did not increase at all during the quarter.** Real GDP increased by 0.4 per cent, while total hours worked also increased by 0.4 per cent. GDP per hour worked — the Australian Bureau of Statistics' measure of labour productivity — was therefore unchanged. Over the year, productivity actually fell by 0.2 per cent. This is not merely a short-term problem. The ABS productivity index stood at 98.7 in the June quarter of 2016\. Ten years later it is just 99.7\. In other words, Australian output per hour worked has increased by only about **1 per cent in an entire decade**. The comparison is even more striking against the post-pandemic peak. GDP per hour worked reached 105.0 in March 2022 before falling sharply as employment and hours worked expanded. It is now around 5 per cent below that peak. Weak productivity matters because sustainable improvements in living standards ultimately require Australians to produce more for each hour worked. It also complicates monetary policy: weak productivity restricts how quickly the economy can grow without generating inflationary pressure. Australia is producing more output. But increasingly, it has done so by using more labour rather than becoming substantially more productive. Australian economy — June quarter 2026 | Measure | Quarter | Year | | ------------------- | ------- | ----- | | Real GDP | +0.4% | +2.1% | | GDP per capita | 0.0% | +0.7% | | Hours worked | +0.4% | — | | GDP per hour worked | 0.0% | −0.2% | Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, June 2026\. Seasonally adjusted chain volume measures. ### Australia is borrowing from abroad to pay higher fuel prices URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-borrowing-abroad-higher-fuel-prices/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T23:48:36.000Z Australia’s dependence on imported fuel has an economic cost that goes well beyond the price at the petrol pump. In the June quarter, Australia recorded a **$5.1 billion deficit on trade in goods and services**, while the broader current account deficit reached **$27.2 billion**. The deterioration was driven partly by imported fuel, with the value of fuel and lubricant imports rising **42.5 per cent** as global oil and refined-product prices surged. The important point is that Australia did not simply receive much more fuel. Across all goods imports, prices rose **4.4 per cent**, while physical import volumes increased only **2.4 per cent**. Australia was therefore paying substantially more overseas for what it consumed. When Australia spends more overseas than it earns, the difference ultimately has to be financed through some combination of additional foreign liabilities, foreign ownership of Australian assets, or reductions in Australian holdings of overseas assets. That matters because fuel is consumed quickly. Borrowing from overseas to finance a new factory can make economic sense: the factory remains and can generate income for decades. Paying substantially more for imported diesel or petrol is different. The fuel is burned, while the foreign financial claim used to help finance Australia’s external deficit can remain. Australia’s net foreign debt already stood at **$1.486 trillion** at the end of June. Australia’s imported fuel vulnerability Goods & services balance **−$5.1bn** Current account balance **−$27.2bn** Fuel & lubricant imports **+42.5%** Goods import prices **+4.4%** Goods import volumes **+2.4%** Net foreign debt **$1.486tn** **The issue:** higher imported fuel prices transfer more Australian income overseas for fuel that is quickly consumed. Unlike borrowing to finance productive investment, there is no lasting asset left behind. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, June quarter 2026\. ### Could Macquarie become Australia’s fourth-largest mortgage bank by 2030? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/macquarie-anz-mortgages-deposits-2030/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T20:45:23.000Z **At recent growth rates, Macquarie Bank is on a path to overtake ANZ’s principal banking entity in both Australian mortgages and domestic deposits around 2030\. But the result is a mechanical extrapolation, not a forecast.** The latest Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics provide a striking measure of Macquarie Bank’s expansion into mainstream Australian banking. At 31 July 2026, Macquarie Bank reported **$113.926 billion of owner-occupied housing loans and $72.007 billion of investment housing loans**. Combined, that gives an Australian mortgage book of **$185.933 billion**. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited — the principal ANZ banking entity — reported **$218.298 billion of owner-occupied mortgages and $113.644 billion of investor mortgages**, or **$331.942 billion combined**. Macquarie is therefore already equivalent to **56.0 per cent of ANZ’s mortgage book**, with a gap of $146.009 billion. In July 2024, Macquarie had $121.874 billion of mortgages. By July 2025 this had risen to $147.741 billion and by July 2026 to $185.933 billion. Growth was therefore **21.2 per cent in the year to July 2025 and 25.9 per cent in the year to July 2026**. Across the full two years, that is a compound annual growth rate of **23.5 per cent**. ANZ’s corresponding mortgage book increased from $301.522 billion in July 2024 to $318.217 billion in July 2025 and $331.942 billion in July 2026\. Its annual growth rates were **5.5 per cent and 4.3 per cent**, producing a two-year compound annual growth rate of **4.9 per cent**. ### What happens if those growth rates continue? To calculate how long before Macquarie overtakes ANZ, Benchmark Analytics uses the **two-year compound annual growth rate assumption**, rather than simply extrapolating the latest 12-month result. The two-year measure reduces the influence of an unusually strong or weak single year. The calculation starts with the July 2026 balances and assumes each bank continues growing at its respective two-year compound rate. Mathematically, the crossover time is: **t = ln(ANZ starting balance / Macquarie starting balance) ÷ ln\[(1 + Macquarie growth rate) / (1 + ANZ growth rate)\]** For mortgages, inserting the July 2026 balances and growth rates gives: - Macquarie starting balance: **$185.933 billion** - ANZ starting balance: **$331.942 billion** - Macquarie assumed annual growth: **23.5 per cent** - ANZ assumed annual growth: **4.9 per cent** The two projected balances become equal approximately **3.55 years after July 2026 — around February 2030**. Using only the most recent 12-month growth rates — 25.9 per cent for Macquarie and 4.3 per cent for ANZ — produces an earlier crossover, around **September 2029**. ### Deposits point to a similar result The analysis uses APRA’s **“total residents deposits”** measure. This is deliberately broader than household deposits: it includes deposits from resident households, non-financial businesses, financial institutions, governments and community service organisations. Macquarie’s total resident deposits increased from **$158.599 billion in July 2024 to $190.345 billion in July 2025 and $237.932 billion in July 2026**. That equates to growth of **20.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent** in the two successive years and a two-year compound annual rate of **22.5 per cent**. ANZ’s resident deposits increased from **$398.961 billion to $415.070 billion and then $438.306 billion** over the same dates. Its two-year compound annual growth rate was **4.8 per cent**. Macquarie currently has deposits equal to **54.3 per cent of ANZ’s balance**, leaving a gap of $200.374 billion. Compounding the respective two-year growth rates produces a crossover about **3.92 years from July 2026, or around July 2030**. Using only the latest 12-month rates gives a slightly earlier result of approximately **March 2030**. ## The assumption behind “2030” is important These are not forecasts of what either bank will actually report in 2030. They are **constant-percentage-growth scenarios**. They assume Macquarie can continue increasing an ever-larger balance sheet at more than 20 per cent a year while ANZ continues growing at approximately 5 per cent. That is demanding. A 23.5 per cent annual growth rate applied to a $186 billion mortgage book requires progressively larger dollar additions each year. A useful sensitivity test is therefore to assume that the latest annual **dollar** increase continues rather than the percentage growth rate compounding. Over the year to July 2026, Macquarie added $38.192 billion of mortgages while ANZ added $13.725 billion. If that approximately $24.5 billion annual rate of gap-closing remained constant in dollar terms, Macquarie would catch ANZ in about **six years, around July 2032**, rather than 2030. For deposits the distinction is greater. The latest annual dollar increases were $47.587 billion for Macquarie and $23.236 billion for ANZ. Holding that dollar differential constant pushes the crossover to approximately **October 2034**. The 2030 result should consequently be read as an answer to a specific question: **what happens if the recent percentage growth rates continue to compound?** ### One important qualification: ANZ owns Suncorp Bank There is also an institutional-definition issue. APRA’s monthly statistics report individual authorised deposit-taking institutions. Macquarie Bank Limited and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited therefore appear as separate entities. But ANZ acquired Suncorp Bank in 2024\. Suncorp Bank is now operated through **Norfina Limited**, which remains a separately licensed authorised deposit-taking institution and is therefore separately reported in APRA’s monthly institution-level data. Accordingly, this analysis supports the statement that, at recent growth rates, **Macquarie Bank could overtake Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited as an individual authorised deposit-taking institution around 2030**. It does **not** establish that Macquarie Group will become larger than the consolidated ANZ Group, which also owns Suncorp Bank. That distinction matters for anyone describing the result as Macquarie “breaking into the Big Four”. The narrower conclusion is nevertheless significant. Macquarie has moved from being a relatively small participant in Australian retail banking to a position where, if anything approaching its recent growth differential persists, **ANZ’s traditional fourth-place position in APRA’s institution-level mortgage and deposit rankings could come under direct challenge around the turn of the decade**. *Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, July 2026 and historical back-series. Balances are reported in millions of Australian dollars. Mortgage balances in this analysis are the sum of APRA’s owner-occupied and investment housing lending categories. Crossover dates are Benchmark Analytics calculations and are scenario estimates, not APRA forecasts.* Macquarie's path towards ANZ APRA institution-level balances, $ billions. Mortgages equal owner-occupied plus investment housing loans. | Measure | Institution | Jul-24 | Jul-25 | Jul-26 | Latest12m | 2-yrCAGR | | ----------------- | ----------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | --------- | -------- | | Mortgages | Macquarie | 121.9 | 147.7 | 185.9 | 25.9% | 23.5% | | Mortgages | ANZ | 301.5 | 318.2 | 331.9 | 4.3% | 4.9% | | Resident deposits | Macquarie | 158.6 | 190.3 | 237.9 | 25.0% | 22.5% | | Resident deposits | ANZ | 399.0 | 415.1 | 438.3 | 5.6% | 4.8% | When does Macquarie catch ANZ? | Assumption | Mortgages | Resident deposits | | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | ----------------- | | 2-year percentage growth compounds Preferred trend scenario | Feb 2030 | Jul 2030 | | Latest 12-month percentage growth compounds | Sep 2029 | Mar 2030 | | Latest annual dollar growth remains constant | Jul 2032 | Oct 2034 | **Source:** Benchmark Analytics calculations from APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, July 2026 back-series. Mortgage balances are owner-occupied plus investment housing loans. Resident deposits are APRA's total residents deposits. Figures compare Macquarie Bank Limited with Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited as individual ADIs. ANZ-owned Suncorp Bank (Norfina Limited) is separately licensed and separately reported in the monthly statistics. Crossover dates are scenario calculations, not forecasts. ### Victoria is approving more homes than NSW despite having 1.5 million fewer people URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/victoria-housing-approvals-outpace-nsw/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T02:38:00.000Z Victoria is now approving more new homes than New South Wales despite having around **1.5 million fewer residents**. The latest Australian Bureau of Statistics Building Approvals data show Victoria approved **4,958 dwellings in July in trend terms**, compared with **4,790 in New South Wales**. Nationally, approvals rose 0.8 per cent in trend terms and were 11.7 per cent higher than a year earlier. The population difference makes the comparison more striking. New South Wales had **8.64 million residents** at the end of 2025, compared with **7.12 million in Victoria**. Annualising July’s approval rate, Victoria is approving about **8.4 dwellings per 1,000 residents**, against only **6.7 in New South Wales**. That means Victoria’s approval rate per person is roughly **25 per cent higher**. Approvals are not the same as completed homes, and a single month should not be over-interpreted. But in Australia’s most expensive housing market, New South Wales’ comparatively weak approval rate remains an important supply-side warning. Victoria is approving homes faster than NSW Annualised dwelling approvals per 1,000 residents, based on July 2026 trend approvals Victoria 8.4 New South Wales 6.7 Victoria's approval rate per resident is approximately **25% higher than NSW's.** Sources: ABS Building Approvals, July 2026; ABS National, State and Territory Population, December 2025\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. ### Queensland's government budget starting to get out of control URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/queensland-government-budget-out-of-control/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T01:58:22.000Z Queensland’s government finances are beginning to look like an Australian fiscal outlier. New Australian Bureau of Statistics data show Queensland’s state and local general government sector collected **$94.8 billion in revenue during 2025–26 but spent $103.2 billion**, producing an **$8.4 billion operating deficit**. That matters because the operating balance **excludes** most spending on new infrastructure. It measures whether ordinary government revenues are sufficient to meet ordinary government expenses. The Australian Bureau of Statistics describes it as a measure of the sustainability of government operations. Put simply, Queensland spent about **$109 for every $100 it received in revenue** before its net investment in new assets was taken into account. Once capital investment is included, Queensland recorded **$19.1 billion of net borrowing**. That was equivalent to **20.2 per cent of government revenue — the highest proportion of any state or territory**. New South Wales borrowed the equivalent of 13.2 per cent of revenue, Victoria 10.5 per cent and Western Australia just 1.1 per cent. The deterioration was also persistent. Queensland recorded an operating deficit in **every quarter of 2025–26**. This is not simply an artefact of Australian Bureau of Statistics accounting. Queensland's own 2026–27 Budget estimates the state government's 2025–26 operating deficit at **$8.85 billion**, following a $4.43 billion deficit in 2024–25\. State government expenses increased from $93.4 billion to $100.9 billion, much faster than revenue. There is an important technical qualification. The Australian Bureau of Statistics figures combine Queensland state and local general government and are not identical to the Queensland Budget. They are valuable precisely because the Bureau applies a **consistent accounting framework across every jurisdiction**, allowing proper comparison. The latest quarterly release is in current prices and original terms; Benchmark has calculated the 2025–26 figures by summing the four quarters, the same approach the Bureau says it will use for its forthcoming financial-year analysis. *Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Government Finance Statistics, June quarter 2026; Benchmark Analytics calculations.* Queensland has Australia's biggest borrowing gap Net borrowing as a share of total government revenue, 2025–26 Queensland 20.2% Tasmania 15.6% Northern Territory 15.2% ACT 14.2% New South Wales 13.2% Victoria 10.5% South Australia 6.0% Western Australia 1.1% Net borrowing is shown as a positive financing requirement. Figures calculated by summing the four quarters to June 2026\. Source: ABS Government Finance Statistics, June quarter 2026; Benchmark Analytics calculations. ### Investor housing credit hits the brakes as tax and rate changes bite URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/investor-housing-credit-hits-the-brakes-as-tax-and-rate-changes-bite/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T09:29:59.000Z The first clear signs of Australia's investor housing slowdown are now appearing in the stock of mortgage credit. Reserve Bank of Australia data released on 31 August show investor housing credit grew just **0.46% in July**, around 0.3 percentage points slower than in June and the weakest monthly result in two years. That is a sharp change. Owner-occupier credit also grew by about **0.46%**, but its growth rate was broadly unchanged. Overall housing credit increased **0.49%**, its slowest monthly pace since March 2025. Importantly, these figures measure the **stock of credit outstanding**, not new mortgage approvals. Credit stocks normally turn slowly because Australia's existing mortgage book is enormous. New lending therefore tends to change first, with the effect appearing in outstanding credit later. That process now appears to be underway. New investor housing loan commitments fell sharply in the June quarter, and the RBA has said recent weakness reflects the combined effect of softer housing conditions, higher interest rates and changes to the tax treatment of property investors. The RBA raised the cash rate three times in the first half of 2026\. The federal Budget also announced changes to negative gearing and capital gains tax that reduce the prospective after-tax return from investment property. There is an important qualification. Housing credit is **not contracting**: it remains 7.4% higher than a year ago. The signal is instead about momentum. Investor borrowing had been one of the strongest parts of the housing market. July provides the clearest evidence yet that this momentum is now reversing. *Technical note: RBA credit growth rates are seasonally adjusted, adjusted for breaks in the statistical series and include securitisations. They measure credit supplied by financial institutions operating domestically.* Investor housing credit loses momentum | Housing credit | July growth | Change in momentum | | -------------- | ----------- | ---------------------- | | Investor | 0.46% | ▼ \~0.3pp | | Owner-occupier | 0.46% | Broadly stable | | Total housing | 0.49% | Slowest since Mar 2025 | Monthly growth, seasonally adjusted. Credit includes securitisations. Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Aggregates, July 2026\. ### Australia's two-speed business economy: mining profits surge while retail profits slump URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-two-speed-business-economy-mining-retail-profits/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T04:45:56.000Z Australia's latest business indicators reveal an increasingly uneven private-sector economy, with booming mining profits sitting alongside much weaker results in consumer-facing industries. The Australian Bureau of Statistics' Business Indicators release for the June quarter 2026 measures private-sector sales, wages, profits and inventories. Company gross operating profits rose 1.8 per cent in the quarter and were 7.4 per cent higher than a year earlier. But the aggregate result disguises a striking divergence between industries. Mining company profits jumped 6.8 per cent during the quarter. Professional, Scientific and Technical Services profits increased 4.6 per cent and Manufacturing rose 1.3 per cent. At the other end of the economy, Retail Trade profits fell 5.2 per cent in just three months, while Wholesale Trade profits declined 2.9 per cent. The difference is particularly interesting when compared with sales volumes. Mining recorded a 3.3 per cent increase in real sales during the quarter, the strongest result reported by the ABS. Retail sales volumes, by contrast, increased only 0.4 per cent and were just 0.8 per cent higher than a year earlier. Wholesale sales volumes also increased 0.6 per cent despite the industry's fall in profits. These figures should not be interpreted as profit margins: the ABS profit measures are in current dollars while the sales figures used here are chain-volume measures that remove price effects. Nevertheless, the direction is revealing. Australia's headline corporate profit recovery is being disproportionately driven by mining and selected business-service industries, while the parts of the economy most directly exposed to household spending remain considerably weaker. Australia's two-speed business economy June quarter 2026 change in company gross operating profits compared with real sales volumes. | Industry | Profits | Real sales | | ------------------------ | ------- | ---------- | | Mining | +6.8% | +3.3% | | Professional & Technical | +4.6% | +2.3% | | Manufacturing | +1.3% | \-0.1% | | Wholesale Trade | \-2.9% | +0.6% | | Retail Trade | \-5.2% | +0.4% | Source: ABS, Business Indicators, Australia, June quarter 2026, released 31 August 2026\. Seasonally adjusted. Profit figures are current-price company gross operating profits. Sales figures are chain-volume measures. The two measures should not be interpreted as a direct profit-margin calculation. ### Macquarie's housing loan book just grew 25.9% in 12 months URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/macquarie-quarter-australia-mortgage-growth/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T04:32:14.000Z Macquarie Bank is rapidly becoming a large force in Australian retail banking. The latest Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics show Macquarie held **$185.9 billion of housing loans at the end of July 2026**, up from $147.7 billion a year earlier. That is an increase of **$38.2 billion, or 25.9%**. Across all authorised deposit-taking institutions, housing loans increased by $159.0 billion over the same period. Macquarie therefore accounted for **24.0% of the net increase in outstanding housing lending**. Its deposit growth is remarkably similar. Household deposits at Macquarie increased from $85.7 billion to **$115.9 billion**, a rise of $30.2 billion or 35.2%. That represented **24.3% of the $124.2 billion increase in household deposits across the system**. APRA defines housing lending as loans to resident households for owner-occupied or investment housing, while household deposits are deposits from resident households. Macquarie's share of outstanding housing lending increased from **6.3% to 7.4%** in just twelve months, while its share of household deposits rose from **5.2% to 6.6%**. Australia still has a Big Four banking system. But the latest numbers increasingly point to a substantial **number five**. **Source:** Benchmark Analytics calculations from APRA Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, July 2026, released 31 August 2026\. Macquarie accounted for almost a quarter of Australia's mortgage growth | 24.0% Macquarie's share of theannual increase in housing loans | 24.3% Macquarie's share of theannual increase in household deposits | | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | Macquarie's retail banking expansion | Measure | Jul 25 | Jul 26 | Growth | | -------------------- | -------- | -------- | ------- | | Housing loans | $147.7bn | $185.9bn | +25.9% | | Household deposits | $85.7bn | $115.9bn | +35.2% | | Housing market share | 6.3% | 7.4% | +1.1ppt | | Deposit market share | 5.2% | 6.6% | +1.3ppt | **Technical note:** Housing loans are the sum of APRA's owner-occupied and investment housing loan categories. Figures represent balances outstanding at month-end, not new loan approvals. Household deposits are deposits by resident households. Market shares and contributions to growth are Benchmark Analytics calculations from institution-level APRA data. Values may not sum exactly due to rounding. **Source:** APRA, Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics, July 2026; released 31 August 2026\. ### Household spending rebound makes the RBA’s job harder URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/household-spending-rba-inflation-july-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T20:46:24.000Z The ABS Monthly Household Spending Indicator measures household expenditure using bank transactions, supermarket data, vehicle sales and other sources. The monthly figures are published in current prices, so they include both changes in the quantity purchased and changes in prices. Australian household spending rose **1.1% in July**, following increases of **1.0% in June and 1.2% in May**. Spending is now **7.0% higher than a year ago**, its strongest annual growth since June 2023. Importantly, this is not simply a story about households being forced to spend more on necessities. Discretionary spending increased **1.0% in July and 7.8% over the year**, compared with annual growth of **5.6% for non-discretionary expenditure**. Spending on services rose 1.5% during July, while all nine major spending categories recorded increases. That creates a political problem. The RBA has already increased interest rates three times during 2026 and left the cash rate at **4.35% on 11 August**, arguing that inflation remains too high and capacity pressures persist. July inflation was still **3.5%**, with trimmed mean inflation at **3.6%**. Today's spending figures give the RBA little evidence that household demand is collapsing under those higher rates. They also reduce Canberra's room for further broad-based cost-of-living stimulus. Measures that increase household purchasing power may be politically attractive, but stronger discretionary spending suggests some of that support could flow straight back into demand. The figures do not mean every household is comfortable. But at the aggregate level, Australian consumers are spending again — and that makes the inflation fight more difficult. Australian household spending — July 2026 | Spending measure | Monthly change | Annual change | | -------------------------- | -------------- | ------------- | | Total household spending | +1.1% | +7.0% | | Discretionary spending | +1.0% | +7.8% | | Non-discretionary spending | +1.1% | +5.6% | | Goods | +0.7% | +7.2% | | Services | +1.5% | +6.8% | **Key point:**Discretionary spending is growing faster than spending on essentials, suggesting the household spending rebound extends beyond higher expenditure on necessities. Current prices, seasonally adjusted. Annual change compares July 2026 with July 2025\. Current-price expenditure includes the effect of changing prices and should not be interpreted as real per-capita consumption. Source: ABS, Monthly Household Spending Indicator, July 2026\. ### Labor’s investment boom survives a data-centre hangover URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/business-investment-capex-data-centres-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T20:30:17.000Z The ABS quarterly capital expenditure survey measures new private business spending on buildings and structures, and equipment, plant and machinery. Its June-quarter actual expenditure figures are measured in volume terms, meaning the effects of price changes have been removed. On the headline number, private capital expenditure fell **3.6% in the June quarter**. But that figure gives a misleading impression of the underlying investment cycle. Trend capital expenditure actually rose **1.6%**, while total real investment remained **10.7% higher than a year earlier**. The main explanation is data centres. Information Media and Telecommunications equipment expenditure fell **53.0%** during the quarter, but only after soaring **199.6% in March**, when the ABS recorded record investment in server racks and processing equipment for data centres. Buildings and structures expenditure, meanwhile, rose 2.1%, partly because data-centre construction continued. Politically, this means Treasurer Jim Chalmers’ recent claim that business investment was “booming under Labor” has survived the June numbers reasonably well. Investment intentions are also encouraging. Expected capital expenditure for 2026–27 has reached **$200.7 billion**. Compared with the equivalent Estimate 3 for 2025–26, that represents an increase of about **14.8%**, with non-mining intentions up around **18.5%**. But the strength is far from universal. Over the year, investment increased 76.8% in Information Media and Telecommunications, 29.4% in Construction and 20.9% in Transport. By contrast, it fell 5.0% in Manufacturing, 9.8% in Professional, Scientific and Technical Services and 17.6% in Financial and Insurance Services. Australia therefore has a genuine investment upswing — but much of its strength remains concentrated in digital infrastructure and a relatively narrow group of sectors. Private capital expenditure by industry — June quarter 2026 Annual risers | Industry | Quarterly change | Annual change | | ---------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ------------- | | Information Media and Telecommunications | −30.2% | +76.8% | | Construction | +16.1% | +29.4% | | Transport, Postal and Warehousing | +16.5% | +20.9% | | Arts and Recreation Services | −11.8% | +20.5% | | Other Services | −1.0% | +18.0% | | Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste | +5.5% | +12.6% | | Rental, Hiring and Real Estate | +3.9% | +9.5% | | Health Care and Social Assistance | −7.4% | +4.6% | | Mining | +1.6% | +2.6% | | Education and Training | −7.3% | +1.3% | | Wholesale Trade | −4.1% | +1.0% | | Administrative and Support Services | +9.8% | +0.6% | Annual decliners | Industry | Quarterly change | Annual change | | ----------------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ------------- | | Financial and Insurance Services | −8.2% | −17.6% | | Professional, Scientific and Technical Services | −12.0% | −9.8% | | Manufacturing | +1.0% | −5.0% | | Retail Trade | −8.6% | −4.1% | | Accommodation and Food Services | −7.1% | −1.7% | Seasonally adjusted chain volume measures. Industries are split into annual risers and annual decliners. Within each section, industries are sorted by annual change. Negative quarterly or annual results are highlighted. Quarterly change compares Mar quarter 2026 to Jun quarter 2026; annual change compares Jun quarter 2025 to Jun quarter 2026\. Source: ABS, Private New Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure, Australia, June 2026\. ### The UK economy looks very weak URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-uk-economy-looks-very-weak/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T21:47:46.000Z Australia and Britain face many of the same economic problems, but the latest data show Australia currently has the stronger economy — accompanied by a more difficult inflation problem. Australian real GDP grew **2.5%** over the year to the March quarter, compared with just **0.9%** in Britain. Australia's unemployment rate is also lower, while employment has been growing more quickly. UK employment increased by about 0.7% over the latest year, compared with 1.3% in Australia. But stronger Australian activity has been accompanied by greater price pressure. Australian CPI inflation reached **3.5%** in July, compared with **2.9%** in Britain. Underlying inflation shows an even larger difference: 3.6% in Australia compared with UK core inflation of 2.6%. UK regular wages are currently growing slightly faster, at 3.5% compared with Australia's 3.2%. **The clearest distinction is monetary policy.** Australia's cash rate has risen from 3.60% to **4.35%** over the past year. Britain's Bank Rate has moved in the opposite direction, from 4.00% to **3.75%**. Australia is therefore outperforming Britain on growth and employment, but that relative strength comes with an important qualification: inflation is proving more persistent and monetary policy has had to become considerably tighter. Neither country, meanwhile, has much cause for celebration on productivity. Output per hour grew just **0.3% in Australia and 0.4% in Britain** over the year to March. Australia v United Kingdom — latest outcomes | Indicator | Australia | United Kingdom | | ------------------------------------------------------ | --------- | -------------- | | **Unemployment** Latest labour survey | **4.5%** | **4.9%** | | **Employment** Latest labour survey | 14.81m | 34.47m | | **Participation/activity rate\*** Latest labour survey | 66.9% | 79.1% | | **Employment/population\*** Latest labour survey | 63.9% | 75.1% | | **Policy interest rate** August 2026 | **4.35%** | **3.75%** | Change over the past 12 months | Indicator | Australia | United Kingdom | | --------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | -------------- | | **Real GDP** Year to Mar qtr 2026 | **+2.5%** | **+0.9%** | | **Headline CPI** Year to July 2026 | **+3.5%** | **+2.9%** | | **Underlying/core inflation\*\*** Year to July 2026 | **+3.6%** | **+2.6%** | | **Employment** Latest annual change | **+1.3%** | **+0.7%** | | **Unemployment rate** 12-month change | +0.2 ppt | +0.2 ppt | | **Wages** Year to Jun qtr 2026 | **+3.2%** | **+3.5%** | | **Labour productivity** Year to Mar qtr 2026 | **+0.3%** | **+0.4%** | | **Policy interest rate** 12-month change | **+0.75 ppt** | **−0.25 ppt** | **Notes:** ppt = percentage points. UK labour-market figures are three-month averages for April–June 2026, while Australian headline labour-market figures are monthly. \*Australian and UK participation/employment rates use different age-population definitions and their levels should therefore not be directly compared. \*\*Underlying inflation uses Australia's trimmed mean CPI and UK CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco. Productivity is output per hour worked. UK productivity uses the ONS Labour Force Survey-based estimate. GDP uses the March quarter to ensure the same reference period. Sources: ABS, RBA, UK Office for National Statistics and Bank of England. Data available at 27 August 2026\. ### Dark stats - Key findings from the latest mortality data URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/key-findings-latest-australian-mortality-data/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T06:15:30.000Z The latest ABS Provisional Mortality Statistics provide an unusually useful picture of both current mortality and the longer-term changes taking place in Australia. There were **73,997 deaths in Australia between January and May 2026**. That was 1.0% more than in the same period of 2025, but 1.3% fewer than in 2024\. In May alone there were 15,897 deaths, down 0.9% from May 2025 and 2.4% from May 2024. But raw death numbers tell only part of the story. Australia has a larger and older population than it did a decade ago. Once population age is taken into account, mortality has generally been declining. The age-standardised death rate in May 2026 was **40.3 deaths per 100,000**, compared with 42.2 in May 2025 and 44.0 in May 2024\. Across January to May, age-specific death rates were lower in **every age group** than in both previous years. The longer 2015–25 data make the distinction especially clear. Australia recorded **188,156 deaths in 2025**, 14.1% more than in 2019\. Yet the average monthly age-standardised death rate was **4.3% lower than in 2019** and the lowest in the 2015–25 series. Population ageing explains much of that apparent contradiction. Of the 23,309 additional deaths recorded between 2019 and 2025, **86% occurred among Australians aged 75 and over**. There have also been substantial changes in individual causes of death. Between 2019 and 2025, the average monthly age-standardised mortality rate fell by approximately **27% for ischaemic heart disease, 22% for cerebrovascular disease and 9% for cancer**. Dementia presents the reverse side of Australia's ageing population. The number of doctor-certified dementia deaths increased by about **21% between 2019 and 2025**, but the age-standardised dementia mortality rate was essentially unchanged. COVID mortality has also fallen sharply. Doctor-certified COVID deaths declined from **9,846 in 2022 to 1,665 in 2025**. In the first five months of 2026 there were 238 such deaths, 65% fewer than a year earlier. The broad message from the data is therefore relatively encouraging: Australia is recording more deaths as its population grows and ages, but the underlying risk of death, after allowing for age, has continued to decline. *Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Mortality Statistics, January–May 2026\. Data are provisional and subject to revision.* Australian mortality — January to May 2026 | Measure | 2026 | Comparison | | ----------------------------------------- | ------ | -------------- | | Deaths, Jan–May | 73,997 | +1.0% vs 2025 | | Deaths in May | 15,897 | −0.9% vs 2025 | | May age-standardised death rate | 40.3 | 42.2 in 2025 | | Doctor-certified COVID deaths, Jan–May | 238 | −65.2% vs 2025 | | Doctor-certified dementia deaths, Jan–May | 7,551 | +5.8% vs 2025 | Age-standardised rate is deaths per 100,000 people, adjusted for differences in population age structure. Longer-term mortality trends | Measure | Latest | Change | | ------------------------------------- | ------- | -------------- | | Total deaths | 188,156 | +14.1% vs 2019 | | Average monthly age-standardised rate | 41.03 | −4.3% vs 2019 | | Cancer mortality rate | 11.50 | −9.4% vs 2019 | | Ischaemic heart disease rate | 2.55 | −27.0% vs 2019 | | Cerebrovascular disease rate | 1.80 | −21.6% vs 2019 | | Dementia deaths | 18,602 | +20.8% vs 2019 | | COVID deaths | 1,665 | −83.1% vs 2022 | Latest longer-term results are for 2025\. Cause-specific figures are doctor-certified deaths. Mortality rates shown are average monthly age-standardised rates calculated from ABS monthly data. Source: ABS Provisional Mortality Statistics. ### Mining’s skills problem is unusually specialised URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/mining-specialist-skills-shortage-abs/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T01:53:34.000Z New ABS data provides a useful insight into the nature of skills shortages facing Australia’s mining industry. Among mining businesses that reported experiencing a skills shortage in 2024–25, **77.3 per cent said the shortage reflected a need for specialist skills or knowledge**. That was the highest proportion recorded across the industries surveyed and well above the **57.1 per cent result for all Australian businesses**. The distinction is important. The ABS measure is not saying that 77 per cent of all mining businesses face a skills shortage. Rather, it shows that **where shortages occur in mining, they are disproportionately concentrated in specialised capabilities**. That is consistent with the increasingly technical nature of modern mining. Mining businesses make extensive use of engineering, project management, environmental, digital and analytical skills, alongside traditional trades and operational occupations. The result also helps distinguish mining’s workforce challenge from a general shortage of labour. Specialist expertise is harder to replace quickly through ordinary recruitment because relevant qualifications, experience and industry knowledge can take years to develop. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/08/mining_specialist_skill_shortages_social.png) ### Australia versus America: ten numbers that tell a different economic story URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-versus-america-ten-numbers-that-tell-a-different-economic-story/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T21:45:50.000Z ### Australia and the United States currently have remarkably similar headline inflation and wage growth, but beneath those numbers the two economies are moving in quite different directions. July consumer price inflation was **3.5% in Australia and 3.4% in the United States**, while wages increased by exactly **3.2%** in both countries over the year to the June quarter. The major difference is productivity. Australian GDP per hour worked increased just **0.3%** over the year to the March quarter. Comparable US nonfarm-business labour productivity increased **2.8%**. Australia has nevertheless generated much stronger employment growth: employment increased 1.3% over the year to July, compared with a decline of about 0.6% in the US household survey. **The key distinction is therefore not simply economic growth, but how that growth is being generated. Australia continues to add workers much faster than it adds output per hour worked. America has recently produced almost the reverse combination.** That divergence also helps explain the unusual monetary-policy contrast. Over the past year the RBA has raised its cash rate by 75 basis points, while the Federal Reserve has cut its target range by 75 basis points. The headline numbers look similar. The economies underneath them do not. Australia v United States — latest outcomes | Indicator | Australia | United States | | ------------------------------------ | --------- | -------------- | | **Unemployment** July 2026 | **4.5%** | **4.1%** | | **Employment** July 2026 | 14.81m | 162.18m | | **Participation rate** July 2026 | 66.9% | 61.4% | | **Employment/population** July 2026 | 63.9% | 58.9% | | **Policy interest rate** August 2026 | **4.35%** | **3.50–3.75%** | Change over the past 12 months | Indicator | Australia | United States | | -------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------- | | **Real GDP** Year to Mar qtr 2026 | **+2.5%** | **+2.7%** | | **Headline CPI** Year to July 2026 | **+3.5%** | **+3.4%** | | **Underlying inflation\*** Year to July 2026 | **+3.6%** | **+2.5%** | | **Employment** Year to July 2026 | **+1.3%** | **−0.6%** | | **Unemployment rate** Year to July 2026 | +0.2 ppt | −0.2 ppt | | **Participation rate** Year to July 2026 | −0.1 ppt | −0.8 ppt | | **Employment/population** Year to July 2026 | −0.3 ppt | −0.7 ppt | | **Wages** Year to Jun qtr 2026 | **+3.2%** | **+3.2%** | | **Labour productivity** Year to Mar qtr 2026 | **+0.3%** | **+2.8%** | | **Policy interest rate** 12-month change | **+0.75 ppt** | **−0.75 ppt** | **Notes:** ppt = percentage points. \*Underlying inflation uses Australia's trimmed mean CPI and US CPI excluding food and energy. Productivity uses Australian GDP per hour worked and US nonfarm-business labour productivity. GDP uses the March quarter to ensure the same reference period. Sources: ABS, RBA, US BEA, US BLS and Federal Reserve. Data available at 27 August 2026\. ### The strange death of Australia’s standard variable mortgage rate URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/standard-variable-mortgage-rate-gap-australia/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T12:00:27.000Z RBA Table F5 is a monthly dataset of **indicator lending rates**. In plain English, that means it reports the headline rates lenders advertise across products such as small business lending, housing loans and credit cards. Within the mortgage series, two terms matter. A **standard variable rate** is the lender’s published benchmark variable rate before discounts. A **discounted variable rate** is the lower advertised rate offered after a discount is applied. The **gap** between the two is measured in **percentage points**, not per cent. The most interesting fact in the latest data is not simply that mortgage rates are high. It is that the so-called standard rate is becoming less informative. In July 2026, banks’ standard variable rate for owner-occupier housing loans was **8.77%**, while the discounted variable rate was **6.80%**. That is a gap of **1.97 percentage points**. For investors, the standard variable rate was **9.35%** and the discounted rate **7.13%**, a gap of **2.22 percentage points**. That is a structural shift in how Australian mortgage pricing works. When the discounted owner-occupier series appears in June 2004, the standard variable rate was **7.07%** and the discounted rate **6.59%**. The gap was just **0.48 percentage points**. In other words, the owner-occupier discount gap has increased more than fourfold over two decades. Why does this matter? Because competition increasingly seems to be happening through **discounts off a headline price**, rather than through movement in the headline price itself. That makes mortgage pricing less transparent for households, because the published “standard” rate may no longer be the rate that matters most in practice. It also matters for policy watchers. If the reference rate is becoming more fictional, then the way monetary policy flows through to borrowers is more complicated than a quick glance at the headline mortgage rate would suggest. For a Benchmark audience, that is the real story in F5: not just that borrowing is expensive, but that the pricing architecture of the mortgage market has changed. Mortgage pricing gap: standard vs discounted rates **Definitions:** “Standard variable” is the lender’s published benchmark rate before discounts. “Discounted variable” is the lower advertised rate after discounts. The gap is measured in **percentage points**. Latest rates — July 2026 Owner-occupier Standard variable — 8.77% Discounted variable — 6.80% **Gap:** 1.97 percentage points Investor Standard variable — 9.35% Discounted variable — 7.13% **Gap:** 2.22 percentage points How much the owner-occupier gap has widened June 2004 gap — 0.48 percentage points July 2026 gap — 1.97 percentage points The discount on owner-occupier mortgages has widened from **0.48** to **1.97 percentage points**. Source: RBA Table F5, Indicator Lending Rates. Latest observation: July 2026\. ### Australians make three debit card payments for every credit card payment URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-debit-credit-card-payments-comparison/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T06:42:58.000Z Australians overwhelmingly choose debit rather than credit when paying by card, but international data show this pattern is far from universal. The latest Bank for International Settlements Red Book statistics show Australians made **432 debit-card payments per person in 2024**, compared with **138 credit-card payments**. That works out at around **3.1 debit transactions for every credit transaction**. In raw numbers, Australians made approximately **11.8 billion debit-card payments** during the year, compared with **3.8 billion credit-card payments**. Debit transactions alone accounted for **56.3 per cent of all Australian cashless payments**, while credit-card transactions accounted for 18.0 per cent. But Australia's preference for debit is actually moderate compared with several European economies. British consumers made more than six debit payments for every credit payment. The ratio was 5.8 in Germany, 5.5 in Sweden and 4.0 in France. The United States sits much closer to the middle, recording 294 debit payments and 182 credit payments per person — a ratio of only 1.6 to one. More strikingly, the pattern reverses in some economies. Canadians made 224 credit-card payments per person compared with 194 debit payments. In Korea, credit was even more dominant: 366 credit transactions per person compared with 204 debit transactions. These differences demonstrate why simply measuring the growth of "card payments" can conceal important structural differences between payments systems. Australia is an exceptionally card-intensive economy, but most Australian card transactions draw directly on customers' funds rather than using a credit function. That distinction matters when considering the economics of the payments system. Debit and credit have different pricing structures, incentives and competitive dynamics. For Australian payments policy, the BIS figures provide a useful starting point: **the typical Australian card payment is now very clearly a debit payment.** *Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, 2024.* Debit versus credit card payments — 2024 | Country | Debitper person | Creditper person | Debit /credit | | -------------- | --------------- | ---------------- | ------------- | | Belgium | 305.0 | 21.6 | 14.1× | | United Kingdom | 411.7 | 67.6 | 6.1× | | Germany | 130.2 | 22.4 | 5.8× | | Sweden | 323.7 | 59.2 | 5.5× | | France | 245.0 | 62.0 | 4.0× | | Australia | 432.4 | 137.9 | 3.1× | | Spain | 159.2 | 78.8 | 2.0× | | United States | 293.6 | 182.1 | 1.6× | | Singapore | 200.1 | 178.5 | 1.1× | | Canada | 193.9 | 223.5 | 0.9× | | Korea | 204.0 | 366.0 | 0.6× | Number of payments per inhabitant. Debit/credit ratio compares transactions processed with a debit function against transactions processed with a credit function. Delayed-debit and e-money payments are separately classified and excluded. Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, 2024\. ### Australia has fast payments — but other countries use them much more URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-fast-payments-international-comparison/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T06:24:16.000Z Australia's New Payments Platform has transformed the speed at which money can move between bank accounts. But new international data suggest Australia is still some distance from being a world leader in the use of fast payments. According to the latest Bank for International Settlements Red Book statistics, Australians made **61 fast payments per person in 2024**. That equates to around **1.66 billion fast payments during the year**, or an average of approximately **4.5 million every day**. Usage is also growing quickly. Australian fast-payment volumes increased **18.5 per cent in 2024**. But international comparisons put that growth into perspective. Brazil recorded 298 fast payments per person, Korea 189 and India 127\. Among advanced Asian and European economies, Hong Kong and Sweden recorded around 95 per person and Singapore 83. Australia's 61 was nevertheless substantially ahead of the Netherlands at 31, Spain at 18, Japan at 17 and France at just nine. Australia's New Payments Platform (NPP) was publicly launched in February 2018\. It allows payments to be made around the clock with near-immediate availability of funds to recipients. The striking feature of the BIS figures is therefore not a lack of Australian fast-payments infrastructure. It is the enormous difference between countries in how heavily that infrastructure is actually used. Fast payments represented only **7.9 per cent of Australian cashless transactions in 2024**. That partly reflects Australia's exceptionally heavy use of cards: as shown in our previous comparison, Australians made almost 577 card and e-money payments per person during the year. The next stage of payments policy should consequently be less about building faster infrastructure and more about how that infrastructure is used. BIS research finds that fast-payment adoption tends to be higher where systems have broader use cases, greater participation by non-banks and stronger public-sector involvement. Australia has successfully built the rails. The international evidence suggests there remains considerable scope to run more payments over them. *Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, 2024.* Fast payments per person — 2024 | Country | Paymentsper person | | ------------- | ------------------ | | Brazil | 298 | | Korea | 189 | | Argentina | 149 | | India | 127 | | Hong Kong SAR | 95 | | Sweden | 95 | | Singapore | 83 | | Australia | 61 | | Türkiye | 54 | | Mexico | 48 | | Netherlands | 31 | | Spain | 18 | | Japan | 17 | | China | 12 | | France | 9 | Fast-payment transactions per inhabitant. Latest available data are for 2024\. Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, CT6E. ### Australians make 768 cashless payments a year URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-cashless-payments-per-person-bis-2024/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T06:14:44.000Z Australia is one of the most intensive users of cashless payments among comparable advanced economies, according to the latest Bank for International Settlements payments data. The BIS Red Book statistics provide internationally comparable data on how people pay. The latest figures cover 2024 and include credit transfers, direct debits, cheques, card and e-money payments and other cashless payment instruments. Adding these categories together, Australians made around **768 cashless payments per person in 2024** — equivalent to more than two transactions per inhabitant every day. That is around one-third above the BIS average of 579 cashless payments per person across advanced economies. Australia's payment structure is also heavily card-based. Australians made **576.9 card and e-money payments per person** during 2024, representing about **75 per cent of all cashless transactions**. Among the selected advanced economies shown below, only Korea and Singapore recorded more total cashless transactions per person. But the composition varies considerably. Singapore is even more card-intensive, with card and e-money transactions accounting for 87 per cent of cashless payments. Korea combines very high card use with substantially more credit transfers than Australia. Germany sits at the other extreme. It records only about 436 cashless payments per person, with direct debits representing 43 per cent of transactions and cards just 36 per cent. The Australian figures illustrate how mature the shift towards digital payments has already become. The policy question is increasingly not how to persuade Australians to adopt cashless payments, but how to ensure that the increasingly important digital payments system remains competitive, resilient and inexpensive to use. That does not mean cash has become irrelevant. The BIS separately notes that cash withdrawals are declining internationally while cash in circulation has broadly stabilised. Digital payments may dominate everyday transactions, but cash continues to perform an important access and contingency role. *Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, 2024.* Cashless payments per person — 2024 | Country | Cashlesstotal | Card /e-money | Cardshare | | -------------- | ------------- | ------------- | --------- | | Korea | \~860 | 572.1 | 66.5% | | Singapore | \~820 | 715.8 | 87.2% | | Australia | \~768 | 576.9 | 75.1% | | Sweden | \~685 | 387.6 | 56.6% | | United Kingdom | \~680 | 490.0 | 72.0% | | United States | \~644 | 505.2 | 78.4% | | Belgium | \~557 | 333.6 | 59.9% | | Canada | \~495 | 418.1 | 84.5% | | France | \~490 | 314.4 | 64.2% | | Germany | \~436 | 157.3 | 36.1% | Payments per inhabitant. Cashless total is approximately calculated from BIS instrument-level data. Card share is card and e-money payments as a percentage of total cashless payments. Source: Bank for International Settlements, CPMI Red Book statistics, 2024\. ### Home insurance premiums keep rising — but APRA data show no profit windfall URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/home-insurance-premiums-apra-profit-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T03:40:37.000Z APRA's latest General Insurance Performance Statistics provide detailed quarterly results for different classes of insurance, including householders insurance. The June 2026 figures allow a full financial-year comparison. Across the four quarters to June, householders insurance generated **$17.13 billion of insurance revenue**, up 8.1% from $15.84 billion in 2024–25. Yet profitability moved in the opposite direction. APRA's insurance service result — broadly the result generated from providing insurance after allowing for reinsurance — fell from a **$1.15 billion profit in 2024–25 to a $42 million loss in 2025–26**. That is important politically because Australian households are unquestionably paying much more for home insurance. Separate ACCC data show the average combined home and contents premium increased from $1,612 in 2021–22 to **$2,360 in 2024–25**, an increase of more than 46% in three years. But APRA's latest numbers demonstrate why simply blaming insurer profits misses much of the problem. In the June quarter, householders insurance revenue was 5.9% higher than a year earlier. Gross claims incurred increased **22.6%**, while the insurance service result fell 38.6% to $431 million. The volatility is particularly striking. The householders insurance service result was a $633 million profit in September 2025, followed by a **$1.09 billion loss in December**, a small loss in March and a return to profit in June. The policy challenge is therefore much broader than insurer margins. APRA estimates home insurance premiums increased by an average 7.2% a year between 2010 and 2025, compared with wage growth of 3.1%. It also estimates that taxes, levies and government charges account for around **21% of the average premium nationally**. Home insurance affordability increasingly depends on disaster risk, reinsurance, construction costs, building resilience, planning decisions and government charges. For households, premiums are becoming a serious cost-of-living problem. But APRA's numbers suggest the solution cannot simply be to squeeze insurer margins. *Source: APRA Quarterly General Insurance Performance Statistics, June 2026; ACCC Insurance Monitoring Report 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations.* Householders insurance — revenue up, profitability down | Indicator | Previous | Latest | Change | | --------------------------------- | -------- | ------- | ------- | | June qtr insurance revenue | $4.10b | $4.34b | +5.9% | | June qtr gross claims incurred | $1.74b | $2.13b | +22.6% | | June qtr insurance service result | $702m | $431m | −38.6% | | FY insurance revenue | $15.84b | $17.13b | +8.1% | | FY insurance service result | +$1.15b | −$42m | −$1.19b | | FY service result / revenue | 7.2% | −0.2% | −7.5 pp | Source: APRA, Quarterly General Insurance Performance Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Financial-year figures sum the four quarterly flow observations ending June. Insurance service result is shown after reinsurance. “pp” denotes percentage points. ### Mental health claims are becoming a superannuation cost problem URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/mental-health-tpd-superannuation-insurance-costs/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T02:58:28.000Z APRA's quarterly life insurance statistics provide industry-wide financial results as well as performance information for individual life insurance product groups, including business written through superannuation. That distinction matters because millions of Australians hold death, total and permanent disability (TPD) and, in some cases, income protection insurance through their super fund. The premiums are generally deducted from members' superannuation balances. The latest figures therefore sit inside a much larger policy problem: **the cost of disability insurance is increasingly colliding with the objective of building adequate retirement savings.** Mental health is now a major part of that story. Industry data show mental-health conditions accounted for almost **one in three TPD claims** in 2024\. Life insurers paid $2.42 billion for mental-health claims that year, including $1.68 billion through group insurance. Most strikingly, the rate of mental-health-related TPD claims among Australians in their 30s has increased **732% over the past decade**. The financial pressure is becoming evident in insurance pricing. KPMG analysis of APRA data found claims for group lump-sum insurance — the category heavily exposed to TPD — increased from 78% of premium revenue in 2023 to **91% in 2025**, before allowing for other insurance costs. AustralianSuper provides a very tangible example. From 30 May 2026, around 1.7 million insured members faced higher insurance prices, including an average increase of about **40% for TPD cover**, 20% for death cover and 38% for two-year income protection. This creates a difficult public-policy trade-off. Insurance through super provides an important financial safety net. But increasingly expensive insurance also means more money being deducted from workers' retirement savings. APRA has warned that traditional TPD insurance was not designed for today's sharp increase in mental-health claims. The question is therefore becoming bigger than insurance pricing: **is a large permanent lump-sum payment still the best way to support younger Australians experiencing long-term mental ill-health?** *Sources: APRA, CALI, KPMG and AustralianSuper.* The growing pressure on disability insurance | Indicator | Result | | --------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | | TPD claims related to mental health, 2024 | Almost 1 in 3 | | Mental health life insurance payments, 2024 | $2.42bn | | Of which: group insurance | $1.68bn | | Mental health TPD claims rate — people in their 30s | +732% in 10 years | | Group lump-sum claims / premium ratio | 78% → 91% | | AustralianSuper members with insurance affected | \~1.7m | | AustralianSuper average TPD premium increase | \~40% | | Death / 2-year income protection increases | \~20% / \~38% | Sources: APRA; Council of Australian Life Insurers; KPMG Life Insurance Insights 2025; AustralianSuper. Group lump-sum claims ratio compares 2023 with 2025\. AustralianSuper insurance pricing applies from 30 May 2026\. ### Private health costs are rising — but insurer profits fell 16.6% URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/private-health-insurer-profits-claims-premiums-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T02:40:10.000Z APRA's latest private health insurance performance statistics provide an industry-wide view of premium revenue, claims, expenses, profitability and capital. Because APRA reports financial flows quarterly, summing the four quarters to June provides a useful comparison between the 2024–25 and 2025–26 financial years. Private health insurers collected **$32.89 billion in health insurance premium revenue in 2025–26**, up 5.7% from $31.11 billion a year earlier. But insurance claims increased faster, rising **7.0% to $28.10 billion**. Claims therefore absorbed 85.4% of premium revenue, compared with 84.4% the previous year. The political significance is that Australia's private health cost problem cannot simply be explained by expanding insurer profits. APRA's insurance service result — broadly, the result generated from insurance operations — fell **6.2% to $1.69 billion** over the financial year. Total industry profit after tax fell even more sharply, from $2.13 billion to **$1.78 billion, a decline of 16.6%**. That provides some support for the Government's argument that underlying health costs were putting genuine pressure on premiums. The Government approved an average private health insurance premium increase of 4.41% from 1 April 2026 after requiring insurers to resubmit their proposed increases several times. There is, however, an important early sign that the premium increase is providing insurers some relief. In the June quarter alone, premium revenue was 8.5% higher than a year earlier while claims rose 6.9%. The quarterly insurance service result consequently jumped 50.4% to $446 million. For policymakers, the problem is therefore broader than insurer margins: households are paying higher premiums and, as APRA's separate statistics show, higher out-of-pocket costs, while insurers themselves are facing rapidly rising claims. *Source: APRA Quarterly Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations.* Private health insurance financial performance | Indicator | 2024–25 | 2025–26 | Change | | ------------------------ | ------- | ------- | ------- | | Premium revenue | $31.11b | $32.89b | +5.7% | | Insurance claims | $26.25b | $28.10b | +7.0% | | Claims / premium revenue | 84.4% | 85.4% | +1.0 pp | | Insurance service result | $1.80b | $1.69b | −6.2% | | After-tax profit | $2.13b | $1.78b | −16.6% | Source: APRA, Quarterly Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics, June 2026\. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Financial-year figures are calculated by summing APRA's quarterly flow data for the four quarters ending June. “pp” denotes percentage points. ### Private health cover grows as hospital out-of-pocket costs jump 7.5% URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/private-health-cover-out-of-pocket-costs-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T02:18:05.000Z ## More Australians are holding private health insurance, but the latest APRA statistics show that having cover is not preventing significant increases in household health costs. At 30 June 2026, **12.82 million Australians had private hospital cover**, equivalent to 45.8% of the population. That was up from 12.53 million people and 45.4% a year earlier. General treatment cover also continued to grow, reaching **15.53 million people**, or 55.5% of the population. Insurers are paying more as well. Average hospital benefits paid per insured person increased from $1,521.73 in the year to June 2025 to $1,553.48 in 2026, an increase of around 2.1%. Ancillary benefits per insured person increased around 3.7%. But the politically important number is what households are still paying themselves. APRA reports that the **average out-of-pocket cost for a hospital episode reached $513.24 in June 2026, 7.5% higher than a year earlier, and roughly twice the pace of inflation.** Average out-of-pocket costs for ancillary services such as dental, optical and physiotherapy rose 5.6% to $64.05. There is an important qualification. The average medical gap, where a gap was charged, actually fell 4.5% to $260.74\. APRA's broader hospital out-of-pocket measure also incorporates excesses and co-payments, so the increase cannot simply be attributed to specialists raising their fees. Nevertheless, the political message is straightforward. Private health insurance membership remains resilient, but insured Australians are still confronting rapidly rising costs when they use the health system. For households already paying private health insurance premiums, a 7.5% increase in hospital out-of-pocket expenses adds another dimension to Australia's continuing cost-of-living debate. *Source: APRA, Quarterly Private Health Insurance Statistics, June 2026.* Private health insurance — June 2026 | Indicator | June 2026 | Annual change | | ------------------------------------- | --------- | ------------- | | People with hospital cover | 12.82m | +2.3% | | Population with hospital cover | 45.8% | +0.4 pp | | People with general treatment cover | 15.53m | +2.1% | | Hospital benefits per insured person | $1,553.48 | +2.1% | | Ancillary benefits per insured person | $512.06 | +3.7% | | Hospital out-of-pocket per episode | $513.24 | +7.5% | | Ancillary out-of-pocket per service | $64.05 | +5.6% | | Medical gap where gap was paid | $260.74 | −4.5% | Source: APRA, Quarterly Private Health Insurance Statistics, June 2026\. Membership and benefit-per-person annual changes calculated from APRA's June 2025 and June 2026 published figures. Out-of-pocket annual changes are as reported by APRA. “pp” denotes percentage points. ### How concentrated is Australia's MySuper market? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/mysuper-market-concentration-hhi/ Last updated: 2026-08-25T08:55:02.000Z Australia's MySuper market contains **52 products holding about $1.21 trillion in member assets**, according to APRA's 2025 Comprehensive Product Performance Package. But simply counting products can give a misleading picture of competition because their size varies enormously. AustralianSuper's MySuper product alone holds around $239 billion, while a number of products have assets below $1 billion. One way of measuring that concentration is the **Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)**. The calculation squares each product's share of total MySuper assets and then adds the results together. This gives much greater weight to the largest products than a simple product count. The results show a market that is **concentrated at the top, but not dominated by only a handful of products**. Across 52 MySuper products holding $1.21 trillion in member assets, the HHI is 793, which is well under the 2000 index level identified by the ACCC as a level of concern about market power. AustralianSuper is by far the largest individual product with 19.8% of assets, while the four largest products together account for 43.8%. The ten largest products hold almost three-quarters of all MySuper assets — 74.5%. How concentrated is Australia's MySuper market? | Measure | Result | | ------------------------------------------- | ------- | | MySuper products | 52 | | Total MySuper member assets | $1.21tn | | Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) | 793 | | Largest product share | 19.8% | | Top four products — asset share | 43.8% | | Top ten products — asset share | 74.5% | | Equivalent number of equally sized products | 12.6 | **HHI explained:** Each product's asset share is squared and the results are added together. The index runs towards 10,000 as assets become increasingly concentrated; 10,000 would mean one product held the entire market. Ten largest MySuper products by member assets | # | MySuper product | Assets | Share | | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | ----- | | 1 | **AustralianSuper MySuper**AustralianSuper | $239.0bn | 19.8% | | 2 | **Aware MySuper (Accumulation)**Aware Super | $108.2bn | 9.0% | | 3 | **Lifecycle Investment Strategy**Australian Retirement Trust | $97.3bn | 8.1% | | 4 | **Hostplus MySuper**HOSTPLUS Superannuation Fund | $83.6bn | 6.9% | | 5 | **MySuper**Retail Employees Superannuation Trust | $79.3bn | 6.6% | | 6 | **Growth (MySuper)**CONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING UNIONS SUPERANNUATION FUND | $71.9bn | 6.0% | | 7 | **HESTA MySuper**HESTA | $70.5bn | 5.8% | | 8 | **QSuper Lifetime**Australian Retirement Trust | $66.8bn | 5.5% | | 9 | **SPIRIT SUPER - MYSUPER**CareSuper | $42.5bn | 3.5% | | 10 | **Mercer SmartPath**Mercer Super Trust | $40.4bn | 3.4% | **Method:** HHI is calculated at the MySuper product level using member assets. Where one trustee operates more than one MySuper product, each product is treated separately. A trustee-level concentration measure would therefore differ. **Source:** APRA Comprehensive Product Performance Package, June 2025\. Member assets include accumulation members who access investment options underpinning a MySuper product. Benchmark Analytics calculations. Another way to interpret the HHI is through the **equivalent number of equally sized products**, which is 12.6\. In other words, although APRA records 52 MySuper products, the distribution of assets has roughly the same concentration as a market containing about 13 equally sized products. The figures therefore reveal a substantial long tail of smaller products alongside a relatively small group of very large providers. MySuper is certainly not a one- or two-player market, but the headline product count considerably overstates how evenly assets are distributed The HHI gives a single measure of concentration, while the largest-product, top-four and top-ten shares show the same issue in more intuitive terms: **52 MySuper products do not represent 52 equally significant competitors**. There is an important qualification. This calculation measures concentration at the **product level**, not the trustee level. Some trustees operate multiple MySuper products. Australian Retirement Trust, for example, has both its Lifecycle Investment Strategy and QSuper Lifetime products. Grouping products under their common trustee would therefore produce a different—and likely higher—measure of concentration. HHI also says nothing by itself about whether concentration is good or bad for members. It measures the distribution of assets, not fees, investment performance or service quality. ### What do we know about superannuation fees? Some core data URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/superannuation-fees-core-data/ Last updated: 2026-08-25T08:19:56.000Z APRA publishes detailed information on individual superannuation funds and their basic superannuation products (called MySuper products). Bringing those datasets together provides a useful starting point for understanding how large Australia's major funds are, what they charge members for administration, and whether greater scale is associated with lower fees. This analysis covers 36 public-offer superannuation funds offering eligible MySuper products. APRA formally describes each regulated superannuation fund as a **registrable superannuation entity, or RSE**. Fund size is measured using the total assets of each RSE, including assets held outside MySuper, while the account and fee measures relate specifically to eligible MySuper products. MySuper Large Employer products are excluded. The fee measures also cover **administration fees and expenses only**. They do not include investment fees and costs, which are generally charged as a percentage of a member's balance. The 36 funds analysed hold almost **$2.38 trillion in total assets** and contain 16.05 million MySuper accounts. Average fund assets are $66.1 billion, although the median is substantially lower at $30.0 billion because several very large funds lift the average. Across funds, the average MySuper administration cost is **29.4 basis points**, equivalent to about **$147 a year on a $50,000 balance**. Weighting the calculation by the number of MySuper accounts produces a lower figure of 24.4 basis points, or around $122. Fund size appears to matter, but only modestly. **Scope:** The analysis covers public-offer superannuation funds offering eligible MySuper products. Fund-size measures use total fund assets, including assets held outside MySuper. Account and fee measures relate to eligible MySuper products. MySuper Large Employer products are excluded. Fee measures cover administration fees and expenses only and do not include investment fees and costs. Superannuation fund scale and MySuper administration fees — core data | Measure | Result | | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | | Public-offer funds analysed | 36 | | Combined assets of analysed funds | $2.38tn | | Average fund assets | $66.1bn | | Median fund assets | $30.0bn | | MySuper member accounts in analysed funds | 16.05m | | Average MySuper administration cost | 29.4 bps | | Average MySuper administration cost on $50,000 | $147 | | Median MySuper administration cost | 26.0 bps | | Median MySuper administration cost on $50,000 | $130 | | Member-weighted MySuper administration cost | 24.4 bps | | Member-weighted MySuper cost on $50,000 | $122 | Fund size does appear to matter, but considerably less than might be expected. Because fund assets range from around $1 billion to more than $400 billion, the statistical analysis uses the logarithm of assets. Put simply, this measures how administration costs change each time fund size **doubles**. A doubling in fund assets is associated with administration costs around **1.36 basis points lower**, equivalent to just **$6.81 a year on a $50,000 balance**. The largest quarter of funds also charge less than the smallest quarter: median administration costs of **23.1 basis points compared with 27.1 basis points**, a difference of around $20 annually. But the overall relationship is weak. The correlation between fund size and administration costs is only **−0.24**, with fund size associated with just **5.8% of the variation in fees**. The initial conclusion is therefore modest: **scale appears to help, but fund size alone tells us surprisingly little about what members ultimately pay.** Correlation measures association rather than causation; these results do not establish that making a fund larger would itself cause its fees to fall. **Scope:** The analysis covers public-offer superannuation funds offering eligible MySuper products. Fund-size measures use total fund assets, including assets held outside MySuper. Account and fee measures relate to eligible MySuper products. MySuper Large Employer products are excluded. Fee measures cover administration fees and expenses only and do not include investment fees and costs. Superannuation fund scale and MySuper administration fees — core data | Measure | Result | | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | | Public-offer funds analysed | 36 | | Combined assets of analysed funds | $2.38tn | | Average fund assets | $66.1bn | | Median fund assets | $30.0bn | | MySuper member accounts in analysed funds | 16.05m | | Average MySuper administration cost | 29.4 bps | | Average MySuper administration cost on $50,000 | $147 | | Median MySuper administration cost | 26.0 bps | | Median MySuper administration cost on $50,000 | $130 | | Member-weighted MySuper administration cost | 24.4 bps | | Member-weighted MySuper cost on $50,000 | $122 | ### Three (blunt) politically relevant messages from the latest RBA Minutes URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-minutes-interest-rates-inflation-housing-august-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-25T01:50:53.000Z ### The Reserve Bank’s latest Monetary Policy Board Minutes cover the meeting held in Sydney on **10–11 August 2026**, when the Board unanimously left the cash rate unchanged at **4.35 per cent**. The Minutes provide a fuller account of the economic evidence considered by Board members and the arguments for and against changing interest rates than the shorter statement released immediately after the meeting. Three politically important messages stand out. **First, another rate rise remains very much possible.** Several members judged that upside inflation risks could crystallise and require further tightening. The Board explicitly retained the option of raising rates if those risks materialise. For the Government, that keeps mortgage costs and cost-of-living pressures politically live. **Second, weak productivity is increasingly part of Australia’s inflation problem.** The RBA said weak productivity continues to restrict the economy’s capacity to supply goods and services, and again revised down its forecast level of productivity. That places greater attention on Australia’s underlying economic performance, rather than inflation being explained simply by temporary overseas shocks. **Third, housing is now weakening noticeably.** National housing prices have fallen around **1.5 per cent from their March peak**, while demand for new housing loans has dropped significantly. Importantly, the RBA attributed the slowdown not only to higher interest rates, but also to **Federal Budget tax changes and weaker sentiment**. [See full set of RBA Minutes here](https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2026/2026-08-11.html?&utm%5Fsource=rbanews&utm%5Fmedium=email&utm%5Fcampaign=minutes-2026&utm%5Fcontent=aug) ### HBF collects almost half of Western Australia's private health insurance premiums URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/western-australia-private-health-insurance-market-concentration/ Last updated: 2026-08-24T23:27:07.000Z APRA's private health insurance performance data provides premium revenue for individual insurers across each state and territory. Benchmark Analytics calculations show substantial differences in market concentration across Australia. The standout among the larger states is Western Australia, where **HBF accounts for 46.7% of private health insurance premium revenue**. HBF is a Perth-founded, member-owned not-for-profit insurer established in 1941 and today has more than one million members nationally. Bupa is WA's second-largest insurer and, together, the two largest providers account for **68.2%** of premium revenue. The five largest collect **90.9%**. A useful measure of how these market shares combine is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI. It is calculated by squaring every insurer's percentage market share and adding the results. Because shares are squared, the measure deliberately gives much greater weight to large firms than small ones. The ACCC considers markets with an HHI above **2,000 to be highly concentrated**, although it emphasises that HHI depends on the definition of the relevant market and is not determinative by itself. Market Concentration Private health insurance concentration varies sharply by state Premium-revenue market shares and concentration measures, 2024–25 | State | Largestshare | Top 2 | Top 5 | HHI | | --------- | ------------ | ----- | ----- | ----- | | Australia | 25.6% | 50.2% | 79.8% | 1,607 | | NT | 38.3% | 74.2% | 90.7% | 2,869 | | WA | 46.7% | 68.2% | 90.9% | 2,852 | | SA | 45.5% | 63.9% | 86.3% | 2,616 | | TAS | 29.0% | 56.5% | 88.7% | 2,182 | | QLD | 31.6% | 60.1% | 81.6% | 2,013 | | VIC | 29.2% | 53.7% | 77.4% | 1,711 | | NSW | 23.1% | 44.9% | 86.7% | 1,710 | | ACT | 26.4% | 45.5% | 85.5% | 1,674 | **HHI:**Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated by squaring each insurer's percentage market share and summing the results. Higher values indicate greater concentration. HHI values above 2,000 are highlighted. **Source:**Benchmark Analytics calculations from APRA Annual Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics 2024–25\. Market shares are based on premium revenue. Western Australia's premium-revenue HHI is **2,852**, compared with **1,607 nationally**. South Australia is also highly concentrated on this measure, recording an HHI of **2,616**, with Bupa accounting for 45.5% of premiums. Queensland sits just above the 2,000 benchmark at **2,013**. By comparison, NSW and Victoria record HHIs of around **1,710**. The figures do not establish that individual states constitute separate competition-law markets. But they reveal something the national figures conceal: **the structure of private health insurance competition differs markedly across Australia, and in Western Australia one locally founded insurer remains extraordinarily dominant.** *Source: Benchmark Analytics calculations from APRA Annual Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics 2024–25.* Private Health Insurance Western Australia's health insurance market is unusually concentrated Private health insurance premium-revenue concentration by state and territory, 2024–25 | 46.7% HBF share in WA | 68.2% WA top two | 90.9% WA top five | 2,852 WA HHI | | --------------------- | ---------------- | ----------------- | ------------ | | State | Largest insurer | Share | Top 2 | Top 5 | HHI | | --------- | --------------- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | | Australia | Bupa | 25.6% | 50.2% | 79.8% | 1,607 | | NT | Medibank | 38.3% | 74.2% | 90.7% | 2,869 | | WA | HBF | 46.7% | 68.2% | 90.9% | 2,852 | | SA | Bupa | 45.5% | 63.9% | 86.3% | 2,616 | | TAS | St Luke's | 29.0% | 56.5% | 88.7% | 2,182 | | QLD | Bupa | 31.6% | 60.1% | 81.6% | 2,013 | | VIC | Medibank | 29.2% | 53.7% | 77.4% | 1,711 | | NSW | Bupa | 23.1% | 44.9% | 86.7% | 1,710 | | ACT | Medibank | 26.4% | 45.5% | 85.5% | 1,674 | **Benchmark Analytics calculations** from APRA Annual Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics 2024–25\. Market shares are based on premium revenue attributed to each state or territory. HHI is the sum of squared percentage market shares. ACCC merger assessment guidelines describe an HHI above 2,000 as highly concentrated. State calculations are descriptive measures and do not imply that each jurisdiction constitutes a separate competition-law market. ### Five health insurers collect 80% of Australia's private health insurance premiums URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/private-health-insurance-market-share-australia/ Last updated: 2026-08-24T22:32:30.000Z APRA's latest private health insurance data provides financial performance information for individual insurers, including premium revenue by state and territory. Summing those state figures shows Australia's 29 private health insurers collected **$31.10 billion in health insurance premium revenue in 2024–25**. The market is dominated by a small number of very large insurers. Bupa accounted for **25.61%** of premium revenue and Medibank another **24.60%**. Together, just those two insurers collected **50.22%** of industry premiums. HCF accounted for another **13.25%**, followed by nib at **9.07%** and HBF at **7.31%**. The five largest insurers therefore controlled **79.85% of premium revenue**, while the ten largest accounted for **91.57%**. A useful broader measure of competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, which squares each insurer's market share and adds the results together. On this measure, Benchmark Analytics calculates an Australian private health insurance HHI of **1,607**. The ACCC's current merger assessment guidelines describe markets with an HHI above **2,000** as highly concentrated, while stressing that HHI depends upon how the relevant market is defined and is not determinative by itself. The result therefore provides an interesting baseline: private health insurance falls below that benchmark nationally, despite extraordinary concentration among the largest providers. *Source: Benchmark Analytics calculations from APRA Annual Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics 2024–25.* Private Health Insurance ### Five insurers collect almost 80% of premiums Share of Australian private health insurance premium revenue, 2024–25 $31.10bn Total premiums 50.2% Top two 79.8% Top five 1,607 HHI Bupa 25.61% Medibank 24.60% HCF 13.25% nib 9.07% HBF 7.31% Teachers Health 3.26% Australian Unity 2.27% Defence Health 2.23% GMHBA 2.08% CBHS Health 1.88% Other 19 8.43% **Benchmark Analytics calculations** from APRA Annual Private Health Insurance Performance Statistics 2024–25\. Premium revenue aggregated across states and territories for each APRA reporting insurer. HHI = sum of squared insurer percentage market shares. ACCC merger guidelines describe HHI above 2,000 as highly concentrated; HHI is not determinative and depends on market definition. ### Australian households - second most indebted in the world URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australian-households-second-most-indebted-in-the-world/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T12:38:44.000Z The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides internationally comparable data on household credit, debt servicing and residential property prices. Together, the three measures provide a useful picture of both household debt and the value of the housing assets sitting behind it. At the end of 2025, Australian household debt was equivalent to 114.0% of GDP — second highest among the 15 advanced comparable economies, behind only Switzerland. The peer median was 83.1%. The BIS debt-service ratio (DSR) estimates the share of household income required for interest payments and principal repayments. Australia again ranked second, at 15.5%, behind Norway’s 20.7%. The median among the other countries with available household data was 10.0%. Cross-country DSR levels should be interpreted with some caution because financial structures differ, but Australia’s gap is nevertheless substantial. Finally, BIS real residential property prices remove consumer-price inflation from movements in house prices. Between the December quarter of 2019 and December quarter of 2025, Australian real residential property prices rose 22.4%. That was the third-largest increase among the 15 countries, behind the Netherlands and Spain. The peer median increase was only 2.6%. The three charts tell a consistent and well known story. Australia combines exceptionally strong real housing-asset appreciation with exceptionally high household leverage and debt-servicing commitments. Household debt as a share of GDP Q4 2025 — selected advanced economies | Switzerland | 123.0% | | -------------- | ------ | | Australia | 114.0% | | Canada | 100.6% | | Netherlands | 93.8% | | New Zealand | 91.1% | | South Korea | 88.6% | | Norway | 87.3% | | Denmark | 84.1% | | Sweden | 82.1% | | United Kingdom | 73.6% | | United States | 68.1% | | Japan | 61.1% | | France | 59.7% | | Germany | 48.9% | | Spain | 42.8% | Source: Bank for International Settlements. Credit to households and NPISHs from all sectors, market value, percentage of GDP. Household debt-service ratio Q4 2025 — estimated debt servicing as a share of household income | Norway | 20.7% | | -------------- | ----- | | Australia | 15.5% | | Canada | 14.0% | | Netherlands | 13.0% | | Denmark | 11.7% | | Sweden | 11.4% | | South Korea | 11.2% | | United Kingdom | 8.8% | | United States | 8.0% | | Japan | 7.5% | | France | 6.0% | | Germany | 5.4% | | Spain | 5.1% | Source: Bank for International Settlements. Switzerland and New Zealand do not have BIS household-sector DSR observations. BIS cautions that absolute DSR levels should be interpreted with some care across countries. Change in real residential property prices Q4 2019 to Q4 2025 — change after consumer-price inflation | Netherlands | +26.3% | | -------------- | ------ | | Spain | +22.6% | | Australia | +22.4% | | United States | +19.6% | | Switzerland | +17.7% | | Japan | +14.3% | | Denmark | +14.0% | | Norway | +5.3% | | South Korea | −0.1% | | New Zealand | −0.9% | | United Kingdom | −1.8% | | France | −2.1% | | Germany | −6.2% | | Canada | −7.4% | | Sweden | −9.2% | Source: Bank for International Settlements Selected Residential Property Prices. Real prices are CPI-deflated. Change calculated from Q4 2019 to Q4 2025\. ### Australia has more workers, but barely more work URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australia-has-more-workers-but-barely-more-work/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T12:45:26.000Z The ABS Labour Force Survey shows employment fell by 15,800 people in July, while the unemployment rate increased to 4.5%. Monthly hours worked fell more sharply, down 0.6%. The more revealing figures, however, are over the past year. Australia has 191,900 more employed people than in July 2025, an increase of 1.3%. Yet total hours worked have barely risen, just 0.2%. There are more Australians with jobs, but the total amount of work being performed is basically flat. Other indicators point in the same direction. The number of unemployed Australians has risen by 45,100, or 7.0%, over the year. Underemployment has increased from 5.9% to 6.4%, while the employment-to-population ratio has fallen from 64.2% to 63.9%. The result also complicates monetary policy. At 4.5%, unemployment has already reached the level the RBA forecasts for the December quarter, while the Bank says labour-market conditions have eased more than expected. Ultimately this data release will be viewed as putting downward pressure on interest rates, so potentially good for mortgage holders. | More workers, but barely more work | | | | | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | | Australian labour market — seasonally adjusted | | | | | Indicator | Jul 2025 | Jul 2026 | Change | | Employed people | 14.62m | 14.81m | +1.3% | | Hours worked | 1,994m | 1,998m | +0.2% | | Unemployed people | 646,400 | 691,500 | +7.0% | | Unemployment rate | 4.3% | 4.5% | +0.2 pts | | Underemployment rate | 5.9% | 6.4% | +0.5 pts | | Employment-to-population ratio | 64.2% | 63.9% | −0.3 pts | ### Canberra workers among the few to beat inflation URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/canberra-workers-among-the-few-to-beat-inflation/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T12:46:23.000Z The ABS Wage Price Index measures changes in wage rates for a fixed basket of jobs, unaffected by changes in employment composition, hours worked or employee characteristics. In addition to a national figure, the ABS breaks down wage changes by state and territory and by industry sector. To calculate industry-based real wage changes between June 2022 and June 2026, the wage indexes are deflated by national quarterly CPI, while state indexes are deflated by the corresponding capital-city CPI. **The results are striking.** Only workers in two of Australia's 18 industries are ahead of inflation. Electricity, gas, water and waste services recorded a **0.89% real wage gain**, while Health care and social assistance managed just **0.23%**. At the other end, wages in Financial and insurance services are **3.27% lower** in real terms, followed by Professional, scientific and technical services at **\-2.55%**. The geographical picture is similarly weak. Only the **ACT (+0.68%)** and **Tasmania (+0.35%)** recorded positive real wage growth using local capital-city inflation. South Australia performed worst at **\-2.63%**, followed by New South Wales at **\-2.37%**. **Critics would argue that the Commonwealth helped create the inflation problem. Yet capital city workers in Canberra are among the very few who have largely escaped its real-wage consequences.** | Real wage growth by industry | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------ | | June quarter 2022 to June quarter 2026\. WPI deflated by national quarterly CPI. Navy = real wage gain; orange = real wage loss. Bar scale: -4% to +4%. | | | | Industry | Real wagegrowth | Loss ← 0 → Gain | | Electricity, gas, water & waste services | +0.89% | | | Health care & social assistance | +0.23% | | | Mining | \-0.79% | | | Manufacturing | \-1.04% | | | Transport, postal & warehousing | \-1.40% | | | Construction | \-1.57% | | | Wholesale trade | \-1.61% | | | Public administration & safety | \-1.65% | | | Administrative & support services | \-1.70% | | | Information media & telecommunications | \-1.74% | | | Arts & recreation services | \-1.76% | | | Education & training | \-1.77% | | | Retail trade | \-1.87% | | | Other services | \-1.88% | | | Accommodation & food services | \-1.92% | | | Rental, hiring & real estate services | \-2.07% | | | Professional, scientific & technical services | \-2.55% | | | Financial & insurance services | \-3.27% | | | All industries | \-1.49% | National benchmark | | Real wage growth by state and territory | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------ | | June quarter 2022 to June quarter 2026\. State WPI deflated by corresponding capital-city quarterly CPI. Navy = real wage gain; orange = real wage loss. Bar scale: -4% to +4%. | | | | State / territory | Real wagegrowth | Loss ← 0 → Gain | | Australian Capital Territory | +0.68% | | | Tasmania | +0.35% | | | Northern Territory | \-0.48% | | | Queensland | \-0.87% | | | Western Australia | \-0.89% | | | Victoria | \-1.31% | | | New South Wales | \-2.37% | | | South Australia | \-2.63% | | | Australia | \-1.49% | National benchmark | ### Wage numbers released - two ugly statistics for the Government URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/wage-numbers-released-two-ugly-statistics-for-the-government/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T14:00:30.000Z The ABS Wage Price Index rose 0.8 per cent in the June quarter 2026 and 3.2 per cent over the year. Over the last year, however, inflation has increased by 3.9%, so real wages have fallen. In fact, workers have still not recovered the loss in real wages since around the time the Albanese Government took office in 2022\. This is despite the key election promise in 2022 was to lift real wages. Since June 2022, the wage price index has increased 15.2 per cent, from 140.4 to 161.7\. Over the same period, the quarterly CPI increased 16.8 per cent. After adjusting for inflation, therefore, workers are around **1.4 per cent lower in real terms than in June 2022**. | Australian wage growth and inflation | | | | | ------------------------------------ | -------- | -------- | -------- | | Measure | Jun 2025 | Mar 2026 | Jun 2026 | | WPI — annual | 3.4% | 3.2% | **3.2%** | | Private sector — annual | 3.4% | 3.2% | **3.1%** | | Public sector — annual | 3.7% | 3.4% | **3.4%** | | Quarterly CPI — annual | 2.1% | 4.1% | **3.9%** | | Real WPI — annual | +1.3% | \-0.8% | \-0.7% | | Real wage change since June quarter 2022 | | | | | | ---------------------------------------- | ---------- | --------- | --------------- | ------ | | Sector | Wagegrowth | CPIgrowth | Real wagegrowth | Result | | All sectors | 15.17% | 16.81% | \-1.40% | Behind | | Private sector | 15.19% | 16.81% | \-1.39% | Behind | | Public sector | 14.80% | 16.81% | \-1.71% | Behind | ### Scary - absolute decline in number of businesses that employ people URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/scary-absolute-decline-in-number-of-businesses-that-employ-people/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T07:45:53.000Z The ABS **Counts of Australian Businesses** publication measures the stock of actively trading businesses in Australia, together with business entries, exits and survival. The latest release, published on 18 August, covers the four financial years from July 2022 to June 2026. The figures are drawn from the ABS Business Register, which is populated using administrative information from Australian Business Number registrations and quarterly or annual business data supplied by the Australian Taxation Office. At 30 June 2022, shortly after the Albanese Government was elected, Australia had **1,018,296 businesses that actually empoyed people.** As at 30 June 2026, that number has fallen to **996,203** — a decline of **22,093 businesses, or 2.2 per cent**. Over these four years, Australia's estimated resident population has grown 7%, from 25,978,935 at 30 June 2022 to 27,801,023\. That is an increase of 1,822,088 people, or 7.0 per cent. It should be noted that over the same period, the number of **non-employing businesses** increased from 1,521,428 to 1,818,575, an increase of 297,147, or 19.5 per cent. This may appear strong growth, but business counts are not measures of economic scale. A new sole trader is counted in exactly the same way as a business employing hundreds of people. Growth in non-employing businesses can therefore occur without corresponding growth in employment, investment or productive capacity, and may partly reflect existing work being reorganised into contracting or self-employment. | Australian businesses by employment status | | | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | --------- | -------- | ------ | | Business type | Jun 2022 | Jun 2026 | Change | % | | Employing businesses | 1,018,296 | 996,203 | −22,093 | −2.2% | | Non-employing businesses | 1,521,428 | 1,818,575 | +297,147 | +19.5% | | Source: ABS, Counts of Australian Businesses, including Entries and Exits. Business counts at 30 June 2022 and 30 June 2026\. | | | | | ### NAB reveals a NIM 26 basis points below CBA URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/nab-reveals-a-nim-26-basis-points-below-cba/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T13:01:40.000Z _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Henry Tax Review - Revisited URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/henry-tax-review-revisited/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T12:34:41.000Z The Henry Tax Review, formally known as *Australia’s Future Tax System Review*, was commissioned by the Rudd Government in 2008 and delivered its final report in December 2009\. Led by Treasury Secretary Ken Henry, it made **138 recommendations** aimed at creating a simpler, more efficient and more sustainable tax system. More than 16 years later, implementation has been limited. Some recommendations have been adopted or partly adopted. Australia established the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, expanded pre-filled tax returns, increased the tax-free threshold, introduced a 25% company tax rate for smaller businesses, and adopted elements of Henry’s proposals on tobacco excise and company loss carry-back. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Home loan data - mixed picture post abolition of negative gearing URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/home-loan-data-mixed-picture-post-abolition-of-negative-gearing/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T14:02:55.000Z The Australian Bureau of Statistics has reported that the number of new home loans fell **5.4% in the June quarter**, to 134,225\. The value of new lending fell **5.2%, or $5.4 billion**, following a 3.4% decline in the March quarter. Investors led the quarterly retreat. Investor loan numbers fell **8.6%**, the largest quarterly decline since September 2022\. New South Wales recorded a 15.5% fall, Victoria 14.2% and Queensland 10.1%. The weakness follows three Reserve Bank cash-rate increases during 2026 and follows the Government's announced abolition of negative gearing and removal of concessional CGT. However, the annual comparison provides some **important perspective**. In the tables below, based on unadjusted data, total loan numbers were broadly unchanged between June quarter 2025 and June quarter 2026\. Investor loan numbers were still **2.5% higher**, while non-first-home-buyer owner-occupier loans were down **2.7%** and first-home-buyer numbers were virtually unchanged. The more striking result is that **loan values remain substantially higher despite stagnant loan numbers**. Across the categories in the table, lending value increased **6.6%** over the year to $99.0 billion. First-home-buyer lending value rose **9.8%**, investor lending 7.9%, and other owner-occupier lending 4.1%. The June quarter therefore looks less like a collapse in housing finance than a significant cyclical slowdown. Fewer loans are being written following higher interest rates, but the average amount being borrowed remains considerably higher than a year ago. | New home loan commitments — number Segment Jun-25 Jun-26 Difference Change Owner occupied — non-first-home buyers 54,476 52,980 \-1,496 \-2.7% Owner occupied — first-home buyers 30,167 30,129 \-38 \-0.1% Investor 52,707 54,046 +1,339 +2.5% Total 137,350 137,155 \-195 \-0.1% | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | New home loan commitments — value Segment Jun-25 Jun-26 Difference Change Owner occupied — non-first-home buyers $40.7bn $42.3bn +$1.7bn +4.1% Owner occupied — first-home buyers $16.7bn $18.4bn +$1.6bn +9.8% Investor $35.5bn $38.3bn +$2.8bn +7.9% Total $92.9bn $99.0bn +$6.1bn +6.6% | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ### New industry pay data gives some insight into pay gap between men and women URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/new-industry-pay-data-gives-some-insight-into-pay-gap-between-men-and-women/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T14:03:24.000Z The ABS's May 2026 Average Weekly Earnings release put the headline gender pay gap in full-time ordinary time earnings at 11.3%, its lowest recorded level, down marginally from 11.5% in November 2025\. Full-time adult ordinary time earnings reached $2,083.70 in May, with six-month growth of just 1.6% — the softest half-year outcome since 2022, and annual growth of 3.7%, also the weakest since late 2022. Industry-level data tells a more textured story. Across the 18 industries measured, gaps in full-time total earnings range from 2.2% in Other Services to 35.4% in Administrative and Support Services, with an all-industries average of 16.3% — notably wider than the 11.3% headline figure. That gap between headline and industry numbers is methodological, not contradictory. The industry table measures *total* earnings (including overtime and penalty rates) for full-time adults on an *original*, non-seasonally-adjusted basis, whereas the headline 11.3% figure uses *ordinary time* earnings, seasonally adjusted. Neither measure adjusts for occupation, seniority, tenure, or hours actually worked within the full-time category — meaning a large industry-level gap may reflect workforce composition (who holds senior versus junior full-time roles) as much as like-for-like pay differences. Readers should treat industry gaps as compositional indicators, not causal measures of unequal pay for equal work. For a cleaner read on pure wage-price movement, the ABS's quarterly Wage Price Index remains the more appropriate benchmark. | Gender Pay Gap by Industry — Full-Time Adult Total Earnings, 15 May 2026 | | | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------- | ----------- | ------- | ------- | | Industry | Males ($) | Females ($) | Gap ($) | Gap (%) | | Administrative and Support Services | 2,219.70 | 1,639.10 | 580.60 | 35.4% | | Health Care and Social Assistance | 2,593.40 | 1,930.00 | 663.40 | 34.4% | | Information Media and Telecommunications | 2,970.80 | 2,342.70 | 628.10 | 26.8% | | Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services | 2,905.10 | 2,306.00 | 599.10 | 26.0% | | Professional, Scientific and Technical Services | 2,606.40 | 2,090.70 | 515.70 | 24.7% | | Financial and Insurance Services | 2,583.20 | 2,093.20 | 490.00 | 23.4% | | Arts and Recreation Services | 2,033.50 | 1,695.90 | 337.60 | 19.9% | | Mining | 3,445.70 | 2,882.20 | 563.50 | 19.6% | | Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services | 2,162.20 | 1,831.90 | 330.30 | 18.0% | | Transport, Postal and Warehousing | 2,286.60 | 1,950.30 | 336.30 | 17.2% | | All Industries | 2,282.60 | 1,963.40 | 319.20 | 16.3% | | Manufacturing | 2,021.50 | 1,755.70 | 265.80 | 15.1% | | Wholesale Trade | 2,111.30 | 1,859.90 | 251.40 | 13.5% | | Accommodation and Food Services | 1,614.50 | 1,441.00 | 173.50 | 12.0% | | Construction | 2,171.70 | 1,985.30 | 186.40 | 9.4% | | Retail Trade | 1,672.00 | 1,530.00 | 142.00 | 9.3% | | Education and Training | 2,320.10 | 2,144.90 | 175.20 | 8.2% | | Public Administration and Safety | 2,318.00 | 2,167.80 | 150.20 | 6.9% | | Other Services | 1,715.10 | 1,677.40 | 37.70 | 2.2% | ### How bad is the US fiscal position? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-bad-is-the-us-fiscal-position/ Last updated: 2026-08-13T01:42:09.000Z In assessing the fiscal position of the US Federal Government, total government revenue provides a useful benchmark for assessing vulnerability because it measures the government’s own capacity to fund its commitments on current tax settings. The latest data are striking. In Q1 2026, federal outlays (total government spending and transfers) were equal to 145.2% of revenue. Put differently, the government was spending about $1.45 for every $1 it received. Interest costs alone were equivalent to 20.8% of revenue, while government debt held by the public was 5.36 times annualised federal revenue. The deterioration is particularly clear over time. During the 1970s, debt averaged only 1.43 times revenue. That rose to 1.79 times in the 1980s and 2.40 times in the 1990s. After declining somewhat in the 2000s, it surged to 4.03 times in the 2010s and has averaged 5.20 times so far in the 2020s. Presidential comparisons tell a similar story. Debt averaged 2.02 times revenue during Clinton’s second term, 3.73 times during Obama’s first term, 4.59 times during Trump’s first term and 5.15 times under Biden. So far under Trump’s second term it has averaged 5.27 times. Interest costs are now adding another layer of vulnerability. They averaged just 13.1% of revenue during Obama’s second term and 14.5% during Trump’s first. Under Trump’s second term so far, the figure is 20.8%. The fiscal problem is therefore not simply that debt is large. It is that debt, spending and interest costs have all become increasingly large relative to the federal government’s capacity to raise revenue. | Federal Fiscal Ratios — Q1 2026 | | | | | ------------------------------- | --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------------------ | | Quarter | Outlays / Revenue (%) | Interest / Revenue (%) | Debt / Revenue (x) | | Q1 2026 | 145.2% | 20.8% | 5.36x | | Federal Fiscal Ratios — By Decade | | | | | --------------------------------- | --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------------------ | | Decade | Outlays / Revenue (%) | Interest / Revenue (%) | Debt / Revenue (x) | | 1970s | 123.3% | 18.1% | 1.43x | | 1980s | 127.3% | 25.2% | 1.79x | | 1990s | 116.7% | 23.9% | 2.40x | | 2000s | 120.7% | 15.6% | 2.07x | | 2010s | 132.7% | 14.4% | 4.03x | | 2020s | 149.3% | 17.3% | 5.20x | | Federal Fiscal Ratios — By Presidential Term | | | | | -------------------------------------------- | --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------------------ | | President / Term | Outlays / Revenue (%) | Interest / Revenue (%) | Debt / Revenue (x) | | Nixon | 122.1% | 17.7% | 1.46x | | Ford | 130.9% | 18.4% | 1.42x | | Carter | 119.3% | 18.9% | 1.38x | | Reagan I | 129.8% | 24.8% | 1.57x | | Reagan II | 128.2% | 26.7% | 2.06x | | Bush I | 125.3% | 26.6% | 2.34x | | Clinton I | 120.0% | 24.4% | 2.58x | | Clinton II | 99.8% | 19.5% | 2.02x | | Bush II – Term 1 | 117.4% | 15.7% | 1.92x | | Bush II – Term 2 | 119.1% | 15.0% | 2.00x | | Obama I | 157.0% | 15.9% | 3.73x | | Obama II | 120.6% | 13.1% | 3.91x | | Trump I | 141.8% | 14.5% | 4.59x | | Biden | 144.3% | 17.0% | 5.15x | | Trump II | 137.6% | 20.8% | 5.27x | ### 9% rise in loan impairment charges not hurting CBA financially URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/9-rise-in-loan-impairment-charges-not-hurting-cba-financially/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T01:08:45.000Z CBA's full-year results reveal an incredibly strong underlying banking franchise, with cash net profit after tax (NPAT) rising 7% to nearly $11 billion, despite operating costs increasing 6% and loan impairment expenses rising 9%. The return on equity (ROE) of 14% demonstrates CBA's strength relative to the other major banks. On Monday, Westpac's quarterly financial update reported an ROE of 10%. The key numbers from CBA's full-year results are below, along with a brief interpretation. | FY26 Results Snapshot | | | | | ----------------------- | --------- | ------ | -------------------------------------- | | Indicator | FY26 | Change | Interpretation | | Cash NPAT | $10.982bn | +7% | Very strong | | Statutory NPAT | $10.866bn | +7% | Very strong | | Pre-provision profit | $16.469bn | +6% | Core earnings strong | | NIM | 2.05% | \-3bp | Remarkably resilient given competition | | ROE | 14.0% | +50bp | Excellent | | Dividend | $5.05 | +4% | Strong income result | | Operating expenses | $13.755bn | +6% | Main earnings pressure | | Loan impairment expense | $788m | +9% | Rising, but still low | | Deposit funding | 79% | +1ppt | Funding strength | | CET1 | 12.0% | \-30bp | Still comfortably capitalised | ### How good is the RBA at hitting the inflation target? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-good-is-the-rba-at-hitting-the-inflation-target/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T09:08:29.000Z Australia’s monetary policy framework is built around an inflation target. The RBA seeks to keep consumer price inflation between 2% and 3%, while also pursuing full employment. Its principal tool for influencing inflation is the cash rate: higher interest rates generally restrain spending and inflationary pressure, while lower rates provide support to demand. Recent experience shows the challenge. Over the four quarters to June 2026, headline inflation averaged 3.70%, with none of the four quarterly observations within the 2–3% band. Trimmed mean inflation, which removes some unusually large price movements, averaged 3.33%, with only one of four quarters within the band. Looking further back produces interesting insights. Since January 1996, headline inflation has averaged 2.69% — comfortably within the RBA’s target range. Yet inflation was actually between 2% and 3% in only 40 of 122 quarters, or 32.8%. This highlights an important distinction between average inflation and inflation stability. Since 1996, headline inflation has averaged 2.69%, but its standard deviation has been 1.52 percentage points. Over the past decade it was even higher, at 1.89 percentage points. The long-run average may look remarkably close to the 2-3% target, but the path taken to get there has been considerably more volatile. | Headline inflation | | | | | | | ------------------------------ | --------- | ------------ | ------------- | ------------- | ---------------- | | Metric | Last year | Last 5 years | Last 10 years | Last 20 years | Since 1 Jan 1996 | | Number of quarters | 4 | 20 | 40 | 80 | 122 | | Number of quarters within band | 0 | 4 | 8 | 23 | 40 | | % within band | 0.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 28.8% | 32.8% | | % outside band | 100.0% | 80.0% | 80.0% | 71.3% | 67.2% | | Average | 3.7 | 4.38 | 3.01 | 2.77 | 2.69 | | Maximum | 4.1 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.9 | | Minimum | 3.2 | 2.1 | \-0.3 | \-0.3 | \-0.3 | | Standard deviation | 0.34 | 1.67 | 1.89 | 1.52 | 1.52 | | Average business expectation | 2.28 | 2.82 | 2.01 | 1.71 | 1.71 | | Trimmed mean inflation | | | | | | | ------------------------------ | --------- | ------------ | ------------- | ------------- | ---------------- | | Metric | Last year | Last 5 years | Last 10 years | Last 20 years | Since 1 Jan 1996 | | Number of quarters | 4 | 20 | 40 | 80 | 122 | | Number of quarters within band | 1 | 5 | 5 | 32 | 64 | | % within band | 25.0% | 25.0% | 12.5% | 40.0% | 52.5% | | % outside band | 75.0% | 75.0% | 87.5% | 60.0% | 47.5% | | Average | 3.32 | 4.08 | 2.81 | 2.8 | 2.71 | | Maximum | 3.6 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | | Minimum | 2.9 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | | Standard deviation | 0.27 | 1.32 | 1.57 | 1.23 | 1.04 | ### AI assesses the RBA decision today - good or bad for Pauline Hanson? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/ai-assesses-the-rba-decision-today-good-or-bad-for-pauline-hanson/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T05:29:25.000Z As expected today, the RBA's Monetary Policy Board left the official cash rate unchanged at 4.35%. Along with the decision, the RBA issued two documents explaining and supporting its assessment. The first provides the brief reasoning behind the decision. The second provides a more thorough assessment of economic conditions in the August 2026 *Statement on Monetary Policy*. Together, they provide the most recent official assessment of the Australian economy. I asked two AI agents, Chat GPT and Claude, to assess (in 200 words) the written material released through a political lens and, specifically, whether the economic update is good or bad for Pauline Hanson's One Nation party. Responses are cut and pasted below. They had not been edited. ### Chat GPT "**Assessment: Positive for One Nation** The economic picture presented by the RBA is, on balance, positive for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation politically, even though it is negative or uncomfortable for many households. The key reason is that the RBA describes an economy combining persistent inflation, high interest rates and weakening growth. The cash rate remains at 4.35 per cent after three increases this year, with higher rates already flowing through to mortgage repayments. The RBA says scheduled mortgage payments are relatively high compared with household disposable income, while domestic GDP growth is expected to be subdued because of weaker real household incomes, softer housing conditions and tighter monetary policy. There are few immediate signs of substantial relief. Inflation remains elevated and is expected to return only gradually to target, while unemployment is forecast to rise to 4.8 per cent and potential economic growth remains weak because of poor productivity performance. Politically, these conditions are likely to favour an insurgent party such as One Nation. Falling real purchasing power, mortgage stress, weak consumer sentiment and deteriorating housing conditions can reinforce perceptions that established economic policy is failing. Indeed, the RBA notes that consumer sentiment remains “very weak” despite reasonably resilient consumption. The qualification is that One Nation must successfully attribute economic dissatisfaction to issues on which it offers a distinctive alternative. Nevertheless, for a party already leading the polls, the RBA’s August assessment provides considerably more political tailwind than headwind." ### **Claude** **"Overall assessment: Negative for the government, and broadly favourable conditions for One Nation's** continued polling strength — though the causality runs through economic distress rather than the RBA statement itself. Reasoning: The Statement paints a picture of persistently high inflation (trimmed mean 3.6%, not expected back to target midpoint until late 2027), an unchanged but "somewhat restrictive" cash rate held at 4.35%, elevated mortgage payment burdens near 2024 peaks, a softening housing market with falling prices, and easing labour market conditions with unemployment drifting up to 4.8% by 2028\. This combination — sustained cost-of-living pressure, high fuel/grocery prices linked to the Middle East conflict, weak productivity, and a labour market turning less favourable for workers — sustains the economic anxiety that typically fuels support for anti-establishment and protest parties. One Nation's electoral base has historically been strongest among voters experiencing cost-of-living strain, distrust of major-party economic management, and grievance politics. Continued high inflation, no near-term rate relief, and a weakening jobs market reinforce dissatisfaction with the major parties (government and Coalition alike), which tends to benefit minor/populist parties polling well on discontent rather than incumbency. This is a directional inference from economic conditions to voting behaviour, not a certainty — polling movements depend on many other factors (campaign dynamics, other issues, leadership)." ### RBA cash rate - predicted to peak in March 2027 URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-cash-rate-predicted-to-peak-in-march-2027/ Last updated: 2026-08-10T09:18:16.000Z The RBA handing down its next interest rate decision tomorrow. Interest rate futures imply there will be no change to the current 4.35% target rate. As it stands, market pricing suggests some probability of rises in either the November or December meetings this year and/or in February 2027\. The market is predicting the cash rate will peak at 4.50% by the 23 March 2027 meeting. From May 2027 onward, the curve turns. Futures begin pricing modest cuts at each subsequent meeting, taking the implied rate back down to around 4.34% by 28 September 2027. | RBA Cash Rate — Market-Implied Pricing (7 Aug 2026) | | | | | --------------------------------------------------- | --------- | ------------ | ------------ | | Meeting Date | Direction | Implied Rate | Implied Move | | 11 Aug 2026 | No change | 4.35% | 0.0bp | | 29 Sep 2026 | No change | 4.35% | 0.0bp | | 3 Nov 2026 | Increase | 4.46% | +10.7bp | | 8 Dec 2026 | Increase | 4.47% | +1.0bp | | 9 Feb 2027 | Increase | 4.50% | +3.2bp | | 23 Mar 2027 (peak) | Increase | 4.50% | +0.3bp | | 4 May 2027 | Decrease | 4.47% | \-3.0bp | | 22 Jun 2027 | Decrease | 4.47% | \-0.7bp | | 10 Aug 2027 | Decrease | 4.45% | \-1.4bp | | 28 Sep 2027 | Decrease | 4.34% | \-10.8bp | | 2 Nov 2027 | Increase | 4.43% | +8.6bp | | 14 Dec 2027 | Decrease | 4.39% | \-3.9bp | Market Data Date: 7 Aug 2026\. Current cash rate: 4.35%. Implied Rate = 100 − futures settlement price. Implied Move reflects the change priced for that specific meeting, net of moves already priced for prior meetings. Row for 23 Mar 2027 marks the priced peak (4.50%). - **Please note** these predictions are based on a proprietary pricing model, of which, the mathematics is derived from AI models and is not independently verified. It is provided as information only and should not be relied upon for financial decisions. ### Capital gains tax policy not hurting Westpac's housing investor loans this year URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/capital-gains-tax-policy-not-hurting-westpacs-housing-investor-loans-this-year/ Last updated: 2026-08-10T01:37:34.000Z Westpac’s latest quarterly update - released today - shows mortgage demand softening, but the bank’s underlying financial performance — particularly its net interest margin — remains relatively resilient. Average monthly mortgage applications fell to around 29,000 in the June quarter, down 11% from the March quarter. Westpac expects applications to fall further to a post-Budget run rate of about 26,000, representing a 20% decline from March-quarter levels. Despite this, housing credit growth is still expected to rise. It forecasts total housing credit to grow 6.8% in FY26, before slowing to 4.7% in FY27 and recovering to 5.2% in FY28\. **Investor credit is expected to be particularly strong in FY26, growing 9.1%.** Importantly for profitability, Westpac’s net interest margin is holding up. **NIM increased from 1.84% in the March quarter to 1.89% in the June quarter,** although it remains below the 1.94% recorded in the December quarter. Core NIM edged up from 1.77% to 1.78%, while the Treasury and Markets contribution increased from 0.07% to 0.11%. Gross loans increased $17 billion during the June quarter to $908 billion, while deposits rose $14 billion to $759 billion. Both were 7% higher than a year earlier. Westpac reported unaudited statutory net profit of $1.8 billion, with net profit excluding notable items also $1.8 billion, 2% above the first-half quarterly average. ### US inflation update - 3.7% - way above Fed 2% target URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/us-inflation-update-3-7-way-above-fed-2-target/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T21:00:14.000Z The latest annualised CPI reading sits at **3.7%** (June 2026), with prices running hotter since the US/Iran conflict began — averaging **4.9%** annualised over that period, versus **4.2%** across 2026 as a whole. The tables below report monthly data but annualise the results by multipling monthly data by 12. The full-term averages smooths this out. Trump's second term has averaged **3.2%** annualised inflation so far (Feb 2025–Jun 2026), lower than the **5.0%** averaged under Biden, which included a peak of **16.2%** in June 2022 amid the post-pandemic and Ukraine-war price surge. Trump's first term averaged just **1.9%**, though it too had extremes — a low of **\-9.1%** in April 2020, as COVID lockdowns crushed demand. Heading into the 86-day countdown to the 2026 midterms, both the headline number and its volatility are likely to stay in focus as a measure of cost-of-living pressure on voters. | Recent Inflation | | | | --------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------- | | Metric | CPI (monthly, annualised) | Dates | | Latest annual inflation rate | 3.7% | Jun 2026 | | Days until the mid-term 2026 election | 86 | 3 Nov 2026 | | Average annualised inflation through 2026 | 4.2% | Jan 2026 - Jun 2026 | | Average annualised inflation since US/Iran conflict | 4.9% | Mar 2026 - Jun 2026 | | | | | | Inflation Under Trump Second Term | | | | ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------- | | Metric | CPI (monthly, annualised) | Dates | | Annual inflation before 2024 Presidential Election | 2.6% | Oct 2024 | | Average annualised inflation under Trump second term | 3.2% | Feb 2025 - Jun 2026 | | Max annualised inflation under Trump second term | 10.9% | Mar 2026 | | Minimum annualised inflation under Trump second term | \-5.0% | Jun 2026 | | | | | | Inflation Under Biden | | | | -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------- | | Metric | CPI (monthly, annualised) | Dates | | Annual inflation before 2020 Presidential Election | 1.2% | Oct 2020 | | Average annualised inflation under Biden term | 5.0% | Feb 2021 - Dec 2024 | | Max annualised inflation under Biden term | 16.2% | Jun 2022 | | Minimum annualised inflation under Biden term | \-0.5% | Jun 2024 | | | | | | Inflation Under Trump First Term | | | | --------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------- | | Metric | CPI (monthly, annualised) | Dates | | Annual inflation before 2016 Presidential Election | 1.7% | Oct 2016 | | Average annualised inflation under Trump first term | 1.9% | Feb 2017 - Dec 2020 | | Max annualised inflation under Trump first term | 6.3% | Sep 2017 | | Minimum annualised inflation under Trump first term | \-9.1% | Apr 2020 | ### US Gas Price Update - Trump vs Biden & midterms URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/us-gas-price-update-trump-vs-biden-midterms/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T03:49:30.000Z The latest weekly US gas price sits at **$4.08** (as of 3 August 2026), well above the $3.72 average recorded so far this year. Prices have run even hotter since the US/Iran conflict began in March, averaging **$4.02** over that period. Under **Trump's second term** (20 Jan 2025 – present), the average price has been **$3.34**, ranging from a low of $2.78 in January 2026 to a high of $4.50 in May 2026\. That's actually lower than under Biden when the average was **$3.46.** There were also larger swings under Biden, from $2.39 at the start of his presidency to a peak of $5.01 in June 2022, driven largely by the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The average gas price under Trump's first term starting in 2016 was $2.48, with a minimum recorded at $1.77 in April 2020. With 92 days until the 2026 midterms, gas prices remain a live political flashpoint. See full tables below. The data below refers to regular gas prices and is sourced from the St.Louis Reserve Bank. --- | Recent Gas Prices | | | | -------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | ----------------------- | | Metric | US Gas Price ($USD) | Dates | | Latest weekly gas price | $4.08 | 3 Aug 2026 | | Days until the mid-term 2026 election | 92 | 3 Nov 2026 | | Average price through 2026 | $3.72 | 5 Jan 2026 - 3 Aug 2026 | | Average price since US/Iran conflict in 2026 | $4.02 | 2 Mar 2026 - 3 Aug 2026 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Trump Second Term | | | | ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------- | ------------------------ | | Metric | US Gas Price ($USD) | Dates | | Price the week before 2024 Presidential Election | $3.07 | 4 Nov 2024 | | Average price under Trump second term | $3.34 | 20 Jan 2025 - 3 Aug 2026 | | Max price under Trump second term | $4.50 | 11 May 2026 | | Minimum price under Trump second term | $2.78 | 12 Jan 2026 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Biden | | | | ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------- | ------------------------- | | Metric | US Gas Price ($USD) | Dates | | Price the week before 2020 Presidential Election | $2.11 | 2 Nov 2020 | | Average price under Biden term | $3.46 | 25 Jan 2021 - 13 Jan 2025 | | Max price under Biden term | $5.01 | 13 Jun 2022 | | Minimum price under Biden term | $2.39 | 25 Jan 2021 | | | | | | Gas Prices Under Trump First Term | | | | ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------- | ------------------------- | | Metric | US Gas Price ($USD) | Dates | | Price the week before 2016 Presidential Election | $2.23 | 7 Nov 2016 | | Average price under Trump first term | $2.48 | 23 Jan 2017 - 18 Jan 2021 | | Max price under Trump first term | $2.96 | 28 May 2018 | | Minimum price under Trump first term | $1.77 | 27 Apr 2020 | ### Signs of stabilisation in female participation in the workforce URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/signs-of-stabilisation-in-female-participation-in-the-workforce/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T00:47:18.000Z One of the biggest changes in the Australian labour market over recent decades has been the increasing contribution of women to total hours worked, which incorporates both part-time and full-time work. In June 1986, Australian men as whole (noting, of course, a much smaller population than today) worked around 706 million hours, more than twice the 337 million hours worked by women. Therefore, men accounted for 67.7% of all hours worked, compared with just 32.3% for women. Forty years later, the gap has narrowed dramatically. | Hours worked by sex | | | | | | ------------------- | ------------------ | -------------- | ------------------ | -------------- | | | Jun-86 Total hours | Jun-86 % Total | Jun-26 Total hours | Jun-26 % Total | | Men | 706,134 | 67.7% | 1,150,531 | 57.1% | | Women | 336,522 | 32.3% | 863,811 | 42.9% | | Total | 1,042,657 | 100.0% | 2,014,342 | 100.0% | In June 2026, men worked approximately 1.15 billion hours compared with 864 million hours for women. Women therefore accounted for 42.9%, up 10.6 percentage points from 1986\. The male share correspondingly fell from 67.7% to 57.1%. Another way of looking at the change is that in June 1986, men worked around 2.1 hours for every hour worked by women. The latest data shows this has fallen to 1.33 hours. Notwithstanding, the trend is flattening. The male-to-female ratio was already 1.35 in June 2023 and 1.35 in June 2024, before falling to 1.33 in June 2025 and remaining at approximately that level in June 2026. ### Latest data - house building shortfall now 86,000 dwellings URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/latest-data-house-building-shortfall-now-86-000-dwellings/ Last updated: 2026-08-08T23:11:42.000Z In October 2022, the Commonwealth government's federal budget introduced the National Housing Accord, setting an initial target of one million new, well-located homes to be built over five years from mid-2024\. On 16 August 2023, National Cabinet — comprising the Commonwealth, states and territories — agreed to lift that target to 1.2 million new homes over the same five-year period, running from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2029\. That works out to an average of 240,000 homes, or 20,000 dwellings, every month. The Australian Bureau of Statistics publishes monthly Building Approvals data for the total number of dwelling units approved nationally, across houses and other residential dwellings, private and public sectors combined. June 2026 data was released last week. | How many houses need to be approved? | | | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | | Metric | Value | | Required monthly pace | 20,000 | | Actual monthly average approved | 16,428 | | Average monthly shortfall | 3,572 | | Required cumulative (24 months) | 480,000 | | Actual cumulative approved | 394,275 | | Cumulative shortfall | 85,725 (82.1% of required pace) | Across the first 24 months of the target period — July 2024 to June 2026 — that series shows 393,193 dwellings approved, against a required 480,000 at the Accord's benchmark pace. That's a shortfall of 86,807, or approvals running at roughly 82% of the pace required to hit 1.2 million homes by June 2029. Note - an approval is not a completed home — projects can stall, be redesigned, or lapse before construction starts. But because every new dwelling legally requires an approval before it can be built, the approvals count sets an effective ceiling: the number of homes actually completed cannot exceed the number approved, only fall short of it. ### More evidence of the painful death of cheques URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/more-evidence-of-the-painful-death-of-cheques/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T06:53:27.000Z The latest Reserve Bank payments data provide further evidence that cheques are next to extinct as a payment instrument in Australia. In June 2026, Australians made just 0.6 million cheque payments. That compares with 1.414 billion card purchases — including 1.084 billion debit card transactions — and 173.6 million New Payments Platform (NPP) transactions. Put another way, there were around 2,356 card transactions for every cheque payment during the month. Against the combined total of card, the NPP, ATM and cheque transactions, cheques accounted for around 0.04% — and against NPP transactions alone, cheque volumes were equivalent to just 0.35%. Cheque payment numbers fell 3.0% in June and were 27.3% lower than a year earlier. By contrast, NPP transaction volumes increased 14.0% over the year, while card purchases increased 3.8%. Cheques, however, do still carry a disproportionate share of value: $11.6 billion was transferred by cheque in June. But this reflects the high average value of the small number of cheques still in use. See more information below. | Retail Payments — Number of Transactions (Million) | | | | | -------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------- | -------------- | | Payment method | Jun 2026 | Monthly (%) | Year-ended (%) | | ATM withdrawals | 28.0 | \-0.2% | \-1.8% | | Total card purchases | 1,413.8 | +0.8% | +3.8% | | — Credit & charge cards | 330.3 | \-1.2% | +1.5% | | — Debit cards | 1,083.6 | +1.4% | +4.6% | | NPP transactions | 173.6 | +0.6% | +14.0% | | Cheque payments | 0.6 | \-3.0% | \-27.3% | | Card transactions per cheque payment | ≈2,356 | — | — | | Cheques as % of card + NPP + ATM + cheque | ≈0.04% | — | — | | Cheques as % of NPP alone | ≈0.35% | — | — | | Total electronic (card + NPP + ATM) | 1,615.4 | — | — | | Retail Payments — Value of Transactions ($ billion) | | | | | --------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------- | -------------- | | Payment method | Jun 2026 | Monthly (%) | Year-ended (%) | | ATM withdrawals | 9.4 | \-0.1% | +2.7% | | Total card purchases | 100.0 | +0.5% | +6.9% | | — Credit & charge cards | 40.0 | \-1.7% | +3.8% | | — Debit cards | 60.1 | +1.9% | +9.1% | | NPP transactions | 265.8 | +4.1% | +33.5% | | Cheque payments | 11.6 | +1.0% | \-13.8% | ### Immigration by Prime Minister - the FACTS URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/immigration-by-prime-minister-the-facts/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T01:22:59.000Z Immigration is one of the most politically charged numbers in Australian public life. Here are some key facts regarding average immigration levels under various Prime Ministers since 1981. **ERP population increase** is the growth in Australia's Estimated Resident Population — the ABS's official population count. **Net immigration** (Net Overseas Migration) is the net population contribution from people arriving versus leaving the country, stripped of births and deaths. Dividing the second by the first tells us how much of Australia's population growth under each leader came from immigration rather than natural increase. The results span a wide range. | Net Immigration as % of ERP Population Increase | | | ----------------------------------------------- | ------ | | Anthony Albanese | 79.05% | | Kevin Rudd | 64.29% | | Malcolm Turnbull | 61.70% | | Julia Gillard | 58.37% | | Tony Abbott | 54.06% | | John Howard | 51.50% | | Scott Morrison | 50.43% | | Malcolm Fraser | 46.85% | | Bob Hawke | 45.03% | | Paul Keating | 33.05% | Under Malcolm Fraser’s latter years in office, migration accounted for less than half of population growth (46.9%). By contrast, under Anthony Albanese it has reached 79.1% — the highest share on record — alongside the largest total net immigration figure (nearly 1.5 million) and the highest single-quarter intake (165,500). Kevin Rudd (64.3%) and Malcolm Turnbull (61.7%) also stand out for high migration-driven growth, while Paul Keating recorded the lowest share (33.1%) alongside the recession-era net outflow of migrants in one quarter (-6,300). Scott Morrison's term reflected the pandemic's disruption: a record quarterly high of 107,500, followed by a record quarterly low of -42,600 as borders closed. | Prime Minister | Total ERP Population Increase | Total Net Immigration | Net Immigration as % of ERP Increase | Max Qtr Immigration | Min Qtr Immigration | | ---------------- | ----------------------------- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ------------------- | ------------------- | | Malcolm Fraser | 365,600 | 171,300 | 46.85% | 34,500 | 16,300 | | Bob Hawke | 2,050,000 | 923,200 | 45.03% | 53,600 | 10,900 | | Paul Keating | 780,700 | 258,000 | 33.05% | 29,200 | \-6,300 | | John Howard | 2,804,600 | 1,444,500 | 51.50% | 76,000 | 6,100 | | Kevin Rudd | 1,125,000 | 723,300 | 64.29% | 93,500 | 41,700 | | Julia Gillard | 1,078,900 | 629,800 | 58.37% | 74,000 | 32,000 | | Tony Abbott | 687,900 | 371,900 | 54.06% | 65,000 | 30,400 | | Malcolm Turnbull | 1,147,300 | 707,900 | 61.70% | 88,800 | 35,800 | | Scott Morrison | 949,700 | 478,900 | 50.43% | 107,500 | \-42,600 | | Anthony Albanese | 1,888,000 | 1,492,400 | 79.05% | 165,500 | 49,200 | ### Trump's tariff policy has not hurt Australian exports - new data URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/trumps-tariff-policy-has-not-hurt-australian-exports-new-data/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T08:34:35.000Z One year after the United States announced sweeping new tariffs on imported goods, there is little evidence that Australia's merchandise exports have been hit, partly because many goods are exempted. ABS merchandise trade data released today shows Australia's total goods exports increased from **$45.6 billion** in June 2025 to **$49.6 billion** in June 2026, an increase of **$4.0 billion**, or around **8.8 per cent**. This suggests Australian exporters continued to record strong growth over the period. | Destination Jun-25 % Latest % Change (pp) USA 4.67% 4.63% \-0.03 China 35.28% 38.35% +3.07 Total 100.00% 100.00% 0.00 Latest period: Jun-26\. "pp" = percentage points. | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Exports to the United States also increased, rising from **$2.13 billion** to **$2.30 billion** over the same period. While exports to the US grew by approximately **$170 million**, the United States' share of Australia's total goods exports was virtually unchanged, moving from **4.67 per cent** to **4.63 per cent**. A movement of **0.03 percentage points** is too small, by itself, to suggest any meaningful structural shift. The most significant change occurred in exports to China. Australian exports to China increased from **$16.1 billion** to **$19.0 billion**, a monthly increase of almost **$2.94 billion**. China's share of Australia's merchandise exports rose from **35.3 per cent** to **38.3 per cent**, a material increase of just over **3 percentage points**. These figures do not establish whether individual industries or products have been affected by US tariffs. They simply indicate that, at the aggregate level, Australia's merchandise exports have continued to grow over the twelve months since the tariffs were announced. Based on the available trade data, there is no obvious evidence that the US tariff policy has materially reduced Australia's overall export performance. One qualification is that while these figures are seasonally adjusted, they are monthly data. \~\~\~ ### Former Albanese adviser has a point on growth URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/former-albanese-adviser-has-a-point-on-growth-2/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T08:53:35.000Z A former economics adviser to the Prime Minister, Alex Sanchez, has criticised the government for lacking a pro-growth mindset. The most commonly **cited** measure of economic growth is GDP per capita, as it adjusts growth for population increase. A purer measure is GDP per hour worked, but politicians tend to focus on GDP per capita. As of the March quarter 2026, real GDP per **capita** fell by 0.1%. It also fell by the same amount in the March quarter of 2025. Over the current decade, the real average quarterly growth rate has been just 0.18%, below the long-run average of 0.37%. The 1990s recorded the highest decade average, at 0.56%. Of all Australian prime ministers since the 1970s, real GDP per **capita** growth under Anthony Albanese has been the lowest, averaging just 0.1% per quarter. The next lowest average was recorded under Kevin Rudd, while Paul Keating recorded the highest. Average growth rates are influenced by many factors and cannot solely be attributed to the person holding the office of prime minister at the time. However, with growth performing so poorly, Alex Sanchez has a point that it should create a sense of urgency for the government to do something about it. See charts below. ### By Prime Minister ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/08/image-2.png) ### By decade ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/08/image-3.png) ### How did Alan Joyce perform in reality? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-did-alan-joyce-perform-in-reality/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T05:16:37.000Z "Very well" in fact. Alan Joyce ran Qantas from 28 November 2008 to 5 September 2023\. Putting aside the controversy and politics and just comparing Qantas's share price against the S&P/ASX 200 we get a realistic picture. | | 28 Nov 2008 | 5 Sep 2023 | Total return | CAGR | | --------------- | ----------- | ---------- | ------------ | -------- | | Qantas (QAN.AX) | $2.47 | $5.64 | +128.3% | 5.75%/yr | | ASX 200 (XJO) | 3,742.5 | 7,314.3 | +95.4% | 4.64%/yr | Qantas beat the index by roughly 33 percentage points over his tenure. However, it should be noted this does not reflect dividend payments which can be important preference for some investor types. When a company pays a dividend, its share price mechanically drops by that amount because the company is worth less. The cash is gone. The share price already reflects the market's judgement of the business; the dividend is just cash moving out afterward, often shaped by board policy or franking strategy. Applying the same metric (closing price) to Qantas and the other top-200 companies, over identical dates, is a genuinely consistent test. And because Qantas paid almost no dividends across nearly all of Joyce's tenure, its entire performance story lives in the share price. Please note, the methodology above measures CEO performance, not investor outcomes. An ASX 200 shareholder who reinvested dividends over 15 years earned more than the price index alone shows. \*\*This post is not investment advice. ### Political Data Alert | Unemployment Rate URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/political-data-alert-unemployment-rate/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T00:48:30.000Z Australia's unemployment rate was 4.43% in the latest period, compared with 4.37% in the previous period and 4.31% in the same period a year earlier. ![Australian unemployment rate compared across selected political and economic dimensions.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/07/ur_by_selected_dimensions.png) ![Recent monthly Australian unemployment rate results.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/07/ur_recent_results.png) ![Average Australian unemployment rate by prime minister.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/07/ur_by_prime_minister.png) ![Australian unemployment rate grouped by decade.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2026/07/ur_by_decade.png) ### Banks have closed 2,489 bank branches since 2017 URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/banks-have-closed-2-489-bank-branches-since-2017/ Last updated: 2026-07-27T02:46:17.000Z This Benchmark Analytics report details key long-term trends in branch and ATM numbers in Australia. --- For non-clients, a PDF copy of the report is available for purchase. (Journalists can obtain a free copy of the report.) Copies are available by emailing Benchmark Analytics at info@benchmarkanalytics.com.au ### Ken Henry tells Treasurer to get going on tax reform URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/ken/ Last updated: 2025-08-05T06:44:31.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Union strike action - trend decline is positive URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/union-strike-action-trend-decline-is-positive/ Last updated: 2025-06-11T21:00:03.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Average house price now over $1 million URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/average-house-price-now-over-1-million/ Last updated: 2025-06-10T21:00:02.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Business turnover still weak - latest turnover figures released URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/which-industries-are-booming-and-those-busting-2/ Last updated: 2025-06-10T02:08:04.000Z Data alert | Business Turnover Indicator - April 2025 --- Another soft monthly turnover result across industries confirms the economy remains subdued, increasing the likelihood that the Reserve Bank will deliver a 50 basis point interest rate cut at its upcoming meeting scheduled for 7-8 July. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) monthly turnover series provides an ongoing snapshot of economic activity. Data released today shows turnover increased by just 0.2% in April, slightly above the 0.1% growth seen in February, but significantly below the peak of 1.5% recorded in November last year. Over the past year, manufacturing has been the strongest-performing sector, achieving growth of 11.5%. Conversely, mining has experienced a downturn, contracting by 3.1%, driven primarily by a significant 24.5% decline in coal mining turnover. A detailed breakdown of one-year growth rates by industry and sub-industry is presented in the chart below. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/06/ghost-image-2.png) --- ### Brief description of the ABS methodology The Monthly Business Turnover Indicator, produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), measures monthly changes in business turnover using data collected by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) via Business Activity Statements (BAS). Businesses with an annual GST turnover of $20 million or more, along with some smaller businesses voluntarily reporting monthly, are included, ensuring coverage of a significant share of economic activity. The ATO provides this data primarily for GST administration purposes. Therefore, the ABS applies several transformation processes to align the data with the Australian System of National Accounts' concept of market output. These transformations involve: Imputation: Missing monthly data from businesses is estimated based on their historical submissions, adjusted for business continuity and industry growth trends. Imputations are replaced when actual data becomes available. Mapping to the ABS Economic Units Model: BAS data, reported at the Australian Business Number (ABN) level, is mapped to the ABS Business Register’s Type of Activity Units (TAUs) to enhance industry classification accuracy and coherence with other ABS statistics. Data Validation: Large anomalies, such as significant asset sales, irregular payments, or reporting errors, are identified and adjusted to reduce distortions in monthly movements. Seasonal adjustments are applied using standard ABS procedures to remove regular seasonal and calendar-related variations, improving comparability across months. The indicator covers thirteen major industry divisions, excluding sectors where BAS data does not adequately represent market output. Monthly movements and index values (base period: July 2019) are published, starting from January 2010, in both original and seasonally adjusted terms. Privacy and confidentiality are strictly maintained, and data revisions may occur as new information emerges or methodological enhancements are implemented. --- ### Notes on the use of Index for time series analysis To present the data consistently, the ABS uses an index format rather than raw dollar figures. This allows for a more meaningful comparison over time. The base year for the index is set at 100 (currently June 2019), and each subsequent month’s data shows how turnover has changed relative to that benchmark. For instance, an index value of 115 in a given month would mean turnover has risen by 15% since the base period. This method neutralises the effect of differing absolute sizes between industries and focuses attention on growth dynamics rather than scale. One of the main strengths of using an index is that it facilitates comparison across vastly different industry types. Retail and mining, for example, operate on different scales and respond to different economic drivers. By using an index, analysts and policymakers can observe relative performance—identifying which industries are expanding more rapidly, recovering more slowly, or declining in the wake of economic shocks. The monthly frequency also enables early detection of turning points in business activity that might not yet appear in quarterly or annual GDP figures. For businesses, investors, and public officials, the Monthly Business Turnover Indicator serves as a useful barometer of sector-specific momentum. It is particularly valuable in periods of rapid change—such as post-pandemic recovery or during inflationary cycles—when traditional measures like GDP or employment may lag. Although the data is experimental and subject to revision, its timeliness and consistency make it one of the most useful tools available for tracking short-term economic trends across Australia's diverse industry base. ### Business conditions turn negative URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/business-conditions-turn-negative/ Last updated: 2025-06-09T21:00:31.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### A glimpse at real productivity URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/a-glimpse-are-real-productivity/ Last updated: 2025-06-08T21:00:21.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Have rents really gone up a lot? - Data provides new perspective URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/have-rents-really-gone-up-a-lot-data-provides-new-perspective/ Last updated: 2025-06-07T21:00:50.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### The heart of political polarisation - in one chart URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-heart-of-political-polarisation-in-one-chart/ Last updated: 2025-06-06T22:04:29.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### At an avg. wage of $211k, mine workers getting a bit greedy URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/at-an-avg-wage-of-211k-mine-workers-getting-a-bit-greedy/ Last updated: 2025-06-06T03:46:42.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Top 20 goods export destinations URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/top-20-goods-export-destinations/ Last updated: 2025-06-05T21:00:19.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Just one chart - offers a nostalgic look back at the GFC URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/just-one-chart-offers-a-nostalgic-look-back-at-the-gfc/ Last updated: 2025-06-05T04:23:40.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Consumers closing their wallets but restaurants still doing well URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/consumers-closing-their-wallets-but-restaurants-still-doing-well/ Last updated: 2025-06-05T01:54:47.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Might be boring...but critical to living standards URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/might-be-boring-but-critical-to-living-standards/ Last updated: 2025-06-04T21:30:43.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Miniscule growth & Productivity down again URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/miniscule-growth-productivity-down-again/ Last updated: 2025-06-04T01:42:55.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### ASIC's real motivation - here is 2 minute summary & analysis URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/asics-real-motivation-here-is-2-minute-summary-analysis/ Last updated: 2025-06-04T00:30:28.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Trump Tariff Threat Sparks an Aussie Gold Rush URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/trump-tariff-threat-sparks-an-aussie-gold-rush/ Last updated: 2025-06-03T21:30:53.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Tax revenue through the roof & link to Roy Morgan finding URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/tax-revenue-through-the-roof-link-to-roy-morgan-finding/ Last updated: 2025-06-03T06:54:10.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### RBA Board minutes - AI assessment URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-board-minutes-ai-assessment/ Last updated: 2025-06-03T02:07:38.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Sales-to-Wage ratio in focus- winning industries URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/sales-to-wage-ratio-in-focus-winning-industries/ Last updated: 2025-06-03T01:53:12.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Latest on commodity price movements URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/latest-on-commodity-price-movements/ Last updated: 2025-06-02T21:00:49.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### The power of Western Australia in one graph URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-power-of-western-australia-in-one-graph/ Last updated: 2025-06-01T20:59:59.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Despite popular belief, banking markets not too concentrated URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/despite-popular-belief-banking-markets-not-too-concentrated/ Last updated: 2025-05-31T21:00:44.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Westpac CEO not mucking around URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/westpac-ceo-not-mucking-around/ Last updated: 2025-05-30T22:00:06.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Another chart damning the Victorian Labor Government URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/another-chart-damning-the-victorian-labor-government/ Last updated: 2025-05-29T21:00:44.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### How superannuation is being invested - on your behalf URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-superannuation-is-invested-on-your-behalf/ Last updated: 2025-05-28T21:00:00.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### The unrelenting rise of the disability worker URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/the-unrelenting-rise-of-the-disability-worker/ Last updated: 2025-05-27T21:00:31.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Top 20 occupations by growth rates over 1, 15 and 30 year periods URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/top-20-occupations-by-growth-rates-over-1-15-and-30-year-periods/ Last updated: 2025-05-26T21:10:32.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### WA workforce churning more than other states URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/wa-workforce-churning-more-than-other-states/ Last updated: 2025-05-26T01:41:51.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Covid impact on workforce experience URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/covid-impact-on-workforce-experience/ Last updated: 2025-05-22T21:00:17.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Power of one word - Michele Bullock Press Conference URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/power-of-one-word-michele-bullock-press-conference/ Last updated: 2025-05-21T21:00:41.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### CBA share price defying gravity URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/cba-share-price-defying-gravity/ Last updated: 2025-05-21T12:21:30.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Frightening increase in public sector wages bill URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/frightening-increase-in-public-sector-wages-bill/ Last updated: 2025-05-21T06:00:44.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Victorian State Budget - Short briefing note URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/victorian-state-budget-short-briefing-note/ Last updated: 2025-05-20T21:00:17.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### What are they saying? Ten perspectives URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/what-are-they-saying-ten-perspectives/ Last updated: 2025-05-20T07:43:39.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### "Clear inflection point" - AI assessment the RBA cash rate decision URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/clear-inflection-point-ai-assessment-the-rba-cash-rate-decision/ Last updated: 2025-05-20T04:44:30.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### 2.6 vs. 2.8 kg chickens - why? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/2-6-vs-2-8-kg-chickens-why/ Last updated: 2025-05-20T01:40:20.000Z Data alert | Meat production data released today --- **Today, the ABS released its quarterly *Livestock Products* publication, which provides figures on the number of animals slaughtered and the amount of meat produced.** By dividing total meat production (in kilograms) by the number of animals or birds slaughtered, one can estimate the average weight of each animal or bird. This data has long been a source of controversy—particularly when it comes to chickens. The average chicken size has steadily increased since the 1960s, and it’s alleged that this growth is driven by aggressive farming techniques, including the use of hormones and feed supplements designed to extract more saleable meat per animal. Measuring the “true” weight of a chicken is more complex than it seems. It depends on the purpose of the measurement. In Australia, the relevant figure for meat production is the weight of *broiler* chickens at slaughter. This refers to the *dressed weight*—after slaughter and evisceration—representing the carcass weight delivered for sale (excluding feathers, blood, viscera, etc.). According to the latest data, the average dressed weight of a broiler chicken in Australia is about **2.6**. In the United States, that figure is higher—**2.8 kilograms**, or roughly **8% heavier**. ### Assuming the same variety of chicken is used, why are American chickens yielding more meat? One reason appears to be the heavier use of a class of feed additives called **ionophores**. A key difference between US and Australian chicken production lies in the use of ionophores—antimicrobial compounds added to animal feed not to treat illness, but to promote growth and enhance feed efficiency. Ionophores work by altering the permeability of cell membranes in certain gut bacteria and protozoa, improving nutrient absorption and reducing infection risks in intensive farming environments. Although ionophores are technically antibiotics, they are not used in human medicine. As a result, US regulators generally do not consider their use to contribute to antimicrobial resistance in humans—a view not universally shared. In the European Union and Australia, ionophores are either tightly restricted or discouraged from routine use. While Australian regulations permit their use in limited veterinary contexts, the kind of routine, subtherapeutic dosing common in the US is not allowed. In practice, this means Australian chickens are raised without the constant medicinal boosting that American chickens receive as a matter of course. ### Another reason why US chickens are heavier While the use of ionophores is likely the technical or scientific explanation for heavier chickens in the United States, it also reflects a deeper cultural difference in entrepreneurial drive between the US and Australia. In Australia, public policy tends to favour caution and bureaucratic control. Bureaucrats and politicians are rarely penalised for blocking innovation—but they are swiftly blamed when something they've allowed goes wrong. As a result, the system is more wired to inhibit rather than to enable. There is, in fact, insufficient evidence that ionophores are harmful to human health. On the contrary, by improving the health and efficiency of poultry, their use may even have indirect human benefits. US chicken producers have had more success in challenging regulators and getting approval of such technologies. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Image1ghost-2.png) --- ### More details about the statistical collection of chicken slaughtering and meat production Statistics for chicken slaughtering, chicken meat produced and gross value of poultry slaughtered have been compiled from quarterly returns supplied by commercial poultry slaughtering establishments and comprise broilers, fryers and roasters. Many small producers are excluded from the collection; however, the statistics represent a high level of coverage. Australian totals for poultry exclude Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory due to limited activity undertaken in those territories. Chicken meat is shown in dressed weight of whole birds, pieces and giblets. Poultry statistics relate to slaughtering for human consumption and do not include animals condemned, slaughtered for pet food or those killed for boiling down. See ABS wesbsite [here](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/livestock-products-australia-methodology/dec-2024?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au). ### Other methodological information about the statistics **Scope** Includes livestock and poultry slaughtering at registered abattoirs, meat production for human consumption and gross value of livestock slaughtered. **Geography** Data available for Australian and state totals. **Source** Data is sourced from commercial abattoirs and meat processors. **Collection method** A quarterly survey of commercial abattoirs and meat processors. **History of changes** The Wool Purchases, Receivals and Sales Survey and data release (Table 16) was ceased in September 2022. ### RBA Rates Decision - one additional chart for background URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-rates-additional-chart-for-background/ Last updated: 2025-05-19T21:00:27.000Z _This post is for subscribers only._ ### RBA cash rate decision Tuesday - history & forecast URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/rba-cash-rate-decision-tuesday-history-forecast/ Last updated: 2025-05-18T21:00:53.000Z Event alert | RBA cash rate decision on Tuesday --- The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will hold its next monetary policy meeting on Tuesday this week, 20 May 2025, to set the Official Cash Rate (OCR)—the benchmark interest rate that influences borrowing costs across the economy. As of today, the cash rate remains at 4.10%, where it has stood since April. However, financial markets are now heavily pricing in a 25 basis point cut, which would reduce the rate to 3.85%. According to the ASX 30-Day Interbank Cash Rate Futures—widely used to infer market expectations for RBA decisions—there is a 96–98% implied probability that the RBA will act to cut on Tuesday. Up until the strong employment growth figures released last Thursday, markets had priced in a 100% probability of a rate cut. The robust jobs data suggest that inflation remains a risk, tempering the earlier certainty. ### Predicted Future Movements The implied yields from financial markets indicate that this will not be a one-off rate cut. Instead, the market is forecasting a gradual but sustained easing cycle over the next 18 months. By October 2025, the expected cash rate is around 3.48%. By December, it falls to 3.3%. And by October 2026, markets anticipate the rate will stabilise at 3.3%—a full 80 basis points below the current level. The chart below tracks the official cash rate from 1990 to the present. In August 1990, the rate peaked at 14.0%. As the chart makes clear, it has declined steadily over the decades, reaching a historic low of 0.1% during the COVID-19 pandemic. The red line on the chart indicates the market's predicted path for future rate changes. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/I1ghost.png) ### Forecasts - who is getting more miserable and who less? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/forecasts-who-is-getting-more-miserable-and-who-less/ Last updated: 2025-05-18T01:28:45.000Z Updated | Misery Index forecasts in 2030 | Eastern Europe doing well --- **Yesterday I posted Misery Index estimates for 2025 and flagged that I would follow up with forecasts for 2030\. Today’s update delivers on that promise, with three new charts to complete the picture.** **Chart 1** presents the average Misery Index across 70 countries from 2025 to 2030\. The trend is encouraging: the global average is forecast to fall from 5.0 in 2025 to 3.9 by 2030\. As a reminder, a lower score is better—the Misery Index simply adds together two negatives things: inflation and unemployment. The less of a negative the better. **Chart 2** tracks how each country’s ranking is expected to shift over the five-year period. Yesterday’s post listed and ranked countries from most to least miserable in 2025\. This chart shows how those rankings change by 2030\. One of the most striking developments is the projected rise of Eastern Europe. Countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Romania and Lithuania are all forecast to make substantial gains in ranking. Bulgaria, for example, is expected to improve 23 places in the rankings. **Chart 3** shows the full country rankings forecast for 2030\. This complements the 2025 rankings published yesterday and provides a clearer sense of where countries are heading—and how quickly. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/I2_180525.png) ### How miserable do you feel? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/how-mis/ Last updated: 2025-05-17T00:58:44.000Z Updated | Misery Index updated for 2025 data --- A commonly used and straightforward measure of a country's relative economic pain is known as the Misery Index. It involves a simple calculation: the addition of a country's unemployment rate and its inflation rate. Both indicators are undesirable—so the higher the total, the greater the presumed economic “misery” for a country’s citizens. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes relatively high-quality, comparable data on unemployment and inflation across countries, allowing for a consistent comparison of Misery Index scores. According to my calculations, among countries to which it makes sense to compare Australia, the most miserable is Iran, followed by Turkey and South Africa. As of 2025, Iran scores a Misery Index of 54.5; Turkey, 40.5; and South Africa, 37.3. Anecdotally, this aligns with broader realities. Iran has recently seen its proxy forces—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—largely dismantled by US and Israeli forces. South Africa is undergoing land confiscations from white farmers, some of whom are reportedly being granted asylum in the United States. While the Misery Index is purely an economic construct, it often reflects the deeper political and social turmoil of a country. Perhaps the two are more closely linked than the formula implies. At the other end of the scale, we find the least miserable countries—and these results are intuitively satisfying as well. Switzerland leads with a Misery Index of just 3.0, followed by Singapore at 3.5 and Japan at 4.4\. These nations are well known for their high living standards, stable economies, and relatively harmonious societies. Australia’s performance is middling. We rank 37th out of a pool of 69 countries, with a score of 7.7\. Notably, we’re edged out by both the United States (7.0) and the United Kingdom (7.3). **How miserable do you feel?** Tomorrow, I’ll post forecasts of global economic misery for the year 2030—based on projected unemployment and inflation rates from credible economic sources.. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-1-used-17may25.png) --- ### Backgrounder to the Misery Index from Chat GPT: The Misery Index is a simple yet strikingly evocative economic indicator that captures the human cost of poor macroeconomic management. At its core, it combines two critical variables that affect the average citizen’s quality of life: the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. The higher the index, the greater the economic “misery” being felt by the public—through joblessness and rising living costs. Unlike more abstract economic metrics, the Misery Index resonates because it distils economic stress into an easy-to-grasp figure. The term and original formulation of the Misery Index are credited to American economist Arthur Okun, a senior adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson during the 1960s. Okun devised the index as a tool for understanding how economic conditions might influence public sentiment. While its construction is arithmetically straightforward—simply adding the unemployment and inflation rates—its policy implications are weighty. It encapsulates the trade-offs central banks and governments often face: stimulate growth and risk inflation, or suppress inflation and risk job losses. The Misery Index gained real political prominence in the 1970s, particularly during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. At that time, the U.S. economy was beset by the rare and toxic combination of high inflation and high unemployment—a phenomenon later termed “stagflation.” The Misery Index soared, giving ammunition to political opponents and leading to its broader popularisation. Ronald Reagan famously used it during his 1980 campaign, quipping that “by this economic measure, things are twice as bad as they were four years ago.” The index had thus evolved from a niche academic concept to a potent political weapon. Over time, several economists have proposed modifications to the original index to make it more reflective of contemporary economic concerns. One notable variant is the “Barro Misery Index,” named after Harvard economist Robert Barro. This version incorporates not just inflation and unemployment, but also long-term interest rates and GDP growth—penalising low growth and high borrowing costs. Barro’s goal was to create a more comprehensive picture of economic well-being, reflecting the fact that slow growth and tight credit can be as painful as joblessness or inflation. Another modification comes from Steve Hanke, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, who has compiled a “World Misery Index” ranking countries by a modified score that includes inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and economic growth. Hanke’s work is especially notable for applying the concept globally, providing comparative misery scores across developing and developed economies alike. In countries like Venezuela or Zimbabwe, hyperinflation alone has often been sufficient to push the index into the stratosphere, highlighting just how destructive runaway prices can be to economic stability. Critics of the Misery Index argue that its simplicity is both a strength and a weakness. It assumes equal weight between inflation and unemployment, even though their psychological and economic impacts can differ greatly depending on context. Moreover, the headline inflation rate does not always reflect cost-of-living pressures faced by lower-income households, just as the headline unemployment rate may mask underemployment or discouraged workers. Nevertheless, the index retains heuristic power—especially in public debate and media commentary—because of its ease of interpretation. In today’s economic climate, where inflation has returned to the forefront after decades of dormancy and labour markets remain in flux due to post-pandemic shifts, the Misery Index is undergoing something of a renaissance. Policymakers face renewed pressure to balance price stability with employment support, and the Misery Index offers a blunt but effective barometer of public sentiment. When people feel squeezed at the supermarket and insecure in their jobs, their misery tends to be captured—however imperfectly—by a rising index score. Ultimately, the enduring appeal of the Misery Index lies in its synthesis of macroeconomic outcomes with everyday experiences. While GDP growth or bond yield curves may better forecast market trends, the Misery Index speaks to something more fundamental: how difficult it feels to get by. In this sense, it remains a valuable, if imprecise, indicator of economic legitimacy and political accountability. ### Is he really Captain Chaos? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/is-he-really-captain-chaos/ Last updated: 2025-05-16T08:40:22.000Z Data alert | The VIX 'Fear Index' since Trump's tariff Liberation Day --- The most widely cited metric for measuring economic fear is the VIX—short for Volatility Index. It tracks expected volatility in the US stock market, specifically the S&P 500, which represents the 500 largest publicly listed companies. The VIX is calculated using a formula based on option prices. Options are financial contracts that give the holder the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell a stock at a specific price within a set time frame—typically 30 days. For example, if Tesla shares are trading at $200, an option to sell Tesla at $195 within the next month isn’t worth much. Why would anyone pay for the right to sell something at a lower price? The answer: fear. If investors suddenly believe Tesla shares might plunge to $150, that $195 sell option becomes highly valuable. Investors will bid up the price of such an option—perhaps from $2 to $30—as a form of insurance. The more fear in the market, the higher the price of options. That’s the concept behind the VIX: rising option prices signal rising fear. The VIX became widely known during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), when it spiked to unprecedented levels. Data since 1990 show there have been three occasions when the VIX has surged above 50\. The first was during the GFC, when it peaked at 80.9\. The second came during the COVID-19 panic, when it reached 82.7\. A third spike occurred when Donald Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs, driving the VIX to 52.3. Trump has a reputation for rattling markets with his unpredictability. But ironically, during his first term (2016–2020), market volatility remained low. The average VIX level under Trump was 18.2, the lowest of any president since 1990\. By comparison, under President George W. Bush, the VIX averaged 20.9\. The long-term average since 1990 is 19.5\. As of 14 May 2025, the VIX sits at a calm 18.6, meaning the market now believes Trump's tariff regime is largely benign in terms of financial risk. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Image-1-for-ghost-.png) --- ### Further plain English explanation of the Vix from Chat GPT: If you’ve ever seen headlines declaring that the "VIX is spiking" or that the "Fear Index is rising," you might have wondered what exactly this mysterious number is and why it matters. The VIX—short for the Volatility Index—is one of the most watched measures of stress in global financial markets. But how is it calculated? What does it actually measure? And why should policymakers, investors, or economists pay attention to it? **What Is the VIX?** The VIX is a market index published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). It measures the expected volatility of the U.S. stock market over the next 30 days. More specifically, it tracks investor sentiment about the S&P 500 index, which is the benchmark for large U.S. companies. In essence, the VIX is a real-time indicator of fear, uncertainty, and risk in financial markets. When investors expect turbulent times ahead, the VIX rises. When they are calm and confident, it falls. **How Is the VIX Constructed?** The VIX is not based on stock prices, but rather on options—specifically, S&P 500 index options. These are contracts that give investors the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell the S&P 500 at a certain price in the future. Here’s a simple breakdown of the logic: **Options prices reflect expectations of future volatility.** If markets are expected to swing wildly, options become more expensive, because they are more likely to be profitable. If things are expected to stay quiet, options are cheaper. **The VIX uses these option prices to infer volatility.** The index looks at a wide range of out-of-the-money options (those not profitable right now) that expire in about 30 days. It uses a mathematical formula to combine these prices into a single number: the implied volatility. **This number is expressed as an annualised percentage.** For example, if the VIX is at 20, it means that investors expect the S&P 500 to move up or down by about 20% over the next year (or about 5.8% over the next month, assuming normal statistical distribution). So: higher VIX = higher expected volatility. **What Makes the VIX Move?** The VIX reacts to shifts in sentiment, uncertainty, and risk appetite. Common triggers include: Market corrections or crashes (e.g., March 2020 COVID panic) Political uncertainty (e.g., U.S. elections, Brexit votes) Global crises (e.g., wars, banking instability, debt ceiling drama) On average, the VIX ranges between 15 and 20 in normal market conditions. Readings above 30 suggest high levels of fear, while readings above 40 or 50 usually occur during crises. **Why Is the VIX Valuable?** The VIX serves as a financial seismograph—it doesn’t tell you exactly what will happen, but it indicates when the ground beneath markets is starting to shake. Its uses include: **Investor sentiment gauge.** Policymakers and analysts often use it as a high-frequency indicator of market psychology. A sudden spike can signal a sharp loss of confidence. **Risk management tool.** Portfolio managers track the VIX to adjust their asset allocations. When the VIX is high, many shift to safer assets or hedge their exposure. **Cross-asset signal.** Movements in the VIX are often correlated with other key metrics—such as credit spreads, currency volatility, or gold prices. **Derivatives benchmark.** There are now financial products that allow investors to trade the VIX itself—such as VIX futures and ETFs—allowing speculation or hedging on future volatility. **Final Thoughts: More Than Just a Number** The VIX is not a perfect predictor of market outcomes—but it’s among the best real-time indicators of market stress. It captures expectations, not certainties. It is forward-looking, not explanatory. If you’re running a business, managing investments, or trying to understand market psychology, keeping one eye on the VIX is worthwhile. Just like a barometer tells you that a storm might be coming, the VIX can alert you when financial weather conditions are starting to turn. ### Intergenerational equity - one indicator looking ok URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/intergenerational-equity-one-indicator-looking-ok/ Last updated: 2025-05-15T21:00:35.000Z Data alert | ABS Lending Commitments released --- A frequently overlooked yet revealing economic indicator is the proportion of new home loan commitments going to first home buyers. It is a deceptively simple statistic, yet it provides important insight into intergenerational equity, market accessibility for younger Australians. Each quarter, the Australian Bureau of Statistics releases a data series titled *Loan Commitments*, which reports the number and value of new mortgages issued by authorised deposit-taking institutions (banks). Within that release it is possible to derive a the metric of the percentage of housing loans going to first home buyers. This figure captures the share of new housing finance flowing to those attempting to enter the property market for the first time—typically younger households. It is a telling measure of whether rising prices, interest rate shifts, or regulatory settings are tilting the housing ladder toward or against new entrants. Since the series began in 2002, the average proportion of loans going to first home buyers has been approximately **31%**. However, recent data shows a somewhat unexpected trend. When the Reserve Bank of Australia began raising the cash rate in May 2022 to combat inflation, many assumed that rising interest rates would disproportionally impact households more dependent on bank finance, and benefit those with existing houses. When the RBA began hiking rates in May of 2022, the share of first home buyers getting finance was 33.1%. After rates started going up, this share increased to to a high of 37% in December 2023\. The relative resilience of first home buyers is politically and economically significant. Whatever the cause, the result is clear: **on this specific metric, intergenerational access to housing finance has held firm—and even improved—during a period of monetary tightening**. Of course, this does not mean that the housing market is fair or efficient in all respects. Dwelling prices remain high by international standards; land use restrictions and supply constraints continue to push up costs. But in the fog of housing policy debate, this statistic offers a shaft of clarity: **first home buyers are maintaining their foothold**. See chart: ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/FHB-ghost-image1.png) ### Australian Treasurers - Ranked by three key labour force metrics URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australian-treasurers-ranked-by-tkey-labour-force-metrics/ Last updated: 2025-05-15T01:53:52.000Z Data Alert | ABS Labour Force released --- ### Key figures In seasonally adjusted terms, in April 2025: - Unemployment rate remained at 4.1%. - Participation rate increased to 67.1%. - Employment increased to 14,642,700\. - Employment to population ratio increased to 64.4%. - Underemployment rate increased to 6.0%. - Monthly hours worked increased to 1,964 million. - Full-time employment increased by 59,500 to 10,074,300 people. - Part-time employment increased by 29,500 to 4,568,400 people. Strong jobs growth means there is **less chance** the RBA will cut interest rates at the next meeting, although a cut is still more likely than not. The labour market is very healthy. --- ### Political dimension - comparing performance of Treasurers The monthly ABS Labour Force statistics were released today. While the data is widely reported in the media, it is rarely put into an historic political context. The following three charts present key labour market indicators for Australian Commonwealth Treasurers, beginning in 1978—the year when high-quality labour market data first became available. The figures show that Treasurer Jim Chalmers has overseen something of a dream labour market. Average unemployment rates during his tenure have been lower than under any other Treasurer. An important but often overlooked metric is the employment-to-population ratio. This measures the health of the labour force and the extent to which an economy’s key resource—labour—is being utilised. On this measure, the average ratio under Chalmers has been 64.2, well above the long-term average of 59.6%. Another significant indicator is the participation rate, which shows the proportion of the working age population (15years+) that is either employed or actively seeking work. Once again, it has averaged higher under Chalmers—66.7%—than under any other Treasurer. It is important to note, however, that a low average unemployment rate does not necessarily indicate that a Treasurer implemented successful economic reforms to bring about favourable outcomes. The benefits of good policy often take years to materialise. For example, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were reformist leaders, yet labour market outcomes were generally poor during their tenures in the 1980s. Even so, politicians themselves will attribute these metric outcomes to the tenures of their opponents, so they are relevant for political analysis and contemporary debate. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-1-7.png) --- ### Additional notes on the definition and importance of the three labour market metrics cited in this post **Unemployment Rate** The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of people in the labour force who are actively seeking work but are unable to find it. The labour force includes individuals aged 15 and over who are either employed or unemployed (i.e. not working but available and actively looking for work). The rate is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed people by the total labour force and multiplying the result by 100. This rate is one of the most closely watched economic indicators because it reflects the degree of underutilisation of labour in the economy. A high unemployment rate suggests spare capacity in the labour market, potentially indicating economic slack or downturn. Conversely, a low unemployment rate can signal a tight labour market, which may place upward pressure on wages and inflation if demand for workers exceeds supply. However, the unemployment rate has limitations. It excludes discouraged job seekers who have stopped looking for work and thus are no longer counted in the labour force. It also does not differentiate between full-time and part-time employment or account for underemployment. Therefore, while the unemployment rate provides important insights, it is most useful when interpreted alongside other indicators like the participation rate and underemployment rate. **Participation Rate** The participation rate measures the proportion of the working-age population (typically aged 15 and over) that is either employed or actively seeking employment. It is calculated by dividing the labour force by the total working-age population and multiplying by 100\. This indicator reflects the willingness and ability of people to engage with the labour market. The participation rate is crucial for understanding broader trends in labour supply and potential economic output. For instance, an increasing participation rate may signal growing optimism about job prospects, especially among groups like women, older workers, or younger people entering the workforce. It can also reflect structural shifts such as rising education levels or changes to retirement patterns. A falling participation rate can be problematic, particularly if it reflects long-term disengagement from the labour market due to discouragement or demographic trends such as ageing. Policymakers monitor the participation rate closely because it affects the size of the labour force and therefore the economy’s productive capacity. It is also key to interpreting changes in the unemployment rate—since a falling unemployment rate, in the context of a falling participation rate, may not indicate an improving labour market. **Employment-to-Population Ratio** The employment-to-population ratio measures the proportion of the working-age population that is currently employed. It is calculated by dividing the number of employed persons by the total working-age population and multiplying by 100\. Unlike the unemployment rate, this metric is not affected by whether someone is actively seeking work, making it a broader measure of labour market engagement. This ratio is particularly useful for assessing the economy’s capacity to generate jobs over time, especially when population growth is rapid or when participation rates are shifting. A rising employment-to-population ratio usually signals improving economic conditions and higher household incomes, while a declining ratio may reflect economic weakness, demographic ageing, or a loss of confidence in the job market. Because it includes all working-age people, regardless of whether they are in the labour force, the employment-to-population ratio is often viewed as a more stable long-term indicator of labour market health. It is valuable in international comparisons and for assessing the full employment potential of an economy. Policymakers and analysts use it alongside the participation and unemployment rates to form a more complete picture of labour market performance. --- ### Sign of India's rise - fastest growing house prices URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/india-fastest-growing-house-prices-in-last-15-years/ Last updated: 2025-05-14T21:00:09.000Z Data alert | Country comparisons of residential property prices + Investment Tips below. --- In a sign of its growing economic strength, India has outpaced advanced economies in residential property price growth since 2009\. It tops the global rankings, followed by Chile and Estonia. The chart below doesn’t measure housing affordability as such but instead shows the percentage increase in average residential property prices by country. The price changes are 'nominal' not 'real', meaning they have not been adjusted for inflation. Interestingly, Australia sits roughly in the middle of the pack. Since 2009, average house prices here have risen by 114%, slightly above the global average of 100%. Emerging market economies have seen average price growth of 120%—though that figure comes off a much lower base. Only two countries have experienced house price declines over the period: Cyprus and Italy. Both have struggled to generate economic growth in the post-GFC era, weighed down by high debt levels and ageing populations. The data comes from a high quality international source: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). It is a membership association of central banks and has an objective to promote global financial stability. The BIS began compiling residential property price data after the 2007–08 Global Financial Crisis, recognising the central role of housing markets in economic resilience, and an acknowledgement that it was an oversight to not have given more focus on residential property prior to the GFC. See chart below. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-1-5.png) ### Some popular Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) that invest in India's growth **iShares India ETF (ASX: IIND):** Offers exposure to large and mid-sized Indian companies. **BetaShares India Quality ETF (ASX: IIND):** Designed to track Indian equities with strong return-on-equity, stable earnings, and low financial leverage. **iShares MSCI India ETF (NYSE: INDA):** For Australians with access to US markets; tracks MSCI India Index. **WisdomTree India Earnings ETF (NYSE: EPI):** Focuses on profitable Indian companies, weighted by earnings. ### Factors driving India residential housing prices Several interrelated factors have contributed to the substantial growth in India's residential property prices: **Economic Expansion and Urbanization:** India's GDP growth, averaging around 6-7% annually over the past decade, has bolstered income levels and urban migration, increasing demand for housing in urban centers . **Demographic Trends:** A young population with a growing middle class has led to increased household formation and homeownership aspirations, fueling demand in the residential sector. **Government Initiatives:** Policies such as the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY) and tax incentives for first-time homebuyers have stimulated demand, particularly in affordable housing segments. **Regulatory Reforms:** The implementation of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act (RERA) in 2016 enhanced transparency and investor confidence, encouraging greater participation in the housing market. **Infrastructure Development:** Investments in transportation and urban infrastructure have improved connectivity and livability in peripheral urban areas, making them attractive for residential development. **Supply Constraints:** In major metropolitan areas, limited land availability and regulatory hurdles have constrained new housing supply, exerting upward pressure on prices. **Inflation and Construction Costs:** Rising costs of construction materials and labor have contributed to higher property prices, as developers pass on increased expenses to buyers. ### Motivation for BIS publish residential property prices "Reflecting the importance of these indicators for dealing with financial stability issues, the BIS disseminates statistics on property prices for a wide range of countries. This data collection has been reinforced since the 2007/08 financial crisis, not least in the context of the Data Gaps Initiative endorsed by the G-20\. Moreover a growing attention is being paid to the long-term trends in property prices, which are an important element in determining the evolution of financial cycles across countries." (See Bruon Tissot, at this [link)](https://www.bis.org/ifc/events/ISI%5Freg%5Fstats%5Fconf2014/session4%5FBISpaper.pdf?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) ### Lucky escape - Albanese avoided election pain on real wages URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/luck/ Last updated: 2025-05-14T02:01:05.000Z Data Alert | Wage Price Index for March Qtr 2025 The ABS has released the latest Wage Price Index. This is a highly anticipated release because it provides the benchmark against which governments are judged on whether they are delivering real wage increases. Increasing real wages was Labor’s primary promise during the May 2022 election campaign, so a key question in the most recent election has been whether the Albanese Government has delivered on that commitment. Today’s data provides evidence to assess that claim. (Real wages are defined as the percentage change in wages minus the percentage change in inflation.) **Anthony Albanese** put it this way in his 2022 Budget Reply: > *“The relentless pressure of flat wages and rising prices won’t stop because of a short-term, pre-election promise. The truth is, if you want real, permanent, meaningful help with the cost of living, you need a plan to get wages growing again. And you need a Labor Government to do it.”* The positive news for Labor is that over the past year, real wages have grown by an average of 1.0% across the economy. During this time, nominal wages rose by 3.4%, while inflation increased by 2.4%. On a one-year basis, the Labor Government is beginning to deliver on its promise. However, over the past three years, Australian workers have gone backwards in real terms. Nominal wages have increased by 11.5%, but inflation has risen by 13.6%. Albanese largely avoided scrutiny on this fact in the last election. Lucky escape. These statistics are summarised in the two charts below. The first shows inflation (dotted line) and real wages over the past year. The second presents the same analysis over a three-year period. Both charts also show wage growth by industry. Workers in the utilities sector (electricity, gas, water and waste) have enjoyed some of the strongest wage growth over both timeframes. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-1-3.png) --- ### Technical note on construction of the Wage Price Index, excerpt from the ABS [website](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/wage-price-index-australia-methodology/dec-2024?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au): The methodology used to construct the WPIs is similar to that used for other price indexes such as the Consumer Price Index. In the WPI, index numbers are compiled using information collected from a representative sample of employee jobs within a sample of employing organisations. Individual indexes are compiled for various combinations of state/territory, sector (private/public) and industry division. Industry is classified according to the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) 2006 (cat. no. 1292.0). For more detailed information on the methodology used in the construction of the WPI, refer to Wage Price Index: Concepts, Sources and Methods (cat. no. 6351.0.55.001). **Current published indexes** Four WPIs are constructed and published quarterly. These indexes were first compiled for the September quarter 1997, and cover: - ordinary time hourly rates of pay excluding bonuses index - ordinary time hourly rates of pay including bonuses index - total hourly rates of pay excluding bonuses index - total hourly rates of pay including bonuses index. In these indexes the term 'bonuses' refers to bonuses and commissions. **Design of the indexes** The WPIs measure changes over time in the price of wages and salaries unaffected by changes in the quality or quantity of work performed. A range of procedures have been developed to identify and measure quality and quantity changes and ensure that only pure price changes are reflected in the indexes. Price-determining characteristics of the jobs are fixed to ensure that changes in these characteristics do not contribute toward index movements. The following are examples of changes in price-determining characteristics which are not reflected in index movements: - changes in the nature of work performed (e.g. different tasks or responsibilities) - changes in the quantity of work performed (e.g. the number of hours worked) - changes in the characteristics of the job occupant (e.g. age, apprenticeship year, successful completion of training or a qualification, grade or level, experience, length of service, etc.) changes in the location where the work is performed. Changes in the price of wages and salaries resulting from changes in the composition of the labour market are also excluded from index movements. To achieve this, a longitudinal survey methodology is used to measure a similar sample of jobs over time. Once a business is selected in the sample, it will be expected to provide data for a sample of jobs for a minimum of five years. **Wage price indexes** The ordinary time hourly rates of pay indexes that exclude bonuses measure quarterly changes in ordinary time hourly wage and salary rates. Changes in rates of pay reflected in these indexes (i.e. pure price changes) arise from a range of sources including award variations, enterprise and workplace agreements, minimum wage setting, individual contracts and informal arrangements. ### Business visitors to Australia - positive news URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/business-visitors-positive-growth-over-last-12-months/ Last updated: 2025-05-13T21:00:36.000Z **Data Alert** | Arrivals and departures of business visitors to Australia One way to assess the extent of Australia’s involvement in international business—and business activity more generally—is to track trends in the number of people visiting the country for business purposes. This is an underappreciated metric. In March this year, 761,240 people arrived in Australia on a short-term basis—almost exactly the same number as in March 2024. There are six main reasons people visit Australia: - Holiday - Visiting friends or family - Business - Education - Convention or conference - Employment (plus “Other” and “Not stated”) The chart below breaks down the number of visitors by their main purpose for travel. For each category, it shows the raw number, the percentage of the total, and the growth rate over the past 12 months. A positive sign for the economy is that the number of visitors intending to conduct business grew by 16.1%—the second-fastest growth category. The highest growth was in education-related visits, which increased by 30.1%. Notwithstanding the positive growth in the past year, the longer-term trend shows a decline in the proportion of visitors coming for business purposes since the early 1990s. This is evident in the trend depicted in the second chart below. (Note that if an individual visits twice, this is counted as two visits in the aggregate). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-1-2.png) ### Home building approvals decline in latest month URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/home-building-approvals-decline-in-latest-month/ Last updated: 2025-05-13T02:01:11.000Z Data Alert | Building Approvals for March 2025 The total number of dwellings approved fell 8.8 per cent in March, to 15,220 - based on seasonally adjusted data. However, over the year to March 25, approvals are up 13.4%. Declines were seen across all dwelling types in March with unit approvals down 15.1 per cent, and private sector houses 4.5 per cent lower. As a percentage of total dwellings approved, the number of units approved accounted for was 40.1%, this is less than the long-term average of about 43.9%. On a state-wide basis (see chart below), total unit approvals in Tasmania declined 42% over the month. In Victoria, a far more significant market, unit approvals fell 31.6% in the month. They increased by 19.6% in Victoria. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/image-1.png) Source: ABS; Benchmark Analytics ### Building Approvals - What the data is used for - Monthly Building Approvals provide a forward-looking indicator of construction activity, offering early insights into future trends in residential and non-residential building work. - Because construction is a labour-intensive sector, changes in building approvals have direct implications for employment, subcontractor demand, and related service industries. - The data helps economists and policymakers gauge the impact of interest rate changes, as approvals typically respond to shifts in financing costs and consumer sentiment. - Sharp rises or falls in approvals can signal turning points in the housing cycle, which often precedes broader movements in the economy due to the multiplier effects of housing investment. - Regional variations in building approvals shed light on population shifts, infrastructure bottlenecks, and the differential impact of housing policy across jurisdictions. - Investors and developers use the statistics to assess market conditions, identify demand-supply mismatches, and inform decisions on timing and scale of new projects. ### Building approvals at a State level, Seasonally Adjusted data ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/image-2.png) ### Factional balance of Albanese's new Cabinet URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/factional-balance-of-albaneses-new-cabinet/ Last updated: 2025-05-12T21:00:14.000Z ALP Left faction has balance of power in Albanese Cabinet. Factional alignments within the ALP are often categorized as "Left" or "Right," though there are also sub-factions and independent alignments. It is not always clear which member of parliament belongs to which faction, and it is common that shifts occur overtime. Nevertheless, based on best available information, the following charts give a sense of the factional balance of the newly announced Federal Cabinet (including Outer Ministry). The first chart lists the names, faction, and position of the minister. The second chart summarises the the factional splits, along with a state-based breakdown. There are 29 members of the Cabinet and Outer Ministry. Of these 18 (62%) are from the ALP Left faction, and 11 (38%) from the ALP Right. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Ghost-image-2-1.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Ghost-image-1-2.png) ### Economy | 15 year comparison - industry winners & losers URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/business-turnover-fifteen-year-industry-comparison/ Last updated: 2025-05-11T21:30:16.000Z --- In yesterday's post, I published a chart showing changes in business turnover over the past year, broken down by both broad industry groups and sub-groups. Today’s chart covers the same industries but shifts the focus to a fifteen-year comparison, offering a look at major structural change in the economy. A fifteen-year perspective is particularly valuable because it captures long-run shifts that shorter timeframes can obscure. Over such a period, persistent trends—driven by technology, global demand, consumer preferences, and policy—become far clearer. For example, the sustained rise in mining turnover reflects not just short-term commodity cycles, but a deeper reorientation of Australia's economic base towards resource exports. This shift has largely been fuelled by the emergence of China as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse and its insatiable demand for raw materials. Conversely, the long-term decline in broadcasting turnover underscores the impact of digital disruption, as both audiences and advertisers have steadily migrated to online platforms. These long-run comparisons provide crucial context for identifying which sectors are in structural growth or decline—vital information for investors, policymakers, and workforce planners alike. Over the past fifteen years, mining turnover has increased by a remarkable 186.1%—more than triple the growth recorded in manufacturing, which rose just 51.5%. This contrast highlights the outsized role that mining now plays in the Australian economy. At a more detailed level, we can see that nearly all sub-industries have recorded positive turnover growth—except for two. Transport equipment manufacturing has declined slightly, down 1.1%. More notably, the broadcasting sector has seen a sharp decline of 24.7%. This sub-industry consists of three key categories: - Radio broadcasting - Free-to-air television broadcasting - Cable and subscription-based broadcastinges and advertisers to online platforms. As can be expected, the major growth sub industries are internet related. Shopping online (formally called 'Non-store retailing') has grown an astonishing 1,381% in fifteen years. Internet service providers and web-search portal suppliers have also grown enormously, 508.5%. (Below the chart, I have included ABS definitions of the main industry groups as a ready reference. There is also a link to the definitions of sub-groups if needed.) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image-2.png) --- ## Industry definitions The ABS publishes definitions of each of the industries listed above. Below are definitions of the broach industry classifacations (ANZSIC 2006). For the sub-industries, see this [link](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/classifications/australian-and-new-zealand-standard-industrial-classification-anzsic/2006-revision-2-0/division-definitions?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) for more information. ### Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing The Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Division includes units mainly engaged in growing crops, raising animals, growing and harvesting timber, and harvesting fish and other animals from farms or their natural habitats. The division makes a distinction between two basic activities: production and support services to production. Included as production activities are horticulture, livestock production, aquaculture, forestry and logging, and fishing, hunting and trapping. The term 'agriculture' is used broadly to refer to both the growing and cultivation of horticultural and other crops (excluding forestry), and the controlled breeding, raising or farming of animals (excluding aquaculture). Aquacultural activities include the controlled breeding, raising or farming of fish, molluscs and crustaceans. Forestry and logging activities include growing, maintaining and harvesting forests, as well as gathering forest products. Fishing, hunting and trapping includes gathering or catching marine life such as fish or shellfish, or other animals, from their uncontrolled natural environments in water or on land. Also included in the division are units engaged in providing support services to the units engaged in production activities. ### Division B: Mining The Mining Division includes units that mainly extract naturally occurring mineral solids, such as coal and ores; liquid minerals, such as crude petroleum; and gases, such as natural gas. The term mining is used in the broad sense to include underground or open cut mining; dredging; quarrying; well operations or evaporation pans; recovery from ore dumps or tailings as well as beneficiation activities (i.e. preparing, including crushing, screening, washing and flotation) and other preparation work customarily performed at the mine site, or as a part of mining activity. The Mining Division distinguishes two basic activities: mine operation and mining support activities. Mine operation includes units operating mines, quarries, or oil and gas wells on their own account, or for others on a contract or fee basis, as well as mining sites under development. Mining support activities include units that perform mining services on a contract or fee basis, and exploration (except geophysical surveying). Units in the Mining Division are grouped and classified according to the natural resource mined or to be mined. Industries include units that extract natural resources, and/or those that beneficiate the mineral mined. Beneficiation is the process whereby the extracted material is reduced to particles that can be separated into mineral and waste, the former suitable for further processing or direct use. The operations that take place in beneficiation are primarily mechanical, such as grinding, washing, magnetic separation, and centrifugal separation. In contrast, manufacturing operations primarily use chemical and electro-chemical processes, such as electrolysis and distillation. ### Division C: Manufacturing The Manufacturing Division includes units mainly engaged in the physical or chemical transformation of materials, substances or components into new products (except agriculture and construction). The materials, substances or components transformed by units in this division are raw materials that are products of agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, or products of other manufacturing units. Units in the Manufacturing Division are often described as plants, factories or mills and characteristically use power-driven machines and other materials-handling equipment. However, units that transform materials, substances or components into new products by hand, or in the unit's home, are also included. Activities undertaken by units incidental to their manufacturing activity, such as selling directly to the consumer products manufactured on the same premises from which they are sold, such as bakeries and custom tailors, are also included in the division. If, in addition to self-produced products, other products that are not manufactured by the same unit are also sold, the rules for the treatment of mixed activities have to be applied and units classified according to their predominant activity. Assembly of the component parts of manufactured products, either self-produced or purchased from other units, is considered manufacturing. For example, assembly of self-manufactured prefabricated components at a construction site is considered manufacturing, as the assembly is incidental to the manufacturing activity. Conversely, when undertaken as a primary activity, the on-site assembly of components manufactured by others is considered to be construction. The boundaries between the Manufacturing Division and other divisions in ANZSIC can sometimes be unclear. The units in the Manufacturing Division are engaged in the transformation of materials into new products. Their output is a new product. However, the definition of what constitutes a 'new product' can be somewhat subjective. As clarification, the following activities are examples of manufacturing activities included in the Manufacturing Division in ANZSIC 2006: - Milk bottling and pasteurising; - Both processing and canning or bottling; - Fresh fish packaging (including oyster shucking, fish filleting); - Printing and related support activities; - Ready-mixed concrete production; - Leather tanning and dressing; - Grinding of lenses to prescription; - Wood preserving and treatment; - Electroplating, plating, metal heat treating, and polishing; - Fabricating signs and advertising displays; - Tyre retreading; - Ship, boat, railway rolling stock and aircraft repair and maintenance; and - Substantial alteration, renovation or reconstruction of goods such as transport equipment. There are some other activities that are often considered 'manufacturing', but for ANZSIC, these are classified in another division. These activities include: - Logging and production of crops or livestock (included in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Division); - Construction of structures and fabricating operations performed at the site of construction by contractors (included in the Construction Division); - Publishing and the combined activity of publishing and printing (included in the Information Media and Communications Division); and - Beneficiation (included in the Mining Division). The subdivisions in the Manufacturing Division generally reflect distinct production processes related to material inputs, production equipment and employee skills. ### Division D: Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services The Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services Division comprises units engaged in the provision of electricity; gas through mains systems; water; drainage; and sewage services. This division also includes units mainly engaged in the collection, treatment and disposal of waste materials; remediation of contaminated materials (including land); and materials recovery activities. Electricity supply activities include the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and the on-selling of electricity via power distribution systems operated by others. Gas supply includes the distribution of gas, such as natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas, through mains systems. Water supply includes the storage, treatment and distribution of water; drainage services include the operation of drainage systems; and sewage services include the collection, treatment and disposal of waste through sewer systems and sewage treatment facilities. ### Division E: Construction The Construction Division includes units mainly engaged in the construction of buildings and other structures, additions, alterations, reconstruction, installation, and maintenance and repairs of buildings and other structures. Units engaged in demolition or wrecking of buildings and other structures, and clearing of building sites are included in Division E Construction. It also includes units engaged in blasting, test drilling, landfill, levelling, earthmoving, excavating, land drainage and other land preparation. ### Division F: Wholesale Trade The Wholesale Trade Division includes units mainly engaged in the purchase and onselling, the commission-based buying, and the commission-based selling of goods, without significant transformation, to businesses. Units are classified to the Wholesale Trade Division in the first instance if they buy goods and then onsell them (including on a commission basis) to businesses. Wholesalers' premises are usually a warehouse or office with little or no display of their goods, large storage facilities, and are not generally located or designed to attract a high proportion of walk-in customers. Wholesaling is often characterised by high value and/or bulk volume transactions, and customers are generally reached through trade-specific contacts. The Wholesale Trade Division distinguishes two types of wholesalers: - merchant wholesalers who take title to the goods they sell, including import/export merchants; and - units whose main activity is the commission-based buying and/or the commission-based selling of goods, acting as wholesale agents or brokers, or business to business electronic markets, both of whom arrange the sale of goods on behalf of others for a commission or fee without taking title to the goods. A unit which sells to both businesses and the general public will be classified to the Wholesale Trade Division if it operates from premises such as warehouses or offices with little or no display of goods, has large storage facilities, and is not generally located or designed to attract a high proportion of walk-in customers. For units that have goods manufactured for them on commission and then sell those goods, the following treatment guidelines are to be followed: - units that own the material inputs and own the final outputs, but have the production done by others will be included in the Manufacturing Division; - units that do not own the material inputs but own the final outputs and have the production done by others will not be included in the Manufacturing Division (these may be included in Wholesale Trade or other divisions); and - units that do not own the material inputs, do not own the final outputs but undertake the production for others will be included in the Manufacturing Division. As a result, units that have goods manufactured for them on commission will be included in the Wholesale Trade Division where they do not own the material inputs to the manufacturing process, but take title to the outputs and sell them in the manner prescribed above for typical wholesaling units. ### Division G: Retail Trade The Retail Trade Division includes units mainly engaged in the purchase and/or onselling, the commission-based buying, and the commission-based selling of goods, without significant transformation, to the general public. The Retail Trade Division also includes units that purchase and onsell goods to the general public using non-traditional means, including the internet. Units are classified to the Retail Trade Division in the first instance if they buy finished goods and then onsell them (including on a commission basis) to the general public. Retail units generally operate from premises located and designed to attract a high volume of walk-in customers, have an extensive display of goods, and/or use mass media advertising designed to attract customers. The display and advertising of goods may be physical or electronic. Physical display and advertising includes shops, printed catalogues, billboards and print advertisements. Electronic display and advertising includes catalogues, internet websites, television and radio advertisements and infomercials. While non-store retailers, by definition, do not posses the physical characteristics of traditional retail units with a physical shop-front location, these units share the requisite function of the purchasing and onselling of goods to the general public, and are therefore included in this division. A unit which sells to both businesses and the general public will be classified to the Retail Trade Division if it operates from shop-front premises, arranges and displays stock to attract a high proportion of walk-in customers and utilises mass media advertising to attract customers. ### Division H: Accommodation and Food Services The Accommodation and Food Services Division includes units mainly engaged in providing short-term accommodation for visitors. Also included are units mainly engaged in providing food and beverage services, such as the preparation and serving of meals and the serving of alcoholic beverages for consumption by customers, both on and off-site. ### Division I: Transport, Postal and Warehousing The Transport, Postal and Warehousing Division includes units mainly engaged in providing transportation of passengers and freight by road, rail, water or air. Other transportation activities such as postal services, pipeline transport and scenic and sightseeing transport are included in this division. Units mainly engaged in providing goods warehousing and storage activities are also included. The division also includes units mainly engaged in providing support services for the transportation of passengers and freight. These activities include stevedoring services, harbour services, navigation services, airport operations and customs agency services. ### Division J: Information Media and Telecommunications The Information Media and Telecommunications Division includes units mainly engaged in: - creating, enhancing and storing information products in media that allows for their dissemination; - transmitting information products using analogue and digital signals (via electronic, wireless, optical and other means); and - providing transmission services and/or operating the infrastructure to enable the transmission and storage of information and information products. Information products are defined as those which are not necessarily tangible, and, unlike traditional goods, are not associated with a particular form. The value of the information products is embedded in their content rather than in the format in which they are distributed. For example, a movie can be screened at a cinema, telecast on television or copied to video for sale or rental. The division includes some activities that primarily create, enhance and disseminate information products, subject to copyright. It is the intangible nature of the information products which determines their unique dissemination process, which may include via a broadcast, electronic means, or physical form. They do not usually require direct contact between the supplier/producer and the consumer, which distinguishes them from distribution activities included in the Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade Divisions. Excluded from the division are units mainly engaged in: - the mass storage or duplication of information products such as printing newspapers, CDs, DVDs, etc. (Manufacturing Division); - purchasing and on-selling information products in their tangible form (Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade Divisions); - providing specialised computer services such as programming and systems design services, graphic design services and advertising services, as well as gathering, tabulating and presenting marketing and opinion data (Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Division); - providing a range of creative artistic activities such as the creation of an artistic original (e.g. a painting), or the provision of a live musical performance by a group or artist (Arts and Recreation Services Division); and - units undertaking a range of activities such as directing, acting, writing and performing (Arts and Recreation Services Division). ### Division K: Financial and Insurance Services The Financial and Insurance Services Division includes units mainly engaged in financial transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets, and/or in facilitating financial transactions. The range of activities include raising funds by taking deposits and/or issuing securities and, in the process, incurring liabilities; units investing their own funds in a range of financial assets; pooling risk by underwriting insurance and annuities; separately constituted funds engaged in the provision of retirement incomes; and specialised services facilitating or supporting financial intermediation, insurance and employee benefit programs. Also included in this division are central banking, monetary control and the regulation of financial activities. ### Division L: Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services The Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services Division includes units mainly engaged in renting, hiring, or otherwise allowing the use of tangible or intangible assets (except copyrights), and units providing related services. The assets may be tangible, as in the case of real estate and equipment, or intangible, as in the case with patents and trademarks. The division also includes units engaged in providing real estate services such as selling, renting and/or buying real estate for others, managing real estate for others and appraising real estate. ### Division M: Professional, Scientific and Technical Services The Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Division includes units mainly engaged in providing professional, scientific and technical services. Units engaged in providing these services apply common processes where labour inputs are integral to the production or service delivery. Units in this division specialise and sell their expertise. In most cases, equipment and materials are not major inputs. The activities undertaken generally require a high level of expertise and training and formal (usually tertiary level) qualifications. These services include scientific research, architecture, engineering, computer systems design, law, accountancy, advertising, market research, management and other consultancy, veterinary science and professional photography. Excluded are units mainly engaged in providing health care and social assistance services, which are included in Division Q Health Care and Social Assistance. ### Division N: Administrative and Support Services The Administrative and Support Services Division includes units mainly engaged in performing routine support activities for the day-to-day operations of other businesses or organisations. Units providing administrative support services are mainly engaged in activities such as office administration; hiring and placing personnel for others; preparing documents; taking orders for clients by telephone; providing credit reporting or collecting services; and arranging travel and travel tours. Units providing other types of support services are mainly engaged in activities such as building and other cleaning services; pest control services; gardening services; and packaging products for others. The activities undertaken by units in this division are often integral parts of the activities of units found in all sectors of the economy. Recent trends have moved more towards the outsourcing of such non-core activities. The units classified in this division specialise in one or more of these activities and can, therefore, provide services to a variety of clients. ### Division O: Public Administration and Safety The Public Administration and Safety Division includes units mainly engaged in Central, State or Local Government legislative, executive and judicial activities; in providing physical, social, economic and general public safety and security services; and in enforcing regulations. Also included are units of military defence, government representation and international government organisations. Central, State or Local Government legislative, executive and judicial activities include the setting of policy; the oversight of government programs; collecting revenue to fund government programs; creating statute laws and by-laws; creating case law through the judicial processes of civil, criminal and other courts; and distributing public funds. The provision of physical, social, economic and general public safety and security services, and enforcing regulations, includes units that provide police services; investigation and security services; fire protection and other emergency services; correctional and detention services; regulatory services; border control; and other public order and safety services. Also included are units of military defence, government representation and international government organisations. Government ownership is not a criterion for classification to this industry division. Government units producing 'private sector like' goods and services are classified to the same industry as private sector units engaged in similar activities. Private sector units engaged in public administration or military defence are classified to the Public Administration and Safety Division. Units that engage in a combination of public administration and service delivery activities are to be classified to this division. ### Division P: Education and Training The Education and Training Division includes units mainly engaged in the provision and support of education and training, except those engaged in the training of animals e.g. dog obedience training, horse training. Education may be provided in a range of settings, such as educational institutions, the workplace, or the home. Generally, instruction is delivered through face-to-face interaction between teachers/instructors and students, although other means and mediums of delivery, such as by correspondence, radio, television or the internet, may be used. Education and training is delivered by teachers or instructors who explain, tell or demonstrate a wide variety of subjects. The commonality of processes involved, such as the labour inputs of teachers and instructors, and their subject matter knowledge and teaching expertise, uniquely distinguishes this industry from other industries. Education support services include a range of support services which assist in the provision of education, such as curriculum setting and examination marking. ### Division Q: Health Care and Social Assistance The Health Care and Social Assistance Division includes units mainly engaged in providing human health care and social assistance. Units engaged in providing these services apply common processes, where the labour inputs of practitioners with the requisite expertise and qualifications are integral to production or service delivery. ### Division R: Arts and Recreation Services The Arts and Recreation Services Division includes units mainly engaged in the preservation and exhibition of objects and sites of historical, cultural or educational interest; the production of original artistic works and/or participation in live performances, events, or exhibits intended for public viewing; and the operation of facilities or the provision of services that enable patrons to participate in sporting or recreational activities, or to pursue amusement interests. This division excludes units that are involved in the production, or production and distribution of motion pictures, videos, television programs or television and video commercials. These units are included in the Information Media and Telecommunications Division. ### Division S: Other Services The Other Services Division includes a broad range of personal services; religious, civic, professional and other interest group services; selected repair and maintenance activities; and private households employing staff. Units in this division are mainly engaged in providing a range of personal care services, such as hair, beauty and diet and weight management services; providing death care services; promoting or administering religious events or activities; or promoting and defending the interests of their members. Also included are units mainly engaged in repairing and/or maintaining equipment and machinery (except ships, boats, aircraft, or railway rolling stock) or other items (except buildings); as well as units of private households that engage in employing workers on or about the premises in activities primarily concerned with the operation of households. The Other Services Division excludes units mainly engaged in providing buildings or dwellings repair and maintenance services (included in the Construction or Administrative and Support Services Divisions as appropriate), and units mainly engaged in providing repair and maintenance services of books, ships, boats, aircraft or railway rolling stock (included in the Manufacturing Division). ### Liberal leadership | Andrew Robb makes important contribution URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/liberal-leadership-andrew-robb-makes-important-contribution/ Last updated: 2025-05-11T21:30:08.000Z Former Minister and Liberal Party State Director Andrew Robb’s opinion article on the election result is worth reading, particularly in light of the Liberal leadership contest set to play out this week. Robb essentially argues that the party need not overreact to the result—it was all Trump’s fault, he suggests. What he fails to explain, however, is why the Australian electorate is so skittish—so prone to shifting quickly and in large numbers in response to events far removed from domestic concerns. Even so, his article is an important background contribution to the Liberal leadership battle. (Note: Andrew Robb is now something of a controversial figure in Australian politics due to his role in the leasing of the Port of Darwin to the Chinese-owned company Landbridge. Darwin is a critical security region for Australia and hosts a rotating contingent of US Marines. The Port is essentially situated in the middle of major troop and naval exercises. Robb—a clever tactician—was, apparently, the paid lobbyist employed by Landbridge to help persuade the Northern Territory Government to approve the lease. He maintains a low profile these days, despite his past reputation as a strategic genius.) Robb’s [article ran](https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/don-t-believe-the-spin-the-australian-election-was-trumped-20250511-p5ly92?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) in The Australian Financial Review this morning and is reproduced below: Robb's article ran in the AFR this morning and is reproduced here: --- ### Don’t believe the spin – the Australian election was Trumped I’ve had enough of the misreading of the election result. It was not about Labor’s strategic brilliance but rather voters’ response to Donald Trump’s wrecking ball. I have no wish to rain on anyone’s parade, nor excuse the inadequacies of the Coalition’s federal election campaign, but I’ve simply had enough of the misreading of Saturday’s federal election result. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, his colleagues and supporters are grinning widely because winners are entitled to be grinners, and I congratulate them. And, of course, Labor members are entitled to spin the result any way that suits their political purpose; they are in politics, and how you position your result, win or lose, can be material because the next campaign begins the moment you finish the last. Just ask Paul Keating regarding his 1993 winning election night declaration that “this is the victory of the true believers”. It became a powerful symbol of his arrogance that led to the Liberal Party’s biggest ever election victory three years later, and the beginning of John Howard’s 11 years as prime minister. So while the political parties have their job to do, so do the political commentators. Their job is to cut through the spin and, to the best of their ability, objectively present their assessment of what happened, why it happened and how it happened. Their job is not to use the result to reinforce their own political prejudices. Labor’s election win is truly a huge one; a victory it will savour for decades to come. It is a win that invites many accolades for Albanese and the party. But the size of the win and the speed at which political fortunes changed in the space of virtually 10 days in early May should at least prompt some commentators to ask: “why”? Furthermore, given that just three days before the election concluded, a poll reported that a significant majority of the voting population, many who went on to vote Labor, said it did not deserve to be re-elected to government (much less with a thumping majority). This warranted some considered analysis. When you add to that Labor’s three years of broken promises on power prices, living costs and mortgages, the housing crisis, uncontrolled immigration, the neglect of national defence, the loss of nearly a year of governing with the costly and hugely divisive Voice campaign, a forecast of 10 years of budget deficits, the spread of violence and the wave of antisemitism, recalcitrant unions, burgeoning red and green tape and the related failing “renewables plus storage” experiment, you would think something was amiss here. Yet on Saturday night’s political panels and subsequent media coverage, we heard or are reading an endless stream of “strategic brilliance”, “acute sense of raw politics”, “Australia has changed”, without any serious assessment of how Labor turned a sow’s ear into a silk purse virtually overnight. There’s no reference to the fact that through January, February and March, Labor government MPs thought the Coalition could not win, but were privately expressing great concern that the party was heading for a loss of several seats and would be confronted with handling a very difficult minority government for the next three years. The fact is that such an extraordinary turnaround in polling, as we witnessed in early May, does not happen without a major, unforeseen consequence emerging. In this instance, of course, it was US President Donald Trump, as he traversed the globe with his tariff-led campaign of revenge, entitlement, coercion and economic destruction. Trump threw his wrecking ball around from April 2 to April 9 as he imposed tariffs on 185 trading partners, ranging from 10 per cent to – in China’s case – 145 per cent. The Australian election was called on March 28\. Five days later, Trump started his onslaught. In the first week of March, the Roy Morgan national poll (the longest-running political poll in Australia) had the Coalition on 50.5 and Labor on 49.5 for the two-party-preferred vote. Just over a month later, after Trump’s global onslaught, and a little more than a week into the campaign, the same poll had the Coalition at 45.5 and Labor on 54.5 for the two-party-preferred vote – an unheard-of turnaround in a month, and a result that matched the actual election result four weeks later. The huge Labor win was not the result of “strategic genius” or a reward for a job well done; it was because voters adopted the instinctive human response when confronted with a big global development, over which they had no control: “stick with the devil you know, rather than change to the devil you don’t”. In such circumstances, incumbency enjoys a huge advantage. An identical phenomenon occurred just days before our election in Canada. Two months ago, the incumbent government there was 20 points behind the opposition and had been so for many months. It was heading for a landslide defeat. When Trump attacked Canada, the incumbent government responded in a way all Canadians would expect. As a result, it wiped out the huge 20 point-deficit and held on to government. The opposition leader lost his seat. Labor was the political beneficiary of being in power when Trump began his unbelievable campaign to tear down the American-built international trading system that has served the world so well for 70 years. Australians are right to be deeply concerned. We are only at the beginning of this Trump escapade, and no one knows where or how it will end. It is a source of great uncertainty. Embracing incumbency is an understandable and defensible response to this situation. My conclusion is that within the first 12 days of the campaign, most voters had made up their minds, and for many that meant voting for the incumbent so that they did not have to deal with further uncertainty – in the form of a change to a Coalition government or a Labor minority government. The subsequent poor Coalition campaign just served to reinforce the Trump-inspired early disposition. This in no way undermines the legitimacy of the Albanese government. However, understanding why many people voted the way they did is important because it pinpoints the priority expectation of many – the Albanese government will be overwhelmingly expected to provide stability. This result, therefore, is not a blanket endorsement of Labor’s policies, as many of those created very significant instability and uncertainty in people’s lives. Just remember that right to the end, despite voting for Labor, a huge majority were reported as believing that Labor did not deserve to be re-elected. [**Andrew Robb**](https://www.afr.com/by/andrew-robb-p4yw3d?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) was Australia’s minister for trade and investment 2013–16. ### Which industries are booming...and those busting? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/which-industries-are-booming-and-those-busting/ Last updated: 2025-05-10T21:30:36.000Z The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) publishes a high-quality data series titled the Monthly Business Turnover Indicator. These statistics offer insight into the short-term movements in economic activity across selected industries. Derived from Business Activity Statement (BAS) data submitted to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the series tracks monthly changes in business turnover across a dozen industry groupings, including retail, construction, manufacturing, and accommodation. Although it does not cover all sectors (such as banking and finance), it provides a high-frequency indicator of how different parts of the economy are performing from month to month. This information is particularly useful for business executives seeking to understand which industries are experiencing materially higher sales volumes or are undergoing contraction. The chart below is an excerpt from a dataset maintained by Benchmark Analytics, based largely on ABS data but supplemented with other sources, including political overlays. For example, we can rapidly determine the turnover rate of specific industries during the tenure of government ministers with formal responsibility for regulating those industries. This is especially valuable for advocacy and media work. For the purposes of this post, I have selected a turnover period covering the twelve months to March 2025\. It shows some surprising results—most notably, the fastest turnover growth has occurred in the manufacturing sector. In just one year, turnover has grown by 12% (adjusted for structural changes). The chart also provides insight into the sub-industries within broader sectors. Within manufacturing, the fastest-growing sub-industry is primary metal and metal product manufacturing, where turnover has increased by 46.1% over the year. In contrast, turnover in the mining sector has declined by 5.9%, with the sharpest fall recorded in coal mining. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghostimage.png) ### Notes on the use of Index for time series analysis To present the data consistently, the ABS uses an index format rather than raw dollar figures. This allows for a more meaningful comparison over time. The base year for the index is set at 100 (currently June 2019), and each subsequent month’s data shows how turnover has changed relative to that benchmark. For instance, an index value of 115 in a given month would mean turnover has risen by 15% since the base period. This method neutralises the effect of differing absolute sizes between industries and focuses attention on growth dynamics rather than scale. One of the main strengths of using an index is that it facilitates comparison across vastly different industry types. Retail and mining, for example, operate on different scales and respond to different economic drivers. By using an index, analysts and policymakers can observe relative performance—identifying which industries are expanding more rapidly, recovering more slowly, or declining in the wake of economic shocks. The monthly frequency also enables early detection of turning points in business activity that might not yet appear in quarterly or annual GDP figures. For businesses, investors, and public officials, the Monthly Business Turnover Indicator serves as a useful barometer of sector-specific momentum. It is particularly valuable in periods of rapid change—such as post-pandemic recovery or during inflationary cycles—when traditional measures like GDP or employment may lag. Although the data is experimental and subject to revision, its timeliness and consistency make it one of the most useful tools available for tracking short-term economic trends across Australia's diverse industry base. ### Diagnosing the Liberal's women problem URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/diagnosing-the-liberals-women-problem/ Last updated: 2025-05-09T20:30:18.000Z News reports have suggested that the 'moderate' wing of the Liberal Party is on the verge of splitting and forming a new political party. Those on the Liberal 'Right' are convinced the party was too wishy-washy in its policy prescriptions and should have been bolder—specifically, by outright opposing the 2050 net-zero environmental commitment. However, all factions agree there is a major problem with the women’s vote. How to address this is at the core of the current leadership battle between Liberal Deputy Susan Ley and Shadow Treasurer Angus Taylor. Exit polling suggests women have indeed abandoned the Liberals once again, despite there being no substantive policy difference between the parties on issues commonly regarded as specific to women. One exception was the Coalition’s policy to force public servants back into the office—later reversed halfway through the campaign—which was said to have cost them support among female voters. Initial assessments suggest the women’s vote may have been even worse than in the 2022 election, when Scott Morrison was heavily damaged by perceptions of his mishandling of the Brittany Higgins alleged rape scandal. What is not receiving enough attention is the substantive issue of the relatively high proportion of women who are dependent on government spending programmes. Perhaps the Liberal Party’s problem with women is not so much their reputation for supporting a historic patriarchy, but rather a straight hip-pocket issue. Remember, Labor’s election campaign was based on the slogan “He Cuts, You Pay”. The chart below sheds light on this issue. It shows the disparity in numbers between males and females across key demographic groups that are heavily reliant on government spending. For example, among Australians who receive their primary income from government pensions and allowances, the number of women exceeds the number of men by almost one million (961,187). Even in the category of those with long-term health conditions—a group one might expect to be evenly split—there are 656,740 more women than men. Among those undertaking unpaid care of children aged 0–12 years, women outnumber men by 1.4 million. (See chart below for full details.) These facts must be acknowledged in the current leadership debate, perhaps the real issue is policy perception and not symbolism. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image2.png) ### "He Cuts, You Pay" - Explained URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/he-cuts-you-pay-explained/ Last updated: 2025-05-08T20:53:40.000Z The Labor Party’s primary election catchphrase was “He Cuts, You Pay.” The “He” is obviously Peter Dutton, and the campaigners gathered evidence from the past where Dutton had attempted to trim government spending. The potency of Labor’s message becomes clear when considering the size of demographic groups threatened by the prospect of government spending cuts, especially in the health sector. Labor’s fear campaign about health spending cuts under Dutton was aimed at an extraordinarily large demographic group. Just about everyone uses a GP regularly, but there is also a very large pool of people who use the health system intensely. ABS data shows that more than ten million Australians consider themselves to have a long-term health condition, suggesting they believe they will require health care and medication for the rest of their lives. Almost six million people report that they have a defined disability. This explains why Labor alleged the Coalition would cut the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). Almost five million Australians receive some form of government pension or allowance. Once again, the “He’ll Cut” message resonates strongly with this group. See chart below. For a full breakdown of key demographic groups, please contact me directly. (Note these groups are not mutually exclusive, many people will classify into multiple categories.) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost-image1-1.png) --- ### Spectator Article For further election result analysis, please refer to my Spectator article published on 7 May. Here is a [link](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/05/what-did-the-election-result-say-about-australia/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) to the magazine. The full article is also included below: ### What did the election result say about Australia? Nick Hossack 7 May 2025 There was one small incident during the Voice Referendum that I never understood, and it has stayed with me. Standing in the cardboard partition to cast my vote, I inadvertently saw the choices of the women on either side of me. Both voted ‘No’. Nothing strange about that – 60 per cent of the electorate did the same. What was slightly unusual was their demographic profile. One was an Asian woman, probably in her early twenties, who had on a uni-style backpack and was fumbling around with an oversized, colourful water bottle. On the other side was a woman wearing a hijab and denim jeans. Throughout the campaign, I had assumed the vote would split along left–right lines, with young people like these voting ‘Yes’, and all the oldies on the other side. I found these two ‘No’ voters very curious. Later that night, the political right celebrated. There was relief that finally there had been some pushback against insane Wokeism. Celebrations continued for several weeks. A question we should now ask is whether the Voice result diagnosis was correct. Was the vote really reflective of an underlying deep well of anti-Wokeism – was the big dog finally stirred? Or was something else going on? Another interpretation may be that it was simply about money and handout culture. For 97 per cent of people, the Voice offered no direct benefit. Nothing. In all aspects of life, taking an action for change involves a cost-benefit calculation: will this benefit me? Normally, when it comes to political votes, political parties present a package of initiatives, some of those will benefit you and some won’t. There are costs and benefits. The Voice proposal offered no direct benefits to roughly 97 per cent of the population. So, by definition, if there was zero benefit for most people, then even the slightest perceived risk (cost) involved in voting ‘Yes’, it will lead you towards voting ‘No’. The recent Labor election slogan, ‘He cuts, you pay!’ is just saying that Dutton represents higher costs and less benefit. My guess is that this hip-pocket idea is better at explaining the decisive Voice referendum result than that of anti-Wokeism. A second point I’ve been considering post-election is something we used to talk about quite a bit when I worked as a political staffer – some decades ago now. We used to debate whether political parties, either state or federal, once consigned to opposition, should adopt one-term or two-term strategies. The one-term strategy entails presenting a set of policies sufficiently broad to have a chance of winning the very next election. The two-term strategy involves recognising that a newly elected Australian government is likely to secure at least two terms, and so you may as well build a solid platform to offer voters when they start to want change. A two-term strategy is akin to laying a concrete foundation for a house: shoring up the base and gradually pulling in new constituencies in an authentic way, through hard policy work and long-term community integration with good candidates. Dutton seems to have chosen a one-term strategy. Putting aside the matter of the campaign’s execution, it’s hard to criticise Dutton for this choice. Polls suggested it was possible. While it ultimately proved unsuccessful, the indicators pointed to it being a valid choice – including deep resentment over cost-of-living pressures that were immediate and widespread. However, as we used to debate, the cost of a one-term strategy is that if it fails, then it’s likely to put you out for three terms because the rebuilding is delayed by one year. Third: one issue barely mentioned or acknowledged by the right is the state of the labour market. We must concede that while higher prices are making a mess of disposable income, there is a lot of income out there. Albanese, in fact, has an impressive record in overseeing low unemployment – especially given the Reserve Bank has raised the cash rate by more than three percentage points since he was elected. It pains me somewhat, but of all our Prime Ministers since 1978, Australia’s unemployment rate has averaged lowest under Albo. This has provided the electorate with a level of comfort: at least workers can continue earning the money needed to pay for higher-cost goods. There appears to be little job insecurity – at least in those jobs not directly threatened by Artificial Intelligence. Bank data on mortgage defaults of households, those most impacted by RBA rate increases, suggests the much-claimed household financial ‘pain’ and ‘doing it tough’ may be overstated and not as politically potent as claimed. A fourth point – one likely to emerge soon – is whether there’s any benefit in the Coalition remaining intact this term. Why not split? Let the Liberal Party chase the Teal and inner-city seats, and let the National Party lead, unrestrained, against Net Zero insanity. The Nats could then rally the conservative base into a single force – perhaps forming some kind of alliance with One Nation and consolidating other disparate voices. This won’t happen with the Libs in their corner. Without the constraint of the Liberals, the Nats could aggressively advocate proper energy policies, including reinvestment in coal and a move towards nuclear. By freeing the Liberals from the Nats, they could position themselves to be ready when Albanese inevitably taps the people in the Teal and other wealthy suburbs to pay for his election promises and fund any further ‘reform’ agendas. Because the Teals have marketed themselves as morally pristine and obsessed with ‘fairness’, they will find it impossible to energise themselves against what we know is coming: a host of taxation policies that will hit the wealthy suburbs in one way or another. This will probably include a land tax at some point which, depending on design, will essentially be paid by those living in the wealthier areas. The Liberals need to be ready to move into that space – but they won’t be able to do so if there is ambiguity over Net Zero. In time, the two parties may find a set of policies to form a coalition again – such as the elimination of tax bracket creep – but that won’t be needed for years. The Net Zero schism will likely be settled by then, one way or another. In the meantime, they can rebuild and expand their bases with more agility and clarity. A split may cause some problems at the state level, but moving apart at the national level is worth considering. On the issue of women voters, I think this really is a crisis for the Coalition. I asked an early-twenties girl I saw yesterday whether she was glad the Labor Party had won the election. She paused, thought about it, and said, ‘I’m glad the Coalition lost!’ Ouch. The complexity of the problem can best be illustrated by the strange commentary we are seeing that the Liberals need to embrace a female leader to win back women voters. I wonder if Adam Bandt and Anthony Albanese are implicitly offended by such arguments. Why are the commentators urging a female leader but not acknowledging the obvious: the most successful Labor election ever was won with a male leader and male deputy. But here is the complexity. Their intuition is correct. Albanese and Bandt are ultra-beta males. I’ve not followed Bandt much, but Albanese seems to mood-swing between instinctive severe nastiness when discussing Peter Dutton or Angus Taylor, to a quivering lip and holding back tears every time an audience claps him. This emotional turmoil doesn’t indicate he’s flush with testosterone. Women voters, particularly alpha women like the Teals, are very comfortable with beta males in leadership positions. They don’t instinctively respect them, but beta males empower women through their own organic subordination. I suspect the best way forward for the Libs is to forget trying to identify women as a project to be fixed, or to elect a leader with the aim of attracting women, and instead just focus on electing a leader who can best argue for policies that benefit everyone, men and women. Renewed focus on policy will be respected by everyone and the best way to increase the female vote. ### Nick Hossack is a public policy consultant. He is former policy director at the Australian Bankers’ Association and former adviser to Prime Minister John Howard. ### Westpac & NAB - difference has emerged on mortgage risk URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/westpac-nab-difference-has-emerged-on-mortgage-risk-copy/ Last updated: 2025-05-08T20:55:47.000Z ## In this issue: - [Westpac and NAB](#westpac-and-nab) - [Retail payments data](#retail-payments-data) - [Rises in living costs confirmed](#rises-in-living-costs-confirmed) - [Spectator Contribution](#spectator-contribution) ## Westpac and NAB The recent financial disclosures from Westpac and NAB for the period ending March 2025 have revealed significant differences in the underlying risk profiles of their mortgage portfolios. While current mortgage default rates are similar, the banks' detailed risk disclosures (known as Pillar 3 Reports) highlight conservatism in Westpac’s mortgage book relative to NAB’s. Westpac also has a considerably larger portfolio of mortgage customers than NAB — 1.497 million loans compared to NAB’s 978,826. The Pillar 3 disclosures allow segmentation of the loan books into risk bands. These risk categories are technically referred to as probability of default (PD) bands, but in the chart below they are aggregated into three broad categories: (a) Very low, (b) Medium, and (c) High risk. (If you would like the full granular breakdown of the risk bands, please contact me via email.) The data show that half of Westpac’s mortgage loan customers are essentially zero risk to the bank, meaning there is no risk of financial losses with these customers. This compares to just 42.3% of NAB’s portfolio in the same category. Given the size of Westpac’s mortgage book, this is a highly positive characteristic when assessing a potential bank investment. Not only is the risk of non-performing mortgage loans lower than NAB’s, but the lower risk profile also enables Westpac to drive greater leverage and return on equity (ROE) from this line of business. ![resimortgage_ghostimage1.png](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/resimortgage_ghostimage1.png) ## Retail payments data The Reserve Bank has released retail payments data for March 2025, which reveals a continued decline in ATM cash withdrawals, with a monthly change of -0.2%. Over the year, cheque payments fell by 18.9% and are becoming close to extinct. By 2030, cheque payments will be phased out entirely. The statistics also reinforce a long-term trend: most card transactions are undertaken using debit cards rather than credit cards. In fact, the number of debit card transactions is three times that of credit cards. With respect to ATMs, an interesting divergence has emerged between Western countries and large developing nations. Over the ten years to 2023, China, India, and Mexico increased the number of physical ATMs in their countries by at least 60% each. In contrast, Belgium reduced its ATM network by 68%, Sweden by 36%, and the Netherlands by 31%. Over the same period, the number of ATMs in Australia declined by 19%. By far, China has the largest number of ATMs, with 845,500\. See chart below: ![imagefor ghost1.png](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/imagefor-ghost1.png) ## Rises in living costs confirmed The ABS has released its estimates of changes in the cost of living for various household types. The timing of this release is notable, coming shortly after a Federal Election dominated by cost-of-living concerns. The ABS defines five main household groups based on the primary source of income. For the three months to the end of March 2025, all household types experienced a rise in living costs: - Pensioner and beneficiary households (+1.6%) - Employee households (+1.1%) - Age pension households (+1.5%) - Other government transfer households (e.g. NDIS) (+1.6%) - Self-funded retiree households (+0.6%) These are quarterly figures. To obtain a rough annual estimate, multiply the quarterly rate by four. ## Spectator contribution Yesterday the the Spectator published my Opinion Article on the Federal Election result. Here is a [link](https://www.spectator.com.au/2025/05/what-did-the-election-result-say-about-australia/?ref=benchmarkanalytics.com.au) to the article. **The full text is also reproduced here:** **WHAT DID THE ELECTION RESULT SAY ABOUT AUSTRALIA** **Nick Hossack** There was one small incident during the Voice Referendum that I never understood, and it has stayed with me. Standing in the cardboard partition to cast my vote, I inadvertently saw the choices of the women on either side of me. Both voted ‘No’. Nothing strange about that – 60 per cent of the electorate did the same. What was slightly unusual was their demographic profile. One was an Asian woman, probably in her early twenties, who had on a uni-style backpack and was fumbling around with an oversized, colourful water bottle. On the other side was a woman wearing a hijab and denim jeans. Throughout the campaign, I had assumed the vote would split along left–right lines, with young people like these voting ‘Yes’, and all the oldies on the other side. I found these two ‘No’ voters very curious. Later that night, the political right celebrated. There was relief that finally there had been some pushback against insane Wokeism. Celebrations continued for several weeks. A question we should now ask is whether the Voice result diagnosis was correct. Was the vote really reflective of an underlying deep well of anti-Wokeism – was the big dog finally stirred? Or was something else going on? Another interpretation may be that it was simply about money and handout culture. For 97 per cent of people, the Voice offered no direct benefit. Nothing. In all aspects of life, taking an action for change involves a cost-benefit calculation: will this benefit me? Normally, when it comes to political votes, political parties present a package of initiatives, some of those will benefit you and some won’t. There are costs and benefits. The Voice proposal offered no direct benefits to roughly 97 per cent of the population. So, by definition, if there was zero benefit for most people, then even the slightest perceived risk (cost) involved in voting ‘Yes’, it will lead you towards voting ‘No’. The recent Labor election slogan, ‘He cuts, you pay!’ is just saying that Dutton represents higher costs and less benefit. My guess is that this hip-pocket idea is better at explaining the decisive Voice referendum result than that of anti-Wokeism. A second point I’ve been considering post-election is something we used to talk about quite a bit when I worked as a political staffer – some decades ago now. We used to debate whether political parties, either state or federal, once consigned to opposition, should adopt one-term or two-term strategies. The one-term strategy entails presenting a set of policies sufficiently broad to have a chance of winning the very next election. The two-term strategy involves recognising that a newly elected Australian government is likely to secure at least two terms, and so you may as well build a solid platform to offer voters when they start to want change. A two-term strategy is akin to laying a concrete foundation for a house: shoring up the base and gradually pulling in new constituencies in an authentic way, through hard policy work and long-term community integration with good candidates. Dutton seems to have chosen a one-term strategy. Putting aside the matter of the campaign’s execution, it’s hard to criticise Dutton for this choice. Polls suggested it was possible. While it ultimately proved unsuccessful, the indicators pointed to it being a valid choice – including deep resentment over cost-of-living pressures that were immediate and widespread. However, as we used to debate, the cost of a one-term strategy is that if it fails, then it’s likely to put you out for three terms because the rebuilding is delayed by one year. Third: one issue barely mentioned or acknowledged by the right is the state of the labour market. We must concede that while higher prices are making a mess of disposable income, there is a lot of income out there. Albanese, in fact, has an impressive record in overseeing low unemployment – especially given the Reserve Bank has raised the cash rate by more than three percentage points since he was elected. It pains me somewhat, but of all our Prime Ministers since 1978, Australia’s unemployment rate has averaged lowest under Albo. This has provided the electorate with a level of comfort: at least workers can continue earning the money needed to pay for higher-cost goods. There appears to be little job insecurity – at least in those jobs not directly threatened by Artificial Intelligence. Bank data on mortgage defaults of households, those most impacted by RBA rate increases, suggests the much-claimed household financial ‘pain’ and ‘doing it tough’ may be overstated and not as politically potent as claimed. A fourth point – one likely to emerge soon – is whether there’s any benefit in the Coalition remaining intact this term. Why not split? Let the Liberal Party chase the Teal and inner-city seats, and let the National Party lead, unrestrained, against Net Zero insanity. The Nats could then rally the conservative base into a single force – perhaps forming some kind of alliance with One Nation and consolidating other disparate voices. This won’t happen with the Libs in their corner. Without the constraint of the Liberals, the Nats could aggressively advocate proper energy policies, including reinvestment in coal and a move towards nuclear. By freeing the Liberals from the Nats, they could position themselves to be ready when Albanese inevitably taps the people in the Teal and other wealthy suburbs to pay for his election promises and fund any further ‘reform’ agendas. Because the Teals have marketed themselves as morally pristine and obsessed with ‘fairness’, they will find it impossible to energise themselves against what we know is coming: a host of taxation policies that will hit the wealthy suburbs in one way or another. This will probably include a land tax at some point which, depending on design, will essentially be paid by those living in the wealthier areas. The Liberals need to be ready to move into that space – but they won’t be able to do so if there is ambiguity over Net Zero. In time, the two parties may find a set of policies to form a coalition again – such as the elimination of tax bracket creep – but that won’t be needed for years. The Net Zero schism will likely be settled by then, one way or another. In the meantime, they can rebuild and expand their bases with more agility and clarity. A split may cause some problems at the state level, but moving apart at the national level is worth considering. On the issue of women voters, I think this really is a crisis for the Coalition. I asked an early-twenties girl I saw yesterday whether she was glad the Labor Party had won the election. She paused, thought about it, and said, ‘I’m glad the Coalition lost!’ Ouch. The complexity of the problem can best be illustrated by the strange commentary we are seeing that the Liberals need to embrace a female leader to win back women voters. I wonder if Adam Bandt and Anthony Albanese are implicitly offended by such arguments. Why are the commentators urging a female leader but not acknowledging the obvious: the most successful Labor election ever was won with a male leader and male deputy. But here is the complexity. Their intuition is correct. Albanese and Bandt are ultra-beta males. I’ve not followed Bandt much, but Albanese seems to mood-swing between instinctive severe nastiness when discussing Peter Dutton or Angus Taylor, to a quivering lip and holding back tears every time an audience claps him. This emotional turmoil doesn’t indicate he’s flush with testosterone. Women voters, particularly alpha women like the Teals, are very comfortable with beta males in leadership positions. They don’t instinctively respect them, but beta males empower women through their own organic subordination. I suspect the best way forward for the Libs is to forget trying to identify women as a project to be fixed, or to elect a leader with the aim of attracting women, and instead just focus on electing a leader who can best argue for policies that benefit everyone, men and women. Renewed focus on policy will be respected by everyone and the best way to increase the female vote. Nick Hossack is a public policy consultant. He is former policy director at the Australian Bankers’ Association and former adviser to Prime Minister John Howard. ### Election | Analysis confirms Liberals have to address women & environment URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/twenty-most-popular-politicians/ Last updated: 2025-05-08T20:56:52.000Z While it will be weeks before the full vote is in, counted and tablulated, there is sufficient first-preference vote data available to start drawing conclusions as to what happened to the Liberals. An analysis of first-preference votes reveals the critical role independents played in hurting the conservative parties. The chart below classifies each political party as either (a) left-leaning, (b) right-leaning, or (c) independent. By grouping parties in this way and consolidating their first-preference votes, we find that left-leaning parties secured about 6.61 million votes (48.59%). The major party in this group, of course, is Labor. Right-leaning parties, with the Liberal and National parties as the main contributors, received about 5.97 million votes, or 43.92% of the overall total. Teals and other 'independent' candidates secured just over 1 million votes, accounting for 7.48% of the total. The majority of these Teal and independent voters were formerly Liberal voters. If the independents' support were to flow back to the Liberals, the right-leaning parties would secure an absolute majority of first-preference votes—comfortably over 50%. Post-election commentary suggesting the Liberals need to embrace harder-line conservative policies—such as abandoning net-zero—is not supported by first-preference vote analysis. Independents are the key to conservative success, and net-zero emissions is a well-supported policy among this group, along with female empowerment. As painful as it may be to conservatives, the analysis points to a need for more progressive policies. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/image2.png) --- ## Popularity of Barnaby Joyce (& Albanese) The chart below shows the twenty most popular politicians as assessed by their raw first preference votes. While this is only interim data, it reveals that only two Liberals make the list and both of them have relatively low profiles, Tony Pasin and Simon Kennedy. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghostimage_first-preference-votes.png) ### Employment-to-population ratio at near record high URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/workforce-participation-at-record-highs/ Last updated: 2025-05-08T20:58:13.000Z The employment-to-population ratio measures the proportion of the population aged 15 and over who are currently employed. More people working means more goods and services are being produced. This drives GDP growth and supports higher living standards. It reflects an economy making good use of its available human capital. It is also a key driver of tax revenue and largely responsible for generating two budget surpluses in the 2022 and 2023 financial years. The two charts below illustrate the current situation. The latest number as of March 2025 reveals that 64.05% of the adult working age population are in some form of paid work, only marginally down from the record high of 64.45% recorded in January this year. The second chart puts the ratio into a political context, detailing averages under each prime minister since 1978\. As can be seen, Anthony Albanese has enjoyed the highest rates of all federal leaders. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/ghost_image2-1.png) ### Productivity | the single statistic ringing alarm bells URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/productivity-the-single-statistic-ringing-alarm-bells/ Last updated: 2025-05-05T06:42:16.000Z A positive development since the emphatic Labor win at the election is the renewed discussion about the potential for productivity-enhancing economic reforms. Encouragingly, this is not being ruled out by anyone. The Treasurer has colourfully noted that the primary economic task for the first Labor Government was to tackle inflation while keeping an eye on productivity. This term, he said, the task is to tackle productivity while keeping an eye on inflation. Measuring productivity is inherently difficult because much economic activity is not market-based — that is, goods and services are provided without clear price signals to indicate demand and supply. For example, much of the health and education sectors operate with heavy taxpayer subsidies and are delivered at little or no cost to the user. Nevertheless, the most widely used and cited figure to track productivity is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per hour worked. By using the ‘hour’ as the base, this measure accounts for changes in the labour market, including the rise in part-time and flexible work arrangements. As shown in the chart below, the current index for GDP per hour worked is sitting at 99.10\. Alarmingly, this was the estimated index level in 2016\. In other words, if accurate, productivity in Australia has not increased for eight years. That’s a shocking statistic. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/gdp-per-hour_ghostimage1.png) --- ## Technical further explanation of indexing and benefits of an index for tracking GDP per hour index An **index** is a statistical construct used to track changes in a variable over time relative to a base period, which is typically assigned a value of 100\. Rather than reporting the actual level of a quantity (e.g. dollars per hour), an index shows how that quantity changes in *relative* terms — as a percentage movement from the base period. In the case of **GDP per hour worked**, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) uses an index to represent **labour productivity**. This metric shows how efficiently labour is being used to produce output in the economy. ### Why is an index appropriate for tracking GDP per hour worked over time? 1. **Adjusts for structural changes**: The absolute value of GDP per hour worked can be influenced by many structural factors (industry mix, relative prices, exchange rates). Using an index focuses on *changes* in productivity, abstracting away from level effects. 2. **Facilitates comparison**: An index allows you to compare growth rates across different time periods or countries, even if the starting levels are different or not directly comparable. 3. **Highlights trends**: By holding the base constant, the index makes it easier to identify long-run productivity trends, growth cycles, and inflection points without being distracted by the raw scale of the underlying numbers. 4. **Avoids distortion from inflation**: The ABS constructs the GDP per hour worked index in *real* terms — meaning it's adjusted for inflation — so the index reflects **real output per hour**, not just nominal increases in prices or wages. 5. **Simplifies complex aggregates**: GDP per hour worked combines national income and total hours worked. Using an index summarises this into a single, trackable figure. ### Example: If the index was 100 in the base year (say 2012–13) and is 110 in the latest year, that tells us productivity has improved by **10%** over that period — without needing to know the raw dollar value of GDP or hours worked. ### This may help explain Labor's win URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/this-may-help-explain-labors-win/ Last updated: 2025-05-07T06:26:17.000Z It is easy to get bogged down in complex explanations as to why Labor had an historic Federal election win. No doubt a contributing factor is revealed in the chart below. Since 1978, the average unemployment rate in Australia has been 6.19%. Of all our Prime Ministers, Albanese has delivered the lower average unemployment rate, 3.18%. A remarkable statistics, an average of full employment. Yes, the cost of living has gone up, but it is equally true that people have a lot of employment options to cover those higher costs. It is worth considering fundamentals and not just the daily twists and nuances of an election campaign. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Unemployment-rate-by-PM_substack-image-1.png) ### This may help explain Labor's win URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/this-may-help-explain-labors-win-2/ Last updated: 2025-05-05T01:24:22.000Z It is easy to get bogged down in complex explanations as to why Labor had an historic Federal election win. No doubt a contributing factor is revealed in the chart below. Since 1978, the average unemployment rate in Australia has been 6.19%. Of all our Prime Ministers, Albanese has delivered the lower average unemployment rate, 3.18%. A remarkable statistics, an average of full employment. Yes, the cost of living has gone up, but it is equally true that people have a lot of employment options to cover those higher costs. It is worth considering fundamentals and not just the daily twists and nuances of an election campaign. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/de/5d/de5d1f33-5b16-4880-95ff-5d52cee4cac5/content/images/2025/05/Unemployment-rate-by-PM_substack-image-1.png) ### Macquarie Bank dominating growth in owner occupied housing lending URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/macquarie-bank-dominating-growth/ Last updated: 2025-05-07T06:31:37.000Z _No content available._ ### Insurance prices up 44.1% in Adelaide under Albanese URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/insurance-prices-up-441-in-adelaide/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:26.000Z _No content available._ ### Westpac winning in business lending URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/westpac-winning-in-business-lending/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:26.000Z _No content available._ ### Double that of France - 31.5% of Australians born overseas URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/double-that-of-france-315-of-australians/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:27.000Z _No content available._ ### Inflation under Albanese well above Scott Morrison URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/inflation-under-albanese-well-above/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:27.000Z _No content available._ ### Three major banks losing market share in domestic banking market URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/three-major-banks-losing-market-share/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:27.000Z _No content available._ ### Covid deaths per week have doubled under Labor URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/average-number-of-covid-19-deaths/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:27.000Z **Notes on data:** Covid deaths recorded under Prime Minister / Health Minister. The marks are labelled by sum of Covid deaths and average of Covid deaths. The weeks used to calculate numbers: (a) for Scott Morrison / Greg Hunt, week one 2020 to week 21 2022\. Anthony Albanese / Mark Butler, weeks cover week 22 2022 to week 52 2024\. Week 53 in 2020 is excluded to equalise yearly number of weeks. The figures are only for doctor certified deaths, do not include deaths referred to the coroner. **Source:** ABS, Provisional Mortality Statistics, January 2025; Average calculation and visualisation by Benchmark Analytics, www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au ### Are we sure Albanese is the highest taxing Prime Minister? URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/are-we-sure-albanese-is-the-highest/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:32.000Z Prime Ministers and Treasurers ranked by the level of taxation gathered - expressed as percentage of GDP. Since 1959, Labor Governments have actually taxed less than Liberals _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Prime Ministers - ranked by defence spending URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/prime-ministers-ranked-by-defence/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:32.000Z Since 1959, defence spend in has averaged 2.2% of GDP. Labor governments have spent marginally more than Liberals. Harold Holt was PM during the Vietnam War, so he records the highest spend. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Australian immigration ministers - Ranked! URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/australian-immigration-ministers/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:32.000Z Since 1981, net immigration has increased 6.87 million people. The chart ranks immigration ministers on quarterly average intake. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Bank Chairman & CEO - Ranked URL: https://www.benchmarkanalytics.com.au/bank-chairman-and-ceo-ranked/ Last updated: 2025-05-03T02:26:32.000Z Over the last ten years, which Australian bank Chairman & CEOs have outperformed the market? _This post is for paying subscribers only._